Created: 9/20/1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Tho Acting Diroctor of Central Intelligence


or! the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tacticaly Major-General of Artillery M. Clushkov

Enclosederbatia translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" oycnn.-ivn Mvsl") nur>liShcd by the Ministry ot Uetense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Amy

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Original: The Acting. Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director-of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

The Directory Defense-Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Tho Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

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Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

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: MILITARY THOUGHT (TOPThe Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designationy Major-General of Artillery M, Glushkov




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Followingerbatim translation of an article titled "The Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designationy Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov.

This article appeared in2 First Issuepecial version of tho Soviet military journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) . This Journal Is published irregularly and isTOP SBCRBT by the Soviets. 2 First Issue went to press on

Headquartors Consent: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. Tbe RESTRICTED version has been issued monthlyhile the other two versions are Issued The TOP SECRET version was initiated iny the end1 issues of the SECRET version bad beenf them


Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation


Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov

The experienceumber of operational and tactical exercises in recent years has greatly enriched the knowledge of our army's generals and officers in the field of operational and combat utilization of nuclear/missile weapons. At the same time, the exert have revealed significant shortcomings in theation and delivery of mass and group nuclear/missile strikes, both in the beginning and in the course of an operation. And such strikes are the very basis for achieving the goals of an operation.

One of the essential reasons for thesecan be found in the imperfect organization of missile troops in the ground forces "and" thedifficulties of conicoj over them by the chief of missile troops and artilleryront (army).

At first glance it would appear that the currently accepted "harmonious" organization of missile troops in the ground forces, wherein missile units (large units) are included organizationally at all levels from division to front, should assure their most effl^lenXxiwibat-utlriization. However, in reality this: is not quite so.

Dnder the conditions which have evolved in the organization of missile troops of the ground forces, the apparatus of the chief of missile troops and artillery has been charged not only with the tasks of preparing; planning and directing the operational and combat utilization of missile troops and artillery.


combat and missile-technical support, but also of their fire control (nuclear/missile strikes).

In preparing and conducting an operation, the headquarters of the chief of missile troops and artillery of an operatlohar"formation" (headquarters and service of missile-artillery armament) Is so loaded down with the solving of operational problems tnat it is in no condition to supervise directly the preparation and implementationstrikes and work on the whole complex of problems of controlling missile troops and artillery to the decree necessary.

esult of this, the chiefs of missile troops and artillery,umber of exercises, coped inadequately withof missile troops, especially during the course of the' operation. But can it generally be otherwise with the existingof missile troops? Experience fromnumber of exercises shows that It cannot.

Apparently we assert in vain that the fuuctionshief of missile troops and artillery have become altered to such an extent that he now controls his' subordinate units and large unitst seems to us that the experience from the exercises oblect-lvely refutes this.

One cannot combine in the same control organ (in this instance, tne headquarters"oT"mTsslie troops and artillery) the performance of both operationaj. and firing tasks, including theof missile units during the course of the entire operation. The modest number of personnel which headquarters of misBile troops and artillery possess is capable ofonly part of the operational tasks relating to the preparation of documents for planning axfoperation and for the operational control of missile troops and artillery during the course of an operation, while carrying an abnormally heavy workload. The headquarters

of missile troops and artillery works under the directionombined-arns headquarters and ln cooporatlon with It and with the headquartera of other arms of troops and aviation In support of the operationhole. This is the only correct method of work, enriched by the experience of warfare, and especially by the experience of World War II.

In order that headquarters of missile troops and artillery might control the fire of missile troops directly with success,tructure must be drastically revised. Butof personnel in tne headquarters of missile troops'and artillery chiefsevel where they includeontrol points, are supplied with the necessaryand personnel calculatedinimum of two positions, and you will become convinced of the ln-advisabllity of this. Inase, tho headquarters of missile troops and artilleryront wouldmoreen, and wouldarge quantity of special vehicles and other equipment. Encumbered to the limit, it would cease toart of the front (army) field command. Consequently, this way of solving the problem under consideration is not practical.

World War II' givesew examples of successful organization of centralized control of artilleryront and army scale. We have ln mind the creation of front and army artillery groups. Thus, forront long-range artillery group (FADD) was created by order of the commander of troops of theront inhich comprised two gun artillorymm guns/howitzers) and one regiment of heavy gunsrfara) . The task of this group consisted of delivering fire strikes on the doclsion of the front commander for tho purpose of destroying enemy artillery, infantry and tanks on tho mnjor aSps, which made lt possible to hold Voronezh. Tho group played a promlnont part in routing the enemy, who was striking toward the east bank of the

Voronezh River. The group's concentrated fire, ordered by decision of the front commander, made possible the fulfilment of tasks assigned to troops ofhh armies.

But there were also great difficulties inront artillery group. First of all, it was necoasary to form hastily Improvised control of the group, since at that time there still were no artillery large units, while the front artillery commander was unable to direct the fireront artillery group because of the necessity toumber of operational tasks and his direct, dally responsibilities.

A front artillery group, mainly as counterartlllory, was also created on the Leningrad Front. The commander of the artillery corps, rather than tbe commander of front artillery, controlled its fire. This isigher level of organizational form for the control of attached artillery. There were similar examples on other fronts as well.

The control of fire of the artillery of an army was effectedanner analogous to this. During the entire war, artillery was under tbe immediate subordination of the commander of artillery of the army, but its fire was not controlled by the commander of artillery himself and his staff, but by theof the army artilleryommander of an artillery large unit was usually appointed to this position.

It is perfectly obvious thatystem of control Is the natural ono,hief of missile troops and artillery of an operational formationbe transformed into the person actually controlling fire. Departing from this system of control^ which haa been tested by the experience of the war, we lose the chief of missile troops and artilleryhief on an operational scale and ln the majority of cases exclude his participation in the solution by the commander of


of the front (army) of very important and constantly arising problems in the preparation of an operation and.'durlng tho course of It.

In our opinion, the experienceumber of exercises in recent years has persistently revealed the necessity of improving the organizational structure of missile troops.

Instead of front and army missile large unitsvhlch, by their composition and thecontrolling them, fall to provide the necessaryefficiency and precision in the delivery ofstrikes in the most important periods ofve propose having missile corps andin the ground

A missile corps must be ofomposition that, when integrated into the compositionront, it can fully cope with tasks assigned to the missile troopsront in ad operation.

A misBj,lfi division mustomposition which assures the performance of tasks in the operationront which is functioningecondary axis, or In an Independent army operation eparate army).

Vhere major missile largo units are available, the chief of missile troops and artilleryront vlll effect fire control of missile troops through the commander of the missile corpshlle he himself, vith his apparatus, can more thoroughlyproblems In the utilization of missile troops and control of them in an operation, working vith his apparatus within the field command structure of tho operational formation. issile corps, in our opinion, can comprise the following:

4issile brigadesange of fire upms;

issile brigadesange of fire600

issile brigadesange of fire up0 kms (all three types of brigade would consist of three battalions)

1egiments of cruise (krylataya) missiles (five-battery composition)ange of fire upms;

missile-technical divisionRTB /mobile technical-repair bases7 and two or three missile depot (parkovyy) battalions;

a regiment of pilotless reconnaissance means;

a regiment of radiotechnlcal intelligence;

a regiment of radlorolay and radio communications

o propose such an organizationissile corps as one of the possible variants. We base this only on the average possible conditions for the conduct of an operation in the West European Theater of Military Operations, and ln keeping with this, on the possible tasks of the missile troops of a front.

The necessity for including reconnaissance meana ln the composition of thais explained by the following. In order to perform tasks effectively with nuclear/missilexploit their possibilities to the utmost, one must know where, when and ten? best totrike. This Is possible;only vhon reconnaissance means are adequately represented in the composition of the missile corps.

But at theituation has developed wherein missile troops, which aro the basic arm of troops utilizing nuclear weapons, receive only the

coordinatestrike mnd the order to fire (launch) In the vast .majority of caaos. Even the commanderissile brigade does not know the target against vhlch he istrike. This comes about because problems of roconnolterlng targets (objectlvoa) have been separated from problems of their destruction. Everyone Is conducting, intelligence collection in support of missile troops except the missile troops themselves, for they dispose of no intelligence collection means.

ituation cannot be considered normal, since the intelligence procoss must be organically linked with the process of carryingtrike, and responsibility for the vhole process must be placed on one specific person. At the moment, however, the credibility of intelligence data, continuity ofcollection, and Its timeliness are not the responsibility of the element which carries out the strike. When this is so, that element cannot bear full responsibility for striking the targets.

Has one of the decisive arms of troops ever fought with closed eyes? No. It le all the more inadmissible to do this now.

uture war, when events will develop with oxceptlonal mobility, the coalescence of technical Intelligence facilities with the means of destruction will become vitally necessary. That is why Intelligence means of all types must be represented as fully as possible ln the compositionissile corps.

Sometimes lt is considered that pilotless means of recpjinalgsance can behief of missile troops and artilleryront, but the question of how and by whom these means will be supported technically remains open for the time being. This can bo resolved with comparative ease within the framework of the proposed organizational

structure of missile troops, to the extent that this

question Is most closely related to missile-technical supply.

The combat composition of the corps requires no special commentary: brigadesange of fire upkmswill be utilizedeans of reinforcing armies, while brigades with great ranges of fire will be used on the basis of the front commandor's decisions.

The necessity of having missile largo unitsange ot fire up0 kmsthe ground forces should be emphasized. occasioned by tne'iacTimportant objectives marked for destruction in supportront operation are located beyond the boundaries of Its depth. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that conditions for the subsequent offensive operation should be prepared during the course of an operation. The presence of missile large unitsange of fire up0 kms within the composition of troopsront will greatly expand the possibility of maneuvering missile/nuclear fire, not only in the zone of operations of their own front, but also in tho zone of adjacent units, as mutual fire support.

The regiments of cruise (krylataya) missiles, which are proposed for the compositionissile corps will carry out tasks of front significance, destroying objectives which are suitable for this type of missile.

It is especially necessary to consider mlsslle-technical support, because this question cannot""De considered apart from the fulfilment of combat tasks assigned to missile troops.

Taking into consideration the experienceumber of exercises with the practical assembly and delivery of missiles to launching positions Inclusively,


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