MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING

Created: 8/7/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

MILITARY THOUUHf (TOP SECRET): "Several

Questions on Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Basic Means of Antlair Defenseront, and Its Organizationaly Colonel-General of Aviationironov

Enclosederbatim translation of an article vhlch appeared In the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought"oyennayaublished by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

For convenience of referenceB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK haa been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK Is classified ^GNrTDEOTIAL snd is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

In the Interests of protecting our source, IRONBARK material should be handledeed-to-knov basis vlthln your office. Requests for extra copies of this' report or forof any part of this document ln any other form should be addressed to the originating office.

Richard Helms Deputy Director (Plans)

Original. "The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Military Representative of the President

Special Assistant to the President for Rational Security Affairs

The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence U. S. Air Force

*

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division oftomic Energy Commission

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Conznlttee

The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director- for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

a

Assistant Director for Research and Reports Asalstant Director for Scientific Intelligence Director, National Photographic Interpretation Cente

COUNTRY

THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "Several Questional on Evaluating thectiveness of the Basic Means of Antiair Defenseront, and Its Organizationaly Colonel-General of Aviationlronov

OF INFO: 1

A reliable source

Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "Several Questions on Evaluating the Effectiveness of the Basic Means of Antiair Defenseront, and Its Organizationaly Colonel-General of Aviation S. Kironov.

This article appeared in2 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) . This Journal is published" TrFegularly and is classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets.2 First Issue went to press on

Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been Issued monthlyhile the other two versions are Issued Irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in By the end1 issues of the SECRET version had beenf them

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Questions on Evaluating tbe Effsctlvoneaa of the Baale Meana cf Antlair Defenseront, and Its Organizational Structure

Colonel-General of Aviationtlronov

The thinking abroad la that aviation will continue to be) tha baalo scans of delivering nuolear warheadsong time to oome, since the overwhelming majority of targets ln the theaters of military operations are small in sis* and highly mobile, and the combat operations of both sides extremely mobile. The enemy's arsenal of means of attackflying apparatuses which represent air attackwith high ooabat capabilities. Aad, ln our view, these characteristics should determine the nature of ths require-menta on the system of weapons of the PTO troops of ground troops.

As is known, among the baalo tasks carried out by front PTO troops arei reconnaissance and destruction in the air of enemy means of air attack; neutralization of his (round and aerial radiotechnlcal means of control and guidance;of airborne troops while in flight to the landing area, and at the landing area; and warning the front troopa and the PVO of the Country about an enemy air raid.

To carry out these tasks, the front PVO has at itsradio technical troops, antiaircraft artillery,missiles, and fighter aviation.

It is oospletely obvious that any system of troopincluding that of the front PVO troops, will attain the highest combat and operational effeotlveneas if the role and place of all basic combat meana ln the system are correctly defined.

Therefore, lt would bo advisable to examine In detail the role and place of tho basic combat means within the PVO systemront, especially since the press has carried articles In which authors have presented contradictory views, sometimes highly praising one type of weapon while undeservedly depreciating the value of another. For example,umber of published articles, authors proclaim the decisive role of antiaircraft guided missiles in destroying an air enemy, while clearly underestimating fighter aviation,which, even at the present time, in our opinion, represents one of the primary means of PVO, especially the antlalr defense of troops.

It must be noted tbat in most cases such statements are made by authors without adequate grounds or concrete analysis of the combat capabilities of all PVO means.

It seems to us that lt is fundamentally wrong to single out only one of the coabat means in decidingystem of weapons for the antiair defense of troops. Because any weapon, even the most sophisticated one, always has its weak points which the enemy can exploit to facilitate his own task of overcoming PVO.

Experience of armed combat very strikingly demonstrates the necessityarmonious combination of all means of combat, since In this way the most effective use is made of the strong points, and the weak points are compensated for, in each of these means, thus causing them to complement each other.

In this connection, we shall examine the basic tactical-technical characteristics and the combat and operationalof the principal PVO meansront and try to establish their true significance on the basis of specific calculations and on the experience gained from exercises.

In view of the fact that antiaircraft tube artillery now carries outimited number of tasks, namely, directly covering objectives from strikes by low-flying, low-speed

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aircraft and hallcoptera and also combating airborne landings, wa shall dwell oa tha analysis of coabat capabilities of antiaircraft guided missiles and fighter aviation.

Antiaircraft guidsd missiles (ZUR)ery effective means of antiair defense. Their probability of destruction of single targets represents an average0hey are less affected by meteorological conditions than other types of weapons of the PVO troops.

At the same time however, antiaircraftumber of negative characteristics which reduce their combat and operational capabilities. The first of these is the low maneuverability of antiaircraft guided missile units. Thus,ituation in which the ground troops are advancingate ofmhour day, ths full complement of guidsd missile units can participate in covering the troops only.when the latter are ia the initial position or when they are delayed by the enemy at soma inter* mediate line; and only an insignificant part of the guided missile forces can provide cover in the coursewift maneuver of troopa.

Also contributing to the above situation is the great amount of time required to bring the antiaircraft guided nlsslle complexes into combat and march readiness. For example, ltours toissile conplex to combat readinessours to dismantle it. Because of the great weight of missile equipment (up toots extreme sensitivity to road-surface irregularities, its limited capabilities of climbing and descending steep grades and managing sharp curves (the turning radiusrime moveraunching mount is not less thanhe speed atount can be moved at night is onlym per hour.

Thus, in view of the high rate of advance of ground troops and the missile complex's limited effective caaualtyohe forward elements of troops will advance beyond the ZOH zone of coverours unless the latter canimely advance to new positions. In view

Of tho above-centioncd shortcomings, lt la Inadvisable to aako frequent shifts in the disposition of antiaircraft missile complexes over short distances. While they are deployingow position, the ground troops will have advanced an average ofohey again will have moved beyond the protective zoneiven missile complex.

Even under the most favorable of circumstances, ln which the missile complex is relocated only once every twenty-four hours, up toours will be required to dismantle, move and sat lt up. Thus, even under the most favorable condition* tho maximum amount of tine left for the combat employment of the complex4 hour periodours. Evenlower rate of advance by the ground troops, there will be virtually noin the timo available for the combat employment of missile complexes because of the aforementioned reasons. the existing antiaircraft nlsslla complexes essentially are meana of protection of stationary objectives, while ln operations of fronts thoy apparently will be used only for tbe protection of troops ln important operational positions, and, most effectively, during lulls in operations.

Antiaircraft missile complexes installed on chassis of assault guns will possess higher maneuver capabilities. even this will notapid concentration of missile troopsequired area during tha course of an operation.

Tho second important shortcoming of missile complexes which sharply reduces the combat and operational capabilities of antiaircraft missile regiments is tho exceedingly great amount of effort spent In the preliminary preparation and checkout of missiles. Tbe productivityechnical battalion under field conditions is extremely low. Even with well-trained personnel working under favorableechnical battalion can prepare, withhockout of

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have batter maneuverability character la ties than theo&es, while thetioa of missiles vithoperate onsfcarply increase their combat

readiness. However, becausehole series of specific characteristics of antiaircraft missiles, which exist in future systems as well, lt is our view that we should not expect in the future to be able to concentrate, within short periods of time, their main effortequired area in the course of an offensive operation and, especially, while an air raid by enemy aircraft aad cruise missiles is under way. This is also detersioisd by the short range of fire of missilos, by the comparatively weak protection against Jamming, and by large limitationsesign nature in launching the missiles.

In view of all the aboyemeatioasd, we are not inclined toward considering antiaircraftissile complexes as the principal and decisive forceystem of antiair defense of troopsront.

We shall examine the tactical-technical characteristics and the tactical and operational capabilitlss of fighter aviation.

Modern fighter aircraft armed with missiles of the "air-to-air" type alsoigh probability of target8) and can destroy one aircraft or one cruise missile of any typo inttack. Thus, the modern fighter in essence hasighly maneuverable, flying ZDS launching mcunt, while retaining its most valuable and most Importanthe high probability of target destruction.

High maneuverability of fighter aviation constitutes its most important quality, which is needed especially in antiair defense, when the initiative in regard to the type of action and time and direction of the etriks always belong to the attacker. It is perfectly obvious that only fighter aviation can be concentrated and employed in xmse in the course of an air enemy attack that has'already began and at the exact place and time of the greatest danger and threat to the troops

and to tho most Important objectives of the front. With its long range of fire and byide maneuver, fighter aviation is capable of providing the necessary correlation of forcesequired area to repulse successfully an enemy attack in any .sectorront and on the flanks of cooperating fronts. Ensuraace of moving from one airfield to another (aerodromayy manevr) by aviation along the line of the front does not present any particular difficulties. On the other hand, ensurance of such moves by aviation while following advancing troops at the present high rates ofpresents, Just as in moves of antiaircraft missile troopa, definite complexities and difficulties. For example, the volume of excavation necessary in tha constructionield fighter base on terrain of average ruggedness is up One engineer-airfield battalion can prepareield inoours. As is known, the volume of excavation work necessary in the first stage of preparing an antiaircraft missile regiment's siting area0 my and can be carried out inoours by the forceseans assigned for the work. Thus, the time necessary to prepare field fighter bases and ZUR siting areas is about the same. However, the time necessary to move them to new positions la different. Just as the respective ranges of these PVO means differ. Moreover, the solution of the problem of vertical takeoff and landing will give fighterewperating without airfields, which will immeasurably increase their combat and operational capabilities.

Fighter aircraft is the only means of antiair defense combining within itself the qualities of defense and attack. They can not only repel raids already under way, but can also disrupt them by combined bombing-strafing attacks against airfields and against launch sites for missiles and cruise missiles and by the destruction of enemy aircraft duringand while assuming flight formation.

Fighter aviation Is capable of destroying the enemy's radiotechnlcal means. Tvo fighters can completely put out ofuidance radar station of any class or designation. Because of their great range cf fire, fighters can destroy

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"alr-to-surfee lie-carrying aircraft vhlch launch their rockets beyond the effective range of the front's ZUR, as veil as,ar-weapon-carry ing aircraft atapproaches. Modern Methods of aerial, radiotechnlcal and other types of reconnaissance permit the timelyof the enemy's preparations for take-off or of aircraft already undervay and tbe immediate dispatch of fighters to destroy them.

Until recently, the accuracy in directing fighters and intercepting air targets vas not high enough, mainly because of the known physical limitations of combat crev personnel at command posts. With the issue of mobile, automated systems of control, which are nov being mastered successfully in units and large units of fighter aviation of air armies, the accuracy of guiding and Intercepting air targets is rising sharply, and the combat and operational capabilities of fighter aircrafthole are Increasing.

Because of automation in the processes of collection, processing and transmittal of data, the varmup time is being sharply curtailed, the lines of Interception are being moved tovard the enemy, the capabilities for intercepting low-flying targets are increasing, the time noceseary for the guidance process is being cut, and the capabilities of simultaneous guidance are being enlarged,esult ofighter division consisting of three regiments vith four command posts, using the communication channel for guidance, can simultaneously directoighters (groups) againstoargets (groups c* targets). The arming of fighters vith "air-to-air" missiles *hich permits an air target to bo attacked from any direction will greatly increase the capabilities of aviation to destroy the enemy at greatfrom tho front line. This is particularly important for carrying out intercepts at low altitudes, vhich at the pro-sent time are accomplished behind the front line over one's own territory, because of the limited range at vhich radar canlow-flying aircraft and the necessity to direct the fighter against the target aircraft's rear (rear hemlsphere-zadnyaya polysfera).

should be noted that fighter aircraft operations are dependent upon meteorological conditionsreater extent than aro antiaircraft missile troops. Under normal meteorological conditions, aa well as below or behind clouds, and depending on the level of training, the full complement of fighters can participate in repelling enemy aircraft and cruise missiles; while in the clouds at night,art of the forces, ln planes with radar and infra-redcan participate. Thus, the combat capabilities of fighters to intercept enomy aircraft in the clouds are significantly lessened. In thisontinuous process is talcing place in the armed forces of equipping air armies with all-weather fighters. In addition, it is necessary to bear in mind the limited capabilitiesrobable enemy to deliver strikes from the clouds and at night, since his basic delivery vehicle of nuclear weapons, as has been previously noted, ia piloted aircraft.

From the point of view of economics it would beto compare the cost characteristics in the construction of each type of weapon in use.

It Is known that the overall material expenditures inombat-ready flghtor regiment are significantly higher than for an antiaircraft missile regiment. However, after aviation and antiaircraft missiles have been used three times in combat toimilar combat effect, the economic indices are in favor of aviation equipment. With further frequency of use, this difference becomes even more perceptible.

The experience from World War II, calculations of combat effectiveness and losses of aviation equipment, and taking into account the modern meana of counteracting aircraft, show that the average number of missions per plane is between These data permit aircraft combat means to be classi-fied among the most advantageous from tho economic standpoint.

A brief analyaia of the tactleal-technical characteristics and the combat and operational capabilities of antiaircraft

guided missiles and fighter aviation indicates that both these meansumber of positive and negative sides. Neither antiaircraft guided missiles nor fighter aviationniversal weapon, guaranteeing the independent achievement of all goals and the solution to all problems of antiair defenseront. In our vlev, both of these means should be combined in the front PVO system, complementing each other and reciprocally compensating each other's negative qualities and raising the effectiveness of each. Hovever, the principal role should belong to fighters.

Let us briefly examine several questions relating to the organizational structureront's antiair defense.

As is known, control ofantlalr defenseront Is the responsibility of the PVO chief of the front ground troops. At the same time, radiotechnlcal troops and the basic PVO means (that is, antiaircraft guided missiles and fighter aviation) are inf the combined-arms armies, air armios and the front itself. istribution of PVO forces and means between the types of armed forces and arms of troops significantly reduces the effectiveness of their utilizationhole, since the organization of coordination is encumborod, the nocossary efficiency of control is not assured, and serious obstacles are placed in the way of concentrating forces and means and utilizing them expediently. Moreover, the front PVO chief does not have the necessary forces and means to organize and carry out the control of antiair defense.

Control over the basic PVO means is organizedudimentary manner and carried out from various command posts: fighter aviation is controlled from the command post of the air army; antiaircraft missile troops are nominally controlled from the command post of the front PVO chief, but actually are controlled from the command posts of the combined-arms armies.

Experience from exercises in groups of forces and in military districtsompletely confirms the

the secondodern air army Is an inlyof fighters and fighter-bombers, which combine the qualities of the means for defense and attack and can, in the course of an operation, and depending on the ground and air situation,ignificant part of its forces or Its entire complement over to carrying out the task of antiair defenseront or to the support of combat operations of ground troops, or, what will most frequently be encountered in practice, to carrying out both tasks simultaneously.

Along with this,esult of the dynamismharply and quickly changing ground and air situation in modern operations, it frequently becomes necessary to switch considerable air army forces which are already carrying out PYO tasks over to the support of combat operations of ground troops in exceedingly brief periods of time, even to the point of redirecting aircraft already aloft. ituationexceptionally efficient control, organization, and maintenance of coordination, which is possible only under strict centralization of control in the hands of the aviation chief alone, who is carrying out tasks of antiair defense of troops and support of combat operations of the front in an operation of all the forces of the air army.

In the third place, the commander of an air army has available toontrol apparatus in the formtaff which has highly qualified specialists with considerableln directing aircraft in carrying out theirtasks, including PVO tasks. An air army staff and its command post are equipped with the necessary technical means and have specialized combat teams. Moreover, from the time they were created in the armedir army staffs have been carrying out PVO tasks at the front level, as aof which the transfer of the direction over all PVO of front ground troops to the commander of an air army and his staff would be the logical continuationurther improvement In the PVO systemront, assuring the continuity ofexperience and traditionodern basis. Thus, the already available control apparatus in an air army, with thecommand posts) and trained personnel, could

direct tho entire antiair defenseront with inaignlfleant reinforcements of appropriate specialists. There ia no similarly prepared apparatnaront at the present time. Therefore, if lt la decided to be done differently, it will be neceesary toew, special control organ, which will entail the expenditure of large meana and will significantly Increaset E. And, what ia most important,ontrol organ will not be able to direct effectively the use of one of the basic PTO meansaviation.

In tha fourth place, aa air armies are equipped with automated systems of control of fighter planes, the capability of intercepting the air enemy will be significantly increased, the time required for the collection and processing of intelligence information on air targets will be sharplyand, with the further improvement of these systems, the automated control of the basio PVO means from command posts of the air army commander will become possible. Naturally, the utilization of an autoaated system of control alsothe unification of all front radiotechnlcal troopa for centralized resolution of the tasks of detecting the air enemyharp reduction in the time necessary for the processing and transmittal of ths necessary information to command posts of PVO neana, as well as the time required to alert the troops.

In the fifth place, great flexibility and uninterrupted control, with an extensive use of diversified and complex technical means, and the availabilityighly qualified control apparatus familiar with the specific characteristics and features of aviation, are necessary for more complete realization of high maneuverability of front aviationharply and rapidly changing situation.

Thus, the problems of direction and organization of antiair defenseront can, in our opinion, be successfully solved only if the front haa, under the Jurisdiction of, for example, the deputy front commander for aviation andesponsible person who has fighter aviation and radiotechnlcal means subordinate to him and antiaircraft missile units under his operational subordination. In this case, the most effective and

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mass use of each of the combat means, the efficient and precise control over them, and the uninterrupted coordination of all forcesharply and quickly changing operational situation vill be assured, in accordance vith the front troop commander's concept of the operation and his official decisions.

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