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MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
Attached ie Seovillc's recommended position in connection with Charyk's proposal onm in agreement with ft.hink the real crux of the matter is whether or not the President will ever authorize its use over the Soviet Union. oubt that he is prepared to make that decision now and,ould urge that we stand firm and not surface the vehicle at this time. hink this mustresidential decision and must be clearly and forceably made directly to the members of the National Security Council. ear that in the interest of expedience, those people who are trapped with the political unpleasantness of the situation will not be as security conscious as they should be. m informed very clandestinely that the Air Force, at least the military elements, are not at all enchanted with this Charyk proposal.
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OriginalDCI
DCI
xecutive DirectorR
nam
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Surfacing2
Draft Memorandum for tbe Secretary of
Defense from DNRO, datedubject: same as above, and Proposed Draft Statement
have reviewed Dr. Charyk's memorandum toof Defense and the proposed draft public statement onof ecision is reached that onewith and surface2 development, then there iawith the proposed draft statement. It is probably abouta statement as could be prepared. However, we believestatoment will in no way conceal the true purpose ofevelopment; and as Dr. Charyk himself admits, theof Lockheed, high secrecy and the reconnaissanceany attempt to conceal the true purpose of thisridiculous. Also, the risk of compromising the verycross section capability is considerably Increased due tocomparison of the merits of2 versus0
and the probable disclosure of2 anti-radar design techniques. Therefore, regardless of the statement issued one must face tbe fact that bytatement the basic objectives of2 program will be compromised.
his proposal for surfacing the RX, Dr. Charykis not possible to keep the existence of the OXCART programforever. Obviously, this is true, but the real questionthe time and manner in which revelation will occur. keptnder wrapsong time. It is true that
the present circumstances are less favorable to such prolonged secrecy. However, so far we have been very fortunate in keeping
this development secret, and we have no reason to believe that wo cannot continue the present situation for some time,ritical accident. In any case, there isifferent situation when there is an accidental disclosureew type of aircraft which people speculate as being for reconnaissance purposes and the open publication by the U. S. Government that they are developingehicle. The latter situation is liable to lead to any number of official statements that we have no intention of using this during peacetime and thereby inhibit our ability to use the vehicle for covert intelligence purposes. ersonally feel that the surfacing as proposed here would leadituation in which, except under the most dire emergency, the highest levels in Government would never beosition to authorize the use of the vehicle over the Soviet Union.
believe that the recent experiences in Cubademonstrated the absolute need for. to haveofehicle of2 nature over the Sovietphotography will never supply the kind of intelligenceneeded under these circumstances. elieve, therefore, thatDCI should make It absolutely clear to the highest authoritycapability should not be Jeopardized without the strongest type
of justification.
am personally not convinced that such justificationfact, the strongest justification for the RX is primarilynature. The DOD has got itself in difficulty with Congress, thethe aerospace industry due to0 program. Theversion is about the last mile in an attempt to provideto this program and thereby Justifyroposed RX has few, if any, characteristics which cannotby other systems. If one really desired to obtainintelligenceigh degree of reliability in asituation, then2uch more reliableobtaining this information than The increasedcapability resulting from the very low radar cross section ofwould probably mora than offset the advantages gained byThis may be an oversimplification of
the capabilities ofut nevertheless, it is really not clear that thisajor improvement in our pre-etrikecapabilities. The post-strike capabilities are similarly questionable since most of the systems do not involve direct readout.
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and therefore2 can be ejected to provide almost aa good data. hink you ahould make it very clear that you question in the National good the wiadom ofery critical intelligence capability to provide very marginal advantages or toifficult political problem. In this latterersonally have very great doubts as to whether2 will really aolve the political questions since we do not believe it will satisfy either the Congress or the aerospace industry. The recent decision to cancel SKYBOLT in favor of POLARIS will giveoost. They also recently wonJet Transport) prime contracta. Since they are now the biggest DOD contractor, cancelling0 for2 under such circumstances will surely cause at least as much trouble with Industry as Just cancelling0 outright. This will be further complicated by the fact that it will bo vary difficult to aubcontract any of2 work to new contractors because of the highly specialized skills and equipment required to handle titanium. In the National good it might be much better to Just drag on0 than to toss2 to the wolves.
I do not believe mat Dr. Charyk'sthe OXCART will leak at least in the near future is This same statement could have beenear ago; yet
we have still maintained security. elieve that weeasonable chance of keeping this development at least under eome semblance of control through maybe the first year or more of operational life of The longer that this can be maintained, the greater will be the delay ln the Sovietsounter to this system. If it were decided to go ahead withelieve thia should be done by the AFlack basis, but this would mean that no announcement of the decision could be made and there would be, therefore, no solution to the0 political problem. While this ln the long run will never be completely satisfactory, it at least might buy us some appreciable time in terms of Soviet defenses or political inhibition*.
elieve that this Issue is of suchto the National security that it cannot be dealt with inpolitical necessity. elieve that it is absolutely essential that
this issue be made crystal clear to the President and that one should
Original document.
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