CHINESE COMMUNIST SHORT-RANGE MILITARY INTENTIOINS

Created: 7/5/1962

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special national intelligence estimate

CHINESE COMMUNIST SHORT-RANGE MILITARY INTENTIONS

NOTE: Thish?t-rsian of IheW -rid additional text willirculated.

Central Intelligence Agency

Submitted by Ihe

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

Concurred in by the

UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

ulywere the Director of

Intelligence and Research. Department of State; TheDefense Intelligence Agency; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army: the Assistant Chief of Navalepartment of the Xaey; the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF; the Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commissionto the USFB and the Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

CLASSIFICATION Of TITLEUSE ONLY WHEN USED SEPARATELY

WA'NING

"TWi imcontain*mg fh* Notional Dele mo of the Unitedit Sin lhe mooning ol the wpionpf Uwrn,SC.. th* M* minion or revHo'ion ol which In anylo onDorian i|

CENTRAL IVTULIGERCE AOEXCT

52

SU3JSCT1i cuirasshort-raice military

INTCJTTONS

THS PROBIZX

To assess the significance of the Chinese Communist military buildup in the Foochcv Kilitary Region facing the Taivan Strait.

MOTE

This Estimate supplenents, "Chinese Cominunist Short-Ranee Kilitaryateduneon the sara subject.

THE ESTIKATS

1. At the tine whena3 approved onune,.Chinese Conmunlst aired forces had noved into the Foochow Military Region in large nusbers. There had been no public announcerent of the nove, and no

xcludedutomatic downgrading and declassification

propaganda manifestations by the Chinese Communists which appeared to have any relationship to it. Neither ware there any other clear indications of the purposes and motivations which night lie behind it. The Chinese Communists did have sufficient reason to take seriously the possibility of incursions by GRC forces in the coming months, and they had of course not abandoned their cloi-Ts to Taiwan and the offshore islands.

2. Soon afterune news of the Chinese Communist military buildup appeared in the Western press, acconpaniec by statements of concern about Feiping's intentions. Chinese Communist propaganda then began vigorously to attack the Chinese Nationalists and the is, accusing them of aintention tc invade the mainland, but placing no stress on the "liberation" of the offshore islands or Taiwan. No movements of major military units into the Tcochow Region were noted subsequent toune. Onune Chinese Corrnunist Ambassador Wang sought out 'JS Anbassador Cabot in Warsaw, probably in order to discover what he could of is Hr was told that the ITS would nothinsse Nationalist attack on the mainland under present circumstances, and was also warned of the risks involvedhinese Communist attack on the offshore islands. US statements and Press Conference remarks by the President reaffirmed earlier declarations of US policy on tho issues involved. Movements and increased readiness of US forces accompaniedtatements.

3. Although those developments have changed the situation considerably they still do notirm estimate of the motivations which lay behind the military buildup. lausible interpretation is that the Chinese Comunlst leaders were seriously concerned with the possibilityRG lixursion, perhaps with US support, onijse of considerable unrest, and that they accordingly noved enough forces into the area to deter such incursions, to cope with them if they occurred, and to beosition to attack the offshore Islands ifourse seemed desirable, possibly in connection with repolling Nationalist landings on the mainland. They ray also have had various expectations of political profit to be made when the trocphe reactions to it registered in the world, and the IS attitude tested. This interpretation of the Chinese motives does not exclude the possibility that offensive action was under consideration prior to tho LE reactions.

ii. Whatever the original motivations of the Chinese Communistbuildup ray hare been, world attention has been focused again on tho 7ci"an Strait issuo,eclaration of attitude and policy has been issued by tho OS. Publicly, the ^hiceao Communists pre claim theirin the US disclaimer of support for GRC intrusion on the mainland, and they probably do remain some:.iiat uncertain of US intentions. Yet tho *JS statement probably diminished their fears of auch attacks. It must alao have encouraged them to hope for serious friction between the US

and the grc. Finally the Chinese Communists have used the situation to try to arouse the mainland population from its lethargy and perhaps to reduce the chances of local support for any possible Chinese Nationalist landing.

5. The ragnltude and scope of the ailitary buildup have increased the offensive as well as the defensive capabilities of the Chinese Cocnunists, and we still cannot dismiss the possibilityull-scale assault on the offshore islands. However, the element of surprise has been largoly lost, and tho risks of the enterprise have been confirmed by US policy statements and precautionary measures. For the near future, therefore, we think that tho odds are against such ar. attack. The Chinese Communists mightraids or small-scale attacks on one or another of the smaller islands held by the Rationalists, but there would be danger of escalation even in such actions and we doubt they would consider the gains worth the risk.

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Original document.

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