THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

Created: 11/3/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SC NO.2

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THE SITUATION IN CUBA

No photographs were takenovember of themissile sites.

The whereabouts of missiles and equipment which have been removed from the missile sites is still unknown. taken yesterday of the ports of mariel and Punta Ger-ardo do not provide evidence as to whether or not Sovietmissiles and related equipment are being prepared for shipment out of Cuba. Missile equipment is visible In tbe dock area of Mariel but lt Is not certain yet that loading of this equipment has begun. There is some evidence tbat one of three Soviet dry cargo ships at dockside was loading cargo of some kind.

At Punta Gerardo, probably the propellant supply point for missiles inonvoy of six oxidizer tanker trucks was observed apparently being readied to leave the area.

The uncrating and assembling ofBEAGLE) bombers at San Julian was continuing. Two additional fuselages had been uncratedovember. Two of the aircraft were evidently operational and five others assembled except for the engines. There has been some evidence In communications intelligence that Cubans were being trained forn the USSR at least as early as August.

There has been no change in the status of two SAM sites covered inovember photography.

No change has been noted In the alert status of the Cuban armed forces.

ovember the Cuban central planning organizationreeze on distribution of all Imported and domestic wood, except tonsolldated shipbuilding enterprise and the Ministry of tbe Armed Forces. This measure could be connected with crating operations.

Moscow broadcast to tbe Soviet homeerse,report of the President's statement last evening' Thenoted the President's reference to the dismantling of Soviet missile bases in Cuba and pointed out that his remarks on aerial photography were clear evidence of the "violation of Cuba's air space," It concluded by citing the President's statement that progress towards establishing peaco in the Caribbean should continue.

Moscow's propaganda coverage- of the Cuban crisis, sharply reduced since the beginning of this week, continues to call for "concrete OS moves" beyond oral assurances tn. I there will be no invasion of Cuba. Duringovember conversation with US officials, Mikoyan Insisted that the US respect Cuban sovereignty. He also raised the question of broadening US-Soviet discussions on Cuba to include Castro's five-point However, he avoided any formal commitment to thisdid not represent Castro's demands as "conditions" for the successful conclusion of negotiations, and even went so far as to assert that Guantanamo wasS-Cuban problem.

On his departure for Havana from New York, Mikoyan attempted to portray Castro's proposals simply as measures designed to insure Cuba's security and declared that the Sovlot Unionthem to be fair and supports them."

Tass has only briefly notedovember speech and made no mention of his refusal to permit inspection of the removal of the missiles.

Further evidence that Mikoyan may extend now offers of economic aid to Castro was implicit ln his assertion to the press in Now York that the Soviet Union is "rendering Cuba comprehensive support and aid."

I

Peiping continues to affirm Its strong backing for the Castro regime and all Chinese papers prominently featuredovember sp* -h.

significant changes have been noted ln the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and Satellite military forces.

with plans to develop at least some submarine support facilities In Cuba, perhaps toepair and supply base. Numeroushave indicated that suchbase might be esTabTishedin the Banes area.

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Soviet armies in East Germany probably aro still on alert but there are bo me indications thatovember they began to returnore routine training status.

personnel held on duty neyonc released soon, possibly this month.

BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

With the departure of the Soviet dry cargo ship Lenlno-gorsk from Odessaovember, the number of Bloc ships en route to Cuba has Increased from thirteen to fourteen.

The Czech dry cargo ship Kladno, dead ln the water NE of the quarantine line sincectober, was reported under way toward Cubaovember, trailedS destroyer. The Belovodsk and the Grozny, li ide the quarantine line, at last report were steaming ahead lor Cuba. The Belovodsk should have reached Cuban waters in the early hours of this morning and the Grozny lateovember or early on 5 The Soviet tankers Mir and Karl Marx should be within the quarantine line early-today.

other bloc moving normally.

en route to Cuba appear to be

ANNEX I

CUBAN SAM PROGRAM UNPRECEDENTED

The USSR's abnormally rapid establishment of more than twenty surface-to-air missile sites ln Cuba during August and September, as partoviet-manned air defensealso incorporating the most modern Soviet radar1 Jet figbters, suggests that the system was designed primarily to provide protection for the offensive IRBM and MRBM bases.

In other countries being supplied with Soviet SAMs, such as Indonesia, Iraq, and the UAR, the Soviet programs have moveduch slower rate and their apparent purpose has been to provide protection for the recipient nation's key metropolitan areas. In addition, those SAM sitesare being supplied under standardagreements which provide for the training of local military personnel to man and control the weapons. esult they require relatively small numbers of Soviettechnicians to be present in these areas.

In all tbe countries, other than Cuba, being supplied with Soviet SAMs, the USSR hasefinite pattern ln providing such military assistance. After signing tho pertinentraining program is established ln tbe USSR for the benefit of the military personnel of the country scheduled to receive the SAMs. aterelatively small number of Soviet militaryusuallyosent to the recipient country tofor andAM training site to facilitate the instruction of additional local personnel on those weapons. Then, usually several months after the signing of theaid agreement, the missiles and equipment for thesite are delivered.

The next step in the process, apparently planned to coincide with the completion of training. of the first group of the recipient's personnel ln the USSR, is the construction of operational SAM si'-'S. Theof these sites also appears to be carried outand routinely. Thus, tbe full development of aSAM program in these countries requires about two years or more, depending on tbe number of sites to be In fact, although Indonesia, Iraq, and the UAR all concluded agreements with the USSR for the supply of SAMsone of these countries is known to have even one operational SAM site as yet.

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Tho USSR began delivering operational SAM equipment to Cuba, however, before the initiation of any training programs, either In the USSR or in Cuba. This equipment was not only supplied rapidly, but the sites themselves were urgently constructed and immediately crewed by Soviet military personnel. Moreover, the SAMs were supplied to Cuba simultaneously with the delivery ofighters and tho moBt modern Sovietpart of an integrated air defensethis materiel too apparently isoperated, at leastSoviet personnel. This alsoeviation from tbe normal Soviet pattern of first training foreign personnel and thenMIGs, radar and other air defense equipmentountry which is scheduled eventually to receive SAMs. Thus, lt is quite apparent that the USSR's primary reason for supplying SAMs to Cuba was not toefense for its major citiea or its existing military bases but rather to cover the rapid establishment of Soviet IRBM and MRBM sites aimed at tbe US.

Since the SAM sites were first constructed in thehalf of Cuba, where the long-range Soviet missiles were also first established, lt appears likely tbat Moscowto set up similar missile bases in the eastern half of tbe country where additional SAM sites nowto defend relatively remote areas from aerial Should all the SAM sites remain in Cuba, Cubans could probably be trained to operato the systemear or

less.

ANNEX II

IMPACT OF US QUARANTINE ON MERCHANT SHIPPING TO CUBA

AND THE CUBAN DOMESTIC ECONOMY

A. The Effect on Bloc Merchant Shipping

An immediate effect of tbe US quarantine on merchant shipping to Cuba was to cause the turn-around of sixteen USSR dry-cargo ships. Seven of these ships are estimated to have been carrying the missiles and associated equipment for an additional IRBM regiment, Tbe other Dine ships are also estimated to have been carrying military associated cargo.

Cargo data on the ships departing from Baltic ports is not available. Tbe ships that left Black Sea ports and then turned around hadinimum0 tons of cargo when transiting the Bosphorous. This cargo was principally military ln nature and classified as general cargo ormaterials. One freighter, for example, may have beenombers. The only cargoes specificallyin Bloc declarationsons of propane gas.

Since the initiation of the US quarantine only four Bloc-flag ships have arrived at Cuban ports. Two of them were Soviet tankers, thehichons of fuel oil, and the Bucharest which0 tons of crude oil. The single Polish arrival, the Blalystok, brought in an unidentified amount of general cargo" probablyand machinery. The East German arrival, the Volke-freundschaft,assenger ship that probably carriedmall quantity of commercial cargo.

We speculate that there were still some construction materials, equipment and missiles for as much as one IRBM regiment still on the wharves ln Leningrad onctober which would probably have been loaded and, at leaat some ships Involved in the movement, would have been en route to Cuba at thla time had the quarantine not Intervened. otalhiploads ofversize hatch vessels lnclut d, would have been required for this movement. We think that athiploads of cruise missiles and cruise missilewould have been loaded during this period or ln the near future. It la possibleart of the above equipment was In fact ln Cuba onctober but not perceived In the surveillance results available.

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ground force equipment and air defensewould have been at or moving to Soviet ports forduring this period. It is impossible to Identify this equipment specifically other than to indicate it wouldof follow-on spares for theystem and possibly additional battalions of Prog SS missiles. As manyohiploads per week might have moved during late October and November.

B, The Effect on Free World Merchant Shipping

Tbe decision of countries such as Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, and West Germany to estop their shipping fromin the Cuban trade had little effect on the movement of cargoes from the Bloc since the shipping of these countries accounted formall portion of the ships in the Bloc -Cuban trade.

Sinceinimum ofree World ships, all under charter to the Bloc, have arrived in Cuba with cargoes from Bloc ports. These ships brought into Cuba an identified minimum tonnage of0 tons of commercial cargoes, principally foodstuffs, trucks and automobiles, fuel oil and other general cargoes. The Pree World arrivals and their cargoes are shown in the attached table.

There have been several attempts on the part of some Pree World ship owners to avoid chartering to the Bloc, or to escape fulfillment of existing charter contracts, and there haveew Instances of non-delivery of cargoes from the Bloc to Cuba. The present reluctance of some ship owners to charter to the Bloc seems to rest principally on the expectation of higher charter rates, and considerableabout the sanctions to be expected from the US for engaging In Bloc-Cuban trade. As of this date the volume of shipping en route to Cuba from the Bloc, or presentlyin Bloc ports for Cuba, shows no noticeable decline from the previous two months.

and of Itself, the naval quarantine has not resultedut-off of the kind of supplies needed by Cuba toits economy. The quarantine has, however, producedpsychological effects within Cuba which appear to be aggravating already-existing economic problems.

An apparent surge of scare buying and black marketeer-ing since the imposition of this quarantine has led the

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government to Impose Increasingly severe penalties onand to exhort the populntion at large not to "attack the people's economy" by hoarding.

Other scattered reporting Indicates that medical andservices for the civilian population have been drastically curbed and that communications services In Cuba have becomesubject to sporadic disruption or delay.

The government has also taken measuresumber ofensure the rationing of basollne, lube oil, and keroseneit considers to be essuntial users. There is atevidence to suggest that misguided enforcement ofat local levels lsisruptive effect onof industrial and agricultural agencies to carryand distribution

Beyond these fragmentary indicators, there is as yet little hard evidence upon which toirm estimate of the degree to which Cuba's Internal economic situation has been affected by the quarantine. In the physical sense, tho existence of the US naval quarantine has not thus far placed any meaningful obstruction in the path of Cuban economic activity. Prom the psychological standpoint, however, the quarantine and the crisis atmosphere it has generated is likely to bealpably disruptive effect upon those in Cuba responsible for the production and distribution of goods and services.

FREE WORLD SHIPS CALLING AT CUBA PROM BLOC PORTSCTOBEROVEMBER

Germany

Greece

Lebanon

Norway

Sweden

Turkey

Regine

Maritsa

Sirlus

Spiros Polemls Pel la Harucla

Evje

Folke Bernadotte Herborg Holthill

Buccanero Coolangatta Hispanlola Sottern

M. Esref

ons foodstuffs andcargo;rucks

ossiblecrates

ons crude oil

ons Industrial equipmentrucks

Trucks, autos, andons

ons general cargo andrucks

ons of crudeons ofotatoes

ons iron andales of paper

otatoes

otatoes andotatoes

ons trucks, spare parts, agricultural equipment and metal-working equipment

ons sulfatesons metals

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