MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH

Created: 6/19/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

. C.

JU'

MEMORANDUM FORI Tho Director of Centred Intelligence

HTLITAJrf THWOffT (TOP BBCRET)i -The Question of

the Organization of the Organs of-Troopy Mejor-Oeneral H. Beut

1* Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared In the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of tha Journal "Military Thought" tVoyennnyaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and. distributed down to the level of Army Cocacander.

2. Tor convenience of reference by US IB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK baa been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDEOTIAL and. is to be used only among persons authorised to read and handle this material.

3* Ia the interests of protecting our source,be bandied on a'need-to-knov basis within yourfor extra copies of this report or fcr utilisationpart of this document In any other form should be addressedthe originating

Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans)

4

Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research Departmenttate

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Ravel Intelligence Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U.ir Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for"

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estlmatee

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation Center

COUJfTKT

y

CF BTfOi

I96I

OT

ocuwsat

Documontary

reliable lource

erbatim tranalatlon of an article titled "The Question of the Organ! tat Ice of the Organ* of troopritten by MBjor-Oenerel I. Rent.

Tola article appeared inourth Issuepecialof the Soviet Military Journal Voyennaya Myel (Militaryhia Journal la published Irregularly and Is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviete. 1 Fourth Issue went to press on

Thought" la published by the USSR Ministry of Defenseversions, claselfled RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. veralon haa been issued Monthlyhi^eversions are Issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version By tbe end1 lsausa of the SECRET version had f then during

The Question of the Organization of tho Organs of Troop Control

bj

Major-General I. Heut

The necessity has long been apparent for discussing the problems involved in Improving the system of troop control (upravleniye voyskaml) and the administrative-organisational structure of the control organs. It is known that the exiating organs of control are unwieldy,flexible, and do not ensure'the mobility necessary for control of troops during abrupt changes in the situation andwith the highly maneuverable nature of combat operetlona.

The articles of Generals M. Ivanov, A. Morozov, V. Arkhlpov, and Colonel K. Pashuk, basically, correctly uncover the flaws in theorganisational structure of control organs, snd the inability of the latter to ensure firm control of troops. ignificant portion of these authors1 proposals for improving the organisation of the control organs is directed, actually', toward slightly modernising the organisational structure and adapting it to modern requirements. In our opinion, such aa approach cannot lead to the eradication of the flaws In the organization of troop control uncovered by the authors.

h the existing structure, as well as in the structure of the control organs proposed by the authors, there areew organs,'acting parallel to one another, and directly subordinate to thelned-erms commander, among which the functions of troop control are divided. The combined-ems staff and the numerous commanders of arms of troops (special troops) and services are such organs now. In general M.roposals, tbe control functions are dividedain planning center, operations, intelligence, and nuclear/missile centers,VO control center. Tha other authors are for maintaining the apparatus of the commanders of area of troops (special troops) andand by sooncur in the existence of numerous control organs.

Indeed, this "overgrowth" of the combined-arms ccmmanders by control organs operating along parsllel lines Is the very thing vhlch brought about loss of flexibility, since it has forced them to spend much time and

]

energy directing the activities oflarge number af directlyofficii Is heeding the specific control org* of.

In our opinion, in order to eradicate the flav noted, lt is necessary to bare only one organ of troop control, directlytoabined-eras ccemmndar. Bach an organ shouldtaff, since only tbe latter is cejeble of evaluating athoroughly and objectively, determining tbe coabat capabilities of friendly troops and tbe troops of tbe enemy, proposing to tbe oabined-arns ccemander an expedient solution to the problem posed, determining tbe forces and weapons needed for lt, and also, quickly coordinating the efforts of the large units and units. Thisermit the combined-arms commander toinimum of time adopting well-founded decisions. The otherommandera ofroops (special troops) and services, and their apparatus,bolished, because they only complicate the process of troop control by their autonomous existence, and have actually lost the role vhlch they played In tbe years of Vorld War II and after its termination. During the course of training, many commandera of arms of troops (special troops) are found to be hostile to troop control and,ertain extent,urden to the control points.

It ia known that in order to perform operational tasksodern operation, the combined-arms ccsnmnder allotsquantity of forces and weapons. Including combined-arms'"units (unlta) and unlta of arms of troops (specialone of such groupings is headedubordinateand Is designated for operatingeparate axisIndependent decisions regarding the tasks confronting him of course, the results of strikes by veapona of massthey are delivered by the senior

Each combined-arms ccemander who leadsrouping cf troops' is given the right of independent command of the forces sndssigned to his Jurisdiction, and is charged vith most effective use of them in performing the assigned tasks. In this case, it becomes superfluous to have supervision from above; thla often erlaes because of the tendency of the ccasanders of arms of troopa (special troops) and services to plan operations and issue orders about the manner of using the units and subunits which are within their competence, but which are subordinate to the lower-renkinge commander.

It is tha removal of thia supervision which creates favorablefor the combined-arms ccesmnder to practice Intelllaent Initiative and sake best uae of forces and meansltuatlon vhlch arises.

It la also known that each combined-arms centsoder keepsquantity of the means of destruction under directhla (large unite and unite of missile troopa, aviation, andmiaailehose allow him to exert decisivethe courae and outcome of combat operatlona, createsi reservesthe main troop groupings, and for performingsuddenly arialng taskaj finally, he also baa units' (largeapodal troopa, which he designatee for the execution'"of themeasures in tbe Interests of supporting the'operatlona "oftroopa in the formation. :

Thus, during the course of the operation, themust direct the lower-ranking combined-armswho heed up the groupings of troops designated totasks on separate axea; he also directs theof destruction, reserves, and units (large unite) ofleft under hie direct subordination. Vhat role, ln troopin theae circumstances, will be played by the comoandera ofof troops and special troopet

Becently it has been recognised Jbat there is need ^for'.'wide'uee'iiof nuclear weapons end other meana of mass destructionhe Tiring capabilitlea of the unite(subunita) having "theseeen increased, aa have the ranges of fire, and the "need baa" arisen to Increase the speed of delivery or retargeting of fire "atrikea agalnet the enemy. All this eubetant tally 'influences the "use of means of doa-true tionodern operation. Itt our opinion, itjle Accessary to change the organization of the control of these means, because' it no longerfeat delivery of fire atrikea, and does not correspond with the new principles of assignment of miaalona by the combined-anas ccooander.

actually during Worldnd after lta termination, tbe combined-arme comnnnder designated only tactical tasks for tbe means of destruction, and in thia connection there vas need for control organs for these means. These organ* were occupied with determining the fire tasks and distributing them among the numerous artillery groupslanned

tbe execution of these tasks, and also organised tbe control ofeffective naased artillery fire, vhlch celled for bringingartillery unite vhlch were subordinate to various levels Thia Justified the Interference of the commander ofthe operational formation (ccabined-arms large unit) with theof the lover-ranking combined-arms cccsnanders, and theof the artillery units subordinate to them for carrying outoo behalf of the operational formation (combined-arms largea .

Tn addition, these organs of control were charged vith organising recounelsaaace of thee tea of fire end carrying out combat vith his aaio meana of destructionartillery and' All this taken together permitted the commander and ataff of tbe artillery of tbe ope re tional formation (ece-blned-erms largeto resolvethe particular sphere of problems connected with the combat activities of the ertlllery and,esult, the above-mentionedorgans were quite necessary.

In modern operatlona tbe combined-era* commander assignsbut actual fire tasks to the missile troopa, Indicatingto be destroyed by nuclear (chemical) warheads, thaquantity of the latter, tbe tine for delivering nuclear strikes,type of buret* Tn other words, at present the combined-erascharged with the planning of fire, vhlch la closely related tooperatlona of .troopa. It therefore follows that .the ,cbmbined-erm*no longer has any need for those organs which vould bewith the planning of fire, end there le no need towork and the work of the combined-arms

At the mm tins, under modern conditions, the basis of the coabat

formation of the enemyhla nuclear meansan be discovered only by the combined efforts of all types of intelligence. In turn, the destruction (limiting the operatlona) of nuclear meana of tbe enemy la also attained by the coordinated efforts of sdealle troopa, aviation, PVO troopa, and radio counterxoaaurea. Id conjunctionwift offensive by the combined-arms large unit* and units. esult, the organization of intelligence and combat with the nuolear means of the eneay can only be In tbe hand* of tbe comblned-arma commoder. It follow, therefore, that the combined-arm* commander baa now become the organizer of combat with the enemy'smeana of de struct loo, and not the commander of mlaalle troopa andany think.

Bmf

Everything which has been Hid, in our opinion, deprives the commander of missile troops and artillery of Independence of action, and turns hlairect executor of fire tasks, vhlch sre specified by the combined-arms commander, and Halts his activity to the control of the units of altslle troops and artillery left directly subordinate to the ccoblned-aras commander.

In connection vith this there arises the Question of whether It is advisable to remove the commanders of missile troops and artillery and their staffs from the commands of operational formations, andurn over to them the command of the missile and artillery units which are directly subordinate' to the combined-eras commander. This will increase their responsibility for the status of the units directly subordinate'to them, and will permit them to exercise full command of the latter| it will also eliminate the possibility of interference vith the operations of the lover-ranking combined-arms commanders.

The fast-moving nature of combat operations, and tbe need forstrikes by nuclear and chemical weapons reeuire Immediateof the fire tasks to the executors. This can he attained todegree by direct communications betveen the combined-armsthehs commanding officer of the missile or(subunlt) directly delivering these strikes. However, anof such executors complicates the activity of thein controlling thea, and necessitates intermediate organsceV

under the existing adalniatrativa-organitational structure of.the control organs, there are, betveen the combined-arms ccemander and the executorhe commanding officer of the missile or aviation subunitthree intervening relay organs. In the missile troops, these include the commanding officer of ths missile troops and artillery, the cconriDding' officer of the misslls brigsde, and the commanders of battalions; in aviation, there are the commander of the air army and the comatnders of aviation divisions and regiments. In our opinion, it vould be advisable to abolish tba brigade level in the missile troops and tha divisional^ level in aviation, because there is no independent use for thea during tbe course of coabat operations. This step will significantly speed up the process of troop control, cut down on the quantity of documents to be processed, and lover expenditures on the maintenance of the control organs.

m

The conditions underodern operation ia conducted, and control of troopa during Ita course evoke the need for review of tho organisation of control of the means designated for combating the air enemy, because the current subordination of these means to two com-mandersthe commander of the sir army and tha ccemander of PVO troopsdoes not ensure unity of ccasaind, nor their effective The need arises for the ccesblned-arms commander to coordinate directly the operations of these two levels, which leads to anwaste of time, which is so precious during the course of combat with ths highly mobile air enemy.

Perfecting tha ground means of combat with the air enemy, andthe combat capabilities of antiaircraft missis units, "allow for creating zones of continuous destruction elong the entire area of operations of the troopsront. In their turn, auch zones ensure centralised use, on the scoperont, not only of the fighterbut of antiaircraft missile units, as well as the means forof the air enemy, and radio countermeasures, all under the directioningle control organ.

In this connection, ve suggest that antiaircraft missile unitsout of the makeup of combined-arms large units and theformations, in order that they may be used In amore effective manner on the scoperont. In this wayba no need for coordinating the combat operations of .aviationnumerous levels of command to which antiaircraft missile .units ereand it will become possible to use theathe air >

Aa suggested by as, shifting antiaircraft missile units toloningle control organ of the front will permit painless elimination of the Intervening control organsthe chiefs of PVO of the combined-eras large unite and the primary operational formations, which, at these levels, have almost no bearing on the course of coabat In the air; it will also eliminate preparation of unnecessary docuaents.

easure will free tbe cceaaandsre of troops of the primary operational fcarnations (coeamnalng officers of combined-arms large units) from organising the combat with the airubject to which they actually attach little significance, since the main thing to them la the defeat of the enemy's ground troops.

t3iai(4)

nwzrraa

It la advisable to assign tbe control of all tbe meansthe destruction of the air enemy to the cceanander who coot roleof air attack. ituatlon la conditioned by the feetthe first place, this ccoBiander can organize the combat vith themore easily, not only in the air, but on the ground, and Inplace, he can coordinate acre promptly the operations ofand antiaircraft missile units with the operatlona of hlaof air

Taking all this into conaideratloo, it occurs to us that it vould be beneficial to combine the means of PVO and aviation under the unified leadership of the cceamnder of the air' army. lll do avay within the work of the chief of rTOtroopsront and theof the air army, and with unnecessary coordination, and will free the comblned-arma commander from still another artificially created organ of controlhe PVO command poetj the use of the latter in the course of an operation, ln the light of tbe control ayatea suggested by us, la highly questionable.

For combat with lev-flying aircraft and cruise missiles, as veil as for tho destruction of the enemy's army aviation aircraft, it vould be expedient for comblned-arma large units and units to have appropriate antiaircraft weapona, which vould be equally suitable for combat vith the ground enemy. It la the versatility of those weapons "which will permit effective employment of peraonnel ln the course of a'battle to "combat tha air or ground enomy, depending on the'aetualThe combined-erna commander can control such units (tubunlta) directlyjthe help of the chief of PVO troops and hie apparatus,*

Uniting the nisnilo and aviation meana of destructioningle organa miaalle/nuolear centeras is auggeated by. Ivanov, conaidering the clear-cut technical isolation vhlch oxinta between the types of armament, la hardly adviaable, be cause such an organ will be incapable of directing simultaneously the operations of tbe missile units and aviation, and eapecially of supporting them from the technical aspect.

The uae of unite (large unite) of special troopa and tbe organization of their control differ somewhat at the present time from tbe analogoua situation during World War II. Specifically, the increased independence in operatlona of the combined-arms commanding officers has aade superfluous tbe interference of the chiefs of the apeclal troops attached to the higher

At tb* uaa time, in our opinion, it le batter to unit* separata unlta of cheadoal troopactroi organ, headed by the chief of cheadcal troops. This vLU eliminate tha lack of control for thea* units which is presently felt by the chief of chemical troops, who bas no contsunl cations means of hi* own.

After th* suggested changes are carried out it will be superfluous to work cut plans for the use of special troops In an operation, because these plans will actually duplicate combined-arms document*.

Summing up tbe foregoing, lt can he concluded that th* changed functions of the chief* of anas of troops (speolal troops) make It possible to remove them from the system of control of the operational formations and shift them from consultants attached to th* combined-area commander into the actual executors of the task* carried out by th* forces and meana left directly subordlnat* to the combined-arms comma nd*r. This will permit the removal of supervision of th* lover-ranking combined-arms ccmeaoderj also, by decreasing considerably the number of control organ* directly subordinate to the senior commander, lt will permit having on* headquartersa single, highly flexible and numerically small organut rolling tb* combat activity of ell troop* within the makeup ofperational formation.

Id these conditions, staffs will be charged with the following function* i preparing Information which will allow the qoafelned-^rm* ebm-mander to make decisions,and drafting theplanning combat operations and detailed support of th* latter) collectingollating of Information on tbe situation and reporting it to th* ccommaodar and highernd informing lover headqnartersj transmitting tasks to th* troops, directing and supervising their daily coabat activities] directing restoration of coabatf troop* and preparing them for performing Impendingnd organising point* of control and craaaualcatlon*.

Tha work of th* *taff will be meet effective If the basl* of itsIs th* principle of independent execution, by eachpecific type of work for control ofithoutother departments. Thi* will result in less tine being spent inthe effort* of th* combined-arms large unit*nit*arms of troops (specialnd aviation, beeaus* all thi*be carried cut by one department (directorate). At the saaedepartment (directorate) will present tbe chief of staff and thean information summary on all th*nd mean*th* operational

Ta our opinion,ataff ehould bar* tba following depertneot*

(directorates),

to* flratvhieh vill take up tba questions of organising iapending oparatlona taking into oonaldaratlon tba altnatlon aa It takea ahapaj prapara recommendation* for tha combined-one* comma Ddarj carry out tha planning of coabat operatlona and their all-round aupport, and lnforn the troopa of their

the eecondto direct the current coabat activities of the troop* in tha course of performing th* tasks assigned to them forend collating Information on the situation and presenting lt to the combined-*rna commander, and higher and lover headquarters, and alao to trans alt all current orders to the troopa and undertake supervision of their execution; tola department aunt have within ita aubcrdlnation all meana of intelligence and traffic

the thirdto develop and carry out aeasores for reatorlngeffeetlvenesa and Increasing th* viability of troopa, aa veil aa thoir combat preparation for impending opera tinits Implementing aetlvatlon of troopa, and tba training baa* abould be subordinate to this department.

the fourthto organise troop control, thata in charge of establishment and aeronaut of control points, end of their protection and defense of apparatus for crasannlcation* between the points; and cf controlf troop* by aocure eoamunl cat lone, and to eupply "them"vith^tdpographic'* naps and charts; thia department direeta coanunlcation*'largo unit*nd eoaaaandanVa and topograpnio.

the fiftho carry outnlnl strati ve and supply function*.

rSf,'"

Tho makeup of each deportment (directorate) should Includ* highly qualified coablned-arma general* andnd general* and officer* of the era* of troop* (apodalf various apecialtle*. omblned-erna general (officer) ehould be ot th* beadepartmenthe org*nit*tion of work in th* departments (directorates) and coordination between them ahoald ba aet up in the manner ouggeated by General M. Ivanov and Colonel K. Pashuk in their article*.

Such an org*nil*tional structuretaff vlll eliminate another

)

deficiency of control organasimultaneous execution by the very *ama depart cent(services) of vork relating to preparation of infornation forccisicn, the planning of combat operations end their support, and also in regard to tha collection of information on tbe situation and the immediate direction of the current combat activities of the troop*, at the same time there will no longer be tb* need to involvelarge number of officer* in controlling theuplication of work, lengthy coordinating processes snd the basis of numerous documents, duplicating each other, will all b* done away vith.

A staff so constructed will bav* two vital department*the first concerned with matter* Of planning iapandlng operations, the second,the current combat activity of the troop*. This will permit sore purposeful distribution of the effort* of the staffn the control of the current activity of the troops and, at the same time, in the organization of Impending operation*.

Ta our opinion,istribution of function* will attain the beat results, sinceefinite number of staff personnel, headedombined-arms generalre dedicated beforehand to theof each task, under the existing system, however, the decision inatter*rrived at vith the participation of the very same officer*. The experience of numerous operational exercise* indicates that the baaic reason for unsatisfactory functioning of staffs in the matter cf troop control, during the course of highly maneuvering and swift-moving combat operations. Is the inabilityto.^rperform both 'func*ic^

The suggested staff structure allcvs tbema coammnder to receive simultaneously collated Information on the situation regarding the enemy and all troop* of the operational formation, and to work out measure* whichl*ct the' combined activity cf all arme of 'troops"(special troop*). It will become feasible to reduce considerably the quantity cf documents processed in tha staff* regarding troop control, mainly those dealing vith plan* for utilization of arms of troops (speciala veil as types of support, since these document* actually only summarize th* basic measures which sre spelled out in document* of th* combined-ems staff. It vill be pee Bible to bring in considerably fever personnel for the purpose of troop control than under the existing aysten, by bringing In, In turn, the first four departments, depending on the actual altuatlon, and also by concentrating the basic work for control of the currentf the troop* in onehe seconddepartment (directorate).

The chief of staff la given the beat conditions forfunctions, because he Is relieved of the necessity ofactivity of officers not under his subordination, and at thehe isreater opportunity to study the situation andcombat operations, and the all-round support of the .

In our opinion, such en orgs nl tat local structure, of the staff is more convenient for vork at the control points, because only the first, second and fourth departments (directorates) may be located with the combined-eras commander, and the efforts of these would be quite sufficient for performing the main functions of troophis vill make it possible to decrease the personnel at the control points. Increase their flexibility, significantly ease tha work of ccemiunieaticms equipment, and decrease its quantity, because It abolishes joint location of tha combined-arms headquarters and the control organs of the chiefs of arms of troops (special troops) and services In one areaa it vas in the past. It will be possible to disperse the points of troop control more, which undoubtedly vill increase their viability.

The nev organizational structure of the control organs Is, in many vays, conducive to reducing the expense of their maintenance, and allows more effective us* of the vork of personnel and employment of th* means ofautomation and mechanization of .controlJto addition, there vill be need of onlyh* ^ceAined-erms ccemander,

and finally, tha organizational structure of conteoT organs "suggested by us vill avoid piecemeal control of operation* of the arm* ofndnd point thea,arge'degree,"tc the performance of task* by combinedhat is, mte the organization of troop control conform with their aotivitie* in the coursa of an operation.

Itnown tbat an important place in the vork of the combined-arms commanderccupied by the problems of material-technical and medical support. Toreriel-technical and medical support, the comblned-aras chief. In our opinion, also should have oo* control organ. Thi* stems from the fact that in modern conditions the troop* will be equally incapable of coabatthey lack materiel supplies or whether their equipment is not serviced and put into combat-effective condition. In turn, if the troop*reat amount of various combat equipment, and it* performance depends on the supply of materiel on one hand, and on technical servicing

and repair on the other, then these type, of activity are made into one process. This is the reason for the need to unite the direction of materiel, equipment, and other types of rear support under the chief of the rear, directly subordinated to the combined-eras ccomnding officer.

In this, centralization of control of the rear must be carried out not only in matters of the organization of the rear, transport of materiel and technical equipment, and medical service, which are now tha respon-albilitles of the chief of the rear, but also in matters of technical supportecond Inherent part of modern rear services, which atIs under the Jurisdiction of the various chiefs of arms of troops end. special troops (services) not subordinate to the chief of tha rear.

Thus, it seems to us that an administrative-organizationalcontrol organs mare suitable than the existing one, or the oneGenerals M. Ivanov, V. Arkhlpov, and Colonel K. Fashuk, vill be onethe headquarters and the chief of the rear with his apparatusunder the direct subordination of the combined-arms conmmnderl Eachwill be concernedpeolfie sphere of problems vhlchdecisions on the part of the combined-erms commander. InIn conformity with modern principles of the use of troops inan operational formation must have within its makeupi(tank) armies and conbined-arna large units, an air army,troops,^larg* unlt.of,of ^

engineer, chemical and ecaxaunieations .troops, as>wli'ei unite andf Intelligence, ccesmndsnt'araffic control, and others. -

Withtructure of the operational formation, 'the combined-arms commander can charge the lover combined-arms commanders with the fulfilment of tasks stemming from the goal and plan of the operation, and also vill have means under his direct subordination with which he will be able to influence the course of the operationhole. At the same time, the organization of troop control is considerably simplified, and many intervening and, in our opinion, needless, control organs are eliminated.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA