Created: 8/1/1962

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The Situation and Prospects in Cuba

the situation and prospects in cuba'

A Pidel Castro has auerled his primacy In Cubanthe "old" CoramunisU have bad to sc commodatehis fact, as has the USSR

D. The Cuban armed forces are well able to intimidate the general population and to suppress any popularlikely to develop in present circumstances. They ara probably capable of containing and controlling any threat the regime through cuerrilla- *

E. Tbe Cuban economy Is in deep trouble!

i in part because ol agricultural andmSmanaeement. Despite remedial measures, it isthat agricultural and industrial productionlncantly Increased within the next year or so.

K. The Castro tegtme still seeks to lead the "inevitable" revolution throughout latin America, but It* preoccupation with domestic problems tends to limit ita tcUrUy In Uu*


2 have tendtdr'y IhC lels'.ioilhips betweenl the pifrevolutionary Cuban Ccmmunlit Parly (PSP) mdn Camo and Ihe USSR. For theeing, at IcaM. Casiro has eitabKihed his primacy In Cuban communis, and the PSP andr j.o accommodateto that ji'ustkm.

tt.rttnutro and the "old" Communists of the PSP developed1 tndlimax tn3 Castro had accepted "old" Communists In evriy branch of his government and had relied reavily on them for their evpcrtlsc. Hoaxer, he vas amlous to pieicive Ml own authoriiy as leader of the Cuban "volution and wanted the -new"*followers of the Jflth oft least equal to that of the te'eran PSP members. Castro va> a'-oto haveember of the "Socialist camp" and resented the appellation of "national democracy* (as opposed lo "socuuislwhich vu Indented for Cuba In 1BS0 at acongress of CommunUt Parly. Li MafCOw. Theere rtlue-tani to make these concessionsegime that they did not eonilder to be Communist and that vaa nol ur.Jrr thrlr Ann control

S. Castro kept up the pressure for fullproclaimingockaiist atates-MttL-nlnUt Meantime elements ofPSP puihH ahead as rapidly ai possible looM" CommunUtof Cuba through the machinery of theftevolu! Senary Organisationsn Interim parly set up lo bring together -he various political forces behind Ihe regime andlngle dominant political parly.fommdnut Ambrl Cieaiante. the organ-

Utng secrciary of ORI. was lh* key figure Li

this effort.

he resulta heitf-en clsvh between the "eld" ComnuniiU anj Castro wholhat they vere threatening his posf.ion and that of his loyal followers ofh ol July Movement Aflcr cirelul maneuverew National Directorate for the ORJ was ag*red *'pon. In which power was shifted from "old" to "new" Conimunisis Thenarch Castro denounced Anibal Escala-tte and by implication a'l "old" Communist* for seeking lo dominate the Cuban revolution.

5 Further reorganuallon ef the ORI and of Oliver elements of the regime's politicalfollowed, with the general effect of strengthening Ihe petitionthe "new"These changes, nowiicr, can by no means be describedhol uale purge of the veteran Communists, Including Dlas Roca. the PSP chairman, have rcmalred In important positions and Caslro has made It clear Ihal the differences between "old" and "new" Communists are not over the goal of eommunialng Cuba The overall effevt of the "Cscalanlend of then the regime which followed, was tne assertion of Castro's personal leadership of Cuban

Neither the PSP nor the scieis proved willing to contest the Issue with Castro. Both moved quickly touthority and lo reaffirm their close Iks with him. Bias Roca rove his approval to Castro's moveEsralante "

I Move* thro proceeded toCub* in ihehwrtrchy byiter i- Bioc Hates and ahead of Yug&ilatU on thr list of May Day greetings and by iwh minoruflctnt moies ai referring to the CubanComrade

n yieldinf* to Castro's drsire to have Cub* broughtloser relationship wlih the Bloc,ifteatt concession. That thr/ shou'ddone ao. fully aware of Ca*tro'a undisciplined nature,aaure not only of thenci they attach to Cuba, but also of lhe narrow Acid of choice open lo Ihem.

I The Soviet Union hu also made adm lie conceuton in lis agreement U>ine of credit for the purchase ofgoods II has. In elect, reaffirmed its willingness to pay Ihe increasing costs ofCuba aJloa;,the Cubans' failures Ind o( economic reorf aruiatton and deeetop.neol

n balance. Castro Istrongerton now than appearedew monthsMe has awe fled Mi leadeiship and It has been accepted by the USSR and by the "cH" Communutt In Cuba Heemarkable political akllls and anlo engage in carefully calculateswhichn obseared by his genenuJj erratic andowell in control of the apparatus ofand security. Hu itiickea-tanur aod the efforts of *he "old" Communists and the reshuffling ef the top leadership ofnd the armec fonts havetausAed the majorily of lhe "new" Com-muruJts. who writ becoming restlre. At lhe same time he has retained the cooperation ef thtCoouTtunlets and Use USSR. He probably believes lhat be can handle them and lhat both the "bid" Cuban Communists and Moscow bhui continue to accept bin as the Indispensable mat in Cuba.

II. Theecoming moreto lheandof the regime

apabilities of the CVbanrees lo (upprru Iniurreetion ofn-Hon have been greatly enhanced by the oe's protiton ol nllitary equfcpmensmlani] struct ionhoroughgoing reorganl-Iioa Initialed In the fall ofThis re-gar liatlon and concomitant training pro-mm> are now weBalthough nol mpleled.'

idvben andare believed to be now tn Cuba (oc advisers are probably assigned lo the inclpal statu throughout the rr Ultary estab-ihment Host of the insL'areat establisheel military schools and ainlng areas. In addition, aetvral hundred uban muiurj personnel have received or sue celvtng military Instruction tn Bloc coua-te*.

lmost certainly the present military tfabiuhmentoMieaDy reU-jlc- and purgM have Ift.L'.aihe seriously disaffected eleoverts. he principal eornmar.derseenheir personal loyalty to the Castro rothert. Gatteniion has been paid lo ae polliicalhe troops, forale probably has been adicr-clyome Instances, particularly among reserve arrtponentj. by Ihe discontent of lhe general oputaiion However, the military rsUbHrh-lenthole wul aim catpport nd defend the Castro regime, unlessmminent. .

he Cuban ground forces are to'.andmg army of abo menead) reserve ofhe s'andlngersonnel sene as full-lime cadres in readyunits In addition, there are homepufjrd type militia Units numbering "nl HjTWffli

id. The standing army has received Inlen-alte training in Ihe use of anni and equipment and tactical training through wlhe batution combat team level ll haacapabilities for Ihe eombal employment of armor and artillery (Including antiaircraft and antitank, weapons) hitherto unknown in any Caribbean country.

IT. Thr ready reserve battalions we leu heavily armed and hu thoroughly trainedull-timearying fromJHj lo MB men. The remaining personnel are available for only one or twoeekonth of active duty turning each yexr. The arms are kept tn the custody of the fuJ-llme cadre. These battalions are baud on placci of employment and are generallyof rapid mobilisation

U. The homeguard mUitla units have no significant combat capability. Theiro augment thes necessary to eoo-fc-ol the ,

h* CuNan ground forco arc well able toeneral population and to aup^rcu any popular Insurrection likely lo develop In present chcunmUncei. They hart not been able to eliminate the lo* level offuvrrtla tetir.ty which now enala In Cuba, but they are probably capable ofung and controlline any threat to thethrough guerrilla action.

he capabilities at Ihr Cuban armed forces will continue lohroughtraining and The Bloc wul almost certainly continue to support thisthrough the provision ofInstruction, and advice.

; findsuban economy leepcnlnrighly vauntednj the record budget officially sounccd for 1W3 hate by nov. for all prac-t] purposes,aridoned Tlxisruption which was evident ln industry

tail year manifested llaelfyear In the agricultural socio* aa well, tl conspicuously In the sugai industry,eart of the economy ano the principal ner of foreign eachange.

ith respcel toother agrkjlturai peod-ucis Cuba has clearly not achieved the much nerdedrailed for under theplan* Cuba's cmn prediction of food has remained Insufficientp'jcrt theand food ral toning hat becomeMeanahik. In thelor the deterioration ef plants. tHuip.ricnt shortages, poor quality of raw. grosscontinue. Because of the US embargo and Ihefub*nsol been able to find adequate scj'cesthe machinery and parts formerly Imported (rem the US and other Western countries. Only the flat beginnings hatrbeenmadeinth* reeonsl rue lien of Cuban IndustryBloc equipment

of plants by unqualifiedcfien aekeled lor their politicalcontinues to be the nJ*.

S3 The regime haa responded to thecrisis with aacnes cl changesnd organisation

- *v


ugar crop vas hard Kit longed drcj,m. groamg apathy andresistance among thead managerialas the felons to reduce the rat' ot replanting and iv*rt carve land to cirvr crops


AcUt* iuj has declined |

for the Castro regime

Duaftccllon la increasing primarilyof the growinr. inabilityIhepreside Ihe Roods and service* toef the Cubin people have bevn-Thef food,Items, owemnrs.ace: in termsto lhe inditld-jal Cuban, lhefailure to live up to Its originalOthersecome bored wilhrepetitious propaganda Onelikely lo ha'C an increasingly adverseis theirrwration of pub-

lic health condltivQj and services.

w The majority of the Cubanfoewj trvdiiterent tea ard i;

St. In the jiit four rxnnihj pidel Cattro and other regime spokesmen hart themselves aekrvowledgrd two cauaet of popular lent and haee begun corrrcllre measures. One of these Is the ditullsfaruon and uue-curlty aroused by the Incrraalngl/ ebetous -old" Cornmuruathich threatened to destroy lhe loyaltyarge segment ol the "nrwclajsj" until Castro took action in starch. The ether Is lhe tft of eoUeeUvttallen on lhe part ef fan/era. which the regime has also taken slept la allay. Public hostility to Com-munkrt rrglmenuiton la likrly to continue toactor In lhe aVxiy of the regime lo con-Ire] theut ll is the efterl ef auch regimentation oo Uum personally, riiher than communism Itself, lhat seems lo arouse


There has been toroe Inereaae In active resistance lo the CasttO regimend eip*ndjig security apparatus and lis constant efforts to Intimidate, harass, and immobilise those aho take action against the government. Th* armed forco are used expensively lo guard *gsjnrt sabotage, topublic demorutraUoM against theand to Sweep area* of nbel activity. The Ministry of Interior, runoyal Castro follower, exercise* checks and controls over the Cuban pubue through Its extensive* apparatus, its network of Informant* In the Committee* of Defense, and the tntue-bolege People'* Defense organisation. housandin everyarc involved tn this elaborale security

hli wiinprni security effort by the Castro government floes erlrelnciy limit and harass Ihe active opponenU of th* regime Ncierthetess. there are at least sot nationwide resistance group* inlaimed membership ranging fromfear hundredew thousand,n.aU tart of whom are*eth* at anyone lime.

astro minir do doubts about. iiij of facing the ml of Iffember or the -Socialist camp- Ht will continue to associate Cub* with the Bloc fid too make lh* meal of Soviet commit-menl For their part, the Soviet*I kid tn* situation in Cub*et gain for their international position, deipile theihty must feel about the Latinreaction to the proclamation ofvowedly Communist regime In Cub*l

Castro's vitriolic antl-US positionunchanged. AnU-AmericaniAm ts deeply Ingrained In the regime and in much of the Cuban popuUce. The authority of the regime depends In significantts so-far wcceastul defiance of the US. andune is unlikely to ae* any advantage to be^ tnr changing Its attitude toward the

M The Cuban regime continues to try to appeal to the Afro-Asttn neutralist Woe, e'en while proclaiming Its adherence to Marxbm-Unlnbm It seek* toauehneu-UalUMpofuorcd eonferenees aa the World without the Bomb" meeting In Ghanaand Ue underdeveloped nations economic conference

In Cairo. Kofcvri the conduct of Ihr Cuban centauries al tnese meetings has generally been such as to anugonutc the Afro-Asian neutrals

SS Tne appeal of Caslronm has dunmed considerably In other Latin Amertian italetonsequence of the Cibanvowal of Marxism-Leninksm. hit obvious toadying to the Bloc, and (hefallings of th* regime.eriod In which Castro and Cuba were the focus of alienuon through the area. Latin Aroerteana have turned back to their own problems Hoaever. there art militant pro-Castro nunonues in several Latin American stales and many neutralists and prougoruiu ofo lock with fa*or on Caslr

So Mexico, BraiU.olivia, andart now the onlymericanmaintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba. Relations between Cuba and Uruguay have been strained on account of the nearly 4D0 asyleej In the Uruguayanavaiu.

IT. Cuban leaders, although preoccupied with domestic problems, still seek to assert Cuban leadership of the "inevitable-En Latin Arrvcrfca Thej ban been veryIn attempta toew andneutral Laud Amsrteao laborCuba operates school* for noting and training in guerrilla warfare Latin American students who eventually return

ommunist parlies In other Latinairs hate been disturbed by events In Cuba, and particularly by the So-v'.ri Union's acceptance OI Castroom-raunut. because they lhat Ihe rd* and the prerogatives of veteraneen cast tn doubl. Uruguayan Communlil*disturbed by slatrmcnL. made by Bias Rocaommunist Party meeting into Ihe eRcci thai ll had been demon-etcatedonCommunlrt coulduccessfuli the capitalists rrlalists

S9 The present Image of the Costrorf In Latin America ts thailient of the Sloeailure in the conduct of its ownparticularly In Ihe important conomic development.





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