C EN TRTELLIGENCE AGENCY
APPROvlD FOR REttaSE DATE?
THE CRISIS USSR/CUBA
PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
CUBAN CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS
U Thant'a preliminary report of his encounters with Fidel Castro onndctober strossed his impression that Castro Is furious over Soviet agreement to dismantle the missile bases and determined to do all in his power to prevent any Inspection of Cuban territory eitheror after removal.
Castrohant there had been no Soviet-Cuban consultation before Khrushchev's letter to Presidentwas released onctober. He acknowledged that tbe subsequent statement of Cuba's demands had been made to complicate the situation for the Soviets.
Soviet General Stazenko, Identifying himself asof.-all Soviet military personnel ln Cuba,hant and his military adviser that Khrushchev's order to begin dismantling the bases had been received00 on Sunday,ctober, and that dismantling began
According to General Rikhye, Stazenko said that all missiles and major equipment items would be removed by Friday, when remaining "bits and pieces" would be Crating and movement to ports would take sometime. Stazenko expects to leave Cuba with the equipment.
There was no montion of the disposition of the Soviet BEAGLE Jet bombers now ln Cuba,hant and Rlkbye "had tbe impression" that these would also be evacuated.
Tbe Soviet officer was described as showing little concern over the prospect of continued US aerialof the missile sites. Castro reportedly was very strongly opposed, even under UN auspices. The Cubans told Rikhye that they would resist any further violations of their air space and left tbe impression that they hadthe standard pattern of such reconnaissance flights. Rikhye was left uncertain as to which anti-aircraftln Cuba were in Cuban hands as opposed to Soviet hands; he was certain that those weapons controlled by Cubans would definitely go into action against US overflights, but did not know whether those manned by Soviet personnel would also do so.
Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov toldMcCloy during the coursene-hourNew York onctober that all anti-aircraftCuba, including the SAM sites, were in Cuban hands.ampleandesMnereports, Cuban
are underucn evidence includes numerous Independent reports of the systematic exclusion of Cubans from all SAM sites,
Soviet leaders are showing concern that Castro'sto block an agreement-could revive tbe danger of US military action and thwart Soviet efforts-tc salvage the USSR's position in Cuba. The immediate purpose of Mikoyan's urgent trip to Havana via New York is veryto exert pressure on Castro so that an early agreement can be concluded. He ls also probably under instructions to work out coordinated negotiating tactics with the Cuban government.
In his efforts to hasten Castro's cooperation, Mikoyan may make new offers of assistance. Several members of the delegation accompanying Mikoyan are Soviet economic and trade specialists. Khrushchev'sctober letter made it clear that the USSR will not "absolve ourselves offor rendering assistance to tbe Cuban people."
Soviet propaganda supporting Castro's "just demands" stops short of suggesting that the USSR is demandingof Castro's proposals, and Mikoyan almost certainly will not endorse Castro's Insistence on the return of the
Guantanamo naval base and termination of US economic
He may, however, agree to support Castro's attempts to obtain US guarantees extending beyond President Kennedy's offer of assurances that the US will not Invade Cuba. In an effort to end US support for the activities of Cuban exile groups, the USSR and Cuba may call for reciprocal pledges by the US, Cuba, and the latter's Western Hemisphereto respect each other's sovereignty and to refrain from Interference in each other's internal affairs.
Kuznetsov hadhant prior to the latter'sfor Havana that the Soviet missiles were beingand shipped out, and that when this process wasthe USSR would report to the UN Security Council and proposeN team could conduct on-site Yesterday, however, Moscow Instructed itsin Havana tohant before his return to New York that he and his associates would be permitted "to look at whatever they wantn Cuba."
This apparent concession to US insistence on theof inspection throughout the process of dismantling would seem to provide further evidence of Moscow's anxiety tbat Castro's obstructionist tactics may provoke the US to resort to military action to neutralize the missile sites. On the other hand, the USSR may feel it can afford to make this ostensible concession at no costs to Soviet interests and rely on Cuban rejection of any UN presence. hant's preliminary report does not Indicate whether the Sovietin Havana made any offer to let him make such an inspection.
Soviet propaganda continues to avoid linking thesituation with the Berlin issue, and Moscow is evidently ordering its propagandists to play down traditionalthemes in its slogans forovember anniversary of the revolution.
Peiping continues Its criticism of Khrushchev's retreat. An article inovember issue of the authoritative party journal Red Flag described UN involvement ln Cuba aswith the independence and sovereignty of Cuba. Red Flag also asserts that only by having unshakeable faith ln the revolutionary fight "can one avoid being cowed" by US military pressure or "deceived" by its flowery words. The article describes the Chinese people as the "most loyal and most reliable" comrades of the Cubans.
THE SITUATION IN CUBA
Castro is expected to break Cuba's official silence on the outcome of the negotiationshant in anation-wide radio-TV address this evening. He may be expected to reiterate both his demand that noof Cuban territory be undertaken and his Insistence that his fivetbe evacuation of the Guantanamo Navalmet by the US before any non-invasion pledge is "satisfactory" to him. Cubanmedia continue to give heavy play to statements that Castro's five points are natural and necessary Soviet endorsement of the demands as,"just" has been seized upon and publicized by Cuba as evidence of the USSR's "vigorous support" of Cuba.
Ipersonnel in Havana saw no evidencetooerauTomobile trip from Havana to Mariel and back that Soviets were then dismantling their missile sites. There was no sign of the transportation of such equipment to port areas of Havana or Mariel; on thethere was evidence of considerable Soviet activity including the movement of building materials for anpurpose.
Soviet General Igor Stazenko told General Rikhye that the UN information on Soviet missile Installations in Cuba (provided to the UN by the US) was "about correct." He said that although none of the IRBHs were operational, "six or eight" HRBMs "had been" operational. Stazenko said there wereoviet military personnelcivilian construction workers in Cuba, and gave thethese would be evacuated along witb the missile equipment. Rikhye appeared convinced of Stazenko's good faith.
BLOC MILITARY STATUS
No significant changes have been noted during the pastours in the disposition or readiness posture of tbeSoviet and satellite military forces.
that transportat several secondary unoccupiedin the vicinity of the Berlin air corridors andairfields are being readied to receiveprecautionary dispersal would be consistent withlevel of alert ln forward
SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA
With the departure of the East German dry-cargo vessel THEODOB KOERNER from Stettin onctober, the number of Bloc vessels en route to Cuba has been increased to eleven. These consist of five Soviet tankers (LISICHANSK, MIR, KARL MARX, GROZNY, andour Soviet dry-cargo ships (BELOVODSK, E. PUGACHEV, MICHURINSK, CHERNYAKOVSK), and two satellite dry-cargo vessels (KLADNO and THCODORf these, the BELOVODSK, GROZNY and KLADNO, which arrived at the quarantine line several days ago, still have notbeyond it.
Tbe KARL MARX and MIR are expected to reach theline tonight.
The Czechoslovak dry-cargo vessel KLADNO left heron the quarantine line yesterday, and rendezvousedositioniles northeast with the Bast Germanvessel VOELKERFREUN DSC HAFT, now en route from Cuba to Rostock, toick KLADNO crewman.
The Soviet tanker TUKUMS, now refueling vessels of the Soviet fishing fleet in the North Atlantic]
le East Ge-man dry cargo vessel HBINBICH HEINE is scheduled to load in Stettin and depart for Cuba in the0 November.
EVIDENCE ON POSSIBILITY CDBANS MAY BE MANNING SA-2
sources within Cuba. Cubanln Miami'
it clear mat rac - r mis-
siie sites in Cuba have been assembled and are being manned exclusively by Soviet personnel.
speed with which the SAM sites haveprecludes any significant participation ofpersonnel in the firing batteries, fire controlor support elements.
We have bad many reports that Cuban personnel are excluded from SAM sites. Most reports suggest that the sole function of Cuban nationals ls to provide security personnel and some support facilities.
For the Cubans to man these sites. It wouldinimum have been necessary topecial cadre ofand technicians to the USSR for several months for initial training and then return to Cuba to train Cuban troops. There ls no evidence this has been done.
ls estimated that personnel for aunit can be checked out and equipped at theYar SAM range in three or fourthinrequire considerable advanced military trainingwork. In toto, closeear's trainingrequired.
has been no SAM training facilityin Cuba, and we have no evident to suggestuban SAM training program which couldby now the personnel required to manow Identified in Cuba.
c. Each such site in the Soviet Union isto requireen, about half in support and security roles which in the present instance could be filled by Cubans. Hence,the SAM system ln Cuba could have as manyoviet troops.
EVIDENCE ON CUBAN INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS SABOTAGE OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
1. There is evidence that the Castro regime has issued at least some instructions for anti-USand sabotage operationsesult of US actions in the current Cuban crisis.
2. Our strongest evidence
ransmitter somewhere near Havana, mown Latin American addressees to destroy "any kind of Yankee property," One day later saboteurs blew up four electrical substationsS-owned oil operation in Venezuela.
ccordinglandestine report, leaders of the Nlcaraguan Communist Party met onctoberlan of action to support Cuba.
ordered strict vigilance because "we have information that enemies of our government plan to sabotage and burntanks of the different gasoline companies duringof the ships."
5. This past June, according to several clandestine reports, certain Soviet and Latin American Communists agreed to organize strikes and sabotage against any g^ -ernments that supported the United States ifbroke out in Cuba or if Cuba were attacked. These plans reportedly call for violence against US citizens and property in Latin America.
Another clandestine reportuatemalan Communist as saying within the past week that "aggression" against Cuba will be the signal for sabotage of US firms and installations and attacks on US personnel.
Castro still has at his disposal five embassies-in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, andcould be used to pass instructions to area Communists. He also has the large Radio Havana facility which beams inten sive propaganda at Latin America, and he operates the Prensa Latina press network abroad.
Castro himself has spoken publicly over Radioonly once since the start of the current Cuban crisis he did not at that time call for any anti-US violence in other Latin American countries.Original document.