Created: 10/1/1962

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1^nforn,4Uon attesting the National Dehnueof ihe United StatoiIhe meaning oi tho espionage low. Title IB. USC.. the IrenunUelon tsvelallon oim any mannoc lo an unauthorisedrohibited by law.



Road, rati, and vater connection! with the German federal Republic are vital lifellnoe of Weet Berlin. Because of its physical isolation from West Germany and its political isolation from Eaat Germany, West Berlin must rely on those surface communication lines for mostupplies and as outlets for Its products. The Western armed forces, which maintain the freedom of West Berlin, ore reinforced and reeupplied mainly by means of these arteries. Western rights of access to Berlin by way of surface routes resteries of foroal and informal agreementssome of them couched in general termsmade in the years following Worldnd, after the attempted Soviet blochode of the city. In addition, certaina have been instituted unilaterally from time to time by one or core of the Western Allies or by the Soviet Union. Thus, although the principle of Westernestablished by President Trumanetter to Marshal Stalin on5 haa been clearly recognized by the Soviet Union, current practice regarding surface access to the cityhe result of gradual, unplanned growth, much of it having no clearly defined documentary reference; and many of the conditions are subject to conflicting interpretations. The traffic with West Berlin is confined to relatively few, heavily traveled routes that present numerous possibilities for harassment or interdiction.

Ihe primary dependence of West Berlin on the Federal Republic for its trade with the outside world is illustratedomparison of1 figures for traffic with Weat Germany and East Germany. I, West Berlinetric tons* of goods from the Federal Republicons from East Germany. It2 tons to the Federal Republicons to East Germany. Of the imports from the Federal Republicl, roughly equal amounta wero transported by road and by inland waterwayomewhat smaller aeount by rail. The tonnage shipped by air was negligible, although the nature of the goods makes this means of transportation important. The items imported fall Intotatisticalf which (coal, stones and earth, food products,primary agriculturaland iron and steel) accounted for more thanercent of the The following table gives1 Imports Into Weat Berlin from the Federal Republic and East Germany by type of goods and, for the Federal Republic, by type of transportation.

Vest Berlin Inporu by BUrraee

rvdrrai SawubTI

r -







but hlu









* Metric tons ore used throughout this memorandum.


Tbe basic decielon concerning rail and highway routes to Berlin wua made at tbeonferanca between Marshal ZhuXov. General Clay, General Weeks and their subordinates. The documentary de-tails concerning rail traffic to Berlin are given ln the report of the Directorate of Transport, Allied Control Authority,pproved under This document, among other things,the Helms tedin route for Inbound freight and tbe Berlin-Oebisfelde-Vorafeldo route for tbe return movement of eaptloa. This portion of the document remains In force. Other portions have been superseded by later arrange-aents, established without formal or written agreementa. Because these arrangoiaonts were ln effecthe Soviet authorities are obligated to maintain then under the terms of the Agreement on Lifting the Blockade, New York, May These Informal arrangements; provided for:

Military passenger trains as followstwo American trains nightly ln each direction between Berlin and West Germany; one British train nightly and one by day, when required, in each direction; two French trains weekly in each direction; und fivo additional tralna per week at night, if required.

Thirteen eustbeund freight trains.

One German civil passenger train daily in each direction.

(k) Special trains as required for Important persons (High Coamifisloners, Commander-in-Chief, etc.).

Although these arrangeaenta were accepted in tbe course of quadripartite discussions after the blockade, no agreed record of the conversations is known to exist.

Additional agreements have been made9 between officials of the East German Relcbsbahn and the West German Hundesbehn, which provide for the operation oferman passenger trains doily in each direction between Berlin and West Germany. Except for the Inclusion among them of the one German passenger train covered by the New York agreement, these are merely agreements between Ccrnanand are not part of the four Power Agreements. The Gorman pnsuenger trains start and terminate at either Ostbahnhof or Friedrichotrasee Station in East Berlin (all stopping at thout they stop at the Zoo Station in the British Sector to pick up and discharge passengers. In addition to the trains listed, international passenger trains transit Berlin, but thoy are not considered here.

The Reichabehn-Bundoabohn agreements also: xtended tho types of freight authorized for rail transport to include all freight correctlyfor the operation of westbound freight trains, within llmito neveralled for tho running of mail trains in both directions, which for eastbound trains would be offset against the total ofreight paths available dally.

* It is believed thatreight trains from Berlin to the West arc available dally; in practice tho demands rarely require the use of morernd the Western Allies do not have the prescriptivo right to demand that allrains should be made avuilablo to them.

Prior toJ, through informal arrangement, an additional two or three freight trains were operated daily, when required, from West Germany to Wast Berlin using routes other than the Helnstcdt route, principally via Oebisfelde and Buches. After the lifting of the blockade, the Soviet authorities were pressed to restore these facilities inasmuch aa the Western Allies considered the USSR to be obligated to do so under tho terms of the New York agreement. This the USSR refused to do under the pretext that the use of the routes hadoncession that it was not bound to honor under existing agreements. Ho new agreement woo reached, and the position has remained unchanged.

In the pre-blockade period, Screen locccotivce from the British and American Zones pulled the trains over the entire distance. Upon the resucption of rail Movements after the blockade, the Soviet authorities insisted that the East Geraan Relchabehn provide the locoaotlves and personnel for the trains on tbe Helmotcdt-Berlln run. Although the Western Allies objected to this change, lt subsequently becone tbe accepted practice to have all military trains pulled through the Soviet Zone by Beichsbahn locomotiveswith the exception of occasional special Diesel trains operated by West German Bundesbahn personnel for the US Forces.

Goods transported by rail other than on military-duty trains must be documented by an Interzonal Trade Permit fWarenbegleitnoheln: WBS)reight Warrant (Prachtbrief). The Interzonal Trade Permit has been the sine qua non for allto or from Berlin since it was put into effectf. Thefor endorsing the WBS was transferred from the Soviet to the Boat German customs office3 and was dropped completely ln Hall shipments of parcel post packages up ton weight compriso anexception to the universal requirement that all shipments be documentedBS.

All military rail traffic and all civil roil freight from the Federal Republic to West Berlin Is channeled through the Helmstedt-Karienborn crossing point and enters Wast Berlin via Griebnitz3ee near Potsdam. The line is double tracklias fron Marlenbornderitzingle track foriles from aiederitr to Wlldparknd double track foriles from Wildpark to Ostkreut (Berlin). Westbound freight trains, which average one per day, hove not been limited by any agreement. Empty freight cars from West Berlin ore routed back to tho Federal Republic via Stendal and Oobisfelde-Vorsfelde.

Civil rail passenger traffic is authorized ut any of the following crossing points: Buchen-Schwanheide, Helmstedt-Marionborn, Bebru-Wartha, Ludwlgslust-Probst-tello, Kof-Gutenfurst, and Luteck-Herrnburg. Controls on civilian rail passengers are the some as for civilian highway travelers and are discussed below.

Roll shipments consist mainly of heavy bulk goods, but items fror. all ofategories of freight mentioned above ore represented. More coal, primaryproducts, and Inorganic chemicals ore usually transported by rail than by voter or rood. oal tonnages accounted for9 percent of the total roll traffic. Primary agricultural products occwinted for aboutercent. The remainingercent is widely distributed. 6 percent of the cool ondercent of the agricultural products shipped from the Federal Republic moved by roil.


The basic decisions regarding road connections between Berlin and the Western Zones of Occupation were made at the5 conference between Marshal Zhukov, General Clay, and General Weeks referred to above. Thin agreement was nevereach party having made his own notes, but the limes of agreement became established by daily usage and practice. The Western Powers had requested two: Berlin-holle-Eisenach-Kassel and Berlin-Magdeburg-Braunschweig; but at this meeting lt vaa agreed to accept the 8erlln-lea47leburg-Helmatedt-Braunschveig autobahn for use by both British and American forces, with the understanding that thocould be reopenedeeting of the Control Council in tbe event that the use of only one rood was not satisfactory. Tbe United States and United Kingdom did not request exclusive use of any roads but otrecoed the need for rights of access and movement without restrictions. The Soviet representative stated, that vehicles would necessarily be governed by Soviet road signs and be subject to document chocking by tho Soviet military police but not to inspection of cargoes. This was agreed to by LI three powers represented.

The Herleshausen-Waxtha and TOpen-Juchhoh autobahns as well as the Uelmstedt-Marienbom autobahn may be uBed for civil traffic- All three autobahns meet near Babelsberg, Just outside Berlin. One additional route to West Berlin is available to civilians.rom Hamburg, which crosses the border near Horst and enters West Ifcrlln at Staaken.

Two basic types of documentation for Allied surface movements were established by quadripartite arrangements: (l) individual movement ordersthe so-called "flag"onvoy-movement orders. Such arrangements,were ambiguous in defining the use of orders for certain types of single, passenger-carrying military vehicles; and,esult, practices are not uniform. For example, single military buses and jeeps of UK origin use flag orders but those of US origin use convoy orders; the French use flag orders for single Jeeps butorders for single military buses.

There are no written quadripartite checkpoint procedures for convoys. The Allies, however, have attempted to reach ad hoc agreements on procedural issues raised by the Soviet authorities. Recent Soviet haraasiaents have revolved around three subjects advance notification, dismounting and headcount, and inspection of vehicles. The practice of "advance notification" as used in the current harass-ments dates from the movement of the first battle group up the autobahn inhen the United States gave advance notification of the arrival of thison the specific understanding that thisnilateral and voluntary US action of purely administrative nature to facilitate the processing and forward movement of our convoy. In general, the United States has continued to give advanceinutes for small convoys and as muchours for largeof arrival of US convoys at the Soviet checkpoint when, in the Judgment of US authorities (because of the size of convoy, number of personnel, or time of theuch notification is likely to facilitate processing. The United States does not issue notification for convoys of leesehicles. The USSR contends thatnotification of convoys has now become an established procedure and has been trying toequirement for advance notification on all US convoys. The British generally give oral notification the day before departure for convoys of three or oore vehicles; sinceowever, they have refrained fromconvoys with three to seven vehicles ln order not to undercut the US So far asnown, tho USSR has not raised the question of advancewith tbe French.

The convoy-movement order lists the total number of officers, noncommissioned officers, and enlisted men with the convoy. The Soviet authorities verify these totals by counting the personnel. Periodic Soviet attempts to require dismounting have been rejected, discounting is practiced on US and UK troop-carrying convoys provided that: (l) orders to dismount and to line up for the headcount are given by the convoy commander and not the Soviethe time required betoinutes (never more thanhe dismounted troops will not be subjected to propaganda broadcasts, leaflet distribution, etc. If drivers and assistant drivers are the only personnel of US and UK convoys, they customarily do not dismount, and dismounting is never performed ln inclement weather or when the number of troops is small enough to be counted readily in the vehicles Involved (such as buses). Occupants of all French vehicles are forbidden to comply with Soviet demands to dismount.

Soviet authorities have made spasmodic attempts over the years to establish the right to enter or to mount Allied vehicles in order to inspect the interior. The Allies have never conceded to Soviet authorities the right of inspection, but by tripartite policy they refrain from using closed vehicles so that the Sovietmay, if they wish, view the interior. Soviet attempts to enter or mount vehicles for inspection continue to be rejected. The United States refuses to lower tailgates to improve visibility of the interior, but the British do lower tailgates, which are higher than the American and do in fact impede the view of the interior. The French have rejected the occasional Soviet attempts to inspect the interior of their vehicles.

Persons other than Western Allied military or official personnel wishing to travel or to ship goods into West Berlin by highway (or by rail) must doal with East German representatives, not with Soviet representatives, and are subject to Bust German passport and customs controls.

West Germans residing in the Federal Republic and West Berliners are askedr.n,rfm- - ii1 "ii in i

viwuc nave rttiuxj-wiie persons were going on to or rexuming rrora 'another country, but most West Germans have been showing their Federal Identity Cards (BundespersonalaugweiBen). West Berliners present the provisional Berlin Personal Identity Cards (behelfsmejsigen Berlin Personalausweisen). Son-Germans and West Germans using Federal Republic passports showing permanent residence abroad are required to obtain visas from East German officials. Theco controls effectively* provide the East Germans with power to determine who and what may enter Eaet Germany, even if only for transit to West Berlin. The East Germans also exercise police power over non-Allied personnel along the There were, for example, lUh known arrests or detentions of varying duration on the interzonal highways0 and again

In addition to his own personal identification the driverotor vehicle must have an Interzonal Trade Permit (Waresbegleltschein: WBS) for the vehicle itself because motor vehicles are on the Allied Restricted Listn the case of vehicles leaving Berlin permanently, not only the original Interzonal Trade Permit but also an Interzonal Trade Permit issued in West Berlin has been As late asome vehiclesincluding some owned by American civiliansere confiscated under this regulation. us driver, in addition, mustist of bus passengers when he crosses the demarcation line. Apermit (Laufzettel) is then issued by the East German authorities without charge for each motor vehicle, regardless of the number of passengers. The Laufzettel contains personal data about the travelers, the amount of money and other valuables they are carrying, and the registration number of the motor vehicle The document is surrendered upon leaving Eaet Germany. ruck must have, in addition to the essential Interzonal Trade Permit, bills of lading and, ifoad list. EaBt German officials frequently inspect these documents, and. difficulties may arisa if they do not agree with the Interzonal Trade Permit. East Germanalso have been known to examine the drivers Trip Book (Fahrtenbuch) and other records.

Over the years the actual practice of East German officials has beenand their procedures have varied both from time to time and from place to place. Thus, certain control pointseputation of being stricter than others. Hot only have individual control personnel acted arbitrarily, butalso have been changed radically with little or no advance notice orJustification. Such changes seem, in retrospect, to bo attuned to over-all Rast German-Soviet policyis Berlin. Tlie sharp increase in autobahn tolls5ampaign against the conveyance of alleged war production in the fall0 are examples of such tactics.

Failures to satisfy tho customs officials may result in long delays, degrading interrogations, fines, or even confiscation of oerchandise. Confiscations,have been very infrequent in recent years and fines generally have been modest in terms of the limits permissible under pertinent Sast German legislation.

For vehicles traveling between Berlin and the Federalcontribution to the upkeep of the roads" must be paid, the amount depending upon how far they travel. The proceeds from these taxes are considerable, as can be gauged from traffic figuresehicles used the highways between Berlin end the Federal Republic.

Practically allategories of freight are represented in the Federal Republic-West Berlin truck traffic. , despite this diversity, most rood shipments from the Federal Republic fellategories: paper products, primary agricultural products, iron and steel, stones and earth, and food products.

C,nbound trucksillion tons, an average loud7 tons per truck. ay week, this was an average ofrucks per day. Aboutercent of the trucks are licensed in Wost Berlin.

Inland Waterways

West Berlin is connected with the Federal Republic by two inlandystem of canals links West Berlin with the Elbe between Havelburg and Magdeburg. Barges can then either ply the Elbe River all the way to Hamburg or thoy canto the Mlttellandkanal, which connects with the Ruhr waterways.

he BibeliDerfoiantlai bottleneck |uti north of the Orcwm interchange toulhweit ol ll-ni" Harriett reduce the uublc raao width to ona lane byillinto Ihe tenter Una before entering thehereafter, puieniri vatvtloiake the left lane and trucks the right The Alliedile north, near ihe Teltow Kanal

Although an Inland Waterwayr. Committee and the Terna of Reference for thishad been set up, It was notocumentary basisfor inland water transport. uadripartite Coordinatingof l66 laid down the principles to be embodied loPlnal). inAnglo-Sovietthe organizations and conditions of operating Inland waterthe British and Soviet Zones. Tbe British occupation authoritiesthis agreement with the Soviet authorities only because the British 7oneinland waterway connections. Throughout these documents referenceonly to the vessels of the respective zones and to navigation betweendirect reference is made in these agreements to navigation between WestWest Berlin nor to Weat Berlin vessels. Any rights pertaining to inlandbetween the Federal Republic and West Berlin derive from practice1UH the continuanco of which was assured by the New York ugreementor by arrangements which postdate the blockade. The1 end subsequent renewals recognised the use of West Berlin bargesthat they would pay lock dues at the British Sector locks inthe agreement old not delimit other areas in which the largea woulddocuments also provide written recognition of the fact that Westwith tho exception of the Teltow Kanal and the Neukbllr.-Britzeroperated by the East German authorities under Soviet control in much tbeas ore the Weat Berlin railroads and for the sane reasonsecause theand waterways of all Berlin, before its division into sectors and its separa-

axiiist-ratior.. oecause xne rotsaam Agreement caiiea for tee establishmententral German Transport Administration, it was then considered contrary to the agreement to split the existing organization and to establish separate sector In practice the East German waterways administration operates the locks and collects fees for their use; and the West Berlin Senat, through the pollco, exercises control in West Berlin over most aspects of waterway operation and administration other than the operation and maintenance of the locks themselves.

To an even greater extent than rail transport, bargee carry bulk goods. Of thetatisticalategoriescoal, stones and earth, POL, and iron and steelomprise more thanercent of the tonnages. Normal transit time from Hamburgays for self-propelled bargesays for towed barges. Prom the Ruhr the corresponding figuresays ando lh days, respectively.

Although not the greatest in tonnage, POL is the most important product hauled.boutercent of the POL imported from the Federal Republic come by barge, compared withercent by truck andercent by rail. Barges also aro leading carriers of nonferrous metals, rubber jn-cducts, and asbestos products. The British military forces bring coal in by barge; the United States uses trains.

or the first year since the war, barges actually led rail and highway vehicles as inbound carrier, withercent of the total tonnage. The average loadons. Traffic via the Elbe from Hamburgarges, whereas that on the Hittellandkanal amountedarges, chiefly from the Ruhr. Practically all of the barges were of Federal Republic registry.

Since, each barge operator is required to show to the competent control authorities at the checkpointsSohnakenburg-Kumlosen, Ruhen-aichhorst and Kladow-Hedlitz the following documents:

A temporary navigation permit (provisonlscher Fahrtcr-laubnlsschein).

A crew list (Kannschaftsliste).

A valid PersonalausweiB for each crew member.

(a) For cargo-carrying vessels, the customary inland shipping documentationill of lading,rachtbriefodeschein).

goods-movement permit (the WBS satisfies this

documentation required by water policeProblems

A variety of forms of harassment can be applied by the Soviet authorities to each means of surface transport without the outright denial of access. Harassment of military rail traffic generally has been attributable to operational problems of the East German Reichsbahn related to personnel and equipment difficulties. In addition, however, politically motivated procedures also have been Intercalated. The introduction in1 of Potsdam as the point for changing engines, for example, hasajor cause of delay; undoubtedly this Innovation wasprimarily to prevent the escape of Reichsbahn employees to West Berlin.

By its control of the loccootlves, tracks, signals, switches, and othercomponents of the rail system the Reichsbahn has plenty of opportunity to interfere with or stop traffic. An accident, rail break, bridge failure, or other technical difficulty wouldeasonable excuse for blocking traffic on the single-track line should this be considered politically desirable. Insistence upon rail access thus might make necessary the supplying of standby maintenance andcapabilities or the use of alternate routings over Reichsbahnrocedure for which there is no specific agreement. Civil passenger traffic, governed only by German agreements, is especially susceptible to harassment.


ThaS^arge number of vehicles passing through the highway checkpolut& each day suggests >he simplest method of harassment of highway traffic. By slowing down the processing of documents, the East Germans can increase the length of the line waiting for document processing and drastically reduce the amount of highway The harriers and slalom-type obstacles also contribute to slow movement. The congestion caused by the back-up of civilian traffic can be utilized to advantage by the Soviet-East German authorities to blur the distinction between civilian and military traffic. Such congestion also provides an ostensible basis for demanding advance notification of the arrival of military transport.*

Under normal conditions the BabeIsberg checkpoint handles more traffic than all other border crossing points together and is therefore the greatest potential bottleneck. ercent of the trucks enroute to Berlin entered via Helmstedt,ercent via Topen,ercent via Herleshausen, thusotal of nearlyercent that passed through the Babelsberg checkpoint. 2 percent of the trucks entered via Lauenberg,ercent via Lubeck-Schlutup-

Surface traffic is also vulnerable to Communist claims that the bridges and the autobahn had been damaged by the increased Allied traffic and hod to be closed for repairs. The "need for repairs" was the ostensible reason for closing the autobahn bridge over the Elbe at the time of the blockade. In such cases the potentially most troublesome points along the autobahn are bridges that cannot easily bethe most critical of which is still the Elbe River bridge (see naps). Most of the other critical bridges are between Magdeburg and Berlin. Still other bridges and overpasses would, if destroyed, slow down traffic and cause inconvenience; bat they could, nevertheless, be bypassed fairly easily.

Hard-surfaced, all-weather secondary roads are numerous and in many cases would provide alternatives with relatively short detours if bridges or sections of the autobahn were closed. Closure of the Elbe River bridge, on the other hand, wouldonsiderable detour via Magdeburg (see small nap, Magdeburg area). The use ofetour might raise Soviet and East German objections because the traffic would have to pass through the city, but there are no practical The nearest other bridges are at Schfe'nebeek aboutilometers to the south and Tongermunde m0 kilometers to the north; ferries, although numerous, could not handle the necessary volume of traffic.

Military training grounds occupy considerable land on both sides of the autobahn. Passage through these restricted areas is prohibited to all but specificallypersons. Therefore, closureortion of the autobahn bounded by military training areas would raise the question as to whether to detour around the military areas orhorter route through them.

Between Berlin and the Elbe, there are fairly extensive areas wheredetours would be impractical most of the time because of soil type, moisture conditions, or degree of slope. In still other places the forests, which cover aboutercent of the area, restrict cross-country movement in areas where it otherwise would be practical (see map). Closure of the autobahn for repairs in such places would make long detours necessary; and, if accompanied by closure of some secondary routes, the situation could become critical and would raise the issue of using other routes, including other autobahn routes, for which there is CO specific

If road traffic alone were harassed, it is possible that the railroads might be able to handle much of the halted traffic. Although the basic rail accessprovideaily maximum ofreight trains to Berlin from the Federal Republic, not all of these trains have been used in the past- Furthermore theagreements place no limits on the length or capacity of the trains. Obviously, however, the conditions of the roadbed and equipment impose technical limitations upon the capacity of the railroads. At one time, the technical limit on the size of the trains was stated to be0 axles)ross tonnageons. Including the weight of the frei{dit cars.

The statistics forusy month, illustrate the extent of unused railroad capacity. otalrains0 cars ipritSTBITg Ififim -fi r il' fill Jaeeaowawa^nllY "frl niTI 'Ififr-rfr- VI,

- . . . _

ported. Thus on additional tonnage roughly equivalent to half tbe present tonnage could be transported try rail If allrain paths were fully utilized. l, anons of freight probably could have been moved by rail. This estimate, however, assumes that the trains would be expeditiously handled by the Peichsbahn, which Is fax free certain.

Conversely, the theoretical capacity of highways to absorb rail traffic, if it were haraseed, ia much more United. The major factor in determining the amount of goods that could be hauled by road is the rate of processing at tho checkpoints. If the number of trucks needed could be obtained, which in itself would raise another set of problems, all of tbe trucks would still have to be processed through tbe checkpoints. 90 an average ofrucks per day were cleared. Although it is true that0 cars anduses alao were processed daily, it Is unlikely that the Soviet or East Oerran authorities would continue to cooperate to that extent with road traffic while harassing rail traffic. It has been estimated that the fastest processing that probably could ce expectedinutes per truck,ally raterucks. At au average capacity ofach, this would amount0 tone annually, which is less than has been carried by road in recent years.

Inland waterway traffic is especially vulnerable to Soviet maneuvering, although the importance of the port of Hamburg and the Elbe waterway to Czechoslovakian and East German trade tends to counterbalance this vulnerability. Traffic can be halted easily byock or portion of the waterway for repairs. Reroutingare limited. Nature, itself, scoot lacUsnlts operationsy low water in summer and ice in winter. Moat of the barges and tugs involved in the Federal Republic-West Berlin traffic are of West German registry and are privately owned. In the event that all but military traffic were stopped, it probably would bedifficult to establish military contractual arrangements to cover all water tronoport. Such arrangements would also have to cover the operators because no US, UK, or French military personnel are qualified to operate barges on these.

* On one occasion, civilian traffic waiting to be processedheckpointthe right lane, in which military traffic normally parka, and military convoys then parked on tho center atrip. The Soviet authorities said they would have cleared parking space in tbe right lane for the military traffic If they had had advance notification. They also indicated that they would refuse to process other military vehicles that were not parked in the right lane.

** Although truck loads In recent years have averaged aboutons, it is doubtful that this average could be attained under the circumstances envisaged becauseercent of the civilian trucks used are registered in the Federal Republic and probably could not be utilized.

The conditions of surface access to West Berlin are complex and offer many opportunities for the Soviet Union to erode Allied morale and increase theof the Western Allies in fulfilling their obligations to adminloter and provision Weat Berlin. The signingeace treaty between East Germany and tbe USSR would further complicate the procedural aspects of surface access to Berlin and provide new opportunities for harassment. Although East Germany ostensibly would be in charge, the USSR would have the ultimate responsibility and, no doubt, would lay down the ground rules for East German actions.

Original document.

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