THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

Created: 11/2/1962

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CENTRAL^ INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: IAN JOM

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THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA

Information as2

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.

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THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Soviet offensive missile units are closing down their launch sites in Cuba and removing their equipment, but the assembly ofombers is continuing.

Analysis of photographyovember shows that the missiles and basic launching equipment have been removed from all the MRBM launch areas. Camouflage has been taken down and support vehicles assembled for movement. The launch sites have been partially destroyed, apparently by bulldozing.

It is not yet clear from photography or otherwhere the missile equipment Is being taken.

Construction at the IRBM sites has stopped and some of the installations at Guanajay have been destroyed. Work on the probable nuclear warhead bunkers apparently has also ceased.

None of the Soviet cargo ships now in Cuba has hatches and holds suitable for handling IRBMs or MRBMs. The seven ships which we believe delivered the missiles to Cuba could return to Cuba betweenndovember. Loading of the missiles after the ships' return would probably takeeek.

The photography shows that ln contrast to theof the missile sites, there has been further progress in the assembly ofomber aircraft at San Julian One fully operationalas observed taxiing on the ground, and personnel were seen working on other bombers

Monitors agree that Castro appeared nervous andlast night during the major portion of his radio-TV speech,ranscript of bis talkst. He was somewhat more confident and forceful in the concluding part when he spoke in his customary extemporaneous manner. Throughout the speech he appeared to belch frequently. As reported ln the press, Castro reiterated his "fivetressing the demand for evacuation of Guantanarao; announced the USSR had "some time ago" canceled all Cuban obligations for arms; and claimed Cuba still has "powerful means of

)

defens since all but "strategic weapons" were to remain inHe said Khrushchev's decision gave his regime "reason forut added: "We respected thesince these weapons were not under oure confined Cuban refusal of Inspection to the transcript of his talkshant.

communications indicate that as ofctober Soviet personnel were still active in the Cuban air defense system. Russian ground-to-air and air-to-air transmissions were again noted. Cuban tacticalwere involved in takeoff and landing training,some relaxation in the alert status.

During the entire crisis period scattered and minor reflections

lof internal resistai

a* instance, reported

nvolved the cuttingeiept Soviet "base" in Camaguey province, possibly SAM site or related barracks area.

Canadian Ambassador Kidd reported onctober that officials in the Cuban foreign ministry werend very sensitive to any mention of the Soviet role in recent events. The Canadian said three middle-rankin the Ministry of Industries appeared "outraged" at the ridiculous role Cuba had played and considered the offer by Khrushchev to trade Cuban for Turkish baseshumiliating. They felt the whole episode showed the bankruptcy of Castro's policies, and said Cuba would sooner or later have to come to terms with the USodified leadership. The Canadian noted, however, that less well educated Cubans are being influenced by Castro's propaganda, which is seeking to make recent events look almostuban victory.

Cuban exile leaders report tbe Cuban community in Florida to be depressed, heartsick, and convinced that the only hope is to provoke Castro "into some mad action."

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TOTT^ECRET

Usually reliable sources in the Communist parties of Chile and Uruguay report continuing evidenceecline in Soviet and Cuban prestige among Latin Americanand othergroupsesult of the events of the past week.

The report to Brazilian President Goulart from bis special envoy to Castro, General Albino da Silva, indicates that Castro might modify his rejection of internationalin Cuba if such inspection were also to cover other territories in the Caribbean area where Cuban exiles might be training.

Thectober Cuban message sent by an .illicitnear Havana to an unidentified station outside Cuba, calling for the destruction of TJS property, was repeated onnd onctober.

Wo nave no reports as0 EST on the New Yorkof Soviet First Deputy Premier Mikoyan.

There has been no significant change in Moscow'streatment of the situation. Soviet media continue to emphasize that the USSR is strictly honoring Khrushchev's pledges to President Kennody. Moscow claims Cuba is ready to cooperate with the UM in workingeacefuland continues to show sensitivity to foreign views that Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the missilesign of weakness.

Moscow has denounced tbe resumption of the US quarantine and charged that "unprecedented war hysteria" still prevails in the US.

Soviet commentators yesterday became markedly warmer in support of Castro's five demands, but they carefully avoided any suggestionettlement is contingent on USof these demands. oscow broadcast to Cuba endorsed Castro's position tbat the US must halt the quarantine,sanctions, subversive activities, andedged, however, on Castro's demand for the return of the Guantanamo naval base, saying only that this question "should be decided by negotiations."

The Chinese Communists have, in effect, urged Castro to resist Soviet pressures for an early settlement. oteto the Cuban chargd ln Peiping rejected as anviewpoint" the suggestion that Cuban demands should bo ignoredettlement between the "big powers." Peiping promised resolute support "regardless of how complicated the circumstances say be."

eeting of the presidium of the World Peace Council ln Stockholm, the Chinese delegate is reliably reported to have characterized Soviet behavior in the Cuban crisis as "cowardly."

BLOC MILITARY STATUS

Ro significant changes have been noted in theor readiness posture of the major Soviet andmilitary forces.

level of flight activity of Long Range Air Force units based ln the western USSR continued to be lower than normal. Weather wasontributing factor.

Although much of the military force probably remainstate of precautionary readiness, sone signs ofhave been noted. Western attache's now have traveled through key rail Junctions in Belorussia and from Helsinki to Moscow through Leningrad without observing any unusual military activity or rail movements. Some militarymay be on leave in the Leningrad area. Elements of two Polish army divisions probably are continuing to aid in the harvest. Thoro are continued indications that the Soviets may proceed with the normal year-end release of GSFG military personnel.

Out-of-area submarine activity continued at ahigh level in the Atlantic. The combined exercise continued in the Baltic. There are indications that alarge-scale exercise is impending in the Sea of Okhotsk, where submarines have deployed. At least three of the seven Northern Fleet ships which appeared I

lare moving southward along thei theseareprobably destroyers.

nips^raign^^eitner move into tner exercise with Baltic Fleet units which havethe Baltic.

SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

Two bloc ships which have been lying dead in the water near the quarantine line have resumed their courses and now are within the quarantine zone en route to Cuba. These are the Soviet dry-cargo ship BELOVODSK, which is being

accompaniedS destroyer, and the Soviet tanker GROZNY. The Czech dry-cargo ship KLADNO, which stopped near the line for several days, has not returned from her rendezvous off Bermuda with the East Germanship VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT. The Soviet tanker MIR crossed tbe quarantine line at0 EST.

There now areloc ships en route to Cuba. The latest additions are the Soviet dry-cargo ship ZYRYANIN, with general cargo from the Black Sea, and the tanker BALAKLAVA,argo of crude oil from the Baltic.

t

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TOP SECRET DINAR

NCtDER OF SHIPS REQUIRED TO REMOVE

Bovirr wTApOh'S SySTluS PrOm CUBA

We believe the main components ol tbe Sovietweapons systems now ln Cuba (as defined by Presidential4 ofctober) could be returned to the USSRotal ofohiploads.

Tho MRBM and IRBM equipment presents the mostshipping task. We do not know exactly how many trips were required to deliver the missiles now in Cuba, but believe that their return will require between five and eight trips with ships having hatches large enough to permit stowage of the ballistic missiles. The principal components of the missile systems probably would amount to about another four shiploads. Some of the supporting construction equipment such as bulldozers, trucks, and cranes probably would be left behind, Inasmuch as Cuba is receiving such equipment as economic aid.

TheEAGLEet bombers known to beoh probably were delivered by three ships, and could be returned by the same number.

TheOUAR guided-missile boats now in Cubaas deck cargo on four separate ships, two carrying two each, and two others carrying four each. Thus three or at the most four trips would suffice to evacuate this equipment; the missile and support gear would fit easily ln the holds of the sblps carrying the KOMARs on deck.

We believe the three identified cruise-type coastal defense missile installations could be sent back ln three-shiploads.

Missile installations: Jet bombers: OMAR ships:

Coast Defense Missiles: Total:

4

3 3

3o

to

ti shiploads

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