Created: 6/7/1962

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MEMORANDUM FORl The Director of Central Intelligence

THOUOlfr (TOP SECRET) l "Questions of the Development of the Organinational Structure of the Tanky Major-General of Tank Troopsavizion

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Original! The Director of Central Intelligence

eoi Tha Director of Intelligence and Research, -Departseat of State

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The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

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Chairman, Guided Missiles and AstronauticsIntelligence Committee

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MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Questions of the Development of the Organizational Structure of the Tanky Major-General of Tank Troopsavltlon


DATE OF INFO: I Documentary

eliable source

Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "Questions of the Development of the Organizational Structure of the Tanky Major-General of Tank Troopsavlzion.

This article appeared In1 Fourth Issue of aof the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Myal This Journal is published Irregularly and laSECRET by the Sovieta. 1 Fourth Issue went toctober

Headquarters Consent: The Zhadov article cited on

was disseminated aaLoW4'

Headquartera Comment: "Military Thought" Is published by theUSSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, clasalfledECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version is Issued monthly and has existed The SECRET version is issued irregularly. By the endssues had beenf thenl. The TOP SECRET version was Initiated ln0 and Is also issued irregularly.



Questions of ths Development of the Organizational Structure of the Tank Troopa by

Major-General of Tank Troopa G. Zavizlon

The necessity of constant study and research of the organizational forms of the types of armed forces and arms of troops la evoked by the rapid development of the means of armed combat and the changes taking place in the methods of ita conduct. Therefore, it is no mere chance that in recent times, considerable attention la devoted to questions of Improvement of the.existing, and creationev, organization of troops in the pages of the military press, higher military-educational Institutions and among the

Quite properly, in our opinion, General ofhadov noted in his article that modern armiesand more being equipped vith the latest meanscombat, which require correspondingand that the problems of the improvementorganization of the troops are now posed by

At the Military Academy of the Armored Troops, a'ntilitary-scientiflc conference was conducted, where tbe problems of the employment of tank troops and the prospects of the future development of their organizational forms were examined.

Marshal of Armored. Rotmistrov, in his lecture, convincingly showed the basichlch the improvement of the organizational structure of the tank troops should take. In the course of the vork of the conference this question was subjected to vide discussion.

Special Collection of Articles of the JournalSecond Issue,

Tho increase ox firepower, striking force,maneuverability will ensure the high mobility oftroops and their capability to conductonsiderably large depth, at highthis must be considered the most importantthe future development of tank troops, the basismust be tank subunits and units and the missilethe way for them. Saturation of tank troopsweapons and new tank equipment willa reduction in the personnel and auxiliarytaking part in combat

We feel, that further development of theof tank troops should also take the line oftheir ability to survive under

odern battle and operation, the leastnuclear bursts are the tank crews (ekipazh) andcrews, (raschet) covered by heavy armor. the offensive capabilities of the large unitsof tank troops, along with equipping themnew tank and missile armament, it isthat the auxiliary organic means not differnew tanks in their antinuclear stability,

Primary in ensuring the tank troops' viability will be the Increase of their nuclear power, which, in the course of the operation, will allow them quickly and to'a great -depth, to neutralize reliably the enemy's nuclear 'means' of attack.

evel with increasing the mobility and defenslbllity of the tank large units and formations from the destructive factorsuclear burst, improving the viability of the tank troops will also promote establishment of the maximum possible uniformity of their organization.


Uniformity of units and large units, under modern conditions, must be viewed as an indication of the strength and stability of the organization of troops. It is achieved by unity of the form of organization of tank troops, the presence in the units and large units of: similar type tank subunits and the maximum possible equality of the mobility and defensive characteristics of tho different

auxiliary combat equipment to those of the tanks, and also the presence in them of the minimum number of mechanized infantry in the new combat vehicles.

The subunits of mechanized infantry, antlair defense, rear services, security and command in the tank large unite also should have increased readability and their ersonnel should be covered with armor with new defensive features. The interests of Increasing the viability of the tank large units also require an organizational change in the supporting subunits. For example, there Is an urgent necessity to centralize the antiair defense means in large measure, which will considerably simplifycontrol of them and will ensure more dependable troop cover In the course of combat operations.

For the purpose of maintaining the constant combat effectiveness of the tank troops and, consequently, ncreasing their viability, it is requiredonstant reserve of subunits and units be included in their complement.

It is also necessary organizationally andensure the capability of the tank units and largeliquidate independently and quickly the results ofand chemical attack. This need may betraining the troops to take the proper measurestank units and large units with special,organic neana. '-.

Great significance under modern conditions is attributed to the capability of the tank units and large units to, repairhort time, armored and other equipment damagedesult of massed missile/nuclear weapon strikes and conventional means of destruction. -In view of this, it is necessary to have repair-rehabilitation subunits and units, equipped with high-efficiency means in the tank troops.

Increasing the tank troops1 viability and that of the ground troopshole,ignificant degree, will promote the radical realignment of the system of control with the introduction of means of automation and mechanization, and also alteration of the organizational structure of staffs, directed toward elimination of some


and Increasing the mobility of the control points.

Finally, the reorganization of rear services subunits, units, and installations, wider use of air transport for support of swift maneuver and accomplishment of the tasks of supplying the troops in the course of vigorous and continuous combats one of the most important conditions for increasing their viability. With this.aim. we consider It necessary to reinforce the tank army with military-transport aviation means.

Such, in our opinion; are the general principles, on the basis of which the organizational forms of the ground forces can be developed practically and above all those of tank formations, large units, and units.

We feel that the tank army's prospective organization may consist of five tank divisions, one missile brigadene PVO division, separate reconnaissance-units, and units of rear support, and also separate tank and mechanized units of the reserve of the army.

ank division 'there may be four tank regiments;hree tank and one mechanized battalion or five tank and one mechanized company. With such variations of organization, the tank division loses the needotorized rifle regiment in

ank battalion (in the case ofrganization) it is expedientave three companies ofanks each. In the absenceattalionank company may consistanks. ivisionhole there may, accordingly,anksrnfantry combat vehicles,

Calculations show that the number of personnel and auxiliary equipment in the tank army and division of the proposed organization will be considerably reduced (though the army will also include one more division thah at the present time). On the whole, this will give the division and army great mobility.

In the organization underore efficient correlation of tank and mechanized subunits is foreseen.

tank, whereas in the present organization there is one notorized rifle companyank companies. In this, in the complement of the tank army the number of new infantry combat vehicles vlll notnits, that is, there vlllonsiderable reduction compared to the number of armored personnel carriersvailable at the present time.

The tank army of the proposed organization, in overall numbers of tanks, vlllS field army made up of cine divisions and our own combined arms army of two tank and three motorized rifle divisions. This will ensure It:.the capability of successfully accomplishing the tasks of modern operations, where engagements and battles will be predominantlyank nature. The presence of five divisions in the complement of an army will broaden its capabilities for delivering strikes and for participating in operations on two axes. For defeat of the enemyeeting engagement and accomplishment of other tasks it will not be necessary to call in all the forces of an army, which happens at the present time, with four divisions in an army. In addition, the army will be able to carry out wider maneuver with its large units.

The creation in the tank armyeserve consisting of two tank and one mechanized regiment will provide the opportunity in the course of an operation for the timely reinforcement of one or another division andombat effectiveness, without drawing on units of the second echelon for this and without taking the whole division out of combat. The expediency ofeserve will be seen especially in that case, when units of one of the divisions suffer heavy casualties from the enemy's nuclear weapons, in the operations of the armyide front, with great Intervals between large units,etc. Do not forget, that the reserve regiments of the army will constantly be replenished from those units which are taken out of combat. Replacement of the personnel of reserve regiments should be carried out first of all by detachments of those who have recovered, andy tanks of the army maintenance pool.



mechanized regiment of the army reserve can be used as an airborne force and for the accomplishment of tasks which suddenly arise.

We have indicated above two possible variants of the organizationank regiment, with the battalion level and without it.

In our opinion, the battalion level of command in

tank units should be abolished. We shall try to substantiate this.

First of all, let us note, that under the conditionsuclear/missile war the lowest tactical element which can accomplish tasks independently, and in the intereats of which it is possible to employ nuclear/missile weapons must be considered to be the regiment. It,actical unit, unites within itself the different arras of troops and means of combat, and has the necessary rear services. Now, when combat operations have become more maneuverable andlustered nature it is the regiment that must become the last level ln which are carried out the most tightly coordinated operations of all forces and means and the direction of their efforts toward the fulfilment of combat missions. Therefore, the regiment is able to conduct combat operations on independent axea and considerably removed from the main forces of the division, cooperating during this, with tactical missileeans and, when necessary, with aviation. v*i

What,.under these conditions is the role of the battalion level of command? Due to the fact that the combat operations of the battalion will be spread out over larger sectors than previously, the commander of the battalion will be unable to observe personally the course of combat operations of all subunits and directly organize and control the tank companies in combat.

Now the focal point of the organization of the attack and combat in depth has shifted to the company commander. The practice of combat training and tactical exercises shows that the commander and staffattalion, in organizing combat, basically duplicate all that is done by the commander and staffegiment. The battalion

regimental means whose tasks are determined by the regimental commander. Therefore, the role of the battalion commander is now reduced only to organizing the attack, which is the function of the company commander. Besides, for independent accomplishment of tactical tasks, the battalion always needs reinforcement and the constant presence of rear services subunits.

Thus, we come to the conclusion that the battalion is an intervening level.

The tank battalion has three companies; always operating in the sameattern of battle,order, independent of the they actually.develop. More often than not, in the first echelon,perate, and in thene company. With considerable losses in tanka, the battalion battle order usually consists of one echelon (almost all the tanks "on theith the detaching of several tanks to the reserve. In these cases the commanders of companies and platoons turn into commanders of regular line tanks. Consequently, the battalion cannot vary the pattern of the battle order, in connection with which maneuver in the course of battle is sharply restricted.

We must also contend with the fact, that theattalionompact and attractive tactical- objective or delivery of strikes by nuclear/missileitf^ -any pattern of its battleonsiderable portion of its subunits will receive hitsuclear warheadield ofoilotons, after which the battalion will really lose its combat effectiveness. Combatwill also be reduced in the regiment in' which,his case, there are only two battalions remaining. 1

The tank regiment in the proposed organization, with five tank companies and one mechanized company in ita complement, will be capable of carrying out wider maneuver of its subunits in the course of battle; concentrate its efforts on one or, if necessary, on several axes, and each time adopt that battle order which suits the actual


case of destruction of one, or even two, tank companies by the enemy's nuclear weapona, the tank regiment will be significantly more combat effective than with the loss of one battalion in the present organization.

With the new regimental organization, without the battalion level, the time for organization of the battle will also be sharply reduced. The regimental commander, having made and announced his decision, will be occupied with the organization of the battle and the commander of the company directly with the organization of the attack. This organization will be more acceptable for future tank troops with fundamentally new tank weapons and improved missile means, .

The chief factor determining the development of the organizational forms of the troops is nuclear/missile weapons, with the employment of which are createfi favorable conditions for the conduct of highly maneuverable combat operations. The nuclear/missile means now available in the tank division and tank army do not fully answer the requirements of modern operations and combat qualitatively. Of the sixissile mounts comprising the army missile brigade, it is conceivably possibleto have not more than three constantly ready for launching, which with only eight issile launchers (raketnaya ustanovka) in the divisions, does not allow reliable destruction of the enemy in- tho zone of the "army with missile fire. The inadequate maximum range of the -organic (voyskovaya) missiles has an adverse effect on assuring the rapidity of operations of large units of the army and their Independence ln accomplishment of combat tasks, and also makes their participationassed army nuclear/missile strike more difficult. For this reason, organic missiles are obliged to move about unceasingly, within the combat formations of units, with the result that the effectiveness of their fire is sharply reduced, and they themselves are constantly under the threat of destruction by the enemy's conventional means.

In our opinion, for the successful conduct of modern operations, taking into account the trend of future development of nuclear/missile weapons, another solution

to the question of the availability of nuclear/missile means in the tank army Is required.

First of all, the quantity of tactical andmissile troops must be increased and their '

In the tank division it is necessary to have that number of missile mounts, which will ensure the conduct of independent combat operationsonsiderable depth and at high*speeds. Together with this, the missile means of divisiona must bo capable of executing maneuver by fire along the front and in the depth for the purpose of delivering massed nuclear strikes against the enemy jointly with array missile units. In our opinion, it is necessary to establish tank-missile subunits in the tank divisions, that is, to have tank missile mounts as armament.

Keeping in mind the prospective organization of tank large units, we figure that in each tank division the missile battalion (raketnyy divizion) must be replacedegiment (polk) of three tank-missile companies,ounts in each company,ange of fire upocket battalion (reaktivnyy divizion) (three or four batteries of mounts of the "Grad" type) also should be included In the complementivision. *

In the army, instead of the missile brigade, it is necessary toissile divisionomposedegiments (battalions)ounts in each,ange of fire upm.

Such an increase in the range of fire of tactical and operational-tactical missiles fills the requirements of supporting the combat operations of tank divisions to the depth of the task of the day, and of the tank army -to the depth of its immediate0ithout changing, or withingle change of siting areas, and also the execution of maneuver by fire along the front and in the depth. In addition, this will promote high tempos of offensive, closer fire coordination of division missiles with army missiles, and of the army's missiles with those of the front.

tank divisions and tho tank army will, on the whole, raise the power and effectiveness of the nuclear destruction of the enemy and will make lt possible, in the course of an operation, to deliver massed strikes of missiles with chemical and conventional filler against him. The proposed number of missile mounts will increase their number ln the present tank army by four times, which, in conjunction with their Increasedrange and effectiveness of fire, significantly increases the capabilities of the prospective organization of the tank army. Calculations show, that with this number of missile mounts, it is possible with one salvo to inflict overall incapacitation on personnel in tanks, in an area of uphich "considerably exceeds the nuclear power of an array corps of the US/Armyi' reinforced to the maximum with nuclear means of attack."

The proposed centralization of the means of antiair defense (PVO) in the tank army envisages their concentration In one combat large unit, for example,VO division, directly subordinate to the army commander. This will allow reliable screening of the troops of an army from enemy atrikea from the air and will reduce the number of Intervening levels of command of these means. arge unit suchVO division should take entirely upon itself the function of protection of the troops of the army from the air. With this, tha necessity for having an intervening level of command in the person of'ths chief of PVO troops and his apparatus disappears, asontrol of PVO means will be concentrated In the hands of the commander of the division.

The organizational structure of the PVO division should ensure the possibility of Its employment both ln its entire complement as well as by portions of lt, and its technical equipment should ensure successful conduct of antimissile and antiaircraft combat.

As already mentioned, an important role In theof maneuverability of forces and meansank army in the course of an operation should be played by its reinforcementroup of military-transport aviation. In the complement of this group it is proposed to have the prospective transport aircraft and helicopters with


a large payload capacity, with which it would be 'possible to carry out the maneuver of the forces and meansank army by air.

maximum use of the capabilities of the new armament depends on the availability in the tank large units and formations of improved means of reconnaissance which ensure the continuous conduct of radiotechnlcal. aerial deep and groundubunits and units of ground reconnaissance should be "air transportable and have tanks with special equipment In their armament.1.

The increase of the capabilities of reconnaissance to ensure effective delivery of nuclear /missile strikes - gainst the enemy entails the necessity of including new reconnaissance units and subunits in the complement of the tank army, namely: egiment of aerial reconnaissance, separate radio and radiotechnlcal battalionsompany of deep reconnaissance. Furthermore,egiment of aerial reconnaissance it ia advisable to have pilotless means of reconnaissance, and subunits of aviation and radiation reconnaissance. In the divisions, it is necessary to establish reconnaissance battalions with the means of ground, radiotechnlcal and deep reconnaissance. "

The new organization of the tank troops will require introduction of substantial changes in the methods of troop controlattle and an operation,a review of the organizational structure oforgansommand. By now, in comparison with WorldStar il, the ethods and forms ofank army" operation have changed considerably and new trends in?the employment of tank troops are noted, but vthe methods pfltroop control have actually remained as of old. The organizational - -structure of the staffs of tank large units>nd-formations, above all, should ensure mobility of troop control. For this, in an army and division, it is necessary to abolish the large number of small, incompetent, and secondary staffs, departments, and services.

We cannot disagree with the repeated statements in tho press that the mobility of command can be increased if only the chief of staff, the chief of missile troopa, the chief of rear services and tank-technical services

t0 theof the army. Thia will free the commander from the solution of

secondary questions and will assure hla the opportunity

of occupying himself in greater detail with thVcommand

Of troops in the course of combat operations.

14have an operations-

reconnaissance department, consisting of three sections, (planning, information, and regulation of the movement ofommunications department; and an engineer-technical department. .

epartmentof the planning section are called upon tocombat operations ot troops and the employment ofof combat. The responsibility of the officersinformation section should Include thecollation of data on the situation and provisionoperations-reconnaissance information tostaffs. The section for regulating the movementis necessary for the organization of thoseof troops which take place in thewhole operation. The engineer technicalcarry on the preparation of data for thestaff on the combat capabilities of the engineertroops, and also supervise thetaaks assigned to

*ncrease of the mobility of the work 'of She staffs will greatly promote the most rapid introduction of the means of mechanization and automation Into the control of troops, and later, also the complex automation systems with electronic computing machines;

This general examination of the organizational structure of the staffank army haa in mind theof,two,eSiial and interchangeable command posts

unDerndear antral ^int S this, the means of communications of CPnd CP,an move along the primary axes of troop operations. The commander and the staff of the army can work at that CP where it will be most convenient for themccording to the situation. When the commander is working at CP Numberis deputy and a


group of officers are working at CP Numbeready to take over the control of the troops.

The fundamental postulates expounded in this article on the further development of the organizational forms of tank troops and their Btaffs can be fully substantiated only by providing them in special and regular troop and command-etaff exercises.

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