vEKCrANDUM FOR: The Director of SaVtraJ. Intelligence
THOUGHT: "Preparation and Conductront Offensive Operationaritime Axis In the Initial Periody Colonel-General G- Khetagurov
For convenience df reference hy USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Sovlot material. The word IRONBARK ia classified CONFIDENTIAL and Is to bo used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.
3- In the interests of protecting our source, ISONBARK should be handledow basis within your office. Request for extra copies of this report or for utilization of any part of thla document in any other form should be addressed to:the originating office.
Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans)
Original: Tha Director cf Central Intelllgenca
cci The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Tha Director, Dofenae Intelllgenca Agenoy
The Dlreotor for Intelligence, The Joint Staff
The Aeaiatant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of tha Navy
Tha Abb latent Chief of Staff, Intelligence U.ir Force
The Director, Rational Security Agenoy
Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy .CoamlBS ion
National Indications Center
'Chairman, Guided Missiles and Aatronautlos Intelligence Committee
Deputy Director for Research
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Assistant Director for National Estimates
Assistant Dlreotor for Current Intelligence
Assistant Director for Research and Reports
Assistant Dlreotor for Scientific Intelligence
Dlreotor, National Photographio Interpretation Center
ront Offenaive Operationaritime Axis in the Initial Periody Colonel-General G. Khetagurov
OF INFO : 1
A reliable source
erbatln translation of an article titled "Preparation and Conductront Offensive Operationaritime Axis in the Initial Periodritten by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov.
This article appeared in1 Fourth Issuepecial version of the Soviet military journalMysl (Militaryhis journal is published irregularly and la classified TOP SECRET bv
ug bent to press on
Comment: The articles cited onero dlssealaated as aswawawmaslibi III
lhe field Service Regulations cited on pageere
cited on pageas disseminated as smBBsmmmBsmammmmmfi
the M. Ivanov article on pages
Preparation and Conductront Offensive Operationaritime Axis In the Initial Periodar
by Colonel-General G. Khetagurov
theoretical elaboration of the actual problems of preparation and conduct of front offensive operationsaritime axis Ih not possible without thorough analysis of the general nature of the initial perioduclear/missile war. lear-cut definition' of the types of military operations to be conducted on the ground, in the air and on the sea, not taking into consideration the Influence of the weapons of mass destruction on the utilization of the types of armed forces in the first daysar, and many other factors of basic significancef it is impossible to carry out preparation of troops purposefully and understand the situation in which the initial operations of maritime fronts will be conducted.
As concerns the general nature of nuclear/missile war, we agree with the opinion given in the pages of the Collection ln the articles of Generals Gorbatov, Gusakovskiy and Babadzhanyan*. The. strategic, jujpect of the Initial periodar will beall by the nuclear/ missile strikes delivered" oy both sides for strategic purposes. The elaboration of the theory and the implementation of such strikes, 'inreuncJioriiof .operatl'ojial preparationission of the front
be incorrect to be silent about this, because theseparticular will set the operational-strategictheaters of military operations, and consequently,determine the nature of the tasks facing the.
In the operational-strategic iha missile troops, in our opinion, it is essential to diffexanti'ate between two types of nuclear/missile strikes: intercontinental delivered by large".uhits'missile* 'troops of strategic designation, in the interests of the warhole/fantp strikes carried out by the missile troops, long-rangeTfffssile-carrylng aviation,/ancpby the forces of the missile-carrying
the fronts to assist in armed combativen theater of military operations. Apparently, the latter will be very closely tied in with the utilization of all types of armed forces. In actuality, they will be the basistrategic offensive on the TVD (theater of military operations -teatr voennykh deystviy) . Therefore, the thorough consideration of all aspects of the concept according to which they aretheir makeup, and of tha results expected, will be the foremost condition for the correct and purposeful planning of the front operationaritime axis.
should be assumed that, under the conditionsWestern Theater of Military Operations, thestrategic goals will depend on thethe main missile, ground and air groupings of thethe internal areas of the European continent, where apart of the most important military-economic and centers nf NATO areas experience of many exercises shows, it isto attain these goals by means ofof the troop groupings operating onmost of which lead to important industrialseries of political centers, large cities, centersmilitary-naval bases and ports,stocks of materiel means in the areas ofare located on the maritime axes. Theroutes, that connect the armed forces oftheir main military-economic base andocean,hrough
The significance of maritime axes,'increases mainly because our probable enemies have a powerful naval.fleet, supplied with the latest combat equipment. For this reason it is not accidental thatVD the situation wlll'depfend,arge extent, on the degree to which it was possible to disrupt the enemy's plan on the sea and in .the coastal zone; to hamper his utilization of missile and air bases located in maritime areas; prevent strikes by carrier large units, missile-carrying vessels and submarines; disrupt naval communication routes and isolate the enemy troops located in the theater from the flow of additional forces and means from other continents.
In the fulfilment of these missions, an important rolo can be played by front formations operating on maritime axes.
In coordination with the missile troops and the moans of the fleet they will protect the strategic flank of the armed forces on the scale of the entire theater of military operations, to execute the deep envelopment of the basic groupings of the enemy, disrupting the forming up of his reserves in the maritime areas, and their transfer and forward movement to the main axis. The end result of the offensive.operations carried out by the maritime fronts willmore favorable conditions willT be created for the rapid destruction of the most important enemy ground troop groupings and for the establishment of active operations by our fleet on the broad ocean.
The Anglo-American command, not without reason, supposes that the naval fleet, in comparison with the other types of armed forces, will suffer relatively smaller losses during the first daysar and will retain its capability for immediate operations. This should be remembered constantly.
The NATO command will apparently use the strikethe fleet primarily to deliver strikes againsttroops and important operational-strategic objectivesland sectors of the theater of militarythe fate of the war will be decided. The forceof the fire effect of the fleetase ofcan be very significant. By using carrierunits, missile-carrying surface vessels, andfleet Is able to deliver strikes not only againstbut.gainst^ .those removed .
thousands of kilometers 'from
In this respect the. NATO exercise0 was quite characteristic, duringn the" hours of militaryuclear strikes were delivered by the means of one carrier-strike large unit, including} accordIng to the plans of the highfor the counteratomico prevent the deployment of ground troops, and.trikes to prevent the deployment of naval forces. otal of more than nine-tenths of all the nuclear weapons were used to destroy ground targets removed upm from the coast.
Hence it becomes evident that under modern conditions the basis of an enemy nuclear groupingaritime axis may consist not only of tho missile weapons of the ground
troops but basically of tho weapons of the fleet. That is why the situation on the sea,reater dogree than before, will Influence tho development of front offensive operations, and Its influence will spreadonsiderable zone, having widened the area boundaries of the marl tine axes.
Of course, not all the Maritime axes will be equal in importance. Their role will be determined in accordance with operational capacity, the composition of enemy forces, the presence of important operational objectives, and other factors. However, in all conditions, by dint of all the above-mentioned circumstances, in the initial periodar, an extremely tense struggle will ensue within the borders of the maritime axes in order to fulfil extremely vital and complox operational-strategic missions.'
As shown by the experience of exercises, the basic principles of conducting an offensive on ao ordinary axis are retained in an offensive operationaritime front. However, the special conditions for developing combat operations also present special requirements for conducting operations: the need to take into consideration all aspects of the situation at sea; determining the concept of the operation according to the nature of the adjoining naval theater, the location of naval bases, ports and other coastal installations. Tbe scope of the operation is influenced by the depth of the continental part of the TVD and tho balance of the forces in the naval theater.
"Under suchirst ofperational missions accomplished by the front troops is widened. In particular, the need arises to seize, straits, islands and peninsulas, to .organize combat operations with the goal of capturing ports and military-naval-bases, to aid the fleet in the destruction of carrier striko large units, and to destroy coastal missile weapons of tho enemy. The fulfilment of these missions requires special organization of control. Joint utilization of the various types of armed forces, application of distinctive methods of operations of the troops, organization of landing operations, and, mainlyclose operational and,ertain degree, tactical cooperation between the ground troops and the
The nature of the cooperation vill depend on the general conditions for conducting war at sea. Por example, it is known that the decisive role in naval operations is passing to the submarine fleet, to missile-carrying vessels, nnd to missile-carrying aviation, operating in dispersed formations and delivering strikes from great distances with nuclear/missile warheads and homing (samonavodyashchiysya) torpedoes.
Of course, under such conditions there is no need to "attach" the fleet to the flanks of the ground troops. However it is completely apparent that together with the utilization of its basic forces on the open seas and oceans, on the sea communication routes of the enemy, as before, the directant will have great significance ia.developing the offensive in the entire deptntheater 'The fleeT'aus't"reliably cover the maritime flank of the front, to protect it from strikes from the sea, prevent the commitment of additional forces of the enemy fleet through straits into internal bodies of water, ensure the disruption of his sea transport, etc. Undoubtedly, the participation of the forces of the fleet will be essential in the neutralization by fire of enemy installations located on land, moreover, not only in the coastal zone, but alsoonsiderable distance from the sea.
We are convinced that the reduction of the forces
Of..tho fleet, the contractionespecially-
in closed seas, may place the.marlt^e.emely difficult position. Inase, the enemy' will derive major advantages. Any possibility of carrying out landing operations or sea transport to assist the front will be almost completely eliminated. The wiping out of enemy groupings pressed up against the sea will bo made more, difficult. The front must bo constantly awareossible enemy intrusion from the sea, because it may be obliged to commit considerable forces to cover the maritime flank, and to organize along theowerful systemntilanding and antiair defense, radio counter-measures, and intelligence, which will undoubtedly influence the tempo of development of the operation into the depth.
Therefore, in our opinion, the fleetlosed sea, even in modern times, must bo strong enough. Its qualitative composition is another matter. We do not
attempt to make any recommendations on this score, but consider that tbe conclusions made on this subject in the article of Admiral V. Kasatonov deserve serious attention.-*
The mission of securing the maritime flank will have to be fulfilled by meansroad maneuver of nuclear/missile strikes in combination with tho swift movement of troops by air and the creation of operational barriers (Including the placement of nuclear mines) on the threatened axes. The pivotal element of tho system of coveraritime flank, obviously, must be tho mobile coastal missile units of the fleet, armed with short-range cruise missile systoms and reinforced as necessary by motorized rifle subunits, as well as by air obstaclery ad zagrazhdeniya) and separate antiaircraft missile (ZURS) units.
The most important condition for ensuring the stability of the maritime flank is maximum exertion in combat not only with the ground enemy, but also with the sea enemy, striving o inflict destruction on tho carrier strike large units before they reach the line of launch of the carrier aviation, and also the disruption of landing operations being prepared, at tho moment the landing force embarks on the ships or during their sea passage.
The framework of tho operation and the actions of,troops will be greatly influenced notmaritime flank but by tbe shore line,inlots, islands, and the nature* of thelocated in tho coastal zone. In many'Cases
these factors may greatly influence the choice of theoperational maneuvor, the utilization ofand the assigning of missions, to the iroopnpurpose of splitting up and liquidating enemyup against the
Inasmuch as the ultimate goal of the front operation, in most cases, will be relatod to the completion of tho
"SpecialCollection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryecond
destruction of the maritime groupings of the enemy,of harbor areas, supply bases, and the movementto the coast, it is expedient to plan andoffensivearitime axis in the entire depth ofof military operationsunder the conditions
the Western TVD,00 km. Here it is extremely important, utilizing the results of strategic nuclear/ missile strikes, to reach the Atlantic coast on the 9thh day of theefore the main reserves of the enemy begin to arrive from the American continent.
The arrival of strike groupings on the coast during this time period will be realistic with.adequate effectiveness of massed strategic nuclear strikes against' the enemy; he preservation of the forces of the front .and theirImmediate transition to vigorous operationsery beginning of the .war,;'tfiat deny the enemy access to our territory; the serious weakening of the'Tehemy fleet, after which it will not be able to give effective support to its troops on the continent and the latter will not be reinforced at this time from bases across the ocean.
a maritime axis the missile weapons, ground troops,nd naval fleet, can be utilized in various ways. However, in all cases, It is extremely important to prevent the enemy from deploying forces on the ground and at sea, and to start vigorous offensive operations .assoon as possible. As experience of ^exercises showsY^the marli front Is extremely, interleaved: in havJ weapons of'the! fleet ^
vigorously, risively aVd^Kat successive""strikes delivered against the enemy" at'sea and at bases'.
On the whole, joint operationsront and a leet must, in our opinion,;be examinedperat1on conductedoint command with tho purpose ofimultaneously destroying the enemy on the ground axes and in the adjoining areas of the naval thea'ter. Moreover, it is expedient to have the fleetlosed sea, before it captures the straits area and exits Its main forces into the ocean, under the direct operational subordination of tho front. In the future, most often it will be utilized independently, but in this case it is essential that the commander of the front be able to assign missions to the fleet for supporting the offensive and to coordinate the
operations of the forces on the ground and at sea.
The unified plan of the offensive operation, conducted jointly with the fleet, must determine the methods for destroying missile, ground, and air groupings and groupings of the naval forces of the enemy. In accordanco with the plan, the system of the front operation provides for the deliveryeries of successive joint massed nuclear/ missile strikes by tbe means of the front andhe conductwift offensive by small operational groupings of the ground troops on isolated axes toward vitally Important areas and installations of operational significance on the coast; the systematic landing of tactical air and combined amphibious landings; fire support for the ground troop offensive by the weapons of missile units, aviation, and .the fleet; the organization of combat with the naval forces'* of tbe enemy tbat are harassing the front troops; screening the maritime flank and the"naval' communication routes, and finally, the disruption of enemy sea transport.
Joint, massed nuclear/missile strikes areby the commanders and staffs of the front and ule, lt is advisable toargothe strikes on behalf of the front from thethe use of thoir results by the ground troops. means of the fleet can be brought in to destroyimportant coastal installations,owever*,roquire'tho'organizatio'n^of^joint masson behalf "of thesuch aand missile weapons of the front will' beexample, for the annihilation of enemy naval bases,his coastal defense units, for supportingaviation of the fleet,facilitating the creationavorable'< r
The basis of ground troop operations is mado up of swift, deep strikes on separate axes with the simultaneous delivery of enveloping strikes from areas distant from the sea against important maritime objectives. It is possible tondependent tank strike groupings in the front, consistingivisions each, androuping of forces for utilizationombined amphibious landing. umber of cases, one of theso groupings will advance right along the coast. Tho main forces, because
of the Indentations ln the coastline and the difficult/ of forcing numerous rivers ln the estuary sectors, vlll,ule, operateertain distance from tha sea. The maneuver to the sea la possible withrcoa, because the action of the troopsolid fronthe entire coast is not expedient at the present time. In the coastal zone lt is only necessary to capture the most important areas (ports, supply bases, and main roadirst breaking up the enemy groupings covering them, pressing them up against the sea and destroying them piecemeal. The basic objectives in the other areas should be suppressed or destroyed by nuclear/missile strikes, creating zones with high radioactive contamination. ,
It is expedient to combine systematically the nvelopment of enemy maritime groupings from the ground with the sudden landing, on the flank and in the rear of the* onemy, of combined (naval, air, and tank) landing forces. Some consider thatodorn war amphibious landing forces, because of their great vulnerability, lose their significance. But thia conclusion is correct only if it
Is based on the old principles of organizing amphibious landing operations. Obviously, the dispersed formation of the landing detachments during tho sea passage, and tha higher tempo of the landing, will make their viability no lower than the viability of regular troop groupings.
It should not be forgotten that the utilization.of nuclear weapons will greatly facilitate the.overcoming of the anttlanding defense arid will permit landingsalied, forces andbort time, to fulfil mlssTons reat "depth and with decisive goals. Therefore? we propose thatijndijujs (if the fleet gota; the ast landing craft for their lonBing) can and must be used widely in the initial operationsEoyill permit the holding down of enemy reserves on'abroad front, will make it difficult to utilize missile weapons doployed in*-the maritime areas, will permit more rapid transfer of ground troop efforts into the depth and will oliminate tho nood to pull ln forces of the front from the main axea to capture coastal objectives.
Inront offensive operation being conducted on a. maritime axis, special attention should bo given to
the correct assignment of the missions. The recommendatioDS of the existing Field Service Regulations (Corps-Division) concerning thia, ln our opinion, are outdated. In keeping with the requirement of the Minister of Defense to carry out an offensive with an average speed of up to lOOam
hour period, the qgpth ofthend_large_ uni,^s, ln comparison with the norms given in the Regulations, should be sharply increased. In our opinion, it is expedient to coordinate the immediate tasks of the troops with the range of fire of the missile weapons which are correspondingly. available to the division, army and front. For example, for the tank division, the immediate task can now be assignedepthoa. tho follow-up task forkm, and the task of the day for lop^jan or more. ombined-arms (tank) amy, conducting an offensivearitime axis, usually will'* get'?; Immediate taskepth of upnd'."i'ts fulfilment is calculated toalendarr SaysT Tasks for groupings conducting an offensive along' the coast should be assigned, and tho method of operation should be pointed out, in the greatest detail, especially if they have totrait zone In order to achieve maximum coordination of their efforts with the utilization of the forcea and means of the naval fleet.
The great depth of the tasks and the necessity of continuous development of the offensive of the maritime fleet require, constant concern regarding the preservation .
-pt .the..combatctiyeness of_ the.
At the moment it is hard to count on the ability.of the motorized rifle division to conduct continuous combat-operatlona for more than two,ank division for more than three to four, calendar days. Under such conditions groat skill is necessary to prevent the prematuref troop efforts. The commanders of the front andrmies must take the most energetic steps for the constant maintenance of the most important strike groupings at the minimum necessary combat strength. This pertains especially to tbe troops operating apart from tho main forces, on islands, or those being used for amphibious landings. The maintenance of their combat effectiveness, obviously may be attained not only by committing to combat the reserves coming up from the zono of Interior, but first of all by having friendly large units that have lost their combat
effectiveness, put back into service quickly. Por this the time limits forivision to full strength must be drastically reduced: otorized rifle division, up to three, andank division, up to four, calendar days.
The restoration of troop combat effectiveness must be executed according to the unified plan of the front in accordance with the actual concept of the operation. Moreover, in some cases it is expedient to give the salvaged materiel and personnel of the large units taken out of combat to the other troops in the first echelon, and to utilize the staffs that have been relieved thereby an .reserve organs of control temporarily. In other cases,It,is possible toompositeesignated for the continuation of combat* actionsto conduct the remaining units to the rear area'to'bring them up to strength as fast as possible by centralized maneuver of the stock of rehabilitated vehicles in routine maintenance and the bringing up of personnel brought in by aircraft from the depth of the country.
The conduct of the first front offensive operation on the maritime axes demands all-round training of troops, great combat efficiency and deep insight in the work of all the organs of control, the ability of +w* and staffs to resolvearise for the troops, in'
mobility in operations is necessary during' the. period' when" the forces are brought to increased combat readiness'
the moment the troops are Withdrawn fromuclear/
ng prepared by' the enemy.
oops aro; iron- rissile strike being .
In short periods of time the locationmissile troops, radiotechnlcal equipment,>nd missile unitB of the front and army must be completely changed, aviation has to be dispersed; control points have to be moved, pontoon-bridge cover of the most important crossings must be organized; the dispersal of materiel reserves is carried out, etc. At the same time, in coordination with the fleet, screening measures should be carried out for antiair and antllanding screening of the
maritime flank, and also aerial reconnaissance of the enemy should be organized in the direction of tho sea. Subsequently everyoours lt is necessary to move not less than half, andhour period, all,units and fire means, without exception,to new areas, taking into consideration that in the maritime zone the enemy reconnaissance may be most active.
In our opinion, the dispersal of the rear services will present the greatest difficulty because of the lack of time and transport. Therefore, so as not to take on too muoh work, it is expedient to plan theffulfilment of this, task in certain phases: theours, thetoours and thealendar days.rf-First of all, missile warheads and supplies ofjjtored in the open at airfields should be dispersed. Then begins the dispersal of the other types of ammunition and. to unload part of them on the ground and keep the rest in the motor vehicle transport of divisions, armies, districts (groups ofn ships at sea and at railroad freight relays (zheleznodorozhnayat small stations and runs. (poregon). It is advisable in the beginning to leave materiel maintained in underground storage areas in place, because its destruction ith the first strike is unlikely.
The development of the first front offensive operationaritime axis will usually be tied in with the moving
..out.rom" the: begins
"with' ;tue^ ihitiation^ofhe concentration of troops with" their being"brought butm from the border and the deployment of troops with the immediate creation of operational groupings. During concentration the large units and'units; Jlnases, will have to. be brought out in extremely^dispersed formations,road zone andarge number'*otoutes, utilizing all types of transport. In the process of deploying, the troops must move out to the axis designated to them mainly under their own power, pecific grouping and in full readiness to go Into battle precipitately. The maximum Increase of the speeds of march in order toapproach the enemy attains great significance here because this will sharply reduce troop losses.
should be expected thataritime axis the enemy, using the capabilities of his fleet, will apply the maximum efforts to disrupt the moving out of our troops. For this purpose,umber of lines and at large water barriers he can create "nuclear firextensive zones of radioactive contamination, and also destroy permanent bridges over rivers such as The Western Bug, Vistula, and Oder.
As shown by the experience of many exercises for the timely creation of strike groupings it is essential that, under such circumstances, the troops moving out from the depth not be dependent on bridge crossings. In ank divisions, to be exact, for each tank regiment it is expedient toompany of tracked, self-propelled ferries, -to switch the motorized infantry to amphibious armored troop carriers; and in the combat-engineer battalion of the division, toanding-crossing company instead of one of the combat-engineer companies.
Besides, on the estuary sectors of the most"important rivers that intersect the maritime axes, already in-peacetime, wo must, carry out advance preparation of components for the construction of underwater bridge crossings, and mainly, for settingnderground tunnel crossings for through railroad and motor vehicle traffic. With this purpose in mind, Colonel-General F. Malykhin proposes, the construction of duplicate bridges (mosty However, sudh'Abridges are .ho less vulnerableho basic crossings ,
while^the destruction* of funnels"ent^
One of the special features of moving the troops out will be the utilization of sea transport. The use of sea transport may play an important role.in closed soas, and also when land communication routes of the maritime front are disrupted. Unfortunately, because of the lack of transport ships and the inability to concentrate them in advance at loading points, the movement of large units of ground and missile troops at full strength by sea is improbable in the firsthe transport of materiel, combat equipment, and replacements may be carried out on quite large scales.
capture of the straits zone willery important missionaritime front ln the operation of the Initial -periodar. This will permit the fleet to exit awlftly into the open sea, to put into effect operations on enemy sea communication routes, and mainly, to assure more effective support of the advancing groupings of the ground troops over the entiro depth of the theater.
The capture of the straits zono must be preceded by powerful nuclear/mlsBile suppression of the enomy system of defense ln tbe maritime zone, on islands and peninsulas, and also the weakening of the enemy fleet by strikes against hla vessels at bases and on the sea. It is also yery^mportant to prevent the planned withdrawal of eneay troops.from land axes, for which it is necessary, in the "shortest possible time, to break through to the approaches of'the straits, at least with separate tank large units.
The basic method for capturing tho straits zone will dotermluod offensive by the tank grouping of thearmy combined with the landing of Joint air andin the areas.that ensure control over theis expedient to carry out the special landing into account the simultaneous capture of allpeninsulas in the zone of the straits. Eowever,shortage of forces lt is possible to use the methodsubsequent capture.
forces and weapons subsequently delivered by'air'or'sea.
In our opinion, the basisombined landing, when landing at considerable distances, must consist mainly of an amphibious landing, and in closed seas over limited distances (upa tank landing with individual means of flotation (type piSTU) . It is true that at tho present time the executionank landing entails great difficulties because amphibious tanks, and even more* so
5 tanks, do not have navigational instruments, are not sufficiently seaworthy, andonsiderable amount of time for demagnetization. But these deficiencies can be remedied.
It is expedient to execute tactical and, even more so. amphibious landingsroad front in several (at) points at the highest possible speed, avoiding the gradual buildup of forces on the shore. For this, simultaneously with the atart of the amphibious landing, it is necessary toelicopter landing forceistancem, and an airborne landing forceom, from the shore. With the support of the missile units of the front and the fleet, the subunits that have landed must develop the offensive swiftly on the designated axes, or they will be wiped out.
In the course of an offensive operationaritime front, the main efforts must be concentrated on the destruction of the means of nuclear attack, and also the ground and air groupings of the enemy, with missile/nuclear and chemical strikes, operations of the aviation, and of missile-carrying vessels. Together with this it Is necessary to organize the swift movement of tank troops to the siting areas of enemy missile woapons.
In the initial operationaritime front,the groupings of enemy groundost _of tenthe form enlarge meet!rig
arise simultaneously on various^'a^es'^ Success achieved in these engagements must, be utilized decisively. Enemy forces that were able to survive must be split up, pressed back to the coast, forced into zones of radioactive contamination and, by blockade from the sea, be destroyed with joint strikes by nuclear weapons, aviation, and the fleet.
For the decisive destruction of. enemy maritime groupings, the high tempos of troop offensives will have special significance. In the maritime zone, tho achievement of this, in the light of the complexity of the military-geographic conditions, entails great difficulties. But nevertheless, even here, it is completely realistic to bring up the question
of speeds of upmhour period. Thisurther increase in the effectiveness of nuclear-fire support and the use of more expedient methods of operation of the ground troops, including increasing of the speed of the attack, reducing the time for deploying large units, the decisive utilization of Intervals and gaps ln the combat formations of the enemy.
It is known that ln the past the average speedank attack wasom/hour. This was conditioned by the possibilities of conducting aimed fire from the old type tanks, and also by the need to maintain constant fire coordination between the NPP (close infantry support-neposredstvennaya podderzhka pekhoty) tanks and' the infantry following them. At the present tlmerthis method of operation becomes unacceptable. The attack,should not be carried outolid front but on axes, wherein the speed of the attack should attain up toom/hour, because only in this way is lt possible to avoid "the destruction of troops at the lines of deployment by nuclear weapons and the fire of guided missiles of the enemy antitank means.
In practice the possibility of conducting an attackpeed ofom/hour is predetermined by the presence of two-plane stabilizing devices for tank armament and the feasibility of operations of the motorized infantry when precipitately breaking through the hastily assumedefense .in Armored personnel carriersn any case, as shown^.Dy: theo exercises^withflela^
Northern Group of Forces, it is" now possible to ensure. fairly high effectiveness of destroying targets" when moving. For example, at the autumn divisional tactical exercisest an attack speed of up tom/hour the "tank battalions, operating in the firstuccessfullyulfilled all fir* tasks, having ensured the destruction ofoercent of the gun andoercent of the machine gun targets.
The decisive utilization of gaps and breaches in the combat formations of the enemy mayig role in Increasing the speed of the offensive. However,ethod of operations cannot be stereotyped. The strike groupings or large units that have entered the breach may often find themselvespocket" nd will
bo subjoctedass enemy nuclear strike. Therefore, the offensive In the gaps of combat formations should be conducted In more dispersed formations, andith maximum speed.
The correct organization of fire support,and mainly constant coordination of the missile weapons of the front and fleet at their full range, attain primary significance. In particular, we consider that the fleet, using its high maneuverability, must give effective fire support to the strike groupings of the maritime front, not only the ones advancing along the coast, but also those operatingistance from the sea. In our opinion, the basis of such support must consist of destroying the missilo weapons f the enemy fleet with the forces of the navy, and also to destroy important ground objectives and reserves with nuclear warheads from great-distances, in the entire depth of the maritime axes.
The complex nature of modern offensive operations requires fundamental improvement of the entire system of troop controlaritime front. Tho principle of simultaneous direction of tbe combat operations of troops on the ground. In the air, and at sea from great distances, '* by technical means, electronic-computing and automatic devices, should be Incorporated in tho basis of control. It Is also necessary to increase sharply the oporatlonal efficiency of the work of commanders and^staffs, and to assure the possibility "of: their Immediate' reaction to the - lightest changes of the operational and radiation, air,nd naval situation.
Unfortunately, the existing system of control, as has been pointed out in print several times, does not fulfil the indicated requirements in many ways. Even boforo complex automatic aystons of control are created, it is necessary to carryeorganization of the control points, put in order tho collection, processing, and routing of operations and intelligence information at the operational and tactical levels, work out the system of "flash (tranzitnaya)reate calculating-analytical and computing centers in the staffs, and ensure the quick assignment of tasks, and monitoring of the results of the strikes Inflicted.
In the light of what has been said, let us examine the proposals given by Major-General M, Ivanov in his article,* The idea of creating centers (command, operations-intelligence, nuclear/missile, and WS and PVOs elements of the command post (KP) and the forward command post (PKP) of the front, was already worked out in the Northern Group of Forcesnd was carried out in practice in three front operational command-staff exercises locally which were described in the Information Bulletin SGV.Northern Group ofevernaya Gruppa Voysk) in tho beginning The recommendations of General M. Ivanov resemble this system In form, but in substance distort its meaning and are inapplicable. The. to unite all the directorates andllervices and staffs of the arms ofoncerned with the direction of troops .into.'unifontrol centers" in practice means the elimination ofhich is unrealistic and wrong. Noassume the full volume of the functions of staffs, directorates and departments. In our opinion, it is impossible to replace the staffs with any kind of centers, either now or In the future. Centers should bo created, not as replacements, but based" on the staffs, as their organic elements, as combat teams called in to perform tasks of immediate direction of an engagement and the utilization of the means of the front.
It is also impossible to agree with theoain command-planning center*jwhore
General Ivanov maintains, "the entire planning of ft* operation" must "take place". The operational, planning will be carried out, not by the center, but by the staff of the front and all the directorates of the arms of troops. ommand center isndommand-planning center, as the working area of Jthe -front troop commander for simultaneous unified direction of all moans of combat, where, in the decisive moments of the' operation, the chiefs of the missile troops and PVO troops, the commander of the air armyepresentative of the fleet may be located, connected to their operating apparatus by selector and television communications.
* Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Militaryirst '
Finally, lt is necessary to note that thethemselves only in the event they are For example, in the command center createdNorthern Group of Forces there are electrifiedof the readiness of missile weapons andof fighter aviation and antiaircraftsignal-code device for transmitting commands, andscreen of the operational situation and radiation situationof the situation at sea, the air and PVO situationsituation of the control of missile troop fire. Inmanner the screen gives the data aboutof friendly and enemy troops. Moreoverare not used for observation, as Generalbut for making specific decisionsand for giving orders to theheorganizing and equipping the command center isthe
One of tho most important questions of control is the organization of coordination with the naval fleet'.. Under the conditions of the Western TVD, this coordination, in our opinion, must be organized mainly on behalf of the troops of the maritime front. Moreover, the Joint operations of the fleet and front for the nuclear-fire suppression of the enemy on land and at sea, the conduct of joint, massed nuclear/missile strikes, support of the amphibious landings, and also all questions of intelligence, PVO, radio countermeasures, and..operational camouflage.must be.coordinated with
A strict method of mutual exchange of operations and intelligence Information must be established between the staff of the front and the staff of then orderly system for directing operations la also'necessary,nsure the fastest possible "'resolution of "all Inatters concerning joint operations of the ground troops and the naval fleet during their simultaneous fulfilment of overall operational tasks.Original document.