ED FORiA HISTORICAL RFi/iEW PROGRAM
TITLE: Counterintelligence In Counter-Guerrilla Operations
AUTHOR: M. H. Schiattareggia
A collection of articles on the historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects o! intelligence.
All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any oihcr US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual staiemenls and interpretations.
Guerrilla mtellip/ence, toayi to awnoaf tt, and organizational roles In counter-crucrrilla
(oimhumi: IN COU.nter-<uierrii,i.
If one Is to become proflcfent In counter-guerrillane must prepare by learning everything there is to know about guerrilla operations. It follows that if one Is to become knowledgeable In the specialty of counterintelligence In counter-guerrilla operations, one must know the objectives, organizational patterns, and modus operandi of typicalIntelligence. It will be comforting to the counter-guerrilla Intelligence officer to know something also of the counterintelligence methods employed by guerrillas, to thethat theyethodical counterintelligence.
The Guerrillas' Intelligence
How do guerrilla IntelligenceEssentialoffrom those of conventional forces? For conventional forces It has long beenArmy doctrine that the division commander needs to know how many battalions of Infantry, artillery, or armor are on hisfront, how many are within reinforcing distance, and how long would It take for reinforcements to arrive Inpositions. He wants also additional order-of-battlesuch as the identities of units and commanders. He seeks answers to such questions as whether the enemy is going to attack, where, when, with how many battalions, and with what objectives, whether he willosition and In what strength, whether he will withdraw and when and
'HoU that this article la confined strictly to the counter .guerrilla aspect of the broader concept "counter Insurgency" currentlyhi ofQclal coDununlcaUons.
whither. Such EEI stem from the objective of conventionalImpose one's will on the enemy by whatever force Is necessary.
This manifestly Is not and cannot be the objective ofwarfare. Guerrillas' objectives are to harass, weaken, demoralize, disrupt; they cannot hope to win wars against massive conventional forces. Their EEI stem from these ob-
' 'voys and troo^clelacriirieiits, their Unung^and
They must know mtlmately the terrain along such routes to select good points for ambush or attack. They must know the terrain offering approaches to these points and possible routes of withdrawal from them. They have to know how the convoys and detachments are armed and protected.
Moreover, the guerrillas must know in detail the complete layout of installations like fortified villages, supply dumps, and command posts which they are going to attack, theirstructures and the strength, tactical practices, andof the guards, what booty the installations offer, andand withdrawal routes from them. They needknowledge of rail lines and roads and of bridges and other critical points on them suitable for sabotage or attack from ambush. Their main concern with the kind ofneeded by conventional forces Is for defensive purposes: they seek Information on movements of major enemy forces to be forewarned of encirclements or sweeps of their base or bivouac areas.
What are the sources for these kinds of information and what sort of Intelligence organization Is formed to procure it? In their early formative periods, at least, most guerrilla bands of the past have had no formal Intelligence organization; many of their leaders have not had the sophistication even toonscious concept of intelligence. The Pathan tribesmen on the Northwest Frontier of old India, whose main sport and livelihood has for centuries been the ambushing of caravans In mountain passes and who make guerrilla-typeon their neighbors In the conduct of blood feuds, might be called natural experts at guerrilla warfare. Theydon't sit down In council to organize Intelligenceforces or process collected information; but you can
ribesman skulking high up on aby natural coloration and his clothes,routes below for great distances and then, bysignals, passing the word to his fellows that It Is timeinto position for attack. Despite Jomo Kenystta'sIn London and Moscow and the sophistication ofKlkuyu leaders In the Mau Mau guerrilla actions, one flnaa^ttie^^thenf, acquiring'
but you do And reference to the advantage the
"gangster" enjoyed in knowing the area better and his "added advantage of good observation points both on the forest fringe and on the moorland areas.H
Regardless of Its lack of formal organization, every guerrilla force of any size which enjoys any successeady-made intelligence collectionpeople on the ground. If tbe guerrilla movement ln fact springs from these people, if itopular wave of feeling against theor occupying power, the people on thepeasant or coolie farmer, the laborer, much of whateverclasses therefeed Information to the guerrillas spontaneously. As the guerrilla leader becomes experienced, he will Improve on this spontaneous flow by teaching theaccuracy In their reporting and by Instructing the most Intelligent, trustworthy, and courageous of them ln what he particularly needs to know and In how to make observations and report them. He will also augment It with trained patrols and with clandestine agents, the latter particularly forHe will work to Improve the speed, accuracy, and security of tbe communications by which this Information gets to him, whether by runners, signals, or electronic means.
In Communist practices, particularly. If not all the people ln the area fully support the guerrilla effort, those who do not will be harassed by pressures and If necessary by terrorist methods, and at tbe same tune Indoctrination teams willpersuasion on the populace. Ultimately, as thegrows, the Communist guerrillas will develop rather
Major P. M. euuu. U. C. The Royal Innlakllllns Puslllers, -TecIleal Problems larmy Quarterly, VOL SO (OctoberM.
sophisticated Intelligence requirements, organization, andInteUlgence documents captured by the French from the Ho Chi Mlnh forces before4 Genevato divide Viet Nam Included remarkably accurate order-of-battle studies on the French units and other situationsummaries, and estimatesighhe guerrillas' primary source of Intelligence Is then the
effort may be anythingrimitive, Instinctive activity In the casual hand of the leader to fully organized workrue Intelligence staff section at the main base or redoubt. Collection facilities can run the gamut from the spontaneous reporting of haphazard Informationystem of patrols,posts, surveillance teams, sentries, clandestinepenetration agents, prisoner interrogations, andintelligence. Communist-directed guerrillas will tendthe sophisticated, the more so the longer they operate successfully.*
This, then, Is the intelligence target, the problemthe counterintelligence organization of any counter-guerrilla force. How does that organization go about Its task of stopping, disrupting, manipulating, or negating theoperations of the guerrillas?
Keeping the Fish from their Sea
Certainly it appears from this analysis that the greatest single problem Is that of stopping the flow of Information from the people on the ground to the guerrillas. Therehoice of two approaches to this problem. The first Is to move the people from the guerrillathe peasant or coolie farmers, but also all the population of smallrelocation centers where they have neither access to Infor-
*8eeanham, Doctrine end Tactics of Revolutionary Warfare: The Vtet Mlnh tn Indochina, Rand
surrey of source materials on guerrUla intelligence Is Included as aa appendix to this paper.
"Some current areas of confusion In delimiting the task of counter-Intelligence with respect to that of poslUve intelligence and that of counter-Insurgent acUon are discussedote appended to this paper.
mjtUori nor contact with the guerrillas. The second is aapplication of normal poiice/counterintelllgenceand identifying the people that supplyto guerrillas, their guerrilla contacts, and their couriers, courier routes, letter drops, or other means ofand then taking either the defensive steps ofInterrogating, and imprisoning these people or the offensive one of turrur^ themarquj^
t!ons?*Outunlng Ih&elthoices Is easy enough, but it must be obvious that carrying either one out Is an absolutelyJob.
Tkt Conduct ol AnH-TerrorlMt Operation* tn Malaya, official mtniul of the Brtusn. (later Malayan) force* Ord edition. IvU, cluilfica-Uonhapter m,ain Talks of the SecurityndiTha Brlagihla la beyond question the best counler<serrltla opcraUOne manual extant It Is argued by some students of cow that the peculiar conditions existing InChinese "minority" (almost aa numerous as the Malayans) being the element supporting tatather than the whole population, aad tbe orgaxuZaUon of civil government, police forces, and military forces being so uniquelyIt not valid for appUcaUon elsewhere; but It distills from many years ofreat amount of practical guidance on modus operandi which Is clearly applicable any plaos In the world where guerrilla movement* might develop.
The relocation method is not an innovation; It has been* demonstrated that lt can be effective. The Russians, forhave proved the harsh effectiveness of massof population ln tbe Baltic states and elsewhere. In Malaya tbe British-Malayan Security Forces can-led out more humane and limited relocation operations, combining these with other forms of action to cut off the Communist Terrorists from contacts with the people, not only forpurposes but to prevent their getting from them food, supplies, and other kinds ofhe French undertook rather massive relocation efforts In Algeria, where whole new towns, with schools, medical facilities, shops, water supplies, and all requirements for living were created, administered, and guarded by the French Army. At present relocationare being carried out In South Viet Nam along the Laotian border.
There will undoubtedly continue to be situations whenIs an essential step in counter-guerrilla action. Some of Its aspects are completely outside the competence ofconstruction of housing for the people, the provision of food and water, sanitation andcare, and schools, the mounting of indoctrinationto change the loyalties of the people, the stationing of
forces. Other aspects, however, areresponsibilities.
First is the painstaking process of checking the bona fides of the people moved to the relocation site, determining that they are not guerrilla espionage agents, active members of the Communist Party, or working for any other subversiveThisequirement basic to allrecords. The vetting and name tracing taskery large one. To approach It practically, one must begin with personnel who have been given anyposition or responsibility, with especial emphasis on the center's securitypolice and self-defense forces, then the clvU officials. When these have been vetted, the Job of checking the population at large can be attacked.
Counterintelligence personnel must draft or be consulted In the drafting of plans for control of theIdentity cards, travel permits and controls, curfew,or block registration and control systems, the selection and training of personnel for these, etc. The development of an Informant net is an essential step In counterintelligence control; It forms part of what Eric Lambert. British MI-dassistance staff officer, speaking from the BritishIn Malaya and Kenya Colony, calls the "policenet at the village level" Together, the blocksystem and the Informant network form one of the most effective means of defensive counterintelligence, detecting the presence of subversive or espionage agents and Identifying them and their contacts
In the alternative method used to shut off contact between the guerrillas and the people In the area, thetask Is probably even more difficult than In relocation. This was the method used by the Filipinos In the Coram unlst-
controlled area, known aaorked.Valeriano, the offlcer of the Philippine Armyprimarily responsible for developing the "BattalionTeam" and "Hunter-Killer Team" techniques employedin destroying the Hukbalahapa on Luzon,elements of the counterintelligence aspect of theIn this way:
Four teams <combined MISompany) with radio setsconsisting of six to eight men. with tbe rankingcharge Later six mora teams of th* same composition Assigned relations wen varied, but eaacnttallr the teams.
were required to penetrate the ruspect area aecreUy and report all observations on the Inhabitants by radio Contact frequency tu once every other hour on theouse In the town of Pandl andamily to occupy the house as cover for MIShe UUUr group was assigned to effect surveillance on the municipal executive and tbe town chief of police, alresdy held suspect.
Becaoa* of the temporary suspension of the writ of habeas corpus In Hukian.1t>t was possible for the ?tb BCT to detain suspects indefinitely. On tha theory that the populace are subjected to deep-cure redt was recommended' that several Individuals be "snatched" and brought to 1th BCT HQ for interrogation, hoping that these Individuals, after being convinced of the proteeUve motives of the government under sklUful handling, will bt made to tell the truth about Pandl. Tha recommendation* were approved and appropriate orders were Issued.
The teams were able to snatch do lea* thanndividual* from different point* of the area without being detected by theSuspicions grew more about hidden power of the Buxa Us Pandl, aa In no tingle case did the mayor or th* chief of poUc* report the disappearance* to the PC or to th* 7th BCT.
With good treatment and frequent appeal* to th* detainees (the Secretary of National Defense participating) [ed. note: Thla was Br. Magaayaay, later FTaaldent of th*o cooperate with the government and promise* of monetary rewards, tha knowledgeable eventually cam* up with startling Information. However, all detainee* agreed on their fear of Hnk reprisals. AllegaUons from detainee affiant* were radioed back to field teams covering Pandl for verification or conflrmaUoo. Thee* Informa-were carefully classified and analysed and compared with
peat intelligence flies as (at backut of this painstakingas able to establish the following Intelligence pattern:
encil was important to the Buk organlzaUons In Luzon due to Its pro-dmlty to the city of Manila, the center of under, ground apparatus of the Communist Party of the country.
herefore, lt was important that Pandl should not catch the attention of the AFP or PC; so as not to be garrisoned by the AFP or PC. the area must bequiet" seele* prohibiting the staging-of raids.'ambuacadeiT'or"*ny Huk activity that win draw troops.
<S) It was commonly known ln the are* that Huk troop concentrations are prohibited In the area. The area,atter of fact. Is supposed to be avoided by traveling units. Foraging wTD be done through supply agents specificallyby the municipal mayor. Direct approach to bouses or Inhabitants Is punishable by death.
Huk wounded or fugitives desirous to seek shelter In Pandl must first get proper permission from their superiors, who ln turn will make proper arrangements with Pandlties.
uk couriers traveling to or from Manila receive brief, tngi from Pandl Huk Intelligence officers on current situations of their destinations, are given pass words, and exercised on new countersigns.
Pandl Inhabitants that had been Judged "reactionary" or recalcitrants are not disciplined within the municipal area, but are by long practice secretly kidnapped and killed outside of Pandl. Several instances were cited where the mayor and the police chkf conspired in the xldnep-murder of individuals that were ordered punished by the Huk high command.
During the past years, several PC garrisons were off and on maintained In Pandl that because of their small size and poor security could easily have been wiped out by local Huks These garrisons were left unmolested to mislead government intelligence appraisals on tha area.
Names of Individuals were submitted as active Huk agents ln Pandl. starting off with the mayor's name,rich and prosperous businessmen, etc
With several sworn statements, each statement corroborating with others, criminal actions were Instituted against all Individuals cited or Involved.
The liquidation of the Pandl sanctuary broke the Huk secret refuge area near Manila, whicharge way hamstrung their clandestine activities In the city and their liaison and control
line* *lth their active field unlU In Certtrml Luzon. Travel for Huk couriers indo end from Manila became more difficult
This kind of counterintelligence effort resembles In many respects the criminal investigation methods employed by the police against powerful criminal ganga who have the support of large numbers of people, and for thla reason and others the police arc likely ln most countries to be the.mostgency for carrying it out.ethoci caUi ror*injormanui ln every village, surveillance personnel, patrols disguised as guerrillas, combat squads with great mobility and advanced communications capable of reacting at once to flash reports, skillful Interrogators, extensive records carefully built up and' cross Indexed, and counterintelligence analysts to study the guerrilla intelligence organization, define Its modus operandi, and Identify Its personalities.
Other CovntennleUigcr.ee Tasks
Aside from Its major special problem deriving from support of the guerrillas by people on the ground, counterintelligence has tasks In counUr-gueirllla action relating directly to the guerrilla forces and their organic Intelligence capabilities which manifest the usual twin aspects, defensive and
Among the defensive aspects Is first the normal Job ofthe security of the police or military forces engaged In the counter-guerrilla operations. Counterintelligence per-sonne] must conduct training, or must prepare training plans and material and train Instructors, to indoctrinate the forces in problems of security. The Importance of thisis highlighted In the Malaya manual referred to above. Its chapter XIV. sectionMilitary Security and Counterakes the following observations:
As the MCP (Malayan CommunUt Party] does not possess the normal organlaaUonirst class enemy. It must exploit every resource of mtelbgeuce lo redress the balance of Inferior force Thus, In addlUon to the direct screen of the Mln Yuen, the MCP hasetwork of agents and Informants throughout
the FederaUon whose ttat Is lo gsther Information sad pass It quietly lo Um CT (ComaiunUl TerrortaU).
ntxb) sUBs [counterintelligence sua sections In mill. Ury headquertersl are responsible for the applicationPrevenUve measures to deny the CT all opportunity ol gaining knowledge of our InUnOons.
(bl DeUcUve measures concerned wiuj the InvesUgaUon of
MlllUryU clear evidence that:(a) Many successful ambushes against SF (Security rorces)
have been the direct result of lack of security, lb) CT movement out of an area due to be the scene of
Impending operations has taken place because of bad
particularly careless Ulk.
In operational areas contractors and their employees, who are all vulnerable to CT pressure, quickly become aware of ration strengths, the unit* engaged, the names and pcrtonallUt* of senior officers and, unless great care Is exercised la ordering rations, can forecast with some accuracy future unit change* of location*.
Security I* many sided and the CT do not rely on on* source only for IntormeUon. All ranks arc prone to careless Ulk, usually through vanity, though Uaacnesa or Ignorance. To counUr In. numerable in*Unee* of Insecurity of material, loose methods offeguarding secret papers. Inefficient giiards. unaulhorUed entry to WD premises and other breaches of security there Is only one remedy: proper security training. Tbe supervision of this training Is the task of the Unit Security Officer, assisted bynt) (b) tUff, and the security agencies, to ensure thai all ranks become security minded.
is unfortunately only too true of the OtlnlXb) staff and security, as lt Is with the police and crime, that most of IU time to taken up In tbe InvestlgaUoo of breaches of security that have already occurred.
The Of hit. (b) staff set* up certain standingystem of passes and permits, and arranges with the help of Special Branch for thorough retting and verification of all em.ut these merely limit the problem. They may make It difficult for an informer or agent to gain access lo military esUb-lUhmenu or. having got lo, to be able to do much barm, but
they cannot exclude the agent or nullify tbe work of those already Inside.
The object ol standingrocess of elimination, to throw Into relief Incidents or persons that seem to beand to make them the subject of Investigation
Properly trained, security minded personnel will not onlyInformation from getting to the CT but. In adhering to standing security controls, srUl^ba^quicker tavobaerrfr any
plclous departurea from them and assist the countertnlelUgence effort.
Since the foregoing; Is the only section In this manualto the subject of counterintelligence. Its writers evl-dently consideredurely defensiveThis would In all probability not have been the case if either the Special Branch of the Malayan cid or MI-opeople had written it The offensiveoperations which can be employed againstInclude penetrations, provocations, double agents, and defections inof the classic devices ofOf these, the most effective is undoubtedlyEven Communist guerrilla forces, who are probably more security-minded than most others, are always under pressure to build up their strength; they always are looking for additional men. It It extremely difficult for guerrillas, with their requirement for the highest degree of mobility, to build up counterintelligence records and maintain them, and they are therefore hampered In making the normal security check on new recruits who show up or are brought In by old members.
Penetrations were used by both the Abwebr and the Gestapo of the Nasi forces In Europe during Worldith varying degrees of success, depending In part on the country where they were employed. Their success was especially great In France against the "Freer OaulUst resistance forces, which were colossally lacking in security consciousness, but also against the compartmented sabotage groups organ-
and led by the much better trained and security conscious officers of the British SOB.*
One corps of penetration agents introduced Into the BOB and other groupsledrenchman, thought to hare been an AlsaUan, known by the code nam. of -arand Clement- Recruited Into an early SOB group Ine was recognized to have oVeliUet of leadership and so was flown to England tor training and bmugh. back as an officer la tbe group. Not long afterward Nazi countor. Intelligence forces arrestedembers of the group Grand
to turn was soon roUed up. and Grand Clement "escaped" again. After this suspicious recurrence it was Impossible for him to operate ^rsonahy againenctrator. but he setraining school tor the Oermans In which hehole corps of penetration Menu alarge number ot whom were wcccLul in ,etUng
After the liberation of Paris, the present writer, then aofficer in the joint DS,Br1Ush.Frenchwith officers of the BOB Security SecUon to trytoTtoand apprehend Orand Clement, but he was ne/er foundneter even determined whether he hadermanthe time of bis Art recruitment intotrue aoentwas recruited by the Oermans later. Two otherwho hadattern much like that ot Grandwere arrested in Perls after the
fair trial, and shot. They had been recruited Into an SOB sabotage group operating near the Swiss border and had shorn, such .bmty that they were flown to England for training and returned to toe group as lieutenant and radio operator respeeUvely. Dunn* tha several months thereafter before the area wasSr rolledumber of neighboring group, which. In vlolztlon of
f"mmunity tod to an Investigation
he two men
established that they had been agent*ut It could not be detonruned whether they were trainees of Orand CKment"M. Begoum, "Observations on the Doubletudies VI l.
The classical double agent operation would presumablyin counterintelligence activity against guerrillas all the hazards and problems so well describedecent article in the Studies*istinct form of double agent operation seems to have worked very well In counter-guerrilla action in
ried out by Inspector Lin Henderson when he turned the captured Mau Mau around and sent them out to track down theirhe preconditions for these operations seem to have been the primitive minds of the targets, subject to Intense superstitions, loyalties which appear strange Indeed to the occidental white man, and an operations officer who knew these characteristics and the people so well that he
cnisp whuti inrewndi! ions
"are not generally to be round, to be sure, but therearge part of one whole black continent, ripe today for Communist exploitation, where they may obtain, and such operations may be desirable among other tribes than tbe Klkuyu. How many. Hendersons do we have?
UHitary or Civilian ComnlennJelligence?
What agency should undertake the counterintelligencefor the counter-guerrilla forces? Every country has some kind of police force, as well as Its military forces. In some state of being: and It cannot be doubted that In most countries the police, whatever their type or organization, will be closer to the people, will know local conditions, will more easily be able to organize, normally In fact will already have organized.nets, and will therefore prove more efficacious In the collection of counterintelligence Information for this type of warfare than agencies of the armed forces would.
'See Ian Henderson with Philip Qoodhart, The Root for EOmathl"
(London.eviewed tn Stalks Hi.peech before the |olnt Military Reserve anils of CIA. Colonel
Blelajac Isivilian official In tbe oQea of tbe CS Army's
Special Warfare Directorate.
The opinion that police will always be superior to armed force* ln counter-Insurgency operations was recentlyby Slavko n. BJclaJac. chief of staff to General Mlhal-lovic In Yugoslavia during World War EL'* 'They canIntelligence better than the armed forces, be said,they get It from tbe people everywhere; tbe armed forces cannot get intelltgence from the front because there Is no front. He referred to tbe experience In Malaya, where tbe police were always kept on top In tbe operations, and tbe
a .v. cgw
army supported them with strikes against concentrations of the rebelsoncentration could be located. He pointed out the greater flexibility and mobUity the police have for to-stant blows or counterblows against guerrillas and theirbetter cornmunlcatlons for such actions. There is much of interest along this line in the Malaya
Tht responsibility foe conducting tne campaign u, Malaya rests' with the Civil OOTenunent. The Policehe Government* normal instrument for the mainUnance of Civil Authority but to the current Emergency, the Armed Forces have been called to lo support the CM1 Power to lis task of seeking out and destroy, tog armed Communist terrorism, tnome Ouard ha, been formed.
The main elements of the operational plan for Malaya which had been developedeneral Brlggs, are discussed as follows:
he Brigga Plan, which came Into effect on 1st June isso aimed at bringing proper adminlstraUve controlopulation which had never been controlled before. The mala aspects of the Plan
The rapid rcsetUement of squatters under the surveillance of Police and auxiliary police.
le> The recruitment and training of CTO and Special Branch Police personnel.
(d) The Army toinimum framework of troops throughout the country to support the Police, and at the same time tooncentration of forces for the clearing of priority
<e> The Police and Army to operate to complete accord. Toto this. Joint Police/Army operations! control is established at all levels and therelose integration of Police and Military Intelligence.
The chain of command established by the Brlggs Planthat "there was always complete Integrationnd that the Security Forces "have always been acting in support of the Civil Power."
O in CGW
The final paragraph on this plan la worth repeating here, for It states objectives which appear likely to be valid In every counter-insurgency situation in which the United States may participate:
The Plan erashorough but long term proposlUon and It would bec to look for speedy and decisive results. Itogical clearing of the country from South to North, leavingtrong police forehand eivU administration oncec'r Btate rsad^be^EeclearedT1 It also aimed to' isolate'the MRW [tbe Malayan Races liberation Army, or Communist guer-rlUa force) from the rest of the rural population, thus enabling the latter to feel safe to come forward with information, whilst at the same time depriving the MRU of their raeans of support and so forcing them Into the open where they could better be-dealt with by the ST.
The roles of police and military forces as describedIn Chapter tTJ are worth studyodel of the Ideal organization wherever counter-Insurgency or counter-guerrilla operations have to be carried out. The philosophy on which these roles were based Is summed up In the second paragraph of the chapter (XXV) on "Intelligence":
Since there Is no state of war In Malaya, the basic responsibility foe maintaining law and order is mil that of the Police. In th* same way the responsibility for producing Intelligence atill rest* with the Special Branch of the Police. In view of th* size and Importance of the problem,pecial intelligencehas been built up.
What the size of the problem required was Joint Intelligence operations centers manned by Special Branch and militarypersonnel. One aspect of their division of labor Is particularly interesting: "All members of the public who have Information to give should be passed on to the Police, who alone will handle agents and Informers. On no account will military units run their own agents or Informers."
The situation In Malaya, of course, with Its almost ideally developed security forces organization. Is one which United States forces will rarely If ever findountry they areto assistounter-guerrilla effort. It might be well, however, to hold up this kind of organization as the goalwhich to work, not only because tbe police can normally be expected toar better Intelligence and countertntelll-
grr.ce job than the local military forces, but also because when the emergency situation Is over the Americans will have left behind the foundationsetter governmental andsecurity structure.
Itnlikelyorces will themselves ever be doing the counter-guerrilla Job In any country; their rote will be to assist local forces to do it competently. Andbereegi^noemergency situation will have been declared, perhaps martial taw. but no true belligerent situation as recognized Inlaw. Under these circumstances It would beIn pursuit of Che long-range goal ofoundcivil government responsive to the wishes of the governed, to keep the civil authority in control at all tiroes.
There should certainly, In any case, be no contendingdifferent elements of the US contingent sent totho indigenous forces as to whether the police and civil forces or the military should have primary responsibility for the conduct of the operation. This question should be settledatter of national policy before any US. elements are engaged, and It should be settled In the way which will lead most surelyound, strong, democratic government when the operation Is finished.
APPENDIX: Survey ol Sources on Guerrilla Intelligence Ituzzling anomaly that one of the poorest sources of Information concerning the Intelligence methods developed and used by guerrillas Is the writings of the great and alleged great guerrilla leaders, Mao Tse-tung'shimanual on the organization, training, equipment, and tactics of guerrilla forces, makes only one expliciteveneed for Information about the enemy; at paget assigns the "anti-Japanese self-defensemong other responsibilities, that of "securing information of thentelligence, not to mention counterintelligence, Is otherwise completely Ignored.
' On Guerrilla Warfare. TTaoslaUoo sod lctroducUon byamuel B. Ortfflth. CSMC. Ret (Frederic* A. Fraeger. mil.
Ernesto "Che" Ouevara. newly touteduerrilladoes include In his recentection on Intelligence, as follows:
"Know jouti'ir and tout enemy and you will be able loundredothing helps lhe combat (otcea more than accurate Intelligence. But be lure to sort tact from fiction As soon as post offices and maU deliveries can be set up within the guerrilla tone, try to gel intelligence about the enemy. Use womenloylnfllirate the'w trainedvnESfand womea to spread rumors and sow confusion and fear among the enemy.
This paragraph, with Its remarkable Instruction on theof Intelligence communications. Is the amazing totality of what Guevara has to say on the subject of positiveIn the field of counterintelligence, however, hehad some afterthoughts. In Appendixagese writes:
Almost all recent popular movements hava suffered frompreparation. FTcquenUy, the secret service of the governing rulers learns about planned conspiracies. Absolute secrecy Is cruelal. Tbe human material must be chosen with care. At times, this selecUoo la saay; at other*.difficult. One has to make do with those who areand volunteers eager to join In the fight for liberation. There Is no adequate LnvestlgaUve apparatus. Yeto exeus* for Intelligence reaching the enemy, even If the guerrilla organisation has been Infiltrated by spies, for do more than on* or two persons should be familiar with preparatory plans. Keep new volunteers away from key place*.
Absolutely nobody must learn anything beyond hisNever discuss plans with anyone. Check incomingmail. Know what contact* each member baa.Uv* In teams, never Individually. Trust no on* beyondespecially not women. The enemy will undoubtedlyuse women for espionage. The revoluttcauury secreUywar must be an asccUc and perfecUy disciplined. Anyonedefies the orders of hi* superiors and makeswomen and other outsiders, however Innocuous, mustImmediately for violaUoo of revolutionaryOf course, thereo reason why you cannotucleus
of SCO men. but these SCO moot be split up. because (a) soroup Is bound to attract attenoon, and lb) In case of betrayal, the entire force could be liquidated.
mTranslaUon by Major Harris. Cllchy Peterson. USMCR (Frederick A. Praeger..
The location of headquarter* may be revealed to moat of the group and eerre aa the meeting place for the volunteen, but the leaden of the conspiracy ahould appear there only rarely and no compromising documents are to be kept there. The leaden should stay ln dispersed, secret hiding places. Locations ofshould not be known to more than one or two persons. Arms are not to be distributed until the operation is ready to start, to as not to endanger those Involved and to avoid possible loss of costly equipment.
Nguyen Clap, has written extensively about guerrillaHis essays, collectedook published'a monotonous reiteration of the theme of closebetween the people and the Cornmunlat armed forces withhistorical treatises on the liberation of North Viet Nam. There Is much repetitive material on the manner ln which guerrillas developed and were organized and some discussion of guerrilla tactics, but nothing whatever on the part played by Intelligence.
General Vo's forces, however, as they have developedonventional army, have not so neglected their Intelligence needs. The foUowing passage from one of their trainingbegins to reflect the military intelligence interests of conventional forces but applies also to guerrilla operations:
Individuals selected for service as Intelligence agents must be acUve. courageous, perspicacious, realistic and calm In the face of danger.
Intelligence targets: Before mounting any attack, you must learn exacUy the number of enemy troops and their armament, as our own forces must be at least equal Learn all you can about tbe commander of tho enemy troops. Ton should also study the morale of the enemy soldiers, the location of their strong points, such as blockhouse* and heavy weapons emplacements, and how many men there areectionompany: IdenUfy enemy units by number or name. Find out the equipment of each unit, the firepower of which it is capable and the political and military training received by the enemy troops.
S. The direct and Indirect methods of obtaining intelligence: The direct method Is to use your own personnel and to tend them out as agents. When you send agents Into villages or cities, they
Vo Nguyen Olap, Ptoplfi War, Peopled Army (Foreign Language* publishing House, Hanoi. iwi>.
mustover nich aa thatishermanoolie. When you tend your agent* Into thepecial cover is not needed, but your men must be able to hide In the forest and must take care to stay away from well-known places, such as water holes or springs, where the enemy will be alert for them. Agents ln the countryside must be careful to leave no trails or other traces of their presence.
The Indirect method is to recruit your agents from among the populace. You should study the
former nets. You should choose your agents from the groups thus studied, train them, and put them to work. Tell each one that he must submit reports at fixed Intervals, and arrange for them to contact your own menystem of signals.
ntelligence reporting'. Ineport from your agents on an enemy base, be sure that the following points are covered:
a. The location of the base and the name of theThe positions of machine guns, blockhouses, trenches and
other strong or weak places In the base.
e. The relationship between the enemy soldiers and theat thatCommunication faculties. Do they have radios or tele-
e. The best routes of approach to or retreat from the base.
Other sections of the Viet Minh document also containIn intelligence aspects of operations:
Before mounting an ambush operaUon. you must thoroughly study your agents' reports on tbe situation among the people In the area. Especially study the routes by which and the hours at which enemy troops move through the area. Bow large are these enemy forces; how fast do they move; what weapons do they carry? Do they have machine guns? In obtaining thisIt Is essential that the enemy be unaware of our Interest. Only the commander and bis agents should know that these things are being studied.
The discussion of ambushes which follows Includes many Items of Intelligence Import and puts emphasis on the effect ofon plana and tactics. The same Is true of theentitled "Balds on EnemyGeneral Operatingnd "Establishing Yourn the last named, an Indication is givenomewhat more sophisticatedof the problem of communication withsources than that displayed by Sr. Ouevara:r-
ganlse youx mtelllgence nets In the area, especiallycommunications between your agents and yourself."concludesealistically grim note:and senior officers must study Judo and all methodscombat to assist them In avoidingmust plan to take the most extreme measures toIf capture seems Inevitable, they should plan to
to nonffcm^urMt iources'^we^f^
of good books written by officers who had experience hioperations during Worldrom these some kernels of wisdom can be extracted with effort, but they suffer as analytical or training texts because they were notfor such purposes, being presented simply as exciting yarns for public consumption.
One of the few bookseliberate attempt to bring together historical examples of guerrilla activities and tofrom them sound principlesairly recent oneritish source. Guerilla Warfare, by C. N. M. Blair, anf this book, "Summary of Guerillaconsolidates the principles distilledenturyalf of history. Its section on Intelligence begins on;
Not only to give timely Information of enemy aeUvltybut also for the success of their own operation*eaemy, on* of the first csaenUals for any guerilla fore* Uan efficient intelligence system. DnUl th*developedarge and widespread guerillamain need will be tacUcal Intelligence on *uchoncentration* and Intentions,of enemy attempts tothe guerillas' own organlsaUon. To satisfy the**guerillas must hava their own tactical Intaulganc*the occupyingwin also hav* to relyth* local populace, who In turn willo penetratesecurity service* to obtain the necessaryIf the enemy are unabl* to obtain mtelUgenea about
the guerlUaa through UM Vocal population, they ar* themselves very greatly handicapped In their counter-cesistau&c* acHrlUea. ft la, therefore, extremely Important that the local population are
'Published by British Ministry of Defence (London.lassified British Restricted (Ufl. Confidential).
to utlie sympathy with the guerillas, andnteresting to note that In everycampaign reviewed In this book this local support has been forthcoming.
Later, aa tbe guerilla force expends. It will require strategicnot only for Its operations and own security but also as as basis for Internal propaganda. This type of Information may be provided through national guerilla or clandestine sources las happened ln the case of the Jugoslavs recelTlng jdeUfls^pt'tSSV plans for.,theourth Offensive) but is morrhxely to ^bavTto com* through Allied channels.
Comm antra Hons and
One of the difficulties In the past baa been to disseminate this Intelligence, whoa received, for coenmankaOons within gnerUIa forces have always been elementary and slow, and as late aaod of World Was II sUU robedery great extent oo couriers and
It seems noteworthy that even this more sophisticatedto identify principles does not reach to concreteon subjects like means of collecting Information (except to stress reliance on theeans ofcollected Information to guerrilla headquarters orsections, and the system for Intelligence processing within the headquarters.
Brig. General Samuel B. Griffith, In his Introduction to tha translation of Mao Tse-tung, covers the subject somewhat more completely, both for positive Intelligence and for
Where is the enemy? In what strength? What does he propose to do? What Is the state of his equipment, his supply, his morale? Are hli leaders intelligent, bold, and Imaginative, or stupid and Impetuous? Are bis troops tough, efficient, and well discipimed, or poorly trained and soft? Guerrilla* expect the members of their intelligence service to provide the answers to these and doxens more detailed questions.
Ouerrllla Intelligence nets are tightly organised and pervasive.uerrilla ares, every person without exception must beanmen and women, boys driving ox carta, glib tending goats, farm laborers, storekeepers, school teachers,oatmen, scavengers. Tbe local cadres "put tha heat" onwithout regard to age or sex. to produce all conceivable in-formaUon. And produce lt they do.
orollary, guerrillas deny al! information of themselves to their enemy, who Is enveloped ln an Impenetrable fog. Total In-
ability to get Informationonstant complaint of th. M. Uter of the Japanese In China and of the FxSh to rJS?
ifem"aeunsuc feSre of^ guerrilla wars. The enemyahledJZ (be darkness around him thousand, of unseen Jye^nterK
.vdiatlon. guerrillas always engage under conditions of their own choosing; because of lupcriot knowledge of terrain, they are able to use lt to their advantage and the enemy's
Within OS. Oovernraent agencies there have been recent attempts to buildody of doctrine on guerrilla forces,their Intelligence. In an2 draft entitled "An Approach to Counter guerrilla Warfare" (Confidential)al. Army Intelligence Center, Port Holablrd, Maryland, Is this brief treatment;
A second requirement for successful guerrilla operations isKnowledge of the enemy it the key to guerrilla success. Th* guerrilla leader cannot lake the enemy by surprise unless he knows where the enemy Is lo beiven time and ln what atrength. In addlUonivilian clandestineuerrilla organlsaUon mustmall group of men trained Inreconnaissance who can move to enemy territory, collect the required Information, and return safely to report.
The Department of the Army Field, "Quer-rtlla Warfare and Special Forces Operations"s authoritative with respect to the Intelligence needs of. Army Special Forces, the units designed to create guerrillas. It covers the EEIpecial Force team before It is launched into an area to organize guerrillas and alsoood list of EEI within the guerrilla area after arrival of the team. The reader Is referred to ChapterTheaterSection Ii.ndnd Development of the Areaection IV,in Guerrilla Warfare Operationalhe manual falls far short, however, with respect to Instruction ln the organization of collection means and in the modus operandi, organization, and operation of intelligencefacilities at guerrilla bases or headquarters. It also dls-
tlngulshes poorly between positive and counterintelligence matter*.
The most complete and probably the soundest analysis of guerrilla warfare in general and Its intelligence andaspects In particular which the writer has been able to And is the Guide to Ouerrilla Warfare published by the Operations School of CIA's Office ot Training under date of 'ffa'Sli.lflepterhbet IBMgnort^uira-
graph atn the "Role ofomprehensive and detailed discussion of Intelligence matters Is contained Inection beginning on pageovering "General"OperationalespeciallySources of Information Which Supplement Physicalpersonnel, friendly and neutral persons In the area, enemy documents, enemy materiel, maps, weather forecasts, enemy radio broadcasts, and aerialand finallyhole chapter beginning on page i9 Is devoted to the subject ofhe first twoalf pages of which are really concerned with the defensive aspects of counterintelligence.
NOTE: The Counterintelligence Function and Its limitations One area of semantic confusion with possible practicalderives from the definition ot counterintelligence which, approved officially by the National Security Council and Incorporated Into NSCTD ft, makes It include count* rsubver-slon as well as counterespionage and countersabotage. Many people In recent tiroes, including Journalist* and even high government officials, have referred to guerrilla warfare as the equivalent of subversion. It would be unfortunate If It should therefore be concluded that counterintelligence personnel have the sole or even the major role In counter-guerrillaan Instant's reflection should make clear how much this is beyond their capabilities.
On the other hand. Itarticularly hard hi counter-guerrilla operations to distinguish between what Is properly positive Intelligence and what Is counterintelligence.. Army officer writing about counter-guerrilla operations
in Southaving eraphaalxed as Items of posturethe need for complete order-of-batUe Information on each unit, to Include each member of each unit, continued:
Personality flies should Include all local eonnecUona;other can persuade her son to surrender,ue trills leader can be captured while rlslUnf his wife or |trl friend capture guerrilla leader.|3
This statement typifies the loose thinking In regard toand counterintelligence which pervades moatabout counter-guerrilla warfare.emantics standpoint the order-of-bat tie information, which Inwarfare would be posiUve Intelligence, must withto guerrilla acUvlty. If that Is the same as subversion be counterintelligence But this sophistry aside, the task ofother toon to surrender, or of seizing communlcaUons equipment, or of gettinguerrilla leader through his girl friend, is not positive intelligence butthat requires professional counterintelligence know-how.
The point to be emphasized Is that, while it is manifestly Impossible for counterintelligence forces to carry by them-selves the whole responsibility for counter-guerrillatheir role In these operaUonsritical one on which the success of the enterprise can very well hang If anyone has any doubt about this statement, let him read Ians fascinating book, cited above, about the final tracking down of the most dangerous of all the Mau Mau guemila-errorlsts, lUmathi, and try to imagine military positivepersonnel or even skilled clandestine espionagenot trained in counterintelligence or police-type workwhat this Special Branch Inspector did
CoL John E. Beebe. Jr.Inf. "Beating the Que milant RevUv. December IMS (publication of the Command and Den era! Staff CoUege. FT Leavenworth KanaaslOriginal document.