THE COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE*

Created: 11/23/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

2 Copy No.

CIA/HS

SUBJECT: The Communist Parties and the Sino-Sovlet Dispute*

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leaders throughout the world are wellsince late October the Chinese Communists have beenthe Soviet party more sharply than at any time inof the dispute. The challenge has been evident Inmilitary attacks ln the disputed Indian borderSoviet calls for peace, and in Poiping's Jeering at

the Russians as cowardly "appealers" in Cuba while simultaneously Inciting the Cubans to defy Moscow.

all of the Communist parties, there arein this latest phase of the Sino-Soviet dispute. and Peiping have been behaving just as they should ln terms of tbe very different conception'- ofstrategy which they have been advocating for The Russians have argued that the balance of powerthat no Communist venture should be carried to therisking general war, while the Chinese have argued thatfavors the bloc and that in any event even theventure does not Increase the existing risk ofRussians, however, have tried to have it bothbloc strength ls sufficient to permit the USSR tosupport to its friends everywhere. In withdrawingCuban venture, the USSR not only failed to providesupport but showedacrifice an ally for its own conyonienceproposal). Similarly, the Russians havealong that "bourgeois nationalist" leaders like Nelirudo advance Communist goals and that Communists shouldwith themrotracted period, while theinsisted that such leaders are unreliableadand that aid should be given not to them but to(especially the Chinese). In the militaryIndia, the Chinese have tried (among other things)Moscow and all of the parties totand lnommuniston-Communist state, to make

Moscow in particular give up its position ol band-wringing neutralism. The Chinese, however, have also tried to bave it both ways on the balance oxconfrontederious Military antagonist. instead ofhe Chinese have usually backed away under the formula of "respecting the enemythe Communist leaders probably realize that, because the Indian venture is not over, lt is possible that the Chinese will yet have toetreat no less humiliating than the Soviet backdown in Cuba.

In formulating their positions on both the USSR's Cuban venture and Peiping's Indian venture, many of the parties may find that the existing splits in their ranks have widened, or that new splits have developed. Moreover, the positions which the non-bloc parties finally adopt may also greatly affect their capabilities, by affecting the attitudes of their own and other governments and peoples toward them. This is true not onlyommunist party which is under the gun, such as the Cuban and Indian parties, but of any non-bloc Communist party.

Most of the non-bloc parties have adopted atrovisional attitude toward tbe Cuban venture, butew baveosition on the Sino-Indian conflict. It seems likely that tbe leaders of most of the parties areto see what willfax tbe Chinese will try to go, what the Russians will try to do about it, what both will do in the event of Western Intervention, whether Moscow and Peiping will openly break, and so on. Hot only are thestill tentative and fragmentary, but it is far too early to assess the effects on most of the parties and on their prospects. Tbe results tothe first reactions

of thesummarized below.

from repercussions ln the Soviet andleaderships (on which there has been rumor but nodevelopments ln tbe bloc parties have beenand have been pretty well reported. Of the sevenwhich had been Soviet supporters in the disputeEuropean parties less Albania but plusgain declared their allegiance to Moscow. PrivateKhrushchev, however, have been strengthened in theEuropean parties, ranging from the East German fear that

he will not be firmerlin settlement to the Polish and

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Hungarian anxiety over his willingness to take oven those risks in Cuba which he did take. The purge of the Bulgarian party does not directly reflect the latest stage of the Sino-Soviet dispute, as the purge was in preparation earlier; coming when It has, however, it serves as an indicator of Soviet intentions as the dispute worsens. Of the two bloc parties which had been strong Chinese supporters (Albania and North Korea) the Albanian party has directed new polemics at Khrushchev and the North Koreans have strongly supported Chinese positions. The North Vietnamese party, which had been an on-balance supporter of Peiping, has praised Khrushchev's retreat in Cuba and hasairly mild line on Nehru, which may indicate that Hanoi is shifting its balance.

The non-bloc parties have by and large reacted to the events of the past month along the lines which haveem sinced CPSO Congress. Broadly speaking, the parties of Europe, North America, and the Middle East-appear tp remain loyal to the,CPSU; the parties of Latin America remain generally so, although Chinese-inroads continue toand most of the parties of the Far East continue to gravitate toward Peeping.

In Europe, the two most important non-blocthose of France andsupported Khrushchev's actions during the Cuban crisis and have continued toild line toward India over theborder dispute. Togliatti, in fact, voiced oblique criticism of Peiping's Indian policy

onovember, and the Italian delegate to the Bulgarian party congress joined in the public assault on the Albanians. of Tirana or expressions of support for Khrushchev's behavior over Cuba were heard from many of the other European and Middle Eastern speakers at the congress. e Belgian party,ell-entrenched pro-Chinese minority faction early in November pre-empted the pro-Soviet leadership by issuing its own resolution condemning Nehru as an aggressor and rejecting any compromise in the Cuban crisis. Moreover, in North Africa the Algerianhas in the past been stronglyso far chosen to refrain froaon Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban crisis. Reporting on the stand of other African parties and some of the European parties is not yet available, but there is no reason to believe that the CPSU has lost its predominance in this area.

8. In Latin America, while the Communist parties havo generally adopted the Soviet line that Khrushchev's action on Cubacourageous victory forhere is evidence of widespread demoralization and dissatisfaction stemming either from the belief that the Soviets went too far ln placing missiles in Cuba or from the conviction that Moscow had not shown strength in dealing with the United States. The Brazilian party leader Prestes is reported to have rebuked certain party membors who had criticized the USSR for not being more Leaders of two other Latin American parties made trips to bloc capitals for guidance. Tbe major CPSU losses to Peiping, however, appear to be occurring in Cuba, where Castro's evident bitter resentment of the Soviet actions seems to bethe response of the former Popular Socialist Partyparty) leaders who are allied with him and dependent on him. Although former PSP chief Bias Rocatand favorable to Khrushchev at the Bulgarian party congress,old PSPa speech ln Havanaovember which implicitly endorsed many Chinese contentions and which pointedly alluded, like Peiping,.to the "terrible hour of Munich ineopleeinghis speech was subsequently reprinted in the Peiping People's Dally. Since Castro, however, had notesire to break with Moscow, Rodriguez coupled his pro-Chinese formulations with gestures to the Soviet Union.

9. In the Far East, the lines of division betweon Soviet and Chinese nonbloc adheronts have been more sharply drawn in the past month, with the Chinese, on balance, continuing to gain. The Indonesian party leadership has deplored the "chauvinism" exhibited by the Indian party, has vehementlyNehru, and bas publicly expressed hope that the Soviet Union would not sail HIGs to India. Indonesian partyAidit has also publicly attacked Khrushchev's Cuban policy by calling the dismantling of Soviet rocketsacrifice to be regretted." Similarly, the Japanese party has republished Chinese vituperative attacks on Nehru, endorsed Chinese border claims, upheld Castro's "fivend warned against "submitting now to the blackmail by. imperialists" over Cuba. Continued adherence to the Chinese position has also been indicated by the New Zealand party, which bas nowelegation to Albania in responseecret invitation of last spring, and by part of the divided Burmese Communistwhose roprosentative at the Bulgarian party congressthe Chinese counterattack on the critics of Tirana. Of

the two non-bloc Asian parties which had supported Moscowafterd CPSU congress, only one--that of Australas continued to back Moscow by prriiuiiig Khrushchev's actions on Cuba; theoltnken anposition. The Indian partypecial coso: the Chinese attack ofctober, the right-wing majority of the Indian Communist party forcedesolution condemning the Chinese, pledging full support to the Indian defense effort, and also endorsing arms aid from thedeviating even from the Soviet party's official position. The leftist pro-Chinese minority has dissociated itself from this statement and has broken off contact with the party leadership; some of tho leftists have sinco boun imprisoned by tho

Communist leaders almost certainly estimate that the latest Chinese challenge to Moscow may soon lead to an open break between the Soviet and Chinese parties. The Soviet party has begun to reply polemically to the Chinese attacksravda article ofovember on "dogmatism, sectarianism, nationalism, and rigid adhorence to the personality cult" in the Communist movement. In criticizing by strong implication Chinese policy toward both Cuba and India, however, the Soviet party newspaper names only the Albanian party. Similarly, the Chinese party, while seeming for weeks to be on the verge of breaking openly with Moscow and clamoring for the(most Importantly, tbe Soviet leaders) to be completelyas not taken the final step of naming names (except Tito's). Should the USSR go on to aid the Indians with materiel, such as the once-promised MIGs, and particularly if Moscow were at the same time to attack openly Chinese policy toward India, the Chinese might well denounce the Soviet party leadership by name. Aftertep, relations between the two parties would probably soon be terminated.

An openopen existence of two Communist camps, one far stronger in terms of economic and militaryand the number of parties adhering to it, but the other camp purporting to represent fully half of the world'sillion Communist partygreatly damage the Communist conceptorld Communist movement representing the wave of the future. Tbe two camps would competefor Influence. There would be increasingas well as polarization ln thc movement, and many Con munlst leaders, perhaps including some of the current Soviet and Chinese leaders, could be expected to fall.

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