CTOBER (Acting DCI)
Met with Senator Saltonstall5 upon the Senator's request, givingorld wrap-up. Messrs. Sheldon and Warner accompanied. , datedctober, re briefing of Senator Stennis on that date, "our conversation centered almost entirely on the Soviet buildup in Cubarought him up to date in specific detailid with Senator Saltonstall. "
Went to see Mr. McGeorge Bundy5 since (perctober Memo attached underas not quite clear as to exactly what kind of flights the President had authorized.
First and second telephone conversations with General McKeeurisdiction. Also telecons this date with Secretary Gilpatric, McGeorge Bundy, General Taylor, and Alexis Johnson. (Attached)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE;5
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Reconnaissance Overflight! of Cuba
morningeeting with Ma. McCone,Mr. Cunningham, and myself, it was decided thatwith reconnaissance overflights of Cuba. If theto be covert, then It would be flown by the CIAockheed aircraft with Lockheed pilot on ato Puerto Rico. If the operation were to be overt, thenwould be flown by U. S. Air Forces pilot In uniform inaircraft plainly marked with Air Force markings. Aduring this meeting between Mr. McCone and Mr.
a trie was not resolved and Mr. McCone instructed me to get the matter resolvsd along tbe foregoing lines with Secretary Cilpatric.
et with Secretary Gilpatrlc andhe had turned the problem over to General McKee (Vicethe Air Force) andhould work it out with Generalfailinghould then see General Taylor andhould return to Secretary Gilpatrlc. hen met withGsneral Strother (Deputy Chief of Staff,ndofficerof the Air Force. engthy discussion (butit was agreed that if the operation were to be purelySAC should fly It as an Air Force reconnaissance mission. Ifpurely covert, then CIA should continue to fly it as a The problem of an in-between overt/covert operationdiscussed nor was it anticipated. In connection with theof the pilots, General McKee directed that the SACstart training under CIA procedures to ensure thatof Central Intelligence (as distinct from CIA) could bethis first mission under the new haxards would be as well done The problem of just how much training would beleft unresolved but flexible since weather seemed to be thefactor. Tbe matter of operational control of the mission,of the film, was not raised.
morning Iby Mr. Gilpatric office tothat ha waa aatiwith my agreement with Generalwaa not. Ha atatad that ha thought tha Praaidant hadmilitary overflights, and that there/or* SAC waa readyahead with them. old him that tha pilot was still batngby as ins and that wa ware not sura whan ha wouldbut. In any event, weather would prevent oar making theSunday morning. old himoped thai by that timewould he currant. Mr. Gilpatric said that tha generalSpecial Group waa that tha old cover story for the CIAnow too thin to hold water and that therefore the Presidentthat tha military should conduct tha reconnaissance. Hathat tha cover story in tha event of difficulty would be thatwas conducting peripheral reconnaissance and had blownold him that this simply would not hold water andover story, than tha operation appeared to be covertPresident had net In fad decided to authorise militaryargued this point back and forth without results until he waasee Mr. McNamava about other matters. He told me that heto General McKaa and that they had agreed that theof theon must be exercised through the CIAa for these overflights, la other words, the aircraftAir Force markings with an Air Force pilot but the operationalprocedures for conduct of the mission would ha handled by
tha established CIA communications network and operations room with the weather decision, go-no-go decision,o be by CIA. onsider essential for tha first few missions or at least until SAC haa developed andapability for conduct of this operational control commensurate with that presently existing based onodd successful missions CIA has already flown.)
I waa not quits clear as to exactly what kind ofPresident hadiscussed the matter with Mr.at noon. He stated that the President of course had not.approved overt military flights over Cubahat theould not, repeat not, stand up and say that they warenationalf their own free will aad without Impunity;President really fait was that it would he easier to live with a
poaalble accident listated tbat tolaoutine peripheral military reconnaissance flight and that we deny any violation of the borders. Certainly this is now, under currentetter cover story than the Lockheed ferry trip. Mr. Bundy likewise agreed that the operational control and the command channels should be the ones presently operated by CIA. Mr. Bundy indicated urgency In getting the initial flight accomplished as quickly aa possible and stated that if the SAC pilot was not ready by Sunday and the weather was readyunday flight, then we should fly it Lockheed all the way.
olaall from Mr. Gilpatrlc stating that ha had Just mat with Zuchert, Charyk. Power, and McKee who all felt that the SAC pilot was ready to go and could make the flight on Sunday if the weather waa right. old him that our people were not quite agreed to this but were heavily engaged in checking the pilot out to get him ready just as quickly as possible,oped this would be on Sunday and, in any event, unless something moat unusual happens, ha would he ready on Monday.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCONE
Attached are the basic papers with reference to the weekend discussions on Cuban overflights. nvite your particular attention, if you have time, to the telephonewhich are roughly transcribed. We are cleaning them up, but this will givelavor of Just what happene
You have already read the three papers at the backive them to you anyway for further background.
ftef Lieutenant General, USA
TAB A Memorandum (or the Record prepared by General Carter,
Subject: Reconnaissance Overflight! of Cuba, dated2
B First telephone conversation between General Carter and General McKee on Friday,ctober
TAB C Second telephone conversation between General Carter and General McKee on Friday,ctober
TAB D Copy of cable to General Power giving authority to SAC to control Cuban overflights
E Firat telephone conversation between General Carter and Secretary Gilpatric on Friday,ctober
TAB F Second telephone conversation between General Carter and Secretary Gilpatric on Friday,ctober
TAB G Telephone conversation between General Carter and McGeorge Bundy on Friday,ctober
TAB H Telephone conversation between General Carszr and General Taylor on Friday,ctober
TAB I Telephone conversation between General Carter and Alexis Johnson on Friday,ctober
TAB J Telephone converaation between General Carter and Mr. Bundy, Saturday,ctober
TAB K Copy of Memorandum for the Director from Mr. Cunningham, Subject: Factora Involved in CIA va SAC Control, Command, and Support ofeconnaissance, dated2
TAB i- Copy of Memorandum for McGeorge Bundy from General Carter, Subject: Command and Control Responsibility foreconnaiasance, dated2
TAB M Copy of Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense and
the Acting Director of Central Intelligence from McGeorge Bundy dated2
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Reconnaiseance Overflights of Cuba
1. Yestorday morningeeting with Mr. McCone, Dr. Scoville, Mr. Cunningham, and myself, it waa decided that in connection with reconnaissance overflights of Cuba, if the operation were to be covert, then it would be flown by the CIA under existing procedures,ockheed aircraft with Lockheed piloterry flight to Puerto Rico. If the operation were to be overt, then the mission would be flown by U. S. Air Forces pilot in uniform inircraft plainly marked with Air Force markings.elephone conversation during this meeting between Mr. McCone and Mr. Gilpatric was not resolved and Mr. McCone instructed me to get the matter resolved along the foregoing lines with Secretary Gilpatric.
2. Yesterdayet with Secretary Gilpatric and he said he had turned the problem over to General McKee (Vice Chief of the Air Force) andhould work it out with General McKee; that failinghould then see General Taylor and that, failinghould return to Secretary Gilpatric. hen met with General McKee, General Strothcr (Deputy Chief of Staff,nd two staff officers of the Air Force. engthy discussion (but nott was agreed that if the operation were to be purely overt, then SAC should fly it as an Air Force reconnaissance mission. If it were purely covert, then CIA should continue to fly itlandestine operation. The problem of an in-between overt/covert operation was not discussed nor was It anticipated. In connection with theof the pilots. General McKee directed that the SAC pilots immediately start training under CIA procedures to ensure that the Director of Central Intelligence (aa distinct from CIA) could be assured that this firat mission under the new hazards would be as well dono as possible. The problem of just how much training would be necessary was left unresolved but flexible since weather seemed to be thefactor. The matter of operational control of the mission, and disposition of the film, was not raised.
3. Thistopped by Mr. GUpatric's office to assure myself that he was satisfied with my agreement with General McKee. He was not. He stated that he thought the President had clearly approved military overflights, .and that therefore SAC was ready towith them. old him that the pilot was still being checked out by us ins and that we were not sure when he would bo ready but, in any event, weather would prevent our making the flight before Sunday morning. old himoped that by that time the pilot would be current. Mr. Gilpatric said that the general consensus at Special Group was that the old cover story for the CIA operation was now too thin to hold water and that therefore the President had decided that thejnilitary should conduct the reconnafsVanceZ He then said that the cover story In the event of difficulty would* Be that the pilot was conducting peripheral reconnaissance and had blown off course. old him that this simply would not hold water and that if thisover story, then the operation appeared to be covert and the President had not in fact decided to authorize military overflights. We argued this point back and forth without results until he waa called to see Mr. McNamara about other matters. He told me that he had talked to General McKee and that they had agreed that the operational control of the mission must be exercised through the CIA long-established procedures for theae overflights. In other words, the aircraft would have Air Force markings with an Air Force pilot but the operational and command procedures for conduct of the mission would be handled by the established CIA communications network and operations room with the weather decision, go-no-go decision,o be by CIA. onsider essential for the first few missions or at least until SAC has developed andapability for conduct of this operational control commensurate with that presently existing based onodd successful missions CIA has already flown.)
4. as not quite clear as to exactly what kind of flights the President hadiscussed the matter with Mr. McGeorge Bundy at noon. He atated that the President of course had not, repeat not, approved overt military flights over Cubahat theould not, repeat not, stand up and say that they were violating Cuban national borders of their own free will and without impunity; what the President really felt was that it would be easier to live with a
possible accident if we simply stated that thisoutine peripheral military reconnaissance flight and that we deny any violation of the borders. Certainly this is now, under currentetter cover story than the Lockheed ferry trip. Mr. Bundy likewise agreed that the operational control and the command channels should be the ones presently operated by CIA. Mr. Bundy indicated urgency in getting the initial flight accomplished as quickly as possible and stated that if the SAC pilot was not ready by Sunday and the weather was readyunday flight, then we should fly it Lockheed all the way.
5. Thisall from Mr. Gilpatric stating that he had just met with Zuckert, Charyk, Power, and McKee who all felt that the SAC pilot was ready to go and could make the flight on Sunday if the weather was right. old him that our people were not quite agreed to this but were heavily engagod in checking the pilot out to get him ready just as quickly as possible,oped this would be on Sunday and, in any event, unless something most unusual happens, he would be ready on Monday.
Conversation between General Carter and General McKee Friday,2
Generalan you hear me ?
Generalust barely can hear you. How're you doing?
'm doinghink we've got this thing all on the tracks. on't know.
ust talked to General Taylor and to Gilpatric and to Charykew other people. Fortunately, Tommy Power was in and he's been completely briefed. He's talked to Gilpatric and Taylor. He knows what his responsibilities are loud and clear. He's talked to his people and he sees no problem as of now. Wc sentessageold our people to furnishopy of the message sent to him, so it would seem to me that things are reasonably well on the track.
ope they are.o Gilpatric this morning and things were fairly well on the trackeftasn't tooas to just what the decision was that the President made.id get It loud and cloar from Mr. Gilpatric that the operation of the mission would be under the operational controlthat presently exist over here and which we've been doing for the last two years plus. id not discuss with him the disposition of the takeould presume the most logical thing would be to keep it in the same procedure. hen talked to
he take will be, obviously, as heretofore, go to you. As farI'm not clear on your control procedures, but, obviously, command of control haa to be under power if he's going to be responsible. That doesn't mean he'won't usera"tnink that would all be very closely tied in together. Do you follow me?
ell,ollow youave trouble fitting the facilities into what's required. In other words,
ell look--we can talk too much. Col. Geary will be over at your office. He haa an appointment with you He said he was going to see you at four,uess he called up your office. Be aure that there's no misunderstanding anyplace, and he's totally knowledgeable, he'a been in the business for years and years and years, and knows every detail of thia, so if there are any questions in your mind, any you posalbly have...
ell, there are big questions in my mind right now, unfortunately, because Mr. Gilpatric assured me that this particular one was real critical as did Mr. Bundy, and they didn't want anything screwing it up and we betterjust keep it operating under the.syVtemwhich has been" operating on_for so long and with such success.old Mr. Gilpatric^that under an orderly transition, there was no reason at all why eventually wo couldn't switch the system over,elt very
strongly, not as Director of Central Intelligence, but as Director
I mean, not as Director of the Agency but as Acting Director of Central Intelligence, that the less we do to upset the normal operatingunder these circumstances until weealhe better off we are.
on't know what is involved here
hole hellot involved here. Thisremendous communications problemremendous support problem, really, which SAC has not boen doing up to now and which we have been doing for two years and have done overf them successfully,uess this midnight transition just frightens the b'Jeezes out of me. There's nothing jurisdictional here,atope there isn't, from my
ell, Pat, after your conversation withbviously, we have to work together, use your resources and whatnot, andI would think, that are set up. We can't start from scratch, we know_thjttt_butsure that Geary will be sblo to cleag_up any doubta in yourjrihad.
ell, I'm not sure, and to be perfectly frank, unless Geary has the authority to make the decisions, there's not much sense in my talking to him. I've been dealing with Gilpatric and he has assured me that.the. operational control will remain in the current channels. Now what thia means is that constant, almost by-the-minute communica-tiona between my people in three different places and between SAC weather, and constant communication control of the operation from start to finish through people who are on myf them are Airthey are on my payroll and they're in bed with the contracted personnel and they have all tho spare parts and they have everything else. Now, it just doesn't make sense to me to completely disrupt this operation overnight. Now, if you want General Power to come over and sit In the operations room here and make these decisions during theours, and we startours ahead, why that's all
right, but aside from that it seems to me that the logical thing to do in order toroper mission is to put the boy in the aircraft and let him fly it in accordance with the procedures that we've been doing for,ay, twoissions so farroblem. But, under the new arena that we're operating in, to switch this thing overnight to an entirely different command controldoesn't make sense to me. I'm talking now as Director
of Central Intelligence (Acting) ratherdelighted to
get out of the overtssure you, and we're not being bureaucratic in this thing at all, but Mr. McConeave one hellesponsibility to make certain that this transition is orderly and gives us the type of intelligence we need.
ell, we all want that.
hould sure hope so.
e certainly have got to work together to that end to get the best operation we possibly can.
hould sure hope so there. Again, if you interject General Power in it you've got one complete more headquarters involved which has not been in the act at all except to furnish weather. Now,f the people who are running these things are SAC people, so it looks to me likeurisdictlonal,bureaucratic problem that we're faced with over there.
ell, let me get ahold of our people and see what the hell is involved, but you ought to go ahead and talk to Geary anyway.
ell, I'll talk to Geary, but I'm totally disenchanted with talkingtaff officer who doesn't have any authority toecision. This is my problem, and he can't reassure me, no matter what he says, that SAC has in existence any system anywhere comparable to what we've been using for the past two years. They couldn't possibly have done itours notice. ave other problemsthe individual safeguards for the personnel involved,ught to talk to somebody about. We're getting some awful funny answers out of the Air Force as to the six qualified people that we got who have been doing thia for the last two years, and so farnow nobody has given any consideration to this poor devil that you're going to lock into thia machine--as to his future ifhappens to him and as to his family and bis benefits and insurance
arid everything else because of the peculiar mission that he is involved in, and we have some cases right now of entirely different typebut the results have been the same, and it's real frightening what can happenuy when he's doing somethingorporation backing himetting through?
ow this worries me and it worries me not because it has any connection with the Agency, but because there's another ramification which in the urgency of getting something done here does not seem to have been considered by anyone.atan't find anyone who knows what happens to this guy if he gets killed and what happens to his family, because no insurance company is going to pay off on it.ay, we have some cases like that which are in existence right now, you see, so there's so damn much that's unbuttoned on this thing stillm almost inclined to say, well, let'better risk and take one of my boys and put himlue suit and hope nothingon't know. But, It seems to me we're really doing this thing without getting tttioroughly thought out.
ell, let me check on this and
ure will,ay again, I'll talk to your fellow Geary, but there's no point in my arguing with him and telling him my thoughts like I'm telling you because all he can do is carry them back to Newcastle.
Generalave talked to our people and have just hungphone in talking to SAC, the guy up there who runs the
business, and it is my considered judgment that your fears are
unfounded. The fact is, my God, we're doing this all over
world. We control our airplanes worldwide. This is just '
mission we have submitted which they had some timeetailed operational plan in the minutest detail, which they always do. They don't see what the problem is, and these guys are in big-time business in the flying business of all kinds of sources and descriptions and all kinds of airplanes and they just don't understand what the problem is.
hey really don't?
heyand they do this all the time. They
AC doesn'ts in it,ingleo what the hell difference does that make.
tellot of difference in flight planning, inin everything. It's entirely different engines
he guys get checked out on that.
heguy, the pilot is, but your people who are operating ita damn thing about it. Now maybeeek we can train
e disagree with that, Pat.
ell, I'm not talking from CIA viewpoint. I'm talking from the overall problem of let's get this first few, when it's so critical, done by the pros who have been doing it for two years and have done overf them, and let's get it and get an orderly transition into the deal. We're not trying to hangapability that we don't want tof these people are already SAC people. Whyomplete new chain of command, and new ope rational controls under something just because you've changed one pilot, you see?
ook,ant to make my position clear. If.we're,going to have our guy in th^ and run this operation thia way, then from anpoint of view we insist.on exercjsing_cornrnand^n^ controlaving this _split.responsibility. Now, if you don't buy that, as far as I'm concerned,et out of'play and say that you run the whole damn thing. Power will never buy this split responsibility because he's ready, and Power had so stated to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he's ready, willing and able and can do. ust checked with this guy that's been in the middle of it who says exactly the same thing, but they cannot accept this split responsibility.
ont get the point where the split responsibility is.
ell, the split responsibility is that if they're responsible for the mission and you command the control, who the hell holds the sack. There'sack to be held.
ure, there'sack to be held and we're entirelyto holding the sack until we get the transition to where SAC
ell, what you're saying--what you're now proposing--is that
you all go ahead and run the thing until you all are satisfied that they're
ready to do it.
ell, substantially that, although all I'm saying is that we have inommunicationsrocedure that we've been activating wekk after wekkeriod of ovor two years.
ell, now look, Pat, as far as the communications, we have far more elaborate communications in SAC than you do, and what we're doing is, we'vearget. It doesn't make any difference if we practice precision on targets all over the damn place all the time and this is just another one, so there's nothing strange or unusual about this.
ell, SAC hasn'tlight in that area since we've been in business on this.
hat difference does it make whether it's that area or someI mean you're up in the air where the hell ever you are andpoints all over, and they do it all over the world so
up, and we have all those procedures established as to exactly how you develop the points and everything else, and an operations room over here manned by SACf them, running this thing daily.
ell, my God, they've got the world's biggest operations center at SAC.
up. and they've got thousands of airplanes also which they're worried about and in this particular area, we have just one airplane we're worried about.
ell, then, see, SAC is just worried about this one too because he's taking charge. But we either got to leave him in charge of it or else you all take it over, one or the other. And, I've talked to Gilpatric and I've talked to Taylor, and they agree with this line of reasoning,on't know what else we can doust can't ask Power, but he wouldn't do it anyway because he takes his orders on this from Taylor, not from me, and Taylor quite agrees with Power and so stated.
ell, what are you telling Power to do then--to go ahead and run the show?
ell, then, who's telling us to give the airplane toell. .
nd the ground control equipment and all the spare parts. SAC doesn't evenpare sparkplug for this aircraft.
ell, we assume that that's being worked out with your people. The fact is we've got two airplanes out there for exactly that purpose.
up. Who's planning tho missions? Who's going to decide go or no go?
he procedures, they don't even have an operations room for this type of thing. on't know. Bozo,m fighting thefc>roblem. Maybe I'm really fighting the problem.
hat in the hell's the matter with their operations roomhey'velobal operations room at SAC headquarters, biggeat in the world.
uh, they sure as hell have and if they're going to control one airplane from that global operations room then they better go buy themselves another one. We've got an operations room right here with communications, direct, immediate, compelling. We've got Geary's information before he gets it, with the sole purpose of running this one aircraft on this one extremely importantate to see it get thrown into theircraft that are wandering aroundntil we get the transition reasonably organised. Now, maybe I'm fighting the problem. TMspoor guyou're out of business. The extra guy who's already down there has alreadyold. He's DNIF, so if this guyold nothing happens.
ell, what you're saying is that y'all ought to run the whole damn thing and we should never have gotten into it in the first place.
o, I'm not. I'm not,Bozo, I'm saying that if we're going toransition into this operation then let's do it reasonably well so that our first few missions which are so importanthink, are done with the greatest possible competence and not onhinkhat Ia flash basis, that'sall. That's all, we're not fighting the problem of turning it over/the military; If it's going to be an overt operation, if they're prepared to accept that if anything goes wrong, yes, it was military, then we want out, but we want out from Central Intelligence Agency standpoint but as Director of Centralant out with asrocess as possible so we don't run the least possible chance of buggering up this first, most important one. This is all.
an understand your concern. However, it seemsto us that looking at the timing, looking at the background and looking at the problem that this can be done and done effectively and efficiently and wc feel confident that this can be done. idn't make theould careidn't make the decision in the first place. This is made by top level authorities that we were to do it, and if we're going to do it, God damnay let's do it, and let's assume full responsibility for it.
uh, well the onlyalled you was because Gilpatric told me thanVe had not decided it that way and that if there was any question to call you.
ust told Gilpatric thatre notfter all my otherhatere notosition to have command sht and control rest with you all and responsibility of performance of the mission rest with us> That it was divided responsibility and that Power would not accept that and in my humble opinion that whoever does it ought to do the
whole damn thing and bear the brunC of whatever occurs, and for your information, with all the yakking I've been doing and whatnot, that'll
be McKee, so I'm looking for alittle--hut up in
here, if anything goes wrong.
on't blame you. The trouble is SAC isn'tositionthe full responsibility because we're responsible foraircraft operational. Now, if SAC is going to flyrewtake care of5 and pick it up and get it tuned up andsure It's ready to go
e certainly expect assistance from you in thatground support. That still doesn't leave you holding the bag.
o? The hell it doesn't. That airplane gets up and falls apart, it's. SAC isn't going to say, Jesus, we buggered it up. They're going to say, well, Christ, we looked to CIA to get that airplane flyable and here we've lost one of our best pilots because the thing fell apart.
ell, we won't do that.
h, Bozo, you know God damn well that's going to be the reaction, just the same as if we take your pilot and we fly the mission andgoes wrong, we can't say it publicly, but we can sure say, well, God damn it, if you'd let us do it with one of our six pilots, it wouldn't have been that way.
ou'd probably say it publicly.
o, SAC says things publicly. CIA doesn'tod damn thing as you know.
ell, I've been in this business for nine years, supporting other
people and whatnot, aervices,on't think
there's any problem there.
ell, that's all we're trying to do. We're trying to get the first mission or two cross-serviced by you providing an adequate pilot and we'll take the rap for everything else, but if the big boys don't want to do thathink somebody had better send us somethingus of all responsibility for any part of this operation exceptan aircraftoint.
hink you've got to provide an aircraft, and should provide such assistance in terms of any technical support on the ground that you have there readily available.hink you should do that, we do the same thing, we support you all the time, all over, and do it happily anddbadly. id itasJ. id more help for you before you got there than you ever realized. And, we expect the same assistance from you.
uh, so would wc.
ell, we give it all the
nd so do we, so do
ell, Pat, there's not much point you/and me arguing here much longer. I'veopy of this message'that was cleared with Gilpatric and Charyk, and you'veopy of it or should have it by now, of the directive to Power.
Gon't have any of those yet,uess they are over here.ave at the moment is the cover plans.
s far as what we need from you, we'll still make it clear to your people what they need,on't thinkellot,hink that's already being worked out directly with your people right on the spot. There's no problem there that we know of, absolutely no problem as tar aa working with your people.
ow on this other problem that you raised about something happening to the boy, why he'd get the same treatment that I'd geto shot here in the office right now. e expected that would happen to our people in Vietnam. Wejveot of people over there. (Sounds like) It doesn't hurt doing the job (some words indistinct). Obviously, we can't provide what you provide. Nevertheless, that'sart of the exercise.
ell, you don't quite put it together, you see. The problem there is this. Thereover plan which the Government is stuck with. That's the word of Isaiah. However, those are not the facts of how this guy got killed. Consequently, the insurance companies and any court of law will not rule in favor of the guy because he was committing an act for which he had no authority and which was contrary to our law and our Government.
on't think that that is true in the case of this kind of an operation.
h, yea sir! It sure as hell is! Because your cover stories never hold water. Never hold water. And all they've got to do, all that has to be shown,Is that this guy wasostile act and there isn't an insurance company in the world that'll pay off on it, and we speak from experience because we are now supporting families who were trapped by exactly this thing. However, it's your problem, it's not our problem, and if something like this does happen,why just out of the kindness of ourhink we'd be constrained to help you out, but that'sromise. But, the thing does exist, Boso, andery dangerous thing for the individual to be engaged in covert operations withoutorporation to back him up, and unfortunately, the military doesn't have the kind of corporation that'sosition to back him up.
ut you're going to back us up. You're going to help us out then.
m, huh? That would be real illegal but we're just soget on with the job we might just consider it, but
've done so damn many illegal things for you that if they ever caught up with me, I'd go to jail.
now, but you made Vice Chief of Staff.
on't know how long that's going to last here in this present Well, let's go ahead with this thing, Pat,on't think it'll be this (indistinct words which may be: time next week) if we keep going round in circles.
ell,ant to know is this:ave an operations room down here fully staffed with SAC personnel who have been doing this for two years. ell them, you're out of the bueiness? The only thing we do now is furnish an airplane atlace. SAC has got everything else there.
ou furnish the airplane and what ground support we need, which isellot.
ou don't want any groundE Yuh, we do needou need some groundhat's already been worked out.
ou don't want any communications. You don't want any liaison with CfNCI-ANT or any of the other areas.
ell, that's already been established in the plan. All that's being worked out, Pat.
ell,ant to do is to tell my people here who are standing by now to make their normal daily five o'clock decision that they are now out of business and that whatever SAC needs, furnish them, but take their orders from SAC. Is this what you want?
ell, it would be my thought that SAC has now got the ball, but we would call on you for such assistance as we need. Sitting where I'm sitting righton't know what the extent of that assistance is, butouldn't think they would operate it from your operations room.
hy don't you put it this way. Looking at that message, say OK SAC has got the Cod damn ball. You're big guys over there--carry the ball. If you need any help from us, let us know what it is. Without giving you the responsibility in case something happens, of getting (risks,ver there.
ell, let me bringouple of related subjects that you might want to worry about. We've had the Navy flying the film back's. We hear that this is going to be totally unacceptable now to SAC and that they're going to fly the stuff in. on't know whether this is true or not but is is partystem which is beginning to fall apart.
an find out about that
ell, wait, now, I'm just telling you some of the details that are involved, yodjsse.
now, from these conversations today,lanthe films to you all right away carefully laid out whether theit or whether the Air Force
ell, all I'm telling you is that we've been doing it for two years having the Navy fly it's and theet from the Indian level in the Pentagon is that, well, SAC will take over that.
K, OK. What difference does it make who flies the damn stuff.
t doesn'tod damn bit of difference except the Navy loves to do that and they feel like they're part of it and everyUody's happy and now wcew system going In. That's all. on't care. Im just telling you some of the things that are going to be disrupted.
Now, the next one is we have six SAC pilots who've been doing this for roughly two years. Theet is that they are to be stood up and asked if they are ready to revert back to the Air Forces now to take on this task. If the answer is yes.they'll be brought right in. If the answer is no, we'd like to finish our contract with the Agency, then they are to be told, well, that's tough boys, the Air Forces is no longer interested in you. Now,et from the Indian level. So thisroblem. on't know. ust wish that there was somebody over there that had the same objectivity that you do who wanted to get this thing done
at, on the ground rules given my by high authority was the decision was made that we do it. on't know what the hell else we do, andish I'd never heard of this thing because that's all these guys have had me doing for two God damn days and the only time I've sat down at my desk Is on this subject.
hat's my problem too. Bozo.
uess that's all you've been doing.
hat's all I've been doing.
our boss is gone and my boss is gone, and in addition, I've got to sit down in the JCS all day for him.
up, and my only concern is to make damn sure that every possible competence available is addressed to this problem over the nextoours,ours whatever the hell it6 hours.
o make sure that we get what we've got to getnow we've got the aircraft. I'm assured weompetent pilot. now we have the system in existence that has been operating beautifully for two years.m just scared to death, by generating all of this new command chain from Omahaew pax procedure, that something's going to get buggered upon't think it's necessary. Now that's my, that's my whole concern and my whole position, and I've said it to you; I've said it to Gilpatric; I've said it to Bundy. About the onlyaven't said it to is General Taylor and the Holy Ghost,till going up the chain of command.
ell, I've told General Taylor what youas trying to help you out there.
ell,eel so alone sometimes.
now, well so do I. Just thinkortunate position your're in . You're off the hook and I'm on.
ou're not. Tommyould say.
ommy, Tommy Power.
ut my finger right on him and said well Bud you've got tho damn ball.
C - Well
e known that and he's pretty good at running these kinds of things you know. He is personally going to run.
and he understands that just about as well ason't think there's any question about that.
ell, he should understand the chain of command and responsibility cause he's in it up to his navel.
M ell he's in the business ofy
all over and(ifhat outfit they're about as sharp as they come.
uh, there's no question about it. Well OK Bozo, I'm going todirective if it's signed by Gilpatric and if
U, theent toigned but Gilpatric coordinated it.
uh, well the onlypotnt isave nothing, absolutely nothing yet in writing except oral. ave absolutely nothing in writing which In any way relieves me, the Director of CIA of any of the reconnaissance responsibilitiesave had upow, norave anything that tells me to turn over the command responsibility for this operation to the Air Forces. J haveonversation with between Charyk and McCone, and between Gilpatric-and myself in which the "resident decided that it would be better to have itilitary operation! That'sot.
ell, Charyk told me that he had talked to McConesometime and McCone bought off completely onto McCone after this oron't know.
alked to McCone yesterday morning and then he talked to Gilpatric and there was no meeting of the minds and he told me to go over and get in bed with Gilpatric and seeouldn't get it straigntened out, and since then I've been carrying the ball.
ince then you'veeal lonely man haven't you.
've been fumbling all over the God damn place. * now have
this directive just came in.
ave you got it in front of you? You want me to hold on while you read it?
eading it rightthis puts us
completely out of the picture except for an unqualified sentence which says, "Necessary support equipment will behat's all it says.
uh, that's the pieae of paper you've been looking for, isn't it.
ight, now all it says, "Necessary support equipment will be provided" Thisirective from Air Forces to SAC. We're not even info nor are we info for the intentions reports, takeoffs ofelse, so presumably we're completely out of the operations picture.
ou are info. You were added as info.
o, in the message itself. It says intention reports, takeoffs landing reports, and so forth will be dispatched so and so and so and so. We're not in on that although we do have access to the JRC so presumablyatter of curiosity we can keep in touch.
uh, we'll keep in touch with you.
ow where are you going to get the requirements ?
e'vef got the requirements.
h, you've got the requirements for this one.
uh we've got aha:the requirements for the whole business.ackage here and we've got the whole damn package.
hat's the COMORuh
hat was the COMOR deal that was approved by USIB.
ell now tell me something else: Is this now out of Speciar Group aaaa^iiKBJOoc cognizance?
on't know, Pat, I'll have to find out.
ell suppose you go on this one and you want to go again day This requires Special Group
uh, wc areundernd it then requires going to the big boas.
nd SACaahsx has been told that. Power was personally told thatuess by Taylor and Charyk both.
he, but the take will be handled as it has previously.
M- It will come to you by the most expeditious means possible. Faster than it's ever been before.
K if you can get it into that airplane.
. Is that fast enough for you?
hat's pretty fast. It isn't quite as plush.
elieered to you personally at Andrews. Youill both be theee to receive it.
ell we've been developing it someplace else you know.
ell it's up to where you want it. We can deliver the damn thing to you amy where you want it.st name it. That's wnert they've been delivering @earirerfc of'
ell, thenssume then that SAC will prepare all of the cover instructions, all the cover plans for the pilot that...
uh, well that's already been given to SAC by...
ny screwed up credentials and stuff like that that heny flight plans to show that he isn't doing anythingll that's going to be taken care of by SAC. All the covert aspects of this operationy SAC. Is this right?
M -hought you said we didn't do anything covert only you coverted.
ell you don't, but thisovert operation because you can't put that poor devel up therelight plan that tells him to do something and then deny that he's doing it.
'm sure he's been furnishedaw from the JCS--he's been furnished all those instructions.
ell, then the only thing I'm lackingirective from somebody telling me to back off,on't have that.
ell, who'd do that/ Wasn't the message enough.
o, this message is from headquarters USAFwho don't exercise any control over me.Bit's from Gilpatric as seQzrn^&hiefc Acting Chairman of the Special Group, maybe that's all right, or if it's fromould buy it on behalf of the President,uppose it's my responsibility to dig up some release from anything except furnishing you kibc whatever suppprt you askaal for, and we'll fall all over ourselves in the field, Bozo, as soonet the instruction, we'll start falling all over ourselves right now.
ell we already have, our people in the field are all in bed. hink it's an unfortunate move, and unla ppy move, but we'll do cvjt.cyjibmgc every God damn thing we can to make it operate.
new you would take that attitude.
nd our people are already doing this. ure as hell hope it works. ure as hell hope It works.
ineading as to whether our operations room and our SAC people who are here are going to have any responslblly or an aonnection with the weather reading, the go, nogo, or anything like that.
ill get that word to your duty officer...
nderstand from you, the whole thing is probably going to baavefeM right from SAC headquarters, is that right.
on't know either.
uh, it'll be operated ntgfct from SAC headquarters. All that kind of work is done from SAC HEADQUARTERS.
ill try to get something from Bundy to protect thewhat it's going toon't know, but
ould think you're protected.
fell I'm not protected if
ell, you haven't been told to do it, so...
aven't been told dec to do anything yet, by anybody.
f you havent been told to do any, God damnon't know what the hell protection you need.
ell, we stillesponsibility, you see. We have not been relieved of the responsibility of furnishing, of meeting toamxtkotx the requirements for reconnaissance, that's the problem. Now I've got to bo relieved by that, from that by somebody. ee the directive that puts it on SAC. That comes from Air Force headquarters,now of the decision that it would be better to haveilitary cover operation ratherockheed cover operation. ow of this, and we'll give you all the possible support that we have an available and you can mmm utilise every facility that we got until you getthe transition capability for yourself. on't know but what it might be better to unload these aircraft on you too, and give you the ground support if we're out of the business from this particular area. But at the moment we're charged with furnishenglyableuess, cause we have the only capability for that. ure hope as hell it stays together.
e won't purposely bugger it upssure you.
ope you get that other one reach/ too.
ell, we're getting the other one ready just as fast as wchat's important.
o think you've got to realizeon't know ndsc how you're going to do it, that we have six fully qualified pilots who've been doing this for two years off and on who are ready to go, except they are under contractto us, even though they're your boys, and that you hi ve at the present only two, one of whom's in bedold.
ow did he get in bedold.
ore arm but now he's gota something wrong with him, he can't fly an airplane. He's DN1F. And the other two guys haven't flownear.
ell, xxasKmaybe we'll have to ittle.
ell yeah it may well be and if LeMay says bring them back in the Air Force and they want to come why that could be done overnight, if wo follow the normal procedures, it'll take probably months, but I'm concerned about them too and I'm in deeper concerns' about the poor devil who's sitting up there riding this iron chargerajor Inthe Air Forces committing an unlawful act.
at, you really arc feeling alone aren't you.
'm real alone. I'm feeling alonehink thereot of people at high IcvoIbot of decisions without the background MXJt of what the problem really is and how professionally something like this has to be done and how you can't turn it over to somebodywho hasn't been doing it in thia atmoaphere, that's all. on't say SAC can't flyellot better than we can.
understand your asawlsaaa feelinga. HI underdtand your fears. The poaition in which we have beenave no alternative.
on't have any alternative either, sitting here
oure auncttyxiucxx commiaserating with each other having been told to do somethingigh level decision,on*6thinkod damn thing we can do about it besides go ahead and do the beat we can.
uh, well we'll fall all over ourselves to do everything we can in here and in the field. on't fight the problem anymore. All I've got to do is get something from Bundy or from some authority that exercisod control over me whichilpatric or anybody in the Pentagon telling meo longer have the responsibility for this type of activity except to render all possible support to the SZ DOD. That'seed.
an't do that for you.
ellnow you can't. /I'll heaexxsi call up Bundy and see if he'll give it to me.
n the meantime as you well know in the field you don't have problems Uxdclike these. Those guys are probably falling all over themselves down there.
C Yuh, they get along fine, I've always found that out. All these God damn arguments go on in Washington. I'm beginning to think we're all pretty studid up here.ant to go back to the field too were people are nice to each other, get along with each other.
uh, well take me with you, will you.et along fine withust don't want to be holding SAC's sack, that's all.
h, don't worry. I'm holding the sack for them, unfortunately, but I'm going to pass it along to Power.
ell,'ll give the boys the word, and you tell Tommy Powers anything we got that he wants and needs for this, why all he has to do is ask for It, and if he doesn't knwwxa what we've got, we'd be delighted to tell him, but not to rest to heavily on the capabilities in the Pentagon because in this type of operations' hey just aren't organized there to control it, you know.
hat's for sure. This is the most overcontrolled operation I've ever been in.
;AG- FOR:.OEM*ONPTON AND
e^ITjjjisPJ?ITY TO EXECUT^PERAT IpN* 9RASS jf*pB -V;f- _bPS'sjiM yf-:l3 AGAINST TARGET-'CONTAINED'^
SAC :HAS EXECUTION AUTHORITY'AND; WILL
l^tJPOPERATIONS'FOR SUBSEQUENT MIS-IONS' WILL -PROBABLY' BE>C
HLIN AFB. NECESSARY, SUPPORT-EOUIMENT VILL BERT<*I. HOUR INTENTIONS REPORTSl; TAEPO^rS'-Viir^^jtClp^
TO "JCS EXCLUSIVE, JRC
IS AFBa WHERE AGaNC
pQfySAj ;CINCL*VMf EXCLUSiytf FOR CHPRjCQNaD
III, Fill WILL- BE COORft'RED'TO
Tolccon between Cener al Carter and Secretary2 Oc
Secretary Gilpatrick: ave just been talking with Charyk. McKee and Power. nderstand it, Bundy said if there is going to be any delay aa far as Sac is concerned beyond Sunday, we will go ahead with the Agency mission.
C: m most reluctant to go ahead with the Agency under the present conditions. hink the weather is going to hold us up. G: General Power just told me that as far as the pilot's concerned, there wont be any question after Sunday.
C: ave told our people to figure on doing it on Sunday with the Air Force pilot, if the weather is good. In any event, to do It on Monday. Ho is in ground school yesterday, flying today, and we would like to fly him once more tomorrow, but again thie iaifference of opinion. O: hink we are on the same wave length.
C: If you are ready to let him gonday, we are ready to run the mission, ant to make one thing clear. There are two problems on
which we feel the deciaion The aircraft will be operand
through our system and our operational control and that the take goes
through the same channel as it has been.
G: McKee just said your control system would be used,
C: We have done overf these. There are some problems oaxxAxxk*hink you should be concerned about the individual problems of the individual involved.
C: The people we use are under contract and we have insurance problems that we can handle very easily. In the Air Force we have no personal insurance. As you know, weellows under contract to us andou would get from the Air Force is that they are ready to stand those fellowa up and say to them that if you will put your soldier suit
back on, veryif not, forget about ever coming back to
the Air Force. eally think to do this thing in the best interest, we
should put the boys in blue suits and keep them under our cover
I am concerned about the individuals personal problems. an tell my people that this will be under our control, that we will make the go-no-go from here, etc, except that there will be an Air Force pilot. This is the way Bundy felt we ought to do itt least until some substitute system that is adequate can be generated.
Believe Secretary Gilpatrick said here that he was not aure of all the details and suggested that General Carter get in touch with General McKee. Also asked General Carter to mention the inaurance problem to General McKee.
Conversation Between General Carter and Secretary Gilpatric on Friday,ctober
C: Sorry to bother you. Sir. anted you to know that I've had two long conversations with General McKee --
G: Ho Just left here.
C: m totallyold McGeorge Bundy this and you canall from him
G: I've been trying to get him.
C: He's not fairly clued in on all the various aspects of this,upposer you or is anybody, really,m totally unconvinced that this is the proper way to do this thing and --
G: uess I'll just have to choose between your judgment, which IGeneral Power, who ls competent, and General McKee andbelieve that SAC can beositioneffectively and --
C: On Monday, as early as Sunday or Monday.
G: General Power left before he could have told to him what theyou've raised with Boco McKee but overall he'sthe Chief of Operations out at SAC and has reviewed theand also with Colonel Geary and and the others --
C: Well, it's all right, it's one of those thingsigh degree of
built-in competence is being thrown aside atery highly critical period in the operation,an't seem to get this serosa to anybodyeek or two weeks of transition could very easily be accomplished and not run this risk. ust can't seem to get throughave reached the point nowtill am totally disenchanted with this concept and am asking for relief from all responsibility other than support, whatever support we can provide to SAC.
G: All the product goes to you.
C: Wall, yea Sir. We get the product but with the degree of competence we have exhibited so far, to putrand new green pilot just because he happens to havelue suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and communications and ground support syetora onours' notice to me doesn'tod damn bit of sense, Mr. Secretary. eel very strongly about this as Director of Central Intelligence, not as representing the Agency or aa any jurisdictional support. It just doesn't make sense.
You have made your position very clearully understand it and
I've gotten equally clear ringing tones from the Commanding General of SAC and General Taylor agrees that this should notplit responsibility, that it shouldombined operation.
er cent that it should notplit responsibility. ant to do is borrow sne little fellowlue suit and put him into my system until,eriodeek or two weeks, we can get SAC to get over the system if this is the decision. That'sant to do.
G: Well, the difference is that SAC thinks that they can get it quickerthink they can do it. aid, that'suestion.
C: Well, in that case, yes Sir, if the decision is that that's the way it's going to be, and froman make out the decision has already been made,ave nothing relieving me of the responsibility, then we'll render all possible support that we can. till think that It's the wrong decisionill still want something to relieve the Agency of the responsibility which it presently bears, that's all.
G: hink whatever you need in tho way of evidence, either from Mac Bundy or2 or the Whiteon't know, I'm going to talk to Mac
C: Yes Sir, he said he was going to get in touch with you. Mac has the
idea that thisouple of squabbling children and I'm not inclined to perhaps go along with that in part, although it juat frightens me, that'a all, and this is not aa far as I'm concerned this isurisdictional, bureaucratic problem. We are perfectly prepared to turn over the operation but we'd like to do it in as orderly means
as possible. till think that is the wrong decision. hink we can provide the military cover story ininutes that will meet all of the requirements of the President, and this was the, if you recall, this was the original purpose of the exercisenderstood it, was to change the cover story because the old one wasn't good any more.
G: Well, we've all gone around and around on this thing for the pastand weairly clear-cut idea. (Secretary's note:was very indistinctelieve what Secretaryis that the military would not take the responsibility, thatwere General Power he wouldn't take it, unless they werethey could do it.
C: on't think General Power does know what is involved. Sir. --
^ They say they do. hink you underestimate them. After all, SAC
has been in this business forears and they fly thesethe time and nothing could be unique aboutouldn'tthey operate the whole thing, command and control wise, and
- wise, no matter where the mission ia, out ofor the Baltic, or --
C: Yes Sir. SAC has not operated in any overflights under any covert operations, to my knowledge, Sir. And this isovert operation.
G: Well the distinction between coverteripheral operation is about aeven minutes over --
C: It's seven minutes. Sir, but you've got the pilot lying and the U. S.
Government lying,onsiderovert operation. don't deny SAC's tremendous capabilities. ay is that inexcruciating tense situation where we don't know whatinto, have no concpet of what we may get into, andhave an operating procedure that has been in existence forwith qualified pilots and with aircraft that have beenay that we ought to retain that competence atwe've broken in the people who are going to take it over. simple as that. These aircraft are ours, we're the only ones that
have spare parts for them, we're the only ones that are now qualified to maintain --
G: That's no problem, though.
C: No, I've already directed my people, in line with your directive, to render all possible support to SAC.
G: Well, we'll get thisiece of paper, unlesshange, but I'm not concerned
C: ust wanted you to know, Sir, that I've talked to Mr.id nothance to express myself either as vociferously or as lengthyave to you,id want you to know I'm reallyhinkrong decision, but if that's it, we'll do every damn thing we can to make it work, and that's about all we can do.
G: Well, no one can take exception to that, Pat.
C: OK Sir, Good luck.
Conversation between General Carter and McGcorge Bundy on Friday,ctober
C: hought you ought to know that the Air Forces haveirective to SAC giving them full and complete responsibility for the entire operation this includes everything.
B: Is this OK with you?
C: No, it's not OK with me at all. I've been fighting Gilpatric evor since noon yesterday, but it leemi I'm fighting Tamanyust don't know where to move next. houghtalked to you this morning that it was your consensus that until we could get in an orderly transition, if this is what they want, if this is what we --
on't know what you and Ros have said to each other, Pat,m
juet in no position to manage this one from here. It does seem to me that there is no point in having an enormous jurisdictional war over it
C: Well, I'm not concerned about that if we can get into an orderly transition. But we've been in this business over two years, we've done over sixty of them, and the only thing that has really occurred to change anything isuylue suit into the airplane, that'a the only thing that'a changed. This started out
B: Well, why don't you call Ros and talk to him direct about it. I'm trying to call the President right now
C: Well, he's completely deaf. ome over thereirective for you to sign, relieving us of all responsibility?
B: I'm not going to sign anything until I've talked to himust say the whole thing looks to me like two quarrelsome children,ust can't figure it out fromit.
C: Well, it isn't that easy. ish it were.
B: But I'm notosition to deal with it at tho moment and I've got the call on the other line. Talk to Ros and then I'll talk to you again.
C: OK, we oughttoeeting, maybe.
B: an't believe it needs that, and I'veillion other things to do, but I'll talk to you again.
Conversation between General Carter and General Taylor on Friday,ctober.
as grave doubts as to their capabilities to take this operation over in that type of time with anything like the competence that we've built into it over two years and overf them.
ell, everybody has the highest regard for the way you've done Do you really think there is anything (flexible) about
eally do, Sir.ave the gravest doubts about it.ave been totally unable to get through to Mr. Gilpatric or General McKee
ou have not talked to them?
es, Sir, I've talked to them at tremendous length. on't know whether you recall it or not, but this matter started out as some dissatisfaction with the cover plan in view of recent events.
es, that is right, the feeling was that that was not the best kind of cover for it.
hat's right. Sir. Then from that point on, somehow it's gotten completely out of phase until where it's nohange in the cover plan, which could have been effected ininutes by rewriting the cover plan. Now the complete operation has been turned over to SAC, lock, stock, and barrel.
hink the reason, Pat, the justification that has been given to me, is the feeling is that nowather complicated and many-sided program and, assuming the whole thing is approved, and has centralized control of it, it isesirable thing.
h yes, Sir. We don't argue with that at all. General, all we're trying to do is to effect some sort of orderly transition if you're going to do it, whereas---
ur, really nothing is going except this first shotad hoped to get off just as fast as possible.
ell if the weather is right, that will get off-hought
onday at the earliest. SAC says the one pilot that they have is competent--
hey told me more pilots than that, Pat. hink we're getting different information on some of these things.
ell, we happen to have the information. Sir, that applies to thiB aircraft because we're the only people who have that type of aircraft. SAC has pilots with many many hours on
ut not with the other engine?
ut not with5 engines, no Sir. The most competent pilots that they have right now. One hasours with that engine and the other One of these fellows is downore arm and can't fly, and the one that we're working on now to try to make himcurrent, we sent him through school until yesterday and we've been flying him today, has not flown that aircraft since Januaryf this year, and SAC said he was competent even before we had looked Into his capabilities and we would like at least another day of flying him. He has no GCA in that aircraft and you just can't say thats like another. All the power settings are different, all your flying characteristics as far as engine performance is concerned are different, your fuel consumption is entirely different,ust want you to know sir, that in accordance with the decision made by Mr. Gilpatric, and he told me he was acting for the President, we are supporting SAC, but we have no operational responsibility for the project.
ell, let me just repeat the information now with regard to the availability sot of the pilots. You say there are only two pilots available?
here are only two pilots available presently to SAC that have any competence at all in5 aircraft.
hey have had onlyndlying hours respectivoly--
ifteen andlying hours respectively on this aircraft. They had had hundreds of hours onhe.
hat about the availability of equipment?
ell, we have one aircraft ready to go and another one shortly coming out of the shop. We have two that are ready to go now.
his is taking over your aircraft?
es, Sir. They're putting their own pilots in our aircraft. We'll urnish the operational aircraft and the ground support, and I've offered them every possible facility, including our operations room here which has been doing this damn near every couple of weeks for two years. We've had overuccessful missions but apparently they don't want any part of that. Sir. It's going to be operated from SAC and we're not even on the information addressee as to take-off and stuff like that. m deeply concerned. General, that'santed you to know, Sir.
Conversation Between General Carter anc AlexiaiQay(ctober
C:uit thought you should know,ember of Special Group, that the command and control responsibility for these flights that we talk about has now been assigned to SAC, lock, stock, and barrel. We are out of the business entirely, except to support them. m totally disenchanted personally with the idea and officially aa the Acting Director of Centralon't question SAC'suestion their operational capabllty at the moment. anted you to know this because I've told this to General Taylor, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. Bundy, roaxshc and as the other member of the Special Groupust wanted to register my protest. on't knowo from here.
J: on't understand how all this came about. We agreed on one type of cover on thia thinghought you were going to,hndc didn't know there wasany question of you not carrying it out.
C: We didn't either, Sir. That was our understanding.
J: My only interest and thought on the thing was the cover we have on it, the contingency cover.
C: Yes Sir. We agree completely with the change in the cover plan, but --
J: Yes, but how it was carried outidn't feel competent to say.
C: No. Well, it was our understanding that wc would just change the cover plan, do enough to make it look clean, and continue the operation.
J: That'shought was going to be done.
C: Yes Sir, well, that's what we thought was going to be done. This is not the way it has happened.
on't understand; how did all this other come about then?
C: It apparently got generated in the Pentagon, Sir, and has been cleared hroughout the Dppartment of Defense and Mr. Gilpatric has made the dociaion, acting in what he thought was the Presidential desire.
J: Well, the President approved it either way.
C: Yes sir. Well, all --
J: Well if it has been done, all right.
C: It has been done. ave nothing releasing me over here. It's all been done within the Department of Defense but, at Mr. Gilpatric's direction, anday I've talked to him aeveral times and he feels that this is within the authority that was given him by the President and that this is the way to do it. ae complained to himave complained to Bundy, in view of the
J: Yeah, your operationalhought was going to be retained.
C: That's what we thought, Sir. Our operational competence extends overissionseriod ofearsingle problem and now
J: Yes, I'm sorry to see that lost.
C: That isost now, the entire chain of command and everything else will rest from Omaha, and as faran make out, all we're doing is supplying the airplanes, and some very low competence of pilots are being used when you compare them against the six that wo've been in tho business. ay ick I'm veryave expressed myself Just as vociferouslyan at all echelons,hought that I'd better cut in the Special Group since they are the ones that are holding the sack on it.
J: Yeah, well thanks for letting me know, Pat.
Conversation between General Carter and Mr. Bundy, Saturday,
General Carter: alked to the boss last night when he was out on the Wast Coast. He said that on that subject, they didn't discuss with the President more thaneconds and all they agreed on was that the cover plan should be changed. alked to Alexis Johnson and he gave me the same answer.
Mr. Bunds': He wasn't there.
o, but it was his clear understanding he
ook,old youtodd on it last night. Now does the Director want me to reopen bac it with Gilpatric or not?
ell, Gilpatric is talking to Scoville on the telephone right now,as talking to Scoville and they interrupted me. The old an's reaction said that if that's the way they're going to run the railroad, let them run the God damn thing and let's hope it doesn't get wing Now that's generally exactly what he said. He doesn't have any more confidence in this type of procedureo, and I've expressed myself awful vociferously. Scoville was going to suggest to Gilpatric that weound table meeting on this thing,hink the wheels of progress have gained such tremendous momentum unilaterally by Gilpatric's actions that there's just probably no way of stopping them. The Air Forces are now in it up the their navel.
ell, I'd be inclined to let it be..
hinkellay toailroad. It's perfectlyeared operation to get SAC in the act. ean this is trans pa rent.
on't feel that way about it.
o. Tbc It puts them in covert operations and if you want to put the Department of Defense in covert operations of that type why we've got toot of our thinking around here, but I'm going to see what Gilpatric has to say to Scoville. In the meantime, I'm going to be coming overemorandum, sayinghink and askingelease from our presently assigned responsibilitiesave absolutely nothing on in any way, shape or form except telephone conversations.
MEMORANDUM FOrl: Director of Central Intelligence
Involved in CIA va SAC Control,
Command, and Support otane e
Thia paper la In responseequirement of the DCI for an analysis of the factors involved la consideration of the possible designation of SAC aa executive agent for the further conduct ofeconnaissance flights. In addition. It contains, at Attachmentrief history of Project IDEALIST'a involvement with5 version ofnd the reasons why USAF did not adopt thia model. While principally for information, tha paper doestaff recommendation for the Director in Paragraph 3.
It seems to us counter-productive to argue from the start that SAC could noteconnaissance of the Island of Cuba, using either theira or thosea which could be made available to them were thia course of action decided upon. Vet,ecision is made to transfer Projects to SAC control for future flights simplyAC pilot may be more desirable In the present political climate and Air Force markings are placed on tha aircraft, we believe due consideration should be given to the following factors, not necessarily act forth In the order of their Importance:
a. CIA Employment of Special Project Concept: Since Ita inception, the Agency has managed and operatedrogramelf-contained project, with the attentionmall group of people in headquarters and the field directed toward ita success and concerned over ita problems and ita security. This task force haa had within its structure the
capability to not only run its own affairs, but to provide its own separate, speedy communications, its own professional securityeparate operations planning stafflosely related staff materiel organization. It has called for Air Force support in terms of personnel, materielingle coordinated point. This project has not only had its own intelligence staff, dealing with other Agencies as their support was requiredission, but it has been physically proximate to the COMOR, from which mission requirements were receivedommunity-wide basis. This unified group of people, all working within the same Agency and under the same security system, has had seven years of experience with, during which timeverflights of denied territory have been successfully conducted, not including someeripheral flights. In Cuba alone,verflights have been conducted periodicallyesearch and Development designed to improve the aircraft performance has been carried on continuously and expeditiously within this same Project framework. Even in an organization like SAC, separate from the balance of the Air Force, this kind of unified management, operations and support is very difficult to duplicate, and transferring this concept to SAC from CIA in workable form would require considerable time, planning and experience.
b. CIA Employment of Contractor Maintenance; Again from the start, this Agency hasystem of contractor-furnished maintenance personnel forirframe and engine as well as for the majority of tbe other aircraftcollection systems. This has ensured the highest degree of reliability throughout the life of the aircraft, although this record has not been achieved inexpensively. Aircrew personnel furnished by Lockheed have averaged more thanears of experience and many of them now have more than seven years working continuously with. The military system, fraught with continuous rotation, is simply incapable of equalling this kind of experience level, and it Is this that pays off in the final analysis in terms of missions successfully run without incident or accident.
Security Clearances and ContaiiuncritInformation: Another major factor workingIntegrity is the fact that Project IDEALIST hassince its starteparate securityand has had available to it an integrated forcetrained security officersigh degreeorientation, nerving the project full-time bothand the field. The single securityextends into Industrial areas aa well. One ofbenefits is that it has been continuously possiblethe maximum amount of containment torby making certain thatnow'1uniformly applied among the smallest number of We submit thatystem does not todaythe Air Force, where security policy is oftenof local commanders.
and CommunlcatlonaProject IDEALIST Communications Staff operatesadministrative communlcatlona but is responsiblecommunications aa well. In contrast to thesystem, all Project traffic la by direct circuitand all of it ia enciphered to the highestCommunications Staff ia composed exclusively ofpersonnel, trained to the uniform Agency standardproficiency, security and speed. The onlyviolations we have experienced In the past year,have been on those circuits manned by This staff has also furnished specializedand ELINT service to Project IDEALIST, in the form
of engineering and maintenance assistance. On EL2NT systems, they work closely with the analysts so that technical maintenanceeal-time relationship to the collection equipment. This is an Important asset not available in package form to the Air Force. Aa an example of its speed, and even allowing for SAC tin familiarity with communications from Omaha to Edwards AFB, on the initial SAC-executed mission ofctober, theo" weather forecast tookotal ofours,inutes to transmit through relay points from Omaha to EAFB, In contraste-transmission time of one hour,inutes from Washington to EAFB on CIA's system.
utilized In thle instanceackup capability. By the time the SAC forecast arrived at Edwards, the mission had been on the ground at McCoy AFB forinutes, and the weather waa no longer within the valid period for which it had been requested.
e. Mission Security: Mission security, both inand the field, has long been traditional with Project IDEALIST. Employment with headquartersieldhaa never entitled anyone to mission information, pertaining either to targets, routes or times. When support ls required from otherSA, NOAAD, JRC,he moat that la given out in advance of the mission is the general area and valid times for Coast-In and Coast-Out Points. Onlyission has departed la flight line information given to just those Agencies required to have it in performance of their support mission, within Air Force we have seen that this is not the way in which they operate; routes are posted In Command Situation Rooms well In advance of mission times, and access to these rooms is too often on the basis of rank and position rather thanlearance status of personnel viewing flight routes is often impossible to determine, especially in advance. Careful adherence to thia form of mission security baaital ingredient in reducing political aa well as operational risk.
f. Relocation of Targeting and Requirements Responsibility: Under the IDEALIST system, targeting and requirements rssponsibillty has been containedingle unit located In Washington where the political decisions necessary to implement missions are made. As missions are run, follow-on missions can quickly be planned on the basis of film readout, also accomplished nearby. COMOR evaluations can beto Operations across the hall. If SAC receives mission responsibility, not only with this close physical relationship be broken, but missions will be launched from Omaha rather than from within the shadow of the Speciale have always bad the capability toission up to takeoff time, based upon late-breaking political developments. Under
SAC operations, this capability will be materially reduced. In addition, SAC is not experienced in the "headquarters-directed mission" concept in operation of, since their mission launching responsibility has always been delegated down to the Wing level from SAC Headquarters.
g. Pilot Experience Levels: Theilot group average at least six years flying theThe majority of their flight time has been spent In3 model since its IntroductionB. At present, SAC has exactly one pilot checked out and current inB, with three others available who have flown the aircraft within periods running from six toonths ago. Retraining would be required for these latter pilots, and in view of the present shortage of mission aircraft, an hour flown today in training mission is an hour subtracted from mission availability. CIA's pilot group is all-weather qualified in5 modal and they are all checked out and current In in-flight refueling techniques, SAC at present haa only two pilots qualified but not current in 1FR techniques. Notional cover with proper backstopping in Air Force could be furnished for CIA pilots to fly the missions without requiring their full integration into USAF. This would be useful for the shorter term it appears to us and would permit continuation of the missions at the highest level consistent with available equipment and with the most experienced pilots. Its adoption would require the strongest kind of support at high levels, since it appears likely that SAC and senior DOD elements would object, nowission has been flown successfully under full military responsibility.
t would seem that the baBlc questions at issue hero are the following:
a. ational Policy, should covertly executedreconnaissance of denied areas be performed by the Defense Establishment, or, because of the plausible denial aspect, by the Central Intelligence Agency with DOD support?
b. he question above can be answered, then how should
covertly exscutsd overhead reconnaissance be managed?
Should it be by the compartmented "special project" method
with an isolated. Integrated capability and control system or
by its normal assignmentajor Department with a
subsequent breakout of funtions through the Department staff?
Since the President has not yet decided to overtlyreconnaissance of Cuba with military assets, but hasofficial positioneported willingness to acknowledgeof the Island by the military, and then only in thean incident, lt would appear to us that grounds still axlet tomissions as covert enterprises, deserving ofby that staff most experienced in conduction operationssmallest circle of knowledgeable people. On that basis, it Isthat theontinue to support execution ofreconnaissance under the command control and guidance ofwith such additional support as may be required fromSAC to carry out the mission in military guise,
PROJECT IDEALIST EMPLOYMENT
Initially,ircraft was teet flown In Auguat5 withngine which lacked some of the refinements incorporated Intoodel originally ordered by USAF for2 aircraft. ersion of the basic7 engine,0 pounds of Sea Level Static Thrust, was usefully employed in the Project beginning with the first successful overflight on6 until the last7 aircraft was converted5 configuration this summer, after not having been actively flown since Aprilhen it was
In order to explain how we became involved witht ia necessary toord or two about Project THERMOS, which was an anti-radar reflective coatingand radars. Work was begun on this blanket reflective coating placed on an underlay of honeycomb material in Inire trapezoidal network was strung around the aircraft fromo tail, extending outboard to the wing tips as added protection to break up the radar silhouette. While this was within the aerodynamic envelope of, and hopefully offeredapability to penetrate the USSR early warning net without open detection, it was heavy and caused drag, reducing the altitude scroae the mission profileinimum ofeet,reater penalty at some points early in the mission.
In the winter, Kelly Johnson suggested to Dickllore powerful engine might be the answer to our altitude problems, Accordingly, study was begun onower plant that could be used Inithout requiring major redesign of the fuselage. We were thus limited to the diameter ofs it was built for7 engine. Several plants were considered, including higherBritish engines, until Kelly Johnson discovered that by relocating the mounted accessories on5 engine, and by enlarging the air scoops, he eould shoehorn5 intot minimum cost In terms of time. This engine is the same basic engine used innd in its commercial versions in the. 5 engines for our aircraft were obtained by USAF from the Navy.
Ita Sea Level Static Thrust0 pounds, and the differential, translated at altitude intoeet across the mission profile. Because itigher specific fuel consumption than7 model, it was necessary to add slipper fuel tanks to the wings as had been begun even at the earlier model, and even so, the maxim altitude profile range dropped from that of. It was not untilhen Project THERMOS was dropped asartial success and the honeycomb and blanket were removed from the covered aircraft that5 began to demonstrate its clear superiority over7 brother which was used on thes.
It should be noted that CIA was always more concerned with altitude capability than was SAC, since the respective missions were different.olitical decision was made6 by the Administration at that time which gave covert overhead reconnaissance, or overflight, responsibility to CIA, preserving for SAC and other military services only that portion of the reconnaissance program that was peripheral. Since CIA overflights were at that time directed primarily against the USSR, It was important to maximize altitudeedge against known (and forecast) Soviet defensive fighter capabilities. With the discovery of Surface-to-Air Missile sites in Russia early in the program, and knowing that time would see improvement in thia capability, altitude was money in the bank.
SAC, on the other hand, devoted much ofime to extended range missions over friendly countries In support ef upper air sampling requirements for AFOAT (later AFTAC). On these flights, respectable altitude in the mid andas sufficient to meet the technical collection requirements. With the cost5 engines averaging in excess0 each, and the additional cost of modifying and converting5 configuration0AC was constrained from converting their fleet,
which was then and remains much larger than that possessed by the
Agency (SAC presently has an Inventory of 24
he Agency converted three of itss to what waa called "an IFR configuration". Thisapability
of refueling the mainallons) in nightanker, and thusreat boost to mission range, now limited only by pilot fatigue. Other modifications were made to differentiates from those owned by SAC. Among these latter are:
We are advised by Lockheed tnat there are additional significant differences between the two models ofow, brought on by altered ship wiring on SAC aircraft, and other penalty items involving weight that have reduced the altitude capability ofore than initially.
NORMAL MISSION OPERATIONS PLAN
The conduct of operation*eneral pattern of planning, preparation, direction and execution. Planning begins with preliminary target requirements COMOR forwards to USIB and the Special Group for approval. At this time information pertainingroposed mission is contained within the Operations Division/ OSA. Upon approval by the Special Group, the implementation mechanism is set in motion.
Execution procedures are the same for forward staging bases as for operations conductedermanent base except for the lead time required to preposition necessary equipment and personnel. The following operational control procedures are standard for Agency activities:
ALERT: The Initial action Is to review the weather in the target area. When the weather is acceptable for photographictheetachment Is alerted. This alert ia provided not less thanours prior to takeoffission. At this time the detachment le given the general framework of the Intended mission in order to allow proper preparation. This information includes takeoff time, general area of operation, equipment desired and special instructions as appropriate. At this time support agencies such as NORAD, Search andNC LANT for fighter cover, JRC for overall coordination, NPIC, HE PC, selected processing facility, and Headquarters USAF, are advised. In addition, higher echelons of the Agency are advised of impending activity.
MISSION PLAN: Weather In the target area is again reviewed and, if satisfactory, the detailed mission plan is provided to the operating detachment not later than twelve hours prior to takeoff, included In the plan are detailed requirements including penetration times, altitudes, headings, targets, and camera flight lines. Also included are emergency instructions, authorized emergency landing bases in order of priority and any special Information regarding survival, cover, and friendly forces that may be pertinent to the mission. Hostile AOB, ROB,s also provided at this time to prepare for the pilot briefing.
inal review of target weather ls accomplished and the authority to launch the mission is provided to the detachment not less than two hours prior to takeoff. At this time the information ls also passed to supporting agencies as well as higher echelons of the Agency. inal recheck is made in Headquarters to see that political approval is still not affected by late breaking developments.
By utilizing the procedures above complete planning, direction and control of operations is retained by the Agency Projectaximum holddown ic maintained on the mission track and on general knowledgeission is in fact in progress. Upon completion of the mission, the community is made aware of results via the Talent System.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Tha Honorable McGeorge Bundy
al stent to the Preside at for
National Security Affair a
Cornmand and Control Reaponefbllity for
accordance withave been informed are theexpressed through the Acting Chairman, Special
I have taken Immediate steps to ensure that fall commend and control responsibility foreconnaissance flights is transferred at once from th* CIA to SAC* effective IX October The fell assets of the Agency inield have already beea placed at SAC's disposal to support their new responsibilities, Including providing to SAC5 equipped U-
However, in the light of conatdereble practical experience gained by CIA in successfully conducting more then sixtylights periodicallyad because of the mechanical and operational differences between5IA haa and7's posse seed by SAC* as well as because of significant differences betweenperating techniques and ourm obliged to record my essential opposition to the extreme rapidity with which this changeover of command control Is being accomplished attime when the criticallty of these missions la so high.
At this time, the only pilot in SAC with even minimalia5 la now being given expedited conversion training to the5 model aircraft in oar Detachment at Edwards AFB. This officer Is being trained ia accordance with Agency standards. As of mis date, it is our considered opinion that thia officer cannot he considered
qualified In5 la accordance, witk Agency standards tor aaml aaloa aa early aa Seuasay.ctober.ollow-on capability of SAC lor coat!oaeu talleconaeJssance flighi.aily baaia doea not now aadai.
1 am la tall agreement with th* necessary and desirable change in the coverlorymy objection la to that interpretation that this change required aa immediate and complete disruption of well-astaMlshedprocedure!. W* will cootinu* to give our mil support to SAC tor these aalssions. Ia my view, however, the) precipitate changeover of command respouslblllty with Its attendant risks without adequateaad advance pfenning, aa well aa evaluation of thehe best interasts ol achieving our IntalHgeace objectives.
Attachedemorandum for your signature directing the accomplishment of these actions which, to date, have been communicated to me only orally by the Deputy Secretary of Defease.
Marshall*-. Carter MeOeaerai, USA Acting Director
Drafted by:unningham Final form: DDCI/MSC:blpctistribution:
Originaltti Copyeputy Secretarytt Copytt Copytt Copytt Copytt Copytt
THX WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON
MEMORANDUM FOR. Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Recoonalaaaace Overflights of Coba
In view of tbe changing International situation aad in the light of the recomrnerarlatione of the Specialhe President has directed that the responsibility, to Include command and control and operational decisions, with regardoverflight* at* Ceha la transferred from the Central intelligence Agency to the Depeurtxneas of Detentee, effective tale date.
Toe, will reader all appropriate support aad as si stance to the agency designated by the Department of Deaeaee aa having the responsibility for theae missions.
THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSETHE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL. INTELLIGENCE
In the light of tbe extensive discussions which have been conducted in recent dsys with respect to the responsibilityarticular reconnaissance operation authorised by higher authority on Octoberish to record my own view of the present situation and of appropriate further procedures. In the light of the views of those with direct recollection of opinions of higher authority who are present In Washington, It seems ta me right thatfor this particular operation which has been authorised should now be vested in the Department of Defease, sad it Is tbe understanding of all concerned that this responsibility now rests with that department. ave been aasured by the Acting Director of CIA that all of bis people are being instructed to cooperate In every way. At the aame time, we must all recognise that there Iseep and honest difference of opinion not only about the wisdom of this particular decision but also in the best way ofin the future. Accordingly, it is my judgment that theof responsibty for this operation should not be regardedinding precedent and that the whole question of roles and reeponsiUUtieB in this area should be reviewed by the appropriate special group and presented to higher authority for decision when further authorisations are requested.
McGeorge BundyOriginal document.