CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT2
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Berlin: Possible Consequenceseace
eries of four-power agreements defined the zones of occupation in Germany and provided that Berlin vas to be Jointlyfour sectors occupied by the four powers and an Inter-Allied Authority (KOmmandatura). No basic document signed by the four powers provided for free and unrestricted access to the city but separate quadripartite agreements provided for Allied access by road Cthe Belmstedtail (the Helmstedt line, with empties to return via Oebisfele) and air (tbe three Berlin corridors, the Berlin Control Zone and the Berlin Air Safety Center). Free circulation within Berlin derived from the Joint occupation of tbe city. The right of access to Berlin was emphasized by the four- -power agreement9 (New York agreement) ending tho Berlin blockade which provided for tha lifitng of "all the restrictions imposed since March 1.8 by the government of the USSR on
With tho signatureeace Treaty betveen tho USSR and East Germany the remaining Western occupation rights in Berlin and East Germany vould be declared by tho bloc to havo ceased toho USSR would have the alternatives at this point of enforcing this declaration in toto or of taking steps piecemeal by which the West's rights were gradually eliminated. Thereetailed discussion of the changes affecting Westernrights which could stem from the signatureeace treaty.
Claim that Western occupation rightshave
A. West Berlin: Since the walkout of the Soviet delegation from the quadripartite Allied Control Council onoreshadowing the Berlin blockade, the city's administration has continuedhree-power umbrella. Only two quadripartite institutions have continued toBerlin Air Safety Center (BASC) and Spandau Prison.** Bloc spokesmen have frequently challenged the "three-power occupation of West Berlin" but Moscow has refrained froahowdown on the issue, in part probably because of the OSSR's own interest inoothold in West Berlin.
communications, transportation and trade between Berlin and the Western zones of Germany and between the Eastern zone and the Westernhis was supplemented by the communique of the council of foreign ministers of9 which declared that "the occupation authorities, each in his own zone, will have an obligation to take the measures necessary to ensure the normaland utilization of rail, water and road (sic) transport for such movement of persons and goods and such communications by post, telephone and telegraph.*' The latter the earlier four-poweran umbrella for West German and West Berlin civilian traffic.
third Tour-powerAllied Auditinglong been dormant.
With the signingreaty, the OSSR would beosition to demand the withdrawal ofoccupation forces from the city within a' specified and probably short period of time. It might even refuse to acknowledge tbe authority of the Western commandants and could recognize the West Berlin Senat as the only legitimate authority ln the Western sectors. The practical consequences of this position would depend upon Moscow's
willingness to resort to measures to enforcecompliance. Shortlockade or an invasion of West Berlin the following steps night be taken:
B. Attempt to transfer competence for certain' natters to the commander-in-chief level: The USSR already appears to be making an effort to induce theestern powers to deal on certain natters concerning Berlin with tbe Soviet commander-in-chief ln Bast Germany rathor than settling such questions, as inthe past, at the level of the Berlin commandants. Tbe Soviet commandsot repeatedly has declared that his functions are limited to those of the commander of tho Berlin garrison and has sought to disclaim an; quadripartite functions. The signingreaty might be accompanied by some type of Soviet-East Oerman pact granting tbe Soviet commander-in-chief competence for dealing with Westernmatters concerning Berlin. Any such agreement, however, would bo drafted to support tbe contention that Western occupation rights in Berlin have lapsed and probably would be exceedingly limited in
C. Soviet withdrawal from Spandan Prison: In the eventreaty, tho USSU might either'Turn over its responsibilities to GDR authorities orIts foothold In West Berlin by continuing its occupation functions undnr soma other name, such as enforcement of anti-Nazi provisionseace treaty.
D- Claims that the West Berlin Senat la the only leglTriaXte" authority: tbe GtDH could demand-that the Senat, as representativefroeegotiate with the regime for the continuance of its vital traffic with West Germany. Tho basis foremand exists ln the customs law enacted by the GDR People's Chamber onarch;tep probably would have to be preceded orby the unilateral abrogation of thetrade agreement (IZT) negotiated with Wost Germanyon-governmental level.*
*The customs law contains the following phrase: "The customs status of Wost Berlin, which lies within tbe customs and sovereign territory of the GDB and does not belong to the customs and sovereignof the West German Federal Republic, shall be regulated under tbe terms of an agreement. Dntll such tine, trade between West Berlin and the GDR, the West Gorman Federal Republic and other countries will proceed on the basis of regulations now ln IZT agreements.
jwh!?; : and that West secure GDR visas to transit the GDRGermany (They already demand visas toother bloc
rno f; AnPeaation of West Berlin's exclave. The GDR might receive Soviet backingove to annex Steinstuecben, Eiskeller and other exclaves of West Berlin forming part of the DS and UK sectors. To dato, however, the East Germans havo sealed off. rather than attempted to move into such areas.
II. Incorporation of East Berlin ln thoxercise ol" Western rights in the Wet sector not involving some degree of acknowledgement of GDR
educed to tbe sending ofBerlin Command patrols into Bast Berlin. Since officials have been forced to show
identification to pass through the Eastpoints on the aector border, or tofrom East Berlin. French and UKstill theoretically go withoutfact tho British flashthe US commandant has been These consequences have resultedstrong backing given by the USSR toclaims. In effect, the building ofWall put an end tocirculation within
The signingeparate treaty probably would be followed by tbe convocation of the GDR People's Chamber to legislate East Berlin's formal Incorporation ln the GDB and seat East Berlin delegates as regular members of the chamber. This move would be accompanied or followed by:
A. The exclusion of Western patrols from East
B. Demands for tho presentation of passports with visas by all persons, probably including West Germans, crossing the former sector border into East Berlin. (At this time, ffeat Germans merely present West German Identification documents and secure GDR permits to visit East Berlin.) This would be accompanied by the imposition of customs duties.
Refusal of East Berlin municipalto deal with thoir west Berlin counterparts anil demand* that they deal directly with tbe GDR govenxxot.
III. Autobahn Access
The three Western powers have maintained tbolr right of ground access to Berlin via thecheckpoints at Uarienbdrn and Babelsberg. The USSR evidently baa hesitated to'turn over these controls to East Germany and, under the Bolz-Zorln agreement of5 maintained for Itself Jurisdiction over Allied personnel.*
eace treaty, the USSR couldabrogate the four-power agreements providing for Western access and transfer this Jurisdiction to the GDR. In this situation, East German officials probably would attempt to impose the same controls now carried out by Soviet authorities.**
Zorln, tho USSR reserved "the control, of traffic of troops and material of the garrluons of France, England and the US stationed in West Berlin passing between tbe German Federal Republic and Westto) tho command of Soviet troops ln Germany,the conclusion of an appropriate agreement." It specified that*thls traffic was to be permitted on the basis of existing four-power decisions on the autobahn, railroad line, and air corridors.
-ontrols exercised by Soviet authorities take the following forma: llied convoys: Since list August the US ba3 generally pToVTcWd brTorof the arrival of convoys numbering moreehlclos but does not recognize any Soviet right of prior notification. The officer orpresents travel orders and convoy manifest to Soviet authorities at the control shack. The lattera head count of Alliedn convoys numbering morexcluslve of drivers and assistant drivers, the dismount; those In smaller convoys do hot. Soviets are not permitted to mount Allied vehicles nor open tailgates,from time to time they attempt to do so. There are minor differences in tho practice of the US, UK and FrenchBritish usetrucks and drop tallgatos. Alliedor official personnel traveling in private, US-forces-licensed vehicles present their travel orders and identification to Soviet authorities at both checkpoints.
A number of variant'approaches would be possible, however, allhaving the ultimate aim of forcing the Allies into some degree of recognition of GDR sover eignty or self-denial of the use of the autobahn. Possible variations include the following-;
A. The Russians could announce tbat they are acting in behalf of the GDRTd exercising control functions at the autobahn checkpoints. They would probably affix East German customs stamps to Allied documents, with or without Soviet stamps.
B- East German officials might appear at the Checkpoints alongside the Russians, wnncr nr 1afOI. attempting to exercise control functions. .
German escorts: The Russiansthat all Allied-licensed vehiclesautobahn mast travel ln convoy, underpolice escort.
t use of autobahn: New regulations be introduced which would limit Allied use
of the autobahn to certain hours, with GDRion required for use at other times.
R. Forbid use of autobahn: The Russians might announce that the Allies no longer can use thebut must use some other less convenientdescribed by the East Germans.
GDR take over all functions: East German officials might take over all Soviet functions at the checkpoints without any advance warning.
G. Russian blockade: The Russians couldto permit any Allied vehicles to use theblockade it.
IV. Railroad Access
. _ . The Western Allies have preserved the right of access for Western duty trains but ln practice have permitted Soviet authorities at the Uarienborn checkpoint to exercise increased At present, two US and one UK train each way travel the Helmstedt railroad line daily andone French each way weakly. Tbe trains are pulled
cosPo^gi.or under the interzonal trade agreement.
reaty several variant courses of action would be available to the USSR:
A- Allies negotiate -with GDR: The Russians or East Germans might -announce that-the Western Alliesthe GDR tor the use-of East German railroad facilities, threatening to refuse.service if the West refused. . *
authorities at checkpoint': As atcheckpoints, East German officialsaccompany tbe Russians"in the earlysubsequently attempt to carry outexercised by Soviet authorities.*
withdrawal: The Russianswithdraw from the Marienbornthe East Germans in full control.
Use of East German railmight bea blockade imposed.
V. Air Access
The Western powers have preserved theiright to use the Berlin air corridors without permitting any substantial Soviet involvementontrol of the corridors. Soviet participation.Id the four-power Berlin Air Safety Center (BASC) is limited to the grant of air safety guarantees; from time to time Soviet controllers have re-fused to initial Western flight plans, but the flights have been carried out on schedule.
In the eventeparate treaty, the USSR probably would attempt to replace its personnel in BASC with East Germans or even withdraw from BASC announcing that all Western rights in the corridors have lapsed. Depending on its estimate of Western firmness, it mightampaign of intimidation in the air corridors similar to last winters harassing campaign by Soviet or even East German fighter aircraft. Ultimately Alliedaircraft would have to maintain normal air traffic to Berlin under conditions involving
train commanders present Russian translation of travel orders for the train and all" passengers aad Russian translations of individual travel orders and AGO cards or passports to Soviet authorities at llarienborn (only).
CoMUDlst haraasMDt. umber of variations are possible short of tbis final phase. These Include:
Prioralkout froa BASC. the Russians could refuse to grant flignt safety guarantees to all commercial flights snd demand that the civil air carriers negotiate with the GDR for permission to-fly the corridors. trong propaganda campaign probably would be staged to induce the carriers to transfer to the GDR'a Scboenefeld airfield outside Berlin on grounds that lt is much larger and faoll-OetSwtt Tempelhof, Tegel and
B- Dse notification procedures to force The Russians could take advantage ofbetween US and OT flight ootificatioo"*the UK practice of supplying BASC with estimated border crossing times for flights in the northern and centralto force US recognition of the GDR's "International frontier."
Russians could announce that aSafety Center" had beenan western flight plans would be referred.
a walkout from BASC. aodVor the East Germans could declora the closed to all Western flights, civil
VI. Abolition of the Western Military
ilitary liaison aisslona
Sjvist commander ln chief in East Germany have continued to function essentially as provided for in four-power agreements and Implementing agreenents between the USSR and each of the three powers.*
agreement between the US and USSR signedpril contains tbe followlnc kev Provision: "Each member of tho mission
lveDtravel facilities to include idontlcal permanent passes in Russian and English
languages permitting complete freedom of and whenever lt will be desiredoverand roads in both rones, except places ofof Military units, without escort or
The fact that the USSR also maintains missions at the three Allied headquarters in West Germanyhas had some part in Moscow's decision up to the present to continue the missions. Marshal Konev as recentlypril gave assurances that the USSR would continue to abide by the Huebner-Malinin agreement.
In the eventeparate treaty, Moscow might decide to impose severe curbs upon the activities of the Western missions, or even to abolish them unless their continuedcould be used to enhance East German sov- -j.. by accrediting the Western missions to- tHe GDR. Possible actions include the
Soviet commander-in-chief mightdocumentation "to Allied missionto emphasize East Gorman sovereignty;documents, for example, might state thatbeen registered with the GDR Defense orMinistry and that mission activitieswith tho approval of the GDR.
travel permits: Soviotannounce that hereafter the missionsto contact East German authorities topermits.
allestricted area: might restrict the whole area ofto mission visits on grounds ofalthough perhaps allowing thentheir headquarters at Potsdam.
missions: The Russiansthat the missions were abolished,occupation was ended, simultaneouslytheir own missions from West Germany.
VII. Conversion of the Demarcation Line into a State frontier
East German authorities longWest German trade with and travelGDR and West Berlin and West Berlin'sand travel to West Germany. Since
these matters have been regulated by IZTthe non-governmental level, which inthe continuityeasure of German .
With the signingreaty the GDRto enforce all the usage, of anat the demarcation line, which theotarch already bas designated as a This might be accompanied by theabrogation of the IZT agreement withor even the suspension of trade andbloc obviously has hesitated to take suchbecause of the value of IZT trade, theof obtaining large West Germanthe possibility of penetrating thethrough the East German back-door. In anythe actual signingreaty could have the
*In terms of travel and trade this situation has had the following consequences: Westtravelers to an from Berlin have presented West German ldcnlxiication documents, not passports and
visas, to East German frontier guards and their baggage has been free of customs duties. Westvisiting the GDR have been required to obtain special permits (Aufenthaltsgcnohmfgungen) issued by East German officials la the areas tlloy intended to visit but have used only their West Germandocuments to secure these. est German freight shipments under IZT agreements have been regulatedomplicated system involving the issuance of permits (Warenbegleitschelne) by West German authorities for1 the mlnurTrcXUYerTEnd delivery of specified, goods. onn has issued revocable Warenbegleitschelne and has refused to permit GDR officials to stamp tho documents.
**West German traffic to an from Berlin or the GDR Is controlled at the following East German
checkpoints; fflRhsay.: .Marienborn, Horst, Wartha and Juecnhoh on cue East-West German border and Staaken and Babelsberg outside Berlin. Railroad; Marienborn (passengers and freight) and SchwaLlaride, Wartha and Probstzella on the border and Grlebnitzsce and Albrechtshof outside Berlin (foraterways: Cumlosen and Buchhorst on the border
and Kedfitz outside Berlin.
A. Demand for recognition of GDRBerlin access
Private vehicular traffic op GDR highways: East German border guards could demand that all west Germans snow passports andat least secure visas for their West German Identificationwhen traveling to or from Berlin or the GDR. Police could enforce full international controls on euch traverlera, including the Imposition of duties. Compliance would be, publicized as implying recogni- ion of the GDR.
Highway Freight Traffic: Drivers of trucks coold bo asked to show passports and visas and to submit customs declarations. might be refused or Bast German guards might attempt to stamp those documents, in either case violating existing IZT agreements.
Railroad and waterways: Corresponding steps might be taken.
of IZT agreements: The GDRdeclare that trade and travel no longer could on the basis of IZT agreements and that for an agreement on thelevel would have to be instituted.
to exclude West GermanWest Berlin: reaty might provide afor the arrest of West Germanto travel to Berlin by groundor for tbe forcing down or shooting down
of aircraft carrying them to or from Berlin.Original document.