APPROVED FOB4 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
TITLE: Unfair Exchange
AUTHOR: Amos K. Wylie
A collection of articles oo the Mslwkal operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol Intetllflcnce.
Allf fad. opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
theey do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual statements and interpretations
The case against Sovietvisitors tn tceapons-retated fields.
UNFAIR EXCHANGE Amos K. WjUe
A recent Article In Aviation Week and Space Technology, a
Tba United State* fctumber of opUcal maaer lethal-weapons pjugiams which may lead lo enure famUlca of reroluUooary new weapons, possiblyast,on nuclear defense against balUsUe miaBlea, by as early as UM
middle of this decade.
Tba optical maset radlaUon weapon *Ul ban far broader Uapn-cauons than balllsUc missile defense alone, although thehe prima need. In space, beyond tbe attenuating and scatteringof the earth's atmosphere, power requirements might be aharply reduced, and with device refinements, weapon devices made small enough to be carried on Inspector satellites or larger space vehicles as anUaatelllte or spacecraft defense weapons.
As an antl-pcraonnel or anU-tank weapon the defies would be useful, but, some Industry sources speeulata, Is roughly likepheasants with an elephant gun. Nevertheless, these appllea-r. are being InvosUgated by Army agencies such as Frankfort Arsenal. Bettingefensive curtain through which neither man nor machine could pass may alsoistinct radlaUon weapon possibility.
A similar articleLightWeapon of tbe Future". Hem and World Report' says of lasers:
Author!Ilea sea the USace with Russiaadical new family of Important weapons. Itmc* tbat could have far-retching effects In UM years ahead.
These articlesaluable background forof the recent visit to tbe United State* of Yurly Mikhailo-vlcbenior scientist at tbe Institute of Physics rmeai P. N. Lebedev, underf tbe Exchange Agreement between the National Academy of Science and the Academy of
.nr Weaponsy Barry Miller. March M.S.
Apm a, iwa,
Sciences of the USSR He wu scheduled during his tour to conduct research at Harvard University, visit nut, Columbia, California Institute of Technology, and the University ofand attend meetings of the American Physical Society ln New York-Two revealing scientific comments on Popov and his visit
the particular attention of the intelligence com-
munity. The observationsrofessor of.pecialist on lasers, con-
are as follows:
Turtj Popovtnaaer-laserll rightis own description ol
Popov said theosy maaer. This would mean theyat toast one. They an extremely interested ln tu properties for burning opfor destruction. Popov said, addlnc that he wax fascinatedaaaer he bad seen in the OS which could bum through Ox razoris ruby maser apparently cannot do this.
With respect to the use of lasers for destruction,ywithin five yean tt will be possible toaser raydestroying an ICDM In flight. Ofid not discusswith Popov,man at his technicalbaa this possibility in fullonclude that Popov la In thao learn aa much aa possible
about our laaer work, in particular
Popovears old, and aeema to havt Use sort ofould associate with an amblUoua guy. Bla English is very good. Hearge vocabulary, lie can even pltk up sobUe
The other comment wu offeredhysicist, aof the technical staff. research organization, after meeting and having dinner with Popov.
IB theave met and convened with many Sovietbut neveret on* so corrupt and Communistaa Dr.
Popovhrewd and intelligent man. Br en though he
was relaxed, be was dlf&cnlt to draw oat and was cautious about
any definite statements He was also very cynical In
altitude, saying In essence, "We know more about you than you do about us. Tou cant learn anything about our work. On tbe
other hand ail we have to do la come to tout country and buj all the technical Information weHere heeferring lo the open aale of technicale wu probably In-itructed to absorb aa much information aa possible beforeto the ussr because he read continuously while here all the latest publication* on masers and lasers and any other material akin to this.
During our conversation. Dr. Popov said that he wanted to obtain (purchase) some DO manufactured rubysked him why. Be said thai those of the US were superior lo those nude In the USSR. Be said he was also baterated laSlaser unit. He then asked meew.dcvlte called the Oofier Cell, used for Infrared radiation. CvldcaUylhe Soviets neither haveevice nor the literature Uiareof and he wanted to Irani something about It However, rather than ask sna outright bow the cell was constructed be asked what the parameters of the celloldidn't
The sclenUflc exchange programine Idea. Out In mythe Soviets are probably gaining more from It than we an. In the case of Dr. Popov, be tried to loam everything be could and fromould ascertain, stuck his nose Into everything. Be visited some of tbe centers of our maaer and laser research and will probably take some valuable Information back to the ussr. His knowledge of up-to-date us maaer and laser data was rather embarrassing.aid, be read everything that be could on the subject and in some Instances was better Informed on the subject than L
Dr. Popov bad nothing but praise roe the Coeamunlit regime. To Mm. Stalin and Khrushchev are both great
Was Yurly Mlkhailovich Popov's visit to the United States In the national Interest? To ask the question is to answer it. He was an agent of our principal adversary assigned toall the Information he could on our workeld basic to revolutionary new weapons. He apparently met withsuccess in his mission, and he Is now back Inusing the knowledge he gained In the United States to help the USSR win the race to develop the laser into anmilitary instrument Moreover, with the knowledge he gained In the United States he Isosition to help the Soviet espionage effort targeted on any future classifiedIn US. research on the laser.
Is this an Isolated caseoviet scientific visit Injurious to the United States? Considering the history of the USSR and the Communist philosophy, It is clear that the Soviet
Party and Government would never permitSoviet scientist to come to tbe United Stales unless lt thought that tbe visit would promote the achievement ol ultimate Soviet objectives. Admittedly one of these objectives Is the elimination of our political and social system. It therefore follows that each visiting Soviet scientist must be assumed to be an agent,to the continuing control of the Soviet state and the CPSU. who has been carefully briefed to obtain while in the United States trlenf'*V* intelligence ofvalue to tbe USSR _WhaUh>Dpcn5jf_the .agent should .seem notienUy^menable to Party 'dlsclplme^?hlle fa' the United States Is illustrated by the sudden departure on1 of the Soviet chemist Oleg Nikolaevich Plrogov from this
] country. The circumstances of his abrupt recall, ostensibly becauseamily emergency, have been said to center on tbe fact that PlrogoVs most outstanding trait was bis utter disdain for the Soviet political officials at the office of the
I USSR Mission to the Unitedark Avenue, New York City.
Soviet scientists in the United States are not under USsurveillance. The great majority of them can speak English adequately and read it with case. They are In most
| cases seeking information in fields In which we are ahead of the Soviets. And we have no law prohibiting our scientists from imparting knowledge and techniques to their scientificfrom tbe USSR unless they have been formally clas-
j sTfled by some competent agency of the government.
! Many Soviet "students" who come to the United Statesso-called student exchanges are not undergraduates, but mature graduate students or teachers capable of learning the
j latest VS. advances in research and deveioprnent In theirfields. Oleg V. Roman, for example, whoeacher
i ln the field of powder metallurgy at the University of Minsk, where he hasreople working under him ln hishas recently, under the student exchange program,research ln powder metallurgy at the RensselaerInstitute, attended tbe annual meeting of the
lurgical Society ol the American Institute of Mining,and Petroleum Engineers In New YorkS. powder metallurgy conference In Philadelphia, and taken parteeting arranged by the Metal PowderFederation between US. powder metallurgists and the Soviet powderedorchenko and Tu. M. Semen or. The report that be writes when be returns to the USSR, together with his debriefing by scientific Intelligencevested with tbe full coercive power of tbe Soviet state, shouldubstantial contribution to Soviet,sclentiflc mtemgence'In'the lVeidof powder"nKtailurgyrVTO otherwise Is to be unrealistic and to Ignore dangerously tbe existence of the cold war.
These considerationsresumption that tbe great majority of visits by Soviet scientists to US. researchuniversities, and technical institutes are contrary to tbe national Interest Is this damage to the national Interest exceeded by the benefit derived from Information US.acquire on exchange visits to the USSR? Here we have the converse considerations.
US. scientists visiting the USSR are not under government direction and control. They can be selected only from among volunteers. Many of them feel their primary mission to be the advancement of science for the benefit of all mankind. The majority can neither speak nor read Russian. Theare knowledgeable In fields in which Soviet science lags behind the US. Their visits are made under rigid Sovietthey sec only those Installations and talk to only those scientists designated by tbe Soviet state.
Moreover, Soviet scientists are subject to trial by military courts, even though they are civilians, and to punishment for military treason if they disclose staterimeordinarily by execution and confiscation of allOne of tbe most notorious provisions of Soviet criminal law Is tbe doctrine of analogy, whicherson to be punishedocially dangerous act not directly prohibited
' SovUt MOiUry Lam and AimttMntkm, by Haroldennan and Ulroilav Kernar.
by law but analogousrohibited act* under theervicemen who disclose, whether throughor by intent, military information constitutingstate secret" are punishableorrective labor camp from ten toIn an accompanying decree such protectedwas defined to include practically allof information bearing not only upon military plansoperations but also upon the physical and economicthe state (including "human reserves subject toteamnicaautesuis of Ate.*-
finally,. scientists are reluctant to cooperate with VS. intelligence officers seeking foreign scientificecently publishedy patrick D. Wall of the depart-! ment of biology at the massachusetts institute of technology reads in part as follows:
as visitedeprcscntauve of tor central
agency. be asked me for information about the enrec-
uon being taken by certain foreign scientists in the held ofihould not give him this lnformauon, imy reasons with him. and heolleague had asked me the ciaould have replied without
it is proper that representatives of VS. agencies seekingmtelligence in peacetime should not be vested withpowers, but does anyone in touch with reality suppose that their counterparts in the ussr do not have at their call the full coercive power of the state?
these opposing sets of conditions leadtrongthat any exchange of visits by VS. and soviet scientists, at least by those whose fields are related to the development
| of new military weapons, will resultet intelligence gain for the ussr. It would therefore seem that those who advocate continuing an exchange of visits by scientistsin lasers, automatic control, acoustics, solid state
i physics, nuclear physics, computers, and other fields related
and tbecience. is.
to nev weapons should come forward with specific, detailed,evidence to prove that the majority of such exchanges have ln the pastet intelligence gain to the United States. Noave seen reaching this conclusionarticular exchange has contained such supporting evidence.
The argument Is advanced that Soviet scientists learn tittle by visiting the United States that they could not learn from the published scientific literature. But each visitovjet scientist puts the Sovietsetter position to exploit tr^Srature^^dreover,oviet. M. Popov will be always probing "the grey area wherescientific data borders on classified Information and will continually try to acquire classified Information or leads as to where it can be acquired. It is his dutyoodto do so.
Another argumentelieve Is used by proponents of these exchanges is that If Soviet scientists are permitted to come to the United States and visit US. universities andinstitutes they will go back to the USSRrue picture of the United Slates which they will spread among their acquaintances, and the result will be that the image of the United Statesegenerate, aggressive, selfish society projected by the Communist Party will be replaced by the truth. The fallacy in this argument Is that It Ignores tbe careful screening process that must take place before ascientist Is permitted to come here. Surely tbe disciplined and purposeful CPSU Is not going tocientist to come to tbe United States if It can foresee that he might actocially dangerous manner on his return. Furthermore. If It is desired torue picture of the United States to the people of the USSR, cannot this objective be accomplished through visits by Soviet authors, poets, singers, or athletes, who will not carry back also Items of scientific intelligence to build up Soviet military might?
I would be happy to read in this Journal an answering article ln support of the proposition that exchanges of visits by US. and Soviet scientists In fields related to the development of new weapons are In the US. national Interest*"
' such an article la under considerauonuture issue.Original document.