NUM8ER ci>'& , . Supersedes NIE 1
Sqyiel Bloc Airapabilities
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTEtllGEN
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
ArTSHEB FORBTORtCai-SEViEW PROGRAM
Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ground controlled intercept
detection of missile
vi. soviet air defense
current capabilities and future
annex b: maps and
SOVIET BLOC AIR ANDDEFENSE CAPABILITIES THROUGH
To evaluate the capabilities of Soviet Bloc air and missilesystems through
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
USSR has continued to devote large-scale effortsand modernizing ita air defense system. Wein recent years, air defense has absorbed about one-fifthSoviet military expenditures which can be attributed tomissions. Moreover, the Soviets consider their airsystem so important that its chief holds the position ofMinister of Defense, ranking with the chiefs ofair, naval, arid rocket forces. (Paras.)
against hostile aircraft, especially againstand high altitude bombers, have been greatlyrecent years by the widespread deployment of(SAM) systems, improved interceptorsnd advanced equipment for air defenseand control. Antiaircraft capabilities will be furtherand extended, but the major future developmentforesee is the adventapability against
priority RAD on anUmissile defenses has beenin the USSR for more than five years. Our evidence isto support ar estimate of the characteristics ofbeing developed. However, it does pointseveral different systems to defend against Western missiles
of various ranges. One ofystem to defend field forces against short-range ballistic missiles, could be operational now or
D. Our evidence leads us to conclude that the USSR isan antibalhstic missile (ABM) system around Leningrad and that it will probably become operationale lack the technical data on components which would be necessaryirm estimate of the capabilities of the Leningrad system.we believe the system has been test-fired at Sary Shagan against ballistic missiles of short and medium ranges,autical mileissiles which are the nearest Soviet equivalent ln range and velocity to the Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris. We are uncertain whether the USSR has test-fired any anti-missiles against ICBM's. However, the Soviets have almostconducted extensive research on ICBM re-entryand we believe that fihey would have concluded that the problems of intercepting IRBMs and ICBMs are not significantly different For this reason, and considering the nature of the ballistic missile threat to Leningrad, we believe that the system being deployed there is probably designed to intercept both IRBMs and ICBMs. We have no basis for estimating itsWe think It unlikely, however,ystem deployed at the current stage ofould be effective againstemploying decoys.' )
"The Director. Defease Intelligence Agency, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, The Assistant Chief of Naval Operation*epartment of uie Kary, the Assistant Chief of Staff, InteiUgenee, USAF, and the Director for intelligence. Joint Staff, do not concur ln this paragraph.
They arc concerned that the paragraph may notroper perspective of the operational capability of the Leningrad system. The reader may Infer mat the systemapability against the ICBM, whereas this cannot be sub. stands ted.
They beUeve Uie Leningrad system wu developed at Sary Shagan for static or field deployment and has been tested only against target missiles with various ranges fromn upM na
They believe also that the system deplored around Leningrad is toeasure of protection against the Thar, Jupiter, and Polaris. When operational, the system shouldapability to engage tha threat posed by these first generation systems. Any major change ln the character of the threat, such as use of salvo Are. decoys, or tankage fragmentation, shouldetrimental effect on the system's capabilities.
(Footnote con tinned next
counter the more complex long-range ballisticof thes, the Soviets may seek to improvesystem, or mayifferent and moreor both. Should they follow the first course,the Leningrad system at additional locations wouldin the near future if it has not already begun. If sitesconstruction now. initial operational capabilities couldat one or more locations in about two years, andimprovements would progressively increase theregard it as more likely, however, that the USSR willat locations other than Leningradewantimissile system is available. In this case, theforould probably delay the beginningfor another year or so. Initial operationalcould probably be achieved at one or more locations
technical achievements enable the Soviets toABM system which they regard as reasonablyigorous deployment program willbe undertaken. Considering the vast effort required forprogram and the relative importance of the variousareas in the USSR, we believeigorousprogram would contemplate the defense ofprincipal Sovietrogram of this scopewould require some five or six years from itsits completion. We have no basis for Judging whether orSoviets would consider their ABM systems effectivewarrant the initiation ofrogram.
One o( the more critlc.nl judgments to be made Is an assessment or the system's potential capability against an icbm re-entry vehicle. They believe Ihst under certain favorable conditions, the system, as synthesized from the Sary Shaft" activity, could engage an icbm re-entry vehicle.f_
suggest* thai the system probably was optimised against MRBMs
While an anu-icbm cspabtllty can neither be confirmed nor denied, theyon the basis of Bring activity and other evidence that the system being deployed at Leningrad Is designed to counter the MRBM/IRBM. snd that present evidence does not support the snll ichm capability Implied ln the text
believe that the Soviet leaders almost certainlyacquire an antisatellite capability. Although we lackthink it probableevelopment program exists. Ifare utilizing components from existing systems,be able to intercept current models of US satellitesthey would almost certainly be able to do so within theor so. )
defense against aircraft, the Soviets now relySAMs employed near important Axed targets, anddeployed to cover approach routes as well as gapslocations. We estimate that inere operational in defense of moreargetthe USSR, including principal cities and other targets ofand military importance. SAMs are also beingdefend major.installations of the theater fieldcities ih the Europeanystem whichis designed to engage aircraft at low altitudes is nowearly stages of deployment. (Paras.
L In the next few years, SAMs will be even more widelynew all-weather Interceptors will appear, and Interceptors will be equipped with better! airborne intercept radar and AAMs. The increasing effectiveness of interceptors and their ground control systems should more than offset the probable reduction in total numbers. We believe thateavy prime radars anduxiliary radars are deployed in various combinations at! sites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The altitude capabilities of the niost advanced air defense radars will continue to exceed the combat ceilings of Western bombers and cruise-type missiles. Early warning (EW) radar will continue to provide overlapping medium and high altitude coverage of the USSR and the European Satellites. Toward the end of the period of this estimate, the USSR will probably have in operationcapable of jamming all frequencies likely to be used by Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment.
J. The significant improvements in the Soviet air defensewhich have been noted during recent years and which will be extended during the next few. years will progressively reduce
the chances of successful attacks by manned bombers.penetration by manned bombers will therefore requiresophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defense capability can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ, including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types,tactics, and electronic countermeasures. Even in suchthe Soviets would probably expect to destroy aof the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR is able toubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.
L The Soviet leaders recognize that an effective air and missile defense Is an essential element of the strong military posture which they wish to maintain, both to contribute to the security of the Bloc and to support their foreign policies. The continuing large-scale effort to Improve and modernize the Soviet air defense system Indicates the high priority assigned to this mission. The expenditure of resources on air defense Is very large; hi recent years it has amounted to about one-fifth ot the military expenditures which can be attributed to broad military missions, and this share Is likely to rise, particularly Ifdeployment of antimissile defenses is begun.
Through these efforts, the Soviets have in recent years greatly improved their defenses against hostile aircraft, especially against medium and high altitude attack. The principal improvements have been: (a) the extensive deployment of surface-to-air missilesb) the introduction of air defense control systems with semiautomatic features; and (c) the deployment of new lighters ln significant numbers to border areas. Other factors Include the advent of radars with better detection and height-finding capabilities and the incorporation of more advanced electronic gear and armament, including air-to-air missilesnto Interceptorew SAM system, believed to be designed to defend against aircraft attack at low altitudes, is in the early stages of deployment in the Soviet Union.
While improvements will continue ln antiaircraft systems, wethat the major future change will be the adventapability against ballistic missiles. Our evidence on Soviet accomplishments in this field is inadequate to support firm estimates, but it is clear that antimissile BAD in the USSR is conductedarge scale andigh priority.
4 All Soviet forces deployed for the air defense of the USSR are under the operational controlingle major headquarters, the PVO Strany, (Air Defense of the Country) which combines ground and air elements. The Commander In Chief of the PVO Stranyeputy Minister of Defense and is the chief adviser to the Minister and Chief of the General Staff on air defense matters. Administratively, he ranks with the Commanders In Chief of the ground, air, naval, and rocket forces.
he chief components assigned to the PVO Strany are the Air Observation. Reporting, and Communication (VNOS) service, the Fighter Aviation of Air Defensend the Antiaircraft Artillery of Air Defensehe latter component including both antiaircraft guns and SAMs. In addition to forces directly assigned, other Soviet forces which can contribute to the air defense mission are alsoavailable to this command
here Is some evidence that antimissile defense units are now being organised in the USSR. Judging by Soviet practice with other air defense organisations, we believe that antimissile units defending strategic targets willomponent of the overall defense system under PVO Strany, whereas units assigned to defend theater field forces against missile attack will probably be subordinated to those forces.
PVO forces are organisederies of geographic divisionsA similar organization is employed by each of theSatellites, whose air defenses are in effect extensions at theAlbania Is an 'exception;esult of politicalcooperation between that country and the other Warsawhas ceased. The Chinese Communist air defense systemIndependent of Soviet control, and Sino-SovietIn this field have long been limited to the exchange
III. AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS Surfact'to-Air Misvlet
The Soviets now have operational three types of SAMwo of these,ndre designed primarily for defense against medium and high altitude attacks; the third,s probably designed to provide Improved capabilities at lowerA-l's are deployed only around Moscow, while SA-2's have been extensively deployed throughout the USSR. The newest system.s in the early stages of deployment at present
ystem. Theystem, consisting ofixed sites otaunching positions each, has been operational around Moscowts chief advantages are Its ability to handlearge number of targets and toigh rate of fire against them. Theystem was apparently designed to counter the massed air raid threat of thes ands. Tbe changed nature of the threat, the magnitude of effort involved in deployment, and the limitations of the system probably argued againsteployment elsewhere. Our evidence Indicates that the defenses of Moscow have
For performance eharacterUUci or SAMs. see Annex A. Table 1.
' For UlustraUons of typicalndites, see Annex B,nd 3.
been undergoing modernization in the put tew years, by theofndites around the city and by the modification of someites, possibly to accommodate the more effectiveissile.
ystem. Sincehe USSR has beenajor operational capability with an Improved SAM systemor the defense of both strategic targets and field force Installations. Although thereariety of arrangement patterns, all observed sites consist of sheuidance radar and linked by service roads to facilitate loading. While the observed sites clearly represent permanent InstaJlatlons, allcomponents of the system are mounted on wheeled vehicles and are capable of movement by road or rail.
Theystem appears designed to cope with the threat posed by small groups of aircraft rather than massed raids. Flexibility and mobility are Its chief advantages over then contrast to the massiveites, each of which is capable of defendingimited sector around the target area, eachite Is capable* coverage. This flexibility is obtained Bt the expense of target handling capacity and rate of fire relative to the SA-1.
Considering US technical studies of theystem andon Soviet assessments of its performance, we estimate the present maximum Intercept range ai thet somewhat more thanm. It probablyigh degree of effectiveness up to altitudes0 feet, with limited effectiveness up0 feet. Ita capabilities would decrease rapidly at higher altitudes, but there Is some evidence that It might be able to engage nonmaneuvering targets at altitudes as higheet The low altitude capability of the system probably extends down toeet The guidance system at anite can handle only one targetime, but can direct three missilesarget simultaneously. Additional missiles could be fired against the same target after one or more missiles of the first salvo had completed their run. The Soviets apparently believe they must program three or four missiles against each target In order to achieve acceptable kill probabilities.
The foregoing figures probably do not apply to allefenses at present An original version of the system, somewhat Inferior In porfonnari.ee. Is probably still deployed in some areas. Further,characteristics will vary depending on the terrain and other conditions at theite, the srze, speed, and approach angle of the target, and other operational factors.
Strattgiche USSR. Thes the basic missile defense system for critical urban-Industrial areas tn the USSR, other
tri an Moscow.* Deployment ofnstallations around Moscow now Includes seven sites, and is probably partrogram to supplement theystem. Sinceoreites have been confirmed ln the USSR, mostly In defense of population centers,complexes, and government control centers. Missile defenses have been provided for most of the Soviet cities with populations greaternd we believe that alluch cities will ultimately be defended.ites have been emplaced at some smaller urban areas, presumably because they contain government control centers or other installations of critical jimportance. They have also been deployed for defense of naval and port facilities, nuclear production and weapon storage installations, missile test ranges, and industrial facilities. Other major military installations, such as long-range missile sites andof the long-range air force, are also defended byeveral sites ln border areas, which we cannot relate to known targets, suggest that the Soviets are deploying peripheral defenses, which may eventually extend from the Kola Peninsula along the western and southern borders of the USSR Into central Asia. Deployment in the Baltic coastal area is particularly dense.
IS. Identification of additional sites and defended areas since the publication of NIEconfirms thateployment Is massive In scale. Considering the pattern of deployment observed to date, the length of time the program has been under way, and the extent of our Intelligence coverage, we estimate that Inites were operational in defense of morearget areas in the USSR In light of the accumulating evidence, we have Increased our estimate of the number ofites to be provided and have modified ourof the timing of the program. We now estimate that the Soviets winotal ofites in the USSR Tbe continuing construction. of new sites and the apparently incomplete defense ln certain target areas lead us to estimate that the program Is still under way. We believe that the major portion of thewill be completed within the next two years. Improvements to the weapons system will continue to be Introduced and some deployment will probably continue in the period
eployment to Field Forces. Somenits hava been deployed in support of Soviet field forces in East Oermany and possibly in the USSR. Althoughnits assigned to Soviet field forces are normally emplaced at fixed installations, the system Is transportable by road andnits have been observed in field exercises. However,nitsimited ability toast moving front because of the
'For details of SAM deployment it Moscow and elsewhere In the USSR, see Annex B.nd 4.
'Air Defense CapsbillUes Throughateduly 1M1 (TOP SECRET)
requirement for good roads and the time required to displace to new positions. We believe, therefore, thatissile defenses for field forces will be primarily assigned to such targets as major headquarters, logistic centers, and airfields. The evidence is iosuffldent to determine the scale of defense planned for the Soviet field forces.
Deployment to Soviet Allies. Deployment ofites for defense of European Satellite targets has been under way" Missile defenses have been observed in East Germany, Hungary. Bulgaria. Rumania, Czechoslovakia, addhe heaviest deployment has occurred In East Germany, where there are nowonfirmed sites,f them completed, and atrobable additional sites. About half of the confirmed sites are manned by East German troops, and the remainder by units of the Soviet field forces. The East German sites are located in the vicinity of Berlin and In the northern portion of East Germany. The Soviet sites appear to be deployed to defend important Soviet military Installations such as major headquarters and airfields. In the other Satellites, aboutites have been confirmed in defense of major cities. On the basis of observed deployment, wethatites will be deployed In the European Satellites during the next two or three years, Including sites manned by Soviet field forces.
Suspension of Soviet assistance has thus far limited the extent ofeployment In China. Onlyalf dozen sites have been Identified In China, three of them at Peiping. These sites are believed to contain Soviet manufactured equipment. We doubtignificant number of additional sites are now deployed In China, or that,ubstantial Improvement In political relations, Soviet assistance for further deploymentubstantial scale will be forthcoming. We also consider It Improbable that the Chinese couldative produced copy of theuring the period of this estimate.
Lene Altitude Defense. We have estimated for several years that the USSR would develop and deploy an additional SAM systempecifically designed to engage targets at lowesseet. Photography at Kapustln Yar ln9 revealed two probable RAD sites, each of which consisted of four launchossible launcher on one of the pads held two missUe-Uke objects abouteet long. We have identified more thanites of this type ln the USSR sincesually nearrites. No pattern can be determined from the limited deployment noted thus far and no associated electronics Installations have been found. While these factors cause us lo be uncertain of the characteristics of the new system, we
details oteployment In East derm sny and Uie other European Satellites, see Annex B,nd I. 'The singleite provided b> albania is now inactive
believe that it Isystem designed to provide better capabilities against low altitude attack than theystem.
A number ofites identified to date have been located around Moscow and Leningrad as well as in coastal regions, particularly. the Baltic* We believe that the Soviets will deploy SA-3's to providecoverage ln certain areas now defended by thendystems. Those coastal areas which the Soviets regard as especially vulnerable to low altitude penetration will probably be provided withefensesriority basis. Apart from this factor, however, we have no basis for estimating how widely the Soviets intend to deploy this system or what kind of fixed installations will be defended. We believe that theystem in mobile configurations will be provided to field forces and that |the extent of deployment with these forces will probably considerably exceed that of the SA-2.
future Developments. We expect the Soviets to continue their efforts to develop new SAM systems and improve existing ones foragainst more advanced aircraft and cruise-type missiles. They apparently Intend to improve range capabilities and system reliability and to overcome other limitations in their current systems, including restrictions on target handling capabilities and vulnerability to Jamming. There is also evidence that the Soviets are seeking further Improvement in SAM systems for use, with field forces.
Scope of Research and Development. We know that the Soviets have for more than five years beenigh priority and extensive program to develop defenses against ballistic missiles. At Sary Shagan, west of Lake Balkhash, they haveeavily, instrumental RAD center extending overquare miles, with housing accommodations for at0 personnel.7 moreissiles, pf various ranges upave been launched Into this center, thus providing much data on re-entryIt is almost certain that during the past two years attempts have been made to intercept incoming missiles by defensive missiles launched from Sary Shagan.
We believeecond antlballlstic missile (ABM) research facility is located on the Kamchatka Peninsula. The facilities here are considerably less extensive than those at Sary Shagan. This facility has almost certainly been engaged since at0 in determining the re-entry characteristics of ICBMs launched from Tyuratam. We
Tor details ofeployment, see Annex B, Finn- 1
are uncertain, however, whether intercepts of ICBMs have yet been attempted from Kamchatka/
The evidence available to us indicates that the Soviets areseveral different ABM systems to defend against missiles of various ranges. This evidence is insufficient, however, to support an estimate of the characteristics or effectiveness of any of these systems. In general, the complex problems involved in antimissileacquisition, discrimination, target tracking, andas difficult for the USSR as for the US. We know that the Soviets are keenly aware of the counterrneasures available to an attacking force, such as the use of decoys, the Jamming of ABM system electronics, and the possible saturation of ABM complexes with multiple nose cones of varying characteristics, directions, and angles of descent. Despite the intensity and demonstrated progress of Soviet RAD, we are not aware of any Soviet breakthrough in ABM technology.
Defense Against Long-Rang* Missiles. Our evidence leads us to conclude that the USSR is deploying an ABM system around Leningrad. Thia system, with facilities resembling some of those first noted at Sary Shaganas been under construction around Leningrad since at leasthese installations Include three launch complexesistinctive type. Each bonslsts of five circular launch sites having six positions each, and associated support areas. We do not believe that construction of the system lat Leningrad has been completed, but we estimate that lt will achieve some operational capability
We lack the technical data on components which wouldirm estimate of the capabilities of the Leningrad system. However, we believe the system has been test-fired at Sary Shagan against ballistic missiles of short and medium ranges,. missiles which are the nearest Soviet equivalent in range and velocity to the Thor. Jupiter, and Polaris. We are uncertain whether
'The Assistant Chief of Staff. taulugtoce. USAF, does not believe thatagainst ICBMs have been attempted from Kamehatxaf_
the USSR hu test-fired any antlmissUes against ICBMs. However, the Soviets have almost certainly conducted extensive research on ICBM re-tntry characteristics and we believe that they would have concluded that the problems of intercepting IRBMs and ICBMs are not significantly different. For this reason, and considering the nature of the ballistic missile threat to Leningrad, we believe that the system being deployed there Is probably designed to Intercept both IRBMs and ICBMs. We have no basis for estimating its effectiveness. We think It unlikely, however,eployed at the current stage ofould be effective against missiles employing decoys.'*
e believe that the cost of extensive ABM deployment,when measured against the competing demands of other advanced weapon systems and the space program for high-quality personnel and materials,ubstantial argument against heavy investment in systems whose effectiveness may be limited or subsequently reduced by expected advances in offensive weapons and tactics. -The Soviet research, development, and testing program has already consumed the equivalent of several billiononsiderable part of which was expended to develop the Leningrad system. The development andcoats of more advanced systems will require continuing ex-
-Tha Director. Defense Intelligence Agtncy. the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Array, the Assistant Chief of Mavsj Operation!epartment of the Nary, the Assistant Chief of Staff,USAF. and tha Director for Intelligence. Joint Staff, do not concur tn this paragraph.
They are concerned that the paragraph may notroper perspective of the operational capability of the Leningrad system. The reader may Infer that the systemapability against the ICBM. whereas this cannot be substanUated.
Tbey believe tbe Leningrad system wis developed at Sary Shagan for static or field deployment and has been tested only againstssues with various ranges fromm. upa.
They believe also that the system deployed around Leningrad Is toeasure of protection against tha Thor, Jupiter, and Polaris. When operational, the system shouldapability to engage the threat posed by these drat generation systems. Any major change In the character of the threat, such as use of salvo fire, decoys, or tankage fragmantaUon, shouldetrimental effect on the system's eapablllUes.
One of the more crlUcal Judgments to be made I* an assessment of UM system's potential capability against an ICBM re-entry vehicle. They believe that under certain favorable conditions, the system, as syntheaUed from Use Sary Shagan acUvlty. could engage an ICBM reentry vehicle. In this connection, we have no evidence that the lyalcm haa been fired against vehicle* with velodUe* and re-entry angles similar to the ICBM. Furthermore, the record or Bring to dale suggests that the system probably was optimised against MRBMs.
While an anU-ICBM capability can neither be confirmed nor denied, they con-elude on the basis of firing activity and other evidence that the system being deployed at Leningrad Is designed to counter the MRBM/IRSM. and that present evidence does not support the anU-ICBM capability Implied In the text.
i TOP CCCMT
pendltures at an even greater rate. On the other hand, the USSR's traditional emphasis on tho [defense of the homelandtrong incentive for early deployment, as docs the desire to foster the image of Soviet military superiority and technical leadership over the US. Thus we believe that the Soviet leaders face difficult choices, some of which are probably yet to be1 made.
"Twenty-five Soviet clUes have populations ofCOO or more, and are of correspondingly great economic and administrate Importance.
Despite the Incentives for early deployment, the probableof the current system and the heavy costs Involved make lt difficult to explain why deployment is occurring now. The Soviets may believe that the present system can later be improved by Introducing moreradars and mlssfles into It. There Is some evidence that Soviet planners recognize the need tootential for improvement in their ABM systems, but we do not know whether the system athas this potential;"
We are also puzzled that Moscow was not chosen for the first antimissile defenses. Possibly the defense of Moscow hasdeferredore effective system is available, and deployment of the present system'will be limited to Leningrad. There is no present evidence of ABM deployment at any location other than LenjngradQ
To counter the more complex long-range ballistic missile threat of thes, the Soviet* may seek to Improve the system now being deployed at Leningrad, or mayifferent and more advanced system, or both. Should they follow the first course, deployment of the Leningrad.system at additional locations would probably begin In the near future. If It has not already begun. If sites are under con-atructlon now, initial operational capabilities could be achieved at one or more locations In about two years, and subsequent improvements would progressively increase the capabilities. We regard it as more likely, however, that the USSR will defer deployment at locations other than Leningradew and better antirnissile system Is available. In this case, the requirement forould probably delay the beginning of deployment for another,year or so. Initialcapabilities could probably be achieved at one or more locations.
If technical achievements enable the Soviets to develop an ABM system which they regard is reasonably effective against long-rangeigorous deployment program will probably be undertaken. Considering the vast effort requiredarge program and the relative importance of the various urban-industrial areas ln the USSR, we believeigorous Soviet deployment program would contemplate theofrincipal Soviet cities." rogram of this scope
almost certainly would require some five or six years from its initiation to Its completion We have no basis for judging whether or when the Soviets would consider their ABM systems effective enough to warrant the Initiation ofrogram.
Against Short-Range Missiles. There are IndicationsSoviets have beenodification of theirissile system for use against short-range'ballisticas the Honestnd Sergeant. We have noSoviet progress, but wo estimate that an Improvedystemeffectiveness against tactical ballistic missiles could beor int ls also possible that the Soviets have chosena completely new system; If so, lt could also be available lnperiod. We believe that whatever system. Is developed will beprimarily for the protection of field forces and for this usemobile. It will probably also be deployed at fixed sites lnvulnerable to short-range missile attack.
An Ii so lettile Piog'am
We believe that the Soviet leaders almost certainly intend to acquire an antlaateUlte capability. Although we have insufficientto determine whether the USSR is attainingapability, we think It probableevelopment program exists. This program might lead to the developmentpecific antlsatelllte missile system, possibly in conjunction with the ABM program. In addition, the Soviets may be attempting to achieve an early capability byystem using radar and passive tracking facilities, missiles, and warheads from other systems.
In the latter instance, the Intercept problem could be solved by determining the target satellite's orbitew passes and thenallistic missileear vertical trajectory so as tothe satellite at or near apogee of the Intercepting missile. Soviet medium or Intermediate range missiles appear to be suitable for this purpose. Such an early capability would probably require the use of
a nuclear warhead. If the Soviets are utilizing components fromng systems, they might be able to Intercept current models of OSnow, and they would almost certainlyapability to do so within the next year or so.
of debris from theuclear test series IndicatesUSSR is continuing Its efforts to reduce the diameters andlow-yield fission weapons. We believe that these tests almostdevelopment of warheads for air defense purposes.handling facilities have been identified at the SAM test com-
plex atKapustin Yar and at tho Sary Shagan ABM research center.
gests that nuclear warheads are not widely deployed at theseWe believe that the Soviets are Interested in developingfor using nuclear weapons to intercept ballistic missiles bothand outside the atmosphere. The larger payload capabilities of the new AAMs under development are compatible with existing nuclear warheads, and we estimate that these missiles will be available in the next year or so.
ofe estimate that there wereperational units throughout the Bloc, withf theseunits.f the Soviet fighters are directlyIA-PVO with air defense as their exclusive mission. Tbeare in Tactical Aviation, are trained in air defense as wellsupport operations.
With the widespread deployment of thehe Soviets haveombination of fighter and missile defenses. They now rely primarily upon missiles for point defense of important fixed targets, and upon fighters for area defense to cover approach routes as well as gaps between missile-defended areas. The arming of fighters with AAMs and the increased useata link intercept control system has significantly increased the effectiveness of fighter aircraft.
These developmentsonsiderable reduction In Soviet fighter strength. Reductions in Soviet fightertactical andwill continue over the next five years. We estimate that the number of operational [Soviet fighters will be reduced on the order ofercent during this period. The more advanced performance characteristics of new model fighters and Improvements In their weapons and control systems should more than offset reductions in numbers.
Although the Soviets have been working to improve the ail-weather capability of their fighter force sincehis force still consists largely of day fighters. The FLASHLIGHT A. Introducedthe first Soviet attempt to develop an all-weather interceptor. Airborne Intercept (Al) equipment has been added to some models of FRESCO. FARMER, and FISHBED. Under non visual conditions, the effectiveness of most of these Al-equipped models is seriously reduced by the limited range of the radar, the continued reliance on gunand the restrictionursuit attack. Some of these models are equipped with AAMs. and their capability Is less seriously limited by nonvisual conditions.'1
" For charbctarIjUcs of Interceptors and airborne Intercept radars, see Annex A.nd 1.
New interceptors now entering service are the FITTER, FISHPOT, and FISHBED CAD. We estimate that production of these newInterceptors begannd thatave been produced since that time. Although we have Identified onlyn units, we estimate that atave actually been deployed.
Three new high performance Interceptor prototypes were displayed in1 Aviation Day show, the FIREBAR B. the FUPPER. and the FIDDLER. We have limited evidenco that FIDDLER and possibly FLIPPER may be In production now. We estimate that all three of the new fighters will be produced and that they could start entering units. All three of these new fighters are equipped with Improved AI radar and AAMs. The appearance of theew long-range fighter, mayoviet Intent toapability to Intercept alr-to-surface missile (ASM) carriers. We estimate that this aircraft will be able,tooiter. or more from base. However, Its potential for such missions ls currently limited by the shorter ranges of Soviet Ground Control Intercept <OCI), and by the amount of warning time available.
Interceptor Production. Soviet production of Interceptor aircraft has dropped sharply In recent years. Annual productioneak ofn thes. Production declined to7 and tohis decline was partly due to rising costs and production difficulties caused by the increased complexity of modern fighters. However, the primary cause was probably thedeployment of SAM sites. The USSR produced on the ordernterceptors annually0e estimate thatnterceptors will be produced
have firm evidence on the deployment of AAMs In theforce and in several or the Satellite forces as well. Wethree types are nowadar beamrlderoming missile (AA -j.issile which may beinfrared homing missile or an all-weather semlactlvtwo versionsrototype AAM. designatedobserved on FIDDLER and FLIPPER at1 Tushlno airwe estimate that one of these versions willt Is probable that these missiles haveradar homing systems and that they can carrywarheads, some of which may be nuclear. SovietImproved AAMs over the next few years will depend primarilydevelopment of interceptors equipped with suitable AI radarcontrol system.1*
"for performance eharacterlsUe* of AAMa. tee Annex A. Table 4.
ii. The Soviets continue lo employ large numbers of antiaircraft guru for defense of field forces and fixed targets, primarily for defense at low altitudes where Aghter and missile effectiveness is poor. These guns range in size frommarge percentage employ fire control radars. Proximity fuses probably are used in some AAA ammunition. European Satellite forces haventiaircraft guns and there aren Communist China. North Korea, and North Vietnam. The number of antiaircraft guns ln the Soviet forces, nowas declined over the past few years and this trend is continuing. Because'of the widespread deployment of SAMs, we believe that most of the remaining medium and heavy guns used in the defense of fixed targets in the USSR wul be phased out over the next few years.arge number of these probably will be held in reserve status near major target areas, and some will be retained to defend field forces. Transfer of some of this equipment toother Bloc countries is probable.1* 1
IV. radar and control equipment
believe thateavy prime radars and aboutradars are deployed in various combinations at someIn the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Overlapping radar coverage extendsentire USSR and European Satellite area, with the heaviestwest of the Urals and in peripheral areas. In the Farcoverage extends from the Soviet-North Koreanthe coastal zona of Communist China, into North VietnamChina along the borders of Laos. Thailand, andcoverage in China Is sparse; radars are generally locatedtarget complexes. In some coastal areas of the USSR,radar is used occasionally to extend early warning (EW)to enhance low altitude detection capabilities.u
Early Warning Radon
Soviet aircraft warning system Is based upon largeEW radars closely spaced throughout the USSR. Underthis system can detect and track aircraft at mediumaltitudes more. from Bloc territory; underconditions the system can detect and track aircraft at. Maximum altitude capabilities of theEW radars will continue to exceed tho operational altitudesaircraft during the period of this estimate. Low altitude de-
" For characteristics of anUalrcraft runs, set Annex A. Table a. "For characterlsUcs of Soviet radars, seeable S.
lection and tracking capabilities are limited, but the density of coverage makes detection and intermittent tracking likely.
Ground Controlled Intercept Radars
EW radars are also usedCI role. To obtainaccuracy for height determination ln GCI operations, theis used in conjunction with height-finder radars, the limitsreduce the maximum effective range toypes of radars employ moving target indicators or otherbut the low altitude capabilities of most GCI radarslimited.
Defection oi Missile Launching!
Soviets have no operational radar system for early warningmissilehe development of highradars for detection of long-range missile launchlngswithin Soviet capabilities for at least six years. The Sovietsa high degree of competence in backscatter research andSoviet work ln the latter field has related to development oftechniques, but the Soviets have probably alsomethod for detecting US nuclear detonations and possibly USlaunchlngs. Its use against missiles mightimitedEW time for alerting defenses.
Soviet ground radar development has stressed reliability, mobility, and ease of maintenance, and this emphasis continues. The Soviets have also incorporated Increased power and greater designIn their newer radars. Recent trends in Soviet radar development appear directed toward countering the Western ASM threat.
The very large number of radars employed In the Soviet system hasigh redundancy of coverage. Moreover, in deploying successive generations of radars the Soviets have tended to retain much of the older equipment In service, resultingteady growth in the operational Inventory. However. In the past year or so. the deployment of new and better radars and the introduction of automated control systems appear to have lededuction In the number of radar sitesew areas. This trend will probably continue, leading eventuallyignificant reduction In the operational inventory.
Soviet air warning system ls supplemented by passivewhich can extend EW range beyond most known radarvariety of special lied equipment, used for detection and direction-
finding, can cover moat of the frequencies used by Westernand radar. Thia equipment haa been extensively deployed at sites in forward areas of the Soviet Bloc and has alao been observed on Soviet ships and aircraft. The extent to which passive detection has beeninto the air defense system is not clear. The large number of sitesair potential for target location, but the elaborate data handling facilities required to exploit this potential effectively may hot be available.
At present, the USSR has an appreciable capability for Jamming Western long-range radio comniunlcatlons and bombing andradars. Including frequencies up0 megacycles and possibly higher. The Soviets are also known to have employed electronicincluding simulation of Western navigational aids, againstaircraft. Present capabilities probably vrtll be Increased by theuse of Improved techniques and higher power. Toward the end of the period of this estimate, the USSR will probably have In operation equipment capable of Jamming at all frequencies likely to be used by Westernradar, and navigation equipment.
The Soviets have long sought to strengthen their air warning system against enemy countermeasures. [_
will probably continue, butoviet electronic systemswill still be subject to disruption by properly employed techniques.
Com mumcatfons and Control
he Soviets continue to use the very high frequency (VHF) band for air-to-air and air-to-ground communications, there Is no indication ^Jhat the Soviets will employ ultra high frequency (UHP) systems.
ot point-to-point ground communications in support of airoperations, the Soviets will continue to Improve and expand land-line and microwave links. The use of high frequency radio will decrease, but will continue for special purposes and backup. The microwavethe Soviets plan to have operating5 will be capable ofa signal over long distances without serious degradation, and willow degree of vulnerability to Jamming and interception. Both operational and experimental tropospheric scatter links are in existence, and at least two ionospheric scatter links are being tested in the far northern areas of the USSR- These links would be important to air defenses in those northern areas, where more conventional radio communications are subject to climatic interference and landlines are nonexistent.
The most Important advance in Soviet air defense communications over the last few years has been the development and deployment of an air defense control system with some semiautomatic features. These features include data handling equipment for rapid processing of air defense Information and data link equipment for controllingBeginning inoviet system, similar in concept to the US SAQE systerA but less complex, was widely deployed In the western USSR. We believe that the ground element of this system has been replacedecond generation system, and that an improved semiautomatic fighter oontrol system Is being Introduced. These new systems will probably be widely deployed In the USSR and possibly Eastern Europe within the next few years.
A video data link system has been introduced which is used to transmit the radar display from the radar site to the filter control center for visual presentation. It Is widely deployed throughout the Soviet Bloc, especially on the periphery.
V. CIVIL DEFENSE
he responsibility for Soviet civil defensetransferred from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to theDefense. Developments since then have appeared to reflectof the difficulty of building deep shelters able toyield nuclear weapons. Relatively more emphasis has beenuse of emergency shelters such as basements and coveredon evacuation, especially preattack evacuation oflikely target areas and their resettlement elsewhere for thethe war. Indoctrination of the populace In civil defensecontinued and has come to include radio lectures and televisedrums. Information on the possibility of widespreadhas been published, and manuals on civil defense for ruralbeen issued.
ivil defense training has been, at least in theory, both obligatory and universal. We believe thatillion Soviet citizens have received some instruction in civil defense. Of these, someillion have probably received good basic training in elementary civil defense techniques such as use ot shelters and gas masks, and have probably been familiarized with protective clothing and radiationequipment. On the other hand, the training program hasin many areas from poor instruction, shortage of training aids, and public apathy.
Although the USSRubstantial lead over any of the Western Powers, lt still larks adequate shelter for the bulk of the population. Basement shelters are probably capable of providing some protection to perhapsillion city dwellers against radiation and Ore.illion persons in Moscow, Leningrad. Baku. Tbilisi, and Kiev can take refuge in subways, which are probably capable of resisting some overpressure. We presume that the USSR has prepared for thoand protection of key party and government personnel, but we have no evidence on relocation centers. We estimate that detached and tunnel type shelters and underground bunkers are available toillion key personnel. Thus, some kind of shelter is available for about one-fifth of the urban population. Virtually nothing has been done to provide shelter for the rural population, who would presumably have to prepare their own shelter in the form of dugouts or earth-covered trenches.
In terms of shelters built and personnel trained the USSR has made greater progress than any1 other major power. Even with Limited warning. Soviet civil defense measures would probably reduce casualties considerably, especially among key personnel Nonetheless, we believe that Soviet civil defense is not prepared to cope with large-scale nuclear attack, especially under conditions of short warning time.
VI. SOVIET AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITIES Deployment
defense weapons and equipment are most heavilythat portion of the USSR westine drawn from the Kolathe Caspian Sea; in East Germany. Poland, and Czechoslovakia;the southern portion of the Soviet Far East. Concentrations areat some specific locations outside these areas, especially inand in eastern China. The approaches to Moscow are by farheavily defended area of the Bloc
radar could now give Moscow and many other targets lnmore than one hour's warning of medium and high altitude
made with Western bombers of2 type, Soviet assurance of such detection would be reduced by low level penetrations. The super-sonic bombers and ASMs now being added to Western inventories could reduce this warning time by as much asercent Moreover, the more limited EW time available in Bloc border areas would reduce the effectiveness of the defenses of even heavily defended targets In such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles Increase, and as Western ballistic missilesreater part of the threat, the problem of warning time will become more critical
Current Capobififies aod Future Trends
The extensive deployment of SAMs over the past four years has significantly Improved Soviet air defense capabilities. These capabilities are greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers In daylight and clear weather at altitudes betweennd0 feet Under such conditions, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to00 feet; the FLIPPER will probably bo able tb execute attacks at0he capabilities of the fighter force would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poor visibility, in the Increasingly widespread areas defended by SAMs. air defense capabilities would be virtuallyby weather conditions and would extend to altitudes of0 feet
Despite Its recent and considerable Improvements, however, the Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in copingarge-scale air attack employing varied and sophisticated tactics, even in daylight and within the foregoing altitudes. In addition, the Soviet defense problem would be complicated by the variety of delivery systems which might be employed. Including air and surface-launched cruise missiles and, fighter-bombers At altitudes beloweet the capabilities of the system would be progressively reduced; beloweet the system would lose most of Its effectiveness. The Soviets will attempt to correct these deficiencies during the next few years by further deployment of low altitudeites and by.Improving the capabilities of fighter aircraft In low altitude operations. Total system effectiveness will be Increased by the further application of automated command and control
"Current operaUonalnterceptors <PI9HDKD,TflHFOD ara capable ofynamic climb and reaching aJUtudes ofeet. Inlimb, the aircraft would be at these aJU lodeshort period of Urn* (perhaps on* to three coinuring which It would have IllUe maneuverability. The precision with which the climb must be planned and executed limit* Ita effecUvenesa as an Intercept tactic
he Soviets now have no operational capability against long-range ballistic missiles. However, they may now have some capability Infield forces against short-range ballistic missiles. TheABM system will probably become operationaln about two or three years, the USSR may achieve some capability toimited number of additional targets against long-range missiles.over this same time period; the Soviets will have little capability against complex forms of miss tie attack. We believeoreABM system will almost certainly not become operationalnd that Its deploymentubstantial scale will require several years.
he significant improvements in the Soviet air defense system which have been noted during recent years and which will be extended during the next few years will progressively reduce the chances ofattacks by manned bombers. Successful penetration by manned bombers will therefore require increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defense capability; can be degraded by the Increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be. able to employ.air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetration tactics, and electronic countermeasures. Even In suchthe Soviets would probably expect toumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR is able toubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.
TABLE I: Probable Soviet Development Program for Surface-lo-AirSystems
TABLEstimated Performance of Soviet Interceptor Aircraft
TABLEstimated Performance of Soviet Airborne Intercept Radars
TABLErobable Soviet Development Program for Air-to-Air Missile Systems .
TABLEstimated Characteristics and Performance of Soviet Early Warning andntercept Radars
TABLEstimated Characteristics ofAntiaircraft Guns
'.'ABLEstimated Strength and Deployment of Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense2
TABLEstimated Sino-Soviet Bloc Fighter Strength,
PROBABLE SOVIET DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR SURFACE-TO-AIR
Mm Op Korf. Range.
Mil ES Altilvae
Min EaT Aluuide
L- ecaii/radlo track-whUa
Accuracy (CEP In
are baaod on originalissile. For thowltee modlBed for theGUIDELINE mlrtOo, eharacUrliUe* will approach Uioic of lite
I Mailmum altitude la not Mcaaaarily achieved at mail mum range
irection of approach, aad alula ia of the attacking aircraft.
Would hava tome eflcoilireocaa up0Mctnlly if equippednclear ltlrtaWi
Thai lyeleni probablyigh degree ofup lo altitude*0 feel.limited caTectivaacaa up0 feat. Iu capabdltiea would decrceae rapidly at higherot then itdene* thai it might be able to *ngagc Mmraaaau-ering target* at allileden aaeet.
Variation! In aueh faetora ai aitluc condition* and target apced* *iB influence low-aiutude capnbilltJee. Soviai doctrine aoggaaU allocation of targaUeel to AAA Sre.
Wa have iaaulflcient evidence lo eaUmaia ehameieroiiea. Thula probably being deplored fordefense.
Although the ii'iginal ay item ww equippedand FRUIT8ETctnd FRU1TSET radar* appearedHeee new radar* hava Improvedthe accuracy andilUlud? capability of tha ivaten.
Nuclear aarheada ara poaaible. although .pacific evidence of thairocating.
the more probable mlaailce ara Dried for eachalrera/i;. could be medlfltd lo carry miaallaa. but Uiay have not be* a Mind rockcta cannot be carried al Uva same Uru.
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OK
to climb0 (t
Ir am braka
mi in iPWVi aaa it ti (ra> f*
Co-nbat radlua (nm)
sip g 8
ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET EARLY WARNING AND GROUND CONTROLLED
0 Fl Target I* lecUon Rang* (am)
Ground Controlled0 Fl Targel Tracking Rang* (um)
KN1PE REST A
KNIFE REST B. C
BIG UESHJMIO BAR
BAR LOCK/CROSS OUT
BaR LOCK/CROSS OUTCake.
spoon rest a
Mesira-a* aefaekaed cexMalleeaJ range eepaoiUUaa ara pteaaaiM condiuone; kkealae leerbaataaHartr aa eeeeatena
Theea rangea tn.tr bea ream under aoane operational Taeee changee dapand upon ailing, anMther. alUlada. aMrtnaaa et theor.arltly of other rattan depending en taa Individual radar and Ita Mia.
In rloiarmlnlna lliaaa raneea,IBilp/Sann ratio wiia naeumod.iu IS iiarveMt Dllp/Saun ratio la Imlluvad lo rcpratonittvctlon range. Tracking, huwuvar, wuubl rathar rnqulroa UUp/Bcan rulloon Ihw oriturercentwould boachlavado two-lhlrda of Um ataMd
Tbaaarapraaaat oar beat eatlfaaW o( radar perfomtaaM aa limited by tba pulaa rapatlUen fmqueaert0 par tent DllfuScan ratio would ba aafelevad.
Tba performance of laeaa raoWee an* aMterUrget.
laetr range -oedd ba Ueeliad by radar horlaonnt an ,
Ik Target Target lNoee-on) (NoM-on) (N
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OP SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
EW-OCI Radat SIM*
Model ' Other Primer* Secondary Ugh I Med/Heavy
East Central USSR...
Eastern Europe Soviet Porcet Easurn Europe SaUllIU Pi Asiatic
Moscow Air Defense1
Trsnebalkal (Ind. In Far
half a .if.
operations! units, ateluding trainers. FIREBAR, aad FLASHLIGHT B.
D. FARMER BAB, FLASHLIGHTISHBED, FITTER.
1 Fighter* and EW and QCI radarsm of Moscow, 8AM aitei withinm, and AA (una withinm. all of which ar* Included above In th* flfursst*rn. northwaeWra, and weal central USSR.
foradnly. d*nca i* aot now available to permit as eaumaU on SA-3.
ESTIMATED SINO-SOVIET BLOC FIGHTER STRENGTH MID7
TOTALS 0 0
Surface-to-Air Missile Sites in the Moscow Area
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SITES IN EAST GERMANY
GERMAN SITESSITES *
(at e* near Important militaryConfirmed SA-2Confirmedite
O Probable SA2 S. te underProbableite
O POSSIBLEITE (Unknown tutor dlnaHe it
Canal NtVJwTJ Ak Corridor
IO) HOOriginal document.