MEMO FROM RICHARD HELMS TO DIRECTOR CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING MILITARY TH

Created: 10/16/1962

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Director of Central Intelligence

MILITARY THOUGHT fTOP SECRET!: "Problem ot tne Strategic deployment of Araed Forces in Hoderny Major-General Kh. Dihelaukhov

to [hisof TOP SECRET CSDB reports containing documentary Soviet materUl The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to beo read and handle this

S-Sj SlISSSj0*our source, IRONBARK vnnJ iJJili 'd be nandiodeed-to-know basis within

XJMthi* roPort or for

SinlJ Jidocument In any otfier form should be addressed to the originating office.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Original: The Director of Central Intelligence

cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence Department of the Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U. S. Air Force

The Director, National Security Agency

Director, Division of Intelligence Atomic Energy Commission t

National Indications Center

Chairman, Guided Missiles and Astronautics Intelligence Committee

Deputy Director for Research

Deputy Director for Intelligence

Assistant Director for National Estimates

Assistant Director for Current Intelligence

Assistant Director for Research and Reports

./Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence

Director, National Photographic Interpretation

IRONBARK

TUOUCiRT (TOP SECRET): "Problems of the Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces ln Modern Warfare" by Major-General Kh. Drhelaukhov

OF INFO

OF CONTENT

Documentary

reliable source

Followingerbatim translation of an article entitled "Problems of the Strategic Deployment of Armed Forces In Modemy Major-General Kh. Dzhelaukhcv.

This article appeared ln2 First Issuepecial version of the Soviet military Journal Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought). This Journal is published irregularly and Ib classified TOP SECRET by the Soviets.2 First Issue vent to press onI.

Headquarters Comment: Militaryt is published by the DSSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthlyhile the other two versions arc issued irregularly. Tbe TOP SECRET version was Initiated In By the endl Issues of the SECRET version had beenf them

Problems of the. Strategic Deployment of Armed Forcea In Modern Warfare by

Major-General Kb. Dzhelauxhov

Our press has devoted adequate attention to the problems of strategic deployment as an Important element of theof the armed forces for var. The publicationork entitled "The Strategic Deployment of Armed Forcesodernroup of authors under tho direction of Lleutenant-General K. P. Skorobogatkin,ontinuation of efforts to study the problems mentioned. With lta appearance, the large gap which existed in thascientific elaboration of one of the most Important sections of Soviet nllitaryhe theoryas been filled.

The book conaiete of an Introduction and ten chapters.

The first chapter is devoted to an analysis of the strategic deployment of armed forces in the Snd World War. In It are examined the strategic deployment of both sides In the German-Polish Warn the western frontier, and the strategic deployment of the German-Fasclat troopa and of the Soviet armed forceso which tbe calc attention la devoted.

One of the important condltioca In tbe strategicof the German-Fasclat Army, arising from thenature of German Imperialism, vas the camouflage by all possible means of military preparation for aggression, and

ollection of Articles nfthe Journal "Military Thought"))0 and 'Military-Historical Journal'

The Strategic Deployment of Armed Porces ln Modern War

Editor-in-chief t Lleutenant-General K. F. Skorobogatkin. Military Publishing Bouse,_ofii.

For example, tbe strategic deployaent of German-Fascist troops on the Gereen-Polish border continued for about tvo am tba, vblle in tbe *est, against France, and In tbe oast, against the Soviet Union, lt continuedonths.

The build-up of the Geroan-Fasclst troops on our bordor vas carried out gradually. Troops destined for the offensive oo the first day of tbe war were brought up In four echelonsebruary to the beginning of. Movement was carried out exclusively at night, with the strict observance of camouflage measures. Byune, the German-Fascist troops were ready to take up the offensive.

ew factor in strategic deployment during the 2nd World War was represented by its protraction over an extended period.

In speaking of the shortcomings in the Soviet Army's strategic deployment in the summerhe authorsumber of most valuable critical comments, which are useful even today. The reality of the threat to the Soviet Union posed by Fascist Germany called for tbe adoption of appropriate measures to strengthen our defense. Thla vas all the more true, since,. German-Fascist troops vere brought Into Human ia and Finland, as early, that is. asur country found Itselfhreatened position. The enemy vas able to forestall us in strategic deployment and to catch us unprepared to wardudden blow. et, decisive measures to bring our armed forces to combat readiness were not taken. Insteadull, planned and concealed mobilization of large units and unite, which could have been carried out in different military districts at various times fur tbe sake of camouflage, ve began huutlly to call up those who vere registered (priplsnoy sostav) in the Internal mlLltary districts innd to transport to theaters of military operations divisions which were not yet cohesive, which were inadequately prepared for combat operations, and which vere without rear services and(page -tl). Further on, on pageshe

-3-

authors examine the basic shortcomings in the strategic and operational deployment of our border military districts on the western border and evaluate the condition of the types of armed forces, the extent to which they were equipped, and the degree of their ccobatreadiness. From this, the conclusion Is drawn that; "The experience gained from strategic deployment of our armed forces1 shows that deployment has acquired decisive Importance under modem conditions and hasost complex and crucial measure for the.

It should be noted that the lamentable experience of the preparation and deployment of our armed forces1 is fully taken into consideration by tbe Central Committee of our Party and by the Soviet Government. "The tragedy of the first months of the 2nd World War, when Hitler attacked the USSR after assuring himself of superiority in coabat equip-ment, is too fresh in people's minds for this to benow",states the Declaration of the Sovietof Therefore, In view of theof the armed forces of. and of its partner's ln NATO Innd the performance of other hostile actions in response to the proposal of the Soviet Union for the conclusioneace treaty with both German nations, our Government was obliged toumber of grave measures to reinforce the security of the USSR and to heighten the combat readiness of tbe armed forces. This found concrete expression in the temporary retention in the army of some contingents due for discharge in the autumnartial call-up for service from the reserve, in the reinforcement of troops of the border military districts (groups ofn the conduct of maneuvers participated in by all arms of troops. Including troops of the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, and ln the resumption of experimental nuclear explosions.

The second chapter la devotedrief study of the natureuture war and of the probable deployment of the types of armed forcea of the imperialist aggressive blocs in the respective theaters of military operations. Naturally, the contents of this chapter areonjectural nature, since the real plans of the Imperialist blocs are kept In

strict secrecy, while the numerical composition of the araed forces in the various theaters changes periodically.orrect orientation is given on the major theaters of military operations, on the probable forces and means deployed in them, and on tbe possible nature of armed combat by tbe enemy during the period of strategic.

The third chapter, "The Essentials ors, in our opinion,ain chapter in the book. Its value lies in the fact that it reveals the content and essence of the' modem concept of strategic deployment, based on criticism of concepts of strategic deployment which have grown up historically.

The author's point of view can be summarized by the statement. strategic deployment is the process of the settingthe beginningf strategic groupings of armed forces, including their concealment, mobilization, concentration and deployment". In principle,efinition characterizes quite completely the content and essence of strategic deployment. It emphasizes that strategic deployment represents tbe single process of up groupings of armed forces, by the beginningar. In which there are separate, individual elements which are closely interconnected.

In the view of the authors, the entire process ofup strategic groupings under modern conditionsin the first place, that part of the peacetime armed forces is at full combat readiness and is capable ofudden attack by the enemy, of delivering an Immediate strike and of conducting the first operations, and, in the second place, that full mobilization, transportand deployment of nev contingents of the armed forces In the theaters of military operations are carried out in accordance with the operational plan for tbe war.

The relationship which should exist between regular troops, ready for immediate operations, and those troops which are boing mobilized and transported to the theaters

of ollltary operations can be debated. But the nature of this relationship vlll not change the essence and content of the strategic deployment itself. Whatever the conditions (here ve are thinkingodern world war) It la not possible to reject the carrying out of mobilization entirely or, consequently, the need to transport and concentrate troopsarious theaters of nllitary operations and to set up the groupings necessary for the performance oftasks.

Tbe objection can be made that under modern conditions strategic deployment will not alwayo be carried out according to the proposed plan.

There arc regular large units of various types of armed forces which are maintained above strength or atstrength in peacetime and ready for immediate operations. Consequently, the process of mobilized deployment does not, in essence, apply to these troops. This can be explained as follows: in the first place, the regular troops mentioned compriseart of the first strategic echelon deployed In accordance with tbe operation plan; In tbe second place, even these completely combat-ready troops vlll. In some cases, need the supplementary mobilization of some rear units,communications or service units and subunits etc. ; In the third place, the mobilized deployment of the regular large units mentioned has actually been carried out ln goodong before the time for tbe strategic deployment of our main armed forces. Thus, the presence of regular, combat-ready large units and formations of typos of armed forces actually deployed in theaters of military operations and in tbe depth of the country, does nottbe definition of strategic deployment given by the authors ln their book.

In our opinion, greater emphasis should have been given to the dual nature of the process of strategicvhlch Includes on tbe one hand tbe deployed forces and means of groups of forcea, of border military districts and of tho other regular formations In the country which are ready for immediate operations) and on the other hand,

-6-

of the mobilization and formation of nev large unltH and unite, of their transportation end concentration inof military operations, and of their combatindependently or within tbe composition of regular troops already there. Thla, essentially, is tbe first strategic echelon of the armed forces.

The whole process of creating strategic groupingsecondary position, and it must not beInto something self-contained, equatablelan of war, as was done by Professor Mellkov In his work Strategic Deployment' Strategic deployment Is planned and carried out on the basis of tbe general plan for strategic operations, which are the direct expression of the military-political goals for the initial period of war In any given theater of nllltary oporations. Its content Is decisively Influenced by the natureuture war, by the military doctrine which has been adoptediven country, and by the plan for Impending strategic operations. Strategic deployment is the concluding act of peace and tbe Initial actar.

The essence of the operational plan is shown in the boldeat relief by the nature of strategic deployment. Thus, rroa the very beginningar, the plan finds Its material expression in the deployment,which, in turn, ia carried out In the name of thosa strategic operationa which are provided for in the operational plan. In this sense, although strategic deployment is one of the most important elements In the preparation of the armed forces, fortependent, subordinatein tbe theory of strategy, as well as In its practical realization. Nevertheless, elaboration of tbe problem of strategic deployment under tbe conditions of modern warfare is extremely urgent, and tne value of the book under review Ilea precisely in the fact that the authors have elaborated thla little-studied topic with sufficient fullnesa and haverofessor V. A. Melixov, Division Commander, "Strategic Deployment, 1st World War loi^-iooo* Volumeilitary

The experience of recent wars shows that,ule, an operational plan undergoes changes during the course of Its realization. An example of this is represented by the operational plan of the Polish commandnd by our own plan,whichadical change after the beginning of the war.

From this It follows that, under certain circumstances, strategic deployment,erivative of an operational plan (the plan for the firstanubstantial Influence on,the realization of the plan Itself. It is possible to possess an Ideal operational plan and yet to suffer defeat. If the armed forces delay In completing their strategic deployment.

It is known thatodern war It may be necessary toecond, and possiblyhird, strategic echelon to reinforce existing strategic groupings or to set up new ones.

The experience of the world wars shows that strategicin new theaters of military operations took place during the course of these wars (tbe deployment of the German-Fascist armed forces first against Poland, then against the West, and, finally, against us; ourin the west and, in the summern the Far East against Japan). henomenon Is defined by tbe authorsuccessive strategic deploymentew war. This lo, inew deploymentew theater of military operations during the courseajor war. One cannot but agree vithefinition. In this connection, this is an appropriate place to examine the concept of mobilization and to elaborate upon theof strategic deployment.

A careful comparison between the conceptnd the formulation of the concept of stra-

tegic deploymentertain discrepancy.

-8-

It la envisaged that strategic groupings will bo created by the beginningar or at its outbreak, while tho concept of mobilization includes various measures which are connected not only with strategic deployment (for example, the creation of reserve troops for theof losses and the establishment of new units to fill out existing strategic groupings). From what has been said, it follows that mobilizationore protracted process than strategic deployment. Tbe authors themselves take this point of view andtage-by-stage account of the entire process of mobilization. Tbe reference to Professor Klkhnevlch, stating that strategic deployment consists of the mobilization of an amy and of its concentrationheater of war, provideselative explanation of tbe thesis advanced by tbe authors that mobilization Is an element of strategic deployment, sinceefinition is Justifiedertain degree only when related to the past. It Is necessary, therefore, to emphasize that mobilizationomposite element of strategic deployment In Its Initialhile strategic groupings are being set up in accordance with the operational war plan. However, mobilization cannot be entirely Incorporated in strategic deployment since the latterelatively short-term measure for the initial periodiven war.

Hobllizatlonpecial placeountry's system of preparation for war. Since It provides for the bringing up to their authorized wart ice strength of large units, units aod establishments existing In peacetime and for the creation of new formations. Intended to replenish and reinforce tbe groupings of the armed forcea which perform tasks ln the opening operations,this part ofla to thisomponent element of strategic deployment. Hovever, as ve know, mobilization continues further. If ve are not to take tbe point of view of "permanenthat is, of measures for mobilization carried out throughout tbe entire course of the war, then we must concede that mobilization cannot be enclosed within the framework of strategic deployment in terms of time and of the measures being

carried out. In this connection, the authors should have elaborated upcn the formulation of tbe concept of strategic deployment and Its elements. In our opinion, when listing tbe elements of strategic deployment. Instead of referring to "the mobilization of the armedr simply tone should speak of "raoblllzatlonal deployment? understanding by this all measures fortaken at the beginningar. In order to ensure the deployment of strategic groupings In accordance with the operational war plan.

As regardsthe mobilization and deployment of the second and subsequent echelons carried out during tbe course of the war, the latter vill be Intended for theof strategic groupings already In existence. If the strategic echelons mentioned ure intended, toew front of armed combat, one con clearly speakew theater of military operationsew enemy and, essentially,ew war (during the courseorld var). Thus, the concept of strategic deployment aa the creation of groupings by the beginningar la Justified In this lastance also.

In tbf* fAtn-frhaii-iy detailed examination Is given to tbe problems of the preparation for and planning of atrategic deployment; of the preparationation's territory for strategic deployment, and of the deployment of types of araed forces and of the rear services.

Chapter fivei reveals the elexenta of cover, which are understood as actionsnit of the armed forcesigh degree of combat readiness to support mobilization, concentration and deployment In the eventudden attack by the enemy from tbe air, land or sea.

In past vara, cover vsb effected by large units which were especially aa signed for this purpose. The tasks of cover became extremely complicated with the development of military technology, the appearanceass scale of air forcea, of tank and motorized large units, of naval submarine forces and of airborne landing troops. Along

with cover from land and sea there arose the necessity for cover from the air as well. By tho 2nd World War lt had already outgrown operational boundaries and had extendedonsiderable depth Into the territoryountry within the range of the bomber aircraft which existed at the time. Under these conditions, cover changed from something of local Importance, Intended to create asetting for the deployment of troops In shallow zones of theaters of military operatlona, and acquired tbeof an important strategic measure throughout the entire country, especially for countries with small territories. Cover has become all the mora complicated in the age of nuclear/missile weapons. It haa become an important componentountry's defense. ,At the same time, coyer, byspecific functions to support the completeconcentration and deployment of troops, forms aof strategic deployment. This dual nature of cover leads certain comrades Into confusion: to negation of the particular functions of cover and to Its equation vith national defensehole.

It seems to us that in defining the concept of cover, the authors have, Intentionally or not, expanded Its functions. This is particularly noticeable in the section in which cover from the air is examined. ull picture la given of the cover (defense) of the entire territory by the antiair defense troops of the country In cooperation with other forces and-means, but no emphasis Is given to the special nature of cover, which is carried out to help strategic deployment in the overall defense system of the nation. This should have been done, since incorrect views exist equating cover from the air with antlairin general, and cover on land and sea with theof troops In the appropriate theaters of military operatlona.

Tha fact is that, as an operationnit of tha armed forces Intended to support mobilization, concentration and deployment, coverpecificto support the deployment of one's own armed forces and, also, to create operational-strategic groupings for military operations In

IRONBARK

depth of the country, in accordance with the operational plan. Upon the conclusion of atrategic deployment,cover is discontinued end the troops detailed for this purpose go over to the performance of other tasks specified in the operational plan. In this sense, coveremporary military operation: it begins In the period of threat (ugrozhayemyy period) and ends wben the major groupings of the armed forces go over to the performance of their tasks In an operation. It should also be noted that In various theaters of military operations and for different types of armed forces the boundaries of space (territory) and time and the forces and means for cover vlll vary. Because of this, the taeke'.of cover will be performed Along those axesheater of militaryon which offensive operations by ground forcea are planned in the initial period of war, the tasks of cover will be performedart of the forces carrying out the offensive operation: periods for the fulfillment of tasks of cover will, obviously, not be of great duration. In those theaters of military operations and on those atrategic axes, where it is intended to organize strategic defense during the initial period of the war, the basic forcea for cover will,ule, be the same troops as are charged with the conduct of defense.

Taaka for cover in naval theaters of operations will be performedimilar manner.

Cover from the air is being performedontinuing basis during peacetime. At the outset of military operations the troops of the antiair defense of the country willspecific tasks with part of their forces to cover the mobilization, concentration and deployment of the armed forcea at the same time as they are carrying out the tasks of covering the territory of tbe whole nation from airignificant proportion of the forces and meana of the antiair defense troops vill also be used for cover from the air.

The fundamental principles of the mobilization of armed forces ore elaborated in chapter six. The authors

regard lt as the deployment of the armed forcestrength which ensures the achievement of the political purposes of the war, and which includes bringing peacetime large units and units up to wartime strength; the formation of new large units, units and establishments based on concealed cadres; the creationarge troop reserve to replenish large units who have lost their combat effectiveness and for the formation of nev "units.

In chapter seven, the authorsetailedof the concentration of troops as one of the important elements of strategic deployment. Concentration isas the assembly of forces and means in theaters of military operations in order to bring the groupings of armed forces already there up to the required strength and to ensure their rapid .deployment.

The concentration of troops In theaters of military operations from disposition areas or from areas of completed mobilization will be carried out by available facilities (svoim khodom) in organic truck transport and through the mass transport of formations and large units by railroad. When navigable rivers are available,and in coastal theaters, river (sea) transport can also be used. The authors emphasize thatesult of major destruction of transport from strikes by nuclear weapons and aircraft, strategic concentration under modern conditions Is an extremelyand complex matter.

The process of concentration (transport and movement) is closely linked with full mobilization, with theof the troops for transport, and with the general concept of the Initialthe idea of strategic deployment.

The Implementation of transport, therefore, depends not only on technical conditions and on the degree of destruction of transport facilities, or the need toarge quantity of troopshort period of time, but also on the preparedness of tbe troopa for transportation and on those changes in strategic deployment which ore unavoidable under modern conditions. The major problem of concentration is preservation of the viability of transport and the skillful

uae of ell its categories. The experience of past vara, the modern state of transport, and the various measures destined to strengthen our armed forces, show that the most probable procedure for carrying out strategicwillixed one, by which concentrationart of the armed forces can be accomplished before the beginning of hostilities, and of tbe rest vhen hostilities begin. It Is clear thathreatening situation arises (or even beforeart of tba armed forcea will be fully mobilized in secret and brought to tbeof military actions. Sometimes, the concentration of troops can also be carried out openly, with the aim of exerting pressure on the enemy, ln order to force bin to give up aggressive operations which he Is undertaking.

In any event, it is necessary to keep ln mind the factecret, slov concentration Is not an end in itself. The International situation and the conditions underar breaks out can compel one to carry out transportation openly ln the shortest possible time andassive flow. In order to forestall the enemy ln the deployment of his baalo strategic groupings.

In view of the need for the extensive anduse of all types of transport to achieve the prompt concentration of troops, the decision to concentrate the use of all types of transport. Including trucks, in the hands of the Central Directorate, for Military Communication, with unified planningasis, tho decision, ln other words, toingle military transport center, seems toorrect one.

Chaptertbe book is devoted to the cccbat

deployment of the armed forces.

Tbe main substance of cccbat deployment is the creation, in theaters of military operations and ln the depth of the

assembly of strategic and operational formations and their

occupation of departure areas.in readlnase to perform the

tasks assigned by the operational plan ln the opening-operations

of the initial period of the var.

On0 and In chapter eight^ the authors have Introduced the concept of "combatoyevoyenvesting itider connotation than that of operational deployment. "Combat deployment (as an element of strategic deployment) should be taken as meaning the creationpecific assembly of forces and their occupation of an Initial position for tbe conduct of combat operations of differing scales"ne could accept or dispute this definition. Tbe one thing which is clear is that strategic deployment can only be considered complete vhen'it has been brought to the stage of operational-tactical deployment and of tbe creation of groupings of troops for the performance of impending tasks.

We agree with the authors when, basing themselves on the principle of deep-echeloned strategic deployment, they divide the armed forces deployedain theater of military oporations into two operational echelons. It has already been stated above that the first strategic echelon of the armed forces should consistumber of operational echelons. It le natural that the first operational echelon should incorporate all the regular large units of the 8trategla missile troopa, groups of forces, border military districts and naval forces, and of the antiair defense troops, which are at constant combat readiness. The formations and large units which are deployed closer to national boundaries will be made up of covering troops, while the troops located deep in the theaters of military operations vill be made up of the main forces of the first operational echelon. The second operational echelon will be composed of formations and large units of tbe Internal military districts and of some large units of the border military districts which need to complete their mobilization. Irrespective of the availability of troops comprising the first and second operational echelons, strategic reserves of all types, subordinate to the High Command, may be deployed tn the theaters of military operations.

Depending on the plan proposed for impending operationB, combat deployment must support the conduct of any and all operations. At the same time, combat deployment and the

of operational-strategic groupings auat be sufficiently flexible to permit rapid transition to an alternate deployment plan conforming to nev conditions at the beginningar if tbe proposed plans are nullified. The complexity ofupplementary or nev deployment is confirmed by the experience of the 2nd World War. It will be even harder to accomplish under modern conditions.

A theater of military operations, particularly oneone in vhlch deployment is impending, must be prepared ahead of time so that combat deployment can be carried, outompressed time period and in order that one's own armed forces may be used as effectively as possible at the beginning of operations. Missile troops, artillery, aviation, and combined-arms large unite intended for an opening strike must have the advantage of being assured of deployment ln good time (In engineering,and material-technical respects).

In chapter eighty the authors examine specific problems of tbe combat deployment of types of armed forces on tbe basis of experience frca tbe 2nd World War, from postwar exercises,and from an analysis of the possible nature of deploymentuture war.

A great virtue of tbe bock under review is that the collective authors constantly bear in mind the Importance of mater Lai-technical support and of the rear area in strategic deployment. These problems are also examinedpecial, ninth chanter "The Deployment of the Bear Area of Armed Forces".

By deployment of the rear area of the armed forces Is meant the full mobilization of rear services large units, units end establishments, their concentration anddjploymcnt in the theaters of military operations for materiel, technical and medical support of the troops. It is explained that the deployment of tbe rear area should correspond to tbe concept of the operations planned, tb the grouping of forces and to tbe degree of combat readiness of tbe large units and formations.

Thus, there shouldlnloua of prepared units and establishments of the rear services ln each borderdistrict (group of forces) so that support can be given to the large units and foraatlons ln their opening operations, pending the complete deployment of the rear areas ln tbe particular theater of military operations.

The tenth andis devoted to the problems of the control of armed forces in tbe period of strategic deployment.

As the authors correctly point out, the complexity of the control of armed forces in the period of strategiclias ln the fact that powerful nuclear/missile strikes vlll probably be being delivered and the formations of types of armed forces which are at constant readiness vlll probably be conducting the opening operationswith the full mobilisation, concentration and deployment of the troops. During this period control must be exercised on the basis of plans drawn up in peacetime, taking Into consideration tbe actual developments of the situation at tbe beginningar. Major difficulties ln the control of deployment can arise because of greatof transport, or an abrupt change ln theand strategic situation. Tbe operational plan Intheaters of military operations may therefore be partially changed, and consequently the Introduction of changes into the plans for concentration and deployment may also be required.

Thua, the entire system of control must be as stable as possible, in order to withstand strikes by modern means of armed combat and to preserve continuity at all levels In tbe complex situation of the initial perioduclear/missile war.

In conclusion, it should be noted that the book la written from the vantage point of Marxist-Leninist teaching on war. In the light of the requirements of the Central Committee of the CPSU and of our Party documents, and reflects modern views on the problems of strategic deploymentuture war with complete correctness.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA