MEMORANDUM FOR* The Director of Central Intelligence
MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP 8BCRBT)l "The Problem
of the Organizational Structure of Front and Army Fieldy Lleutenant-General N. Volodin
Enclosederbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryyennays.ublished by the Ministry of Defenee, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army
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MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Tho Problem
of the Organizational Structure of Front and Army Fieldy Lieutenant-General N. Volodin
DATE OF INFO : 1
A reliable source
erbatim translation of an article titled "The Problem of the Organizational Structure of Front and Army Fieldy Lleutenant-General N. Volodin.
This article appeared in1 Fourth Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is published irregularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. 1 Fourth Issue went to press on
Headquarters Comment: "Military Thought" is published by tho USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version Is Issued monthly and has existed The SECRET version la issued irregularly. By tbe end1 Issues had beenf them The TOP SECRET version waa initiated Inand is also issued irregularly.
The Soviet critique of the rearonas disseminated as
The Problem of the Organizational Structure of Front aad Army Field Commands by
Lleutenant-General N. Volodin
Recently, In the pages of the Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Though^.nas been given widely to the problem of the organizational atructure of operational headquartera. On thisumber of authors have properly pointed out that the existing organizational atructure and equipment of front and army field commands require radical reexamination, as they are inconsistent with the changed nature of modern operations and the demands made on troop control. We are fully in agreement with this view.
Under modern conditions, control points (punkts the organs for directing combat operations, are one of the Important objectives'nuclear atrlkes This is especially true of the major operationalhoae of fronts and armies,
For this reason the moat important condition forfirm and uninterrupted troop control la, in our opinion, an increase in the viability, mobility, andof headquarters. Thia can "be"attained provided the headquarters have few personnel and are well equipped with the latent technical meana of control, and also with staff cars having good cross-country ability and suited for the work. Only under these conditionseadquartera be able to move rapidly behind the troops, and more frequently change Ita location, and thus sharply reduce the possibility of Its discovery by the enemy and destruction by nuclear weapons.
As already noted in the press, the front and army field commands in existence at the present time in accordance with he provisional TO&E, are too unwieldy. Insufficiently mobile,'
inadequately supplied with means of control and movement. By virtue of thia, as has been shown by the experience of exercises in postwar years, the headquartersront is able to move not more than once in two or three days, and an army headquarters,ay. It ia entirely obvious that with modern tempos of attackm and more per day,ituation is fraught with the danger of loss of troop control and may lead to failure of the operation.
Beforeook at the organizationalthe control organs, let us dwell briefly on themeans of__lroop_.control, by which we meanall the means of In our opinionnecessarymore widely into all headquarterscommunications scrambling devices,photocopying devices,and plotting boards (these last particularlyheadquarters of missile troops and artillery andof PVOnd it is also necessary tosets of various stamps, etc. It is especiallycreate models of staff cars and of field equipmentwork of headquarters. All this will play ain Increasing the operational efficiency of .
ositive example one may even cite the use in one of the exej^cisefl_oi__Uie_Cajpathian
In the springf the mogile"olioto-Iaboratorv of an airborner armyT*Tor the reproduction of ocumenTs' and diagrams. The laboratory crew of three men, headed by an officer, reproducedery ahort time hundreds of various diagrams, graphs, designs and schedules, substituting for the labor of no less thanfficers and draftsmen. Positive results have also been achieved by the useleld cartographic unit for the reproduction of documents supplemented by maps. Despite the duration and imperfection of the technological process, because of the improved organization of the work, the time for the Issuance of the documents was significantly decreased. In one of
the divisional exercises in the Carpathian Militaryield cartographic unit, staffedmall group of officers, NCO'a and enlisted men, reproduced hundreds of graphiching which was not within theof the entire district headquarters.
Passing on to the problem of the organ!national structure of control points, we believe that the existing division ol them into forward command posts ommand posts (KP) and rear control pointa (TPU) is correct in principle, since this does increase the viability and operational efficiency of headquartersonsiderable degree. ystem, however, does not fully guarantee the firm and uninterrupted direction of tho combat operations of troops, especially of missile troops and the forces and means of PVO and of aviation. ystem does not permit the effecting of coordination of the control points in case one of them is put out of action, and it leads to parallelism in the work and to duplication of one another.
The experience of exercises underscores the viewsIn previous articles of the Special Collection to the effect that tho forward, command postront or army, by virtue of its small sCaff and* inadequate equipment of control means, cannot fully substituteP when the latter is put outj'.of. action. one speak of such InterchangeabilityKP and KP when, for example, the missile troop and artillery chiefsront or army are at the PKP, and have the basic means for controlling missile troops at the KP and do control them through their headquarters, which is also located at the KP. ituation can occur also for the chief of tbe PVO troopsront or for the commander of an airborne army, where the basic means of control are located at the command post of the front or airborne army.
Besides this, it is froa the command post that the basic communications are maintained for coordination and communications with higher headquarters. Together with this, the attachment of almost all the responsible persons, the best and most highly trained generals and officers, and
onsiderable part of the control means, to the forward command post, seriously weakens the commandhich, in case the PKP is put out of action, will experience great difficulties in troop control.
Therefore, in our view the personnel and equipment of control points must be such that in caae one of them is put out of action, another can substitute fully for lt.
The organizational structure which we are proposingront field command (Diagram No,asically comes to the following.
A command post and an alternate command post re created within the front, which are capable ofcarrying out full and purposeful direction of troops. Inear control point is set up which will carry out the functions of missile, material-technical and medical support of operations, and in case of necessityeven temporarily assume control of the troops.
Th* command post and alternate command postront command are made up of personnel of directorates andof all arms of troops (or services) at reduced strength, which must ensure the direction of all arma of troops, aa well aa the organization and maintenance of uninterrupted cooperation among them.
In order to guarantee stability of troop control, each KP and ZKP must be provided with identical communications regiments, the forces and means of which will permit the organization of communications in two positions. Tha rear control point is providedommunications battalioneparate communications company of the missile rear. The makeup of the remaining communications units may be the same as that stipulated by the provisional TC*B.
Correspondingly the communicationsront are also organizedP, ZKP, and TPU.
Thus, all the control pointsront ar* equipped
with autonomous communications, thua guaranteeing their independence and reliable communicatlona with thend among themselves.
This system of organizing troon control into aand TPU was tested in the operational-rearln the Carpathian Military District in Julythe dlrectlotTof the Commander-in-Chief ofMarshal of the Soviet. Chuykov,positive results.
Aa haa been shown by the experience of this exercise it is advisable to locale the ZKPom from the KP to the side or In front of lt, and, ln tha Interests of security,pecified period of time complete radio silence is observed in lt, and strict limitation of messages over technical means of communication. The ZKP receives all Information on troop positions and combat operations from the command post by "VCh" telephone, by telegraphJnbllng device, or by mobile means. DufTng^tfiia period, part oi the offlcera of the ZKP may be used for work with tbe troopa.
If th* KP should be put out of action, the alternate command post is automatically transformed Into the command post and completely takea over troop control. During shlftB of the KP, the control of troops may temporarily est with the ZKP.
Because of the Importance of intelligence ln modern operations, all means of It are concentrated in th* hands of the chief of Intylllgancaront, ln order to ensure the purposeful usemeans for the prompt and full acquisition of Information on the enemy, and above all on his meana of nuclear attack.
Missile, material-technical, and raodlcal aupport, aa already pointed out, is effected from the rear control point of the front. The building up to strength and training of the reserves are directed from here, for which purpose the TPU willeputy troop commander of the front
for coabat trainingirectorate of organization and replacementsepartment of combat training.
In connection with the fact that problem* of mlaalle support have acquired exceptionally great slgniflcancaT-and^are on* of the main tasks of therear. it is proposed to introduce the position oi deputy chief of the rear
* ?ron? fof Mla8lIe support, subordinate to whom would be the directorate of missile and artillery armament and the missile fuels department.
Aa for tanjt-technical and motor-tractor support, the experience of"7the last war and of postwar "exorcise* has shown that it la most convenient to solve theae problems from the command post of the front, since it la from here that the planning of the operation is carried out, within whioh th* probloms of the use of armored and motortroopsarge place. Therefore, with the aim of Increasing operational efficiency ln the solution of these problems, it la more expedient to put the depart-menta for armor and motor-tractor equipment ln the command poat, eubordlnating them to the deputy troop commander of the front for technical matters. Changes tn th* title ot this position are dictated by conaiderationa of eliminating varying interpretations of the Droblem.
our opinion thaof tha proposed organizational structureront field command are:
of lnterchangeablllty of control points, increase in their viability and stability, and ensuring uninterrupted troop control;
ln the personnel of the field commandront by one sixth ln comparison with the provisionaln force; the attainmentreater reduction in the personnelield command obviously la not possible, since the means of automation and mechanization of control procedures are actually atlll only being developed and have not been tented In troop exerclaea; with the Introduction of theae meana into troop units, the personnelront
field command can be further reduced by about one third;
--increase in the mobility of control points and in their capacity for rapidly changing their location, thus increasing the operational efficiency and flexibility of troop control.
The organizational structure of the field commandtank armv can be analogous to thatront field command. Other forms, however, are also possible, one of which we have presented in Diagram Wo. 2. In essence it consists of creating two equal control"'points (the first and the second) in an army field command, which are capable of independently planning and carrying out operational troop control. ear control point is also set up.
The basic directing nucleus of an army field command is the operations center. It includes the chief of staff, the chiefs of the arms of troops and of special troops (missile troops and artillery, engineer and chemical troops, PVO andhe chief of the operationsthe chief of Intelligence, the deputy army commander for the rear, and five officers (three from the operations dopartment, one for the rear, and one for the armored and motor-tractor service).
The operations center, which is headed by the army commander, will be located at one of the control points, and will direct the troops on the main axis, and the second control point will at the same time direct the troops operating on separate axes or cut off from the mala forces. Part of the officers of the second control point can also be used to carry out occasional assignments in the troop units.
Vhen necessary, an operations center headed by the commanding officer can quickly be transformed into the second control point. When one of the points is put out of action, complete direction of troop operations can be assumed by the second control point.
The rear control point carries out all the functions inherent in the missile, material-technical, and medica^ support of the troops of an army. If the first and second control points are put out of action, the TPU may temporarily assume troop control. With this aim, officer-operators from the basic arms of troops are included in its makeup and communications and cipher sections are set up.
All three control points ensure autonomous communications with the troops and among themselves.
The method of organizing the control pointsombined-arms or tank army obviously has advantages over the existing organizational structure and is more responsive to modern requirements .Original document.