Created: 6/11/1962

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Director of Centrel Intelligence

MILITARY THOUGHT pTOPA New Combaty.Lieutenant-General A. Shevchenko-

Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared In the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "MilitaryVoyennayaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

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byeneral A- Shevchenko


DATE OF INFO: I Documentary

reliable source

Followingerbatim translation of an article entitledev Combatritten by Lieutenant-General A. Shevchenko.

This article appeared inI Fourth Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya Hysl (Military Thought). This journal is published Irregularly and Is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets. l Fourth Issue went to press on

Comment; disseminated as

and Zhadov'a article aa

Cccnnent: "Military Thought" Is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version Is issuediaoothly and has existed The SECRET version is Issued irregularly. By the endl,ssues had beenf theml. The TOP SECRET version vas initiated In0 and Is also Issued Irregularly.


A Hew Combat Vehicle by

Lleutenant-General A. Shevchenko

Recently, in our military preea and In tha military press abroad there haa been vide discussion of the role of the armed forces and the arms of troopsuture var and of the directions of future development and Improvement of combat equipment and armaments. ignificant place ln this diacusslon Is devoted to determining the role of tanksodern battle and operation. This la not accidental because the firepower, armor protection, and mobility which are combined ln tanks have always given them certain advan-tagee over the other arms of troops and permitted theconduct of combat operations.

At tha present tine tank formations and large units also have the greatest mobility and resistance to destruction by nuclear weapona; therefore, ln modern operations too they are able to fulfil the quite complex and responsible missions that are aaalgned to them.

But this does not mean that tha modern tank must be conaldarad the ultimate ln the perfection of combat equipment and that it is fully suited to conducting combat operations under tha new, complex conditions. We share tha opinion of Marshal of Armored Troops P. A. Rotmlstrov" about the need to Increase the relative proportion of the tank troopa at the front level and ln the armed forceshole, and weit advisable and feasible to create and Introduce into the ground troops, instead of the tank, an armored vehicleew type that, in its characteristics and utility, would

Special Collection of Articles of the JournalFirst

fulfil the modern requirements to the maximum.

With the appearance of antitank guided missiles with shaped charges (PTURS) that have high armor-piercingtanks lose one of their basic qualitieseffective protection from the fire of these new weapons.

One cannot disagree with the opinion of Colonel-General A. Kb.ho maintains that in single combat with an antitank missileank will be defeated, and with the adequate saturation of the troops with these launchers, any tank attack may be broken uparge part of the tanks participating in it destroyed,togetber with their crews.

It is true that antitank missiles have not yet been tried

in combat and still have several shortcomings, but this is one

of the types of weapons having the best long-range prospects

and one which will be constantly improved. Therefore, there

is little Justification for the attempt by Marshal of Armored

Troops P. A. Rotmistrov to prove that the new antitank missile

weapons, with the availability of weapons of mass destruction.

are not very dangerous for tanks and that their use allegedly

will not greatly influence the employment and operations of tank troops.

In the near future, antitank missiles will comprise the greatest danger for tanks with any armor protectdbn, and the use of the PTURS on armored vehicles and the improvement of the means of guiding the missile to the-target will make them even more menacing weapons.

Should we pose the problem of further increasing the thickness of tank armor under these conditions? Of course not. One should speakharp increase in the firepower of the tank by replacing the gunissile launcher.

Special Collection of Articles of the JournalFirst issue,


A correct solution of this problem Is offered by General of the Aray A. S.hen he speaks of the need to ars the modern tank with the most advanced missile weapona, that ensure the destruction of any enemy tanks or other objectives at great distances during combat.

As far as the mobility of the tank is concerned, it is relative, and doea not fully meet the requirementsodern operation and battle, which are conducted at high tempos. Juat as before, water barrierserious obstacle for heavy and medium tanks.

Therefore, destruetlblllty by the fire of new antitank weapons, the comparatively weak firepower, and the Inadequate cross-country ability and mobility of the tank demand its replacementombat vehicleore Improved type, which is capable of performing comprehensive combat' missions.

odern battle and operation, success is achieved by the Joint efforts of the missile, tank, motorized rifle, artillery, and other larga units and units ln close But the fact that at the present time each arm of troops has different combat capabilities, unequal protective capability against the destructive factors of nuclear weapons, and therefore la not suited for the fulfilment of all the comprehensive operational and combat missions Independently, can lead not only to the dlaruption of coordination but ln several instances to the loas of the combat effectiveness of formations and large unlta.

That Is why it is necessary toombatat the very leaat, would combine in itself thethat are inherentmissiles (artillery),

and motorized rifle subunits. ehicle must ensure the successful fulfilment of various combat tasks successively accomplished in the offensive and on defense, have maximum protection from weapons of mass destruction, and at tha same

time serveeans of transportation for personnel and armament. Firepower, armor protection, and mobility have toew balance in it, in the presenceewersatile, universal utility.

The new combat vehicle must have the following:

meana of reconnaissance and communications permitting the detection of enemy targets andat great dlatances and the maintenance of reliable communications between vehicles, subunits, and units;

armament capable of destroying enemy personnel in armored vehicles and outside them and also various combat equipment at considerable distances;

adequate amount of ammunition, calculatedalendar days of combat operations.

The speed ofehicle must reach up topb on roads and up toph off roads, and mustupply of fuel0 km and high cross-country ability, Including rapid crossing of zones of radioactive contamination, water barriers, snd various obstacles and obstructions.

Armor protection and hermetic sealing of the vehicle must ensure reliable protection of personnel from small-arms and fragmentation injuries and from the effects of radioactive and toxic substances, bacteriological agents, thermal radiation, and,if possible, the shock wave.

Zt Is proposed to have the vehicleersons, preferably with means for digging themselves in: rewersonsombat teamersons having the capability of conducting fire directly from the vehicle In motion, and when necessary of performing combat missions after dismounting. At tbe same time, the team is assigned the duties of operating instruments, servicing the vehicle, concealing it, etc.



Consequently, unlike the tank,on which riflemen can operate only as riders, in the proposed vehicle the team la an Integral part of tha vehicle, aa well as of the combat element. It la planned to have tbe new combat vehicle simultaneously replace the tank, armored personnel carrier, and partially the gun wltha prime mover.

Lleutenant-General H. P. Slyunin* also speaks of the need toew combat vehicle to replace the existing tank. However, he examines it from slightly different taking the concept of atomic resistance as the basis for its creation and defending the retention of the combat vehicles for the Infantry and artillery (for example, an artillery regiment remaina ln the division, etc.). ehicle of thia type will notniversal vehicle, but an Improved armored personnel carrier which cannot eliminate the existence of tanka.

In tha combat vehicle lt la not absolutely necessary to have large stocks of foodstuffs and water, much less bunks to provide rest for the personnel, as proposed by Lleutenant-General N. F. SSyunin.

It appears to us that, besides the proposed combat vehicle, lt la necessary to have vehicles capable of performing mora complex fire missions. For thia purpose, tha means for using nuclear weapons, and also antiaircraft weapons, are mounted on nuch vehicles. The creation of groups of such vehlclea ln companies and regiments will strengthen the fire support of line subunits, give them great independence, and will ensure tha successful fulfilment of combat missions.

For the firm and continuoua control of troops, it la also neceasary to have command combat vehicles with modern armament and equipped with the necessary means of

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The basis of the coabat foraations of subunits and units under these conditions will be aade up of line, coaaand coabat vehiclesertain number of special coabat vehicles comprising groups of fire support.

At the modern stage of developaent of Soviet tank building, the amphibious tank or the amphibious armored personnel carrier serve as the basis for creating acombat vehicle.

The introductionew type of combat vehicle into the armament of the troops will fundamentally influence the organization of the troops. First of all, the need ceases for arms of troops such aa tank, motorized rifle, and To replace then, lt la necessary to create unified armored troops with subunita, units, and large unitsnitary type.

The crew and team of each combat vehicle mayquad,quads (vehicles)latoon. In the ine vehicles of the platoon, it Is advisable to have means for combating personnel, including those located in shelters, and eneay armored vehicles, for which it is possible to use missile weapons, large-aallber machine guns, and grenade launchers. It la dealrable to have PTUHS mounted on all vehicles.

In the company, it ia advisable to have three platoonsire groupehicles, including the commander'a vehicle) with meana for using nuclear weapone.

At the presentendency exists to have one or two intermediate levels between the company and the diviaion. It appearsto usiviaion should consist of regiments In which lt is advlaable to have companies, but excluding the battalion level. The elimination of the battalion level with the presence of new coabat vehicles of one type will notegative Influence on tbe fulfilment of tasks by the regiaent, even though the battalion, with the loss of combat effectiveness by two companies, will obviously lose ltsindependence. Troop control and their dispersal during

combat operations will also become simplified. Besides that, the battalion level is not directly tied in with materiel and technical support measures.

With the introduction of the new combat vehicle, the regiment can consiat of up to fiveire group, means of combat support, and corresponding rear services.

The regimental commanding officer's fire group must include missile launchers, antiaircraft guns for combat with low-flying enemy airplanes, means for combating radio-technical equipment, snd spocial vehicles for conducting reconnaissance. Special aubunits to eliminate theof an enemy nuclear attack should be Introduced into tbe regiment.

The unitary division mayegiments having the same composition. This number of regiments will permit the executionroad maneuver on theform the most diverse combat order, and disperse the troopa even more, eapecially ln depth. Naturally theapart from the regiments, will have the means ofmateriel, and technical support. ivision with the proposed complement willotalombat vehicles, and lt willtrength00 men.ivision willodern tank,and,otorized rifle division, in fire and striking power, and also in mobility and maneuverability.

In our opinion, the army must mainly have dlvlslona with Identical organization. When necessary, separata divisions may vary from the standard organization for example, divisions Intended for operationsountainous area, as an airborne force, etc.

We consider that for the timely reinforcement of dlvi-alona, wider use of airborne forces, and for performing other tasks, it is necessary to have one or two reserve2 to ISn an army.



ktfor 1 troop organization.

At the present stage of development of the organizational structure of troops, the creation of new largl units! be carried out on the basis of tank and motorized rifle divisions For example, from two tank and two motorized rifle regiments lt is possible toivisionof four regiments,with four companies in each Initially, the company can haveormored personnel carriers, and fire support weapons, atzirst the basis of the combat power of such subunits will consist of tanks.

Closer coordination of tank and motorized rifle subunits is ensured with such organization. These will be detachmentspecial type, having high maneuverability, great strikine force, and the capability of performing combat tasks that are more varied in nature. Moreover, the faults of modern tank and motorized rifle regiments are eliminated, and measures connected with the dispersal of troops and increasing their viability will be conducted with greater success.

At the same time, the army may includeomplement of modern motorized rifle regiments, but without tanks, with an adequate quantity of antitank weapons and more powerful weapons to neutralize the enemy

e designated forthe consolidation of lines, for conducting combat operations In

populated points and on terrain that is difficult for tanks

to transit, and also may operate as airborne forces.

The proposed organizational measures permit the use among the troops, during combat training, of new methods of combat operations which meet modern requirements.

Only general questions of the creationew combat vehicle and the improvement of troop organization are set forth in this article. It seems to us that the time has

n print of Problems pertaining to this field of military theory and practice.

Original document.

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