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FURTHER DISSEMINATION OF [NFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
JFK LIBRARY MANDATORY REW CASENIK- OCUMENT*.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MEMORANDUM: The Cuban Situation
The Continuing Soviet Military Presence in Cuba:
Since the withdrawal of the Soviet strategic missiles and the, we have not noted anyreduction ln the number of Soviet sdlltaryln Cuba. We estimate that0 remain,
Recent photography of the four Soviet armored group encampments reveals continuing activity and no signs of preparation for withdrawal. Construction of barracks at the encampment near Artemisa was continuing as recently asecember. Anoviet troops are stationed at the four camps.
Theoviet-controlled SAM sites remain operational and buildings are being constructed at some of the sites. Anovietman the SAM sites. There is no operational reason why these weapons could not be used against USaircraft at any time.
Three coastal defense cruise missile sitesoperational. They are manned by anoviet military personnel. ourth such site waslast month, but the equipment bas probably oot been removed from Cuba. Photography indicates that lt was apparently delivered to the Campo Florldoten miles east of Havana, where cruise missile equipment has been noted previously.
9. Thes known to be in Cuba are almost certainly operated solely by Soviet pilots. At least some of them are equipped with air-to-air missiles. InSoviet personnel dominate the air defense system, including the early warning radar network.
6. Eleven of theOMAR-class missile-equipped patrol boats have been sighted in recent photography
and appear still active. These boats are probably operated by mixed Soviet-Cuban crews.
are no reliable indications ofreduction in the Soviet military presenceSoviet Intent to turn over theirto the Cubans.
of tbe nature and extent ofeconomic support for the Castro regime maythe discussions now underway in Moscow betweenleaders and veteran Cuban Communist Carlos Rodriguez, who accompanied the Cubanto Moscow early this month, told the pressonecember that his talks will "coverthan trade. After commenting on Sovietcredits granted Cuba in the past, he said thatduty is to "steadily reduce the need forcomments seem to reflectontinuingto squeeze as much as possible from thepossible Cuban concern that Moscow may now bemore tight-fisted in its aid policies.
clandestine source who was in contactof the Soviet embassy in Havana earlyreports that Rodriguez isen year,loan fromew agreement onImports,igher price for Cuban sugar sold
to the bloc. The special premium price Moscow had agreed nearly two years ago to pay for Cuban sugar has now been exceeded by the world market price.
TheInternal Cuban Situation:
stresses of the recent crisis periodCuban leadership could well lead toin the near future. Fidel Castro's ownstill appears dominant and there is nothat his position is being challenged by anyleader.
is still no evidence to supportuntested clandestine sources that CheCubaecemberear's "leave ofhealth reasons and that President Dortlcos hasthree months leave. Guevara's most recentappearance wasecember when heeries of particularly aggressive Guevara, in hisovember Interview forDally Worker came closer than any Cuban leaderto publicly criticizing the Soviet missilealso reiterated his hatred of the US and statedterms the important role of Cuba in providingfor Latin America'sumber of other Latin American countriescalled ripe for revolution and where guerrillasIn the field."
agitation for the removal of therector of Havana University, Juanbe the beginningew drive against "old"who have not adapted to Castro'sis accused by the students of havingSoviet position, not Cuba's, during the recent The University students are widely regardedCastro's most vigorous supporters.
statements by Cuban leaders suggestCuban political machine modeled after blocmay be formally organized early in the year,next month,irst National Congress of theof the Socialist Revolution. Preparations forcongress have been underway for some months inofficials describe as "the election of theby their comrades at every workthe country." This suggests that the newto be builtompletely new base and thatorganizations such as the old CommunistCastro'sf July Movement are not to betoto. Guevara has stated that the initial membership
of tFe party will be00 militants.
Summary of Reportsuban Military Officer:
uring the past week we haveumber of reportsuban military officer who has had first-hand informationumber of aspects of the Cuban military situation. Some of his information ls new, much of it tends to confirm information previously received from other sources ln less detail, and most of it appears true. The source appears reliable onrelating to Cuban military activities; hison Soviet military activities ln Cuba ls generally secondhand and not as reliable.
The officer had first-hand knowledge ofconstruction activities in many parts of the island. He provides detailed information on tbe construction of military storage facilities in caves ln various parts of Cuba and especially on three specific caves on which he is most knowledgeable. He strongly doubts that Soviet missiles are being concealed ln Cuban caves, although he grants that this would be technically possibleew of them. He reports that the Items stored in cavesrifles, machineguns, ammunition, emergency rations, explosives, and gasoline. Refugee and other clandestine sources have previously reported on tho utilization of caves for military purposes, but this source has provided the most detailed and useful information yet recslved on this subject. The general belief ls that these storage sites aro Intended to be used by guerrilla forces in the event tbe Island ls Invaded.
The source offers information on the Sovietbuildup in Cuba, but on this subject be appears to rely largely on secondary sources. He doubts that all the strategic missiles bave been withdrawn froa Cuba, but bases thla on having learned of sore missiles coming into Cuba during the buildup period than he has heard ofthe Island. In describing the variousof Soviet military personnel in Cuba he repeatedly states that be does not know the precise numbers orof the personnel ln these places since no Cubans
) (ii hawt been permitted in the sites.
source states that on or aboutovember
jThia rs me titst
information Indicating that these installations might be
turned over to the Cubans. The source also stated, as his personal opinion, that the SAM sites in Cuba would probably be turned over to the Cubans eventually and that Soviet forces throughout the Island would gradually be reduced as the Cubans became capable of handling the equipment. Be stated that theave not been turned over to Cuban control and, in fact, that Cuban pilots have not been permitted to fly the planes. This tends to confirm Information from other sources, although the source's added comment implying that theight be sent back to the USSR if the "US puts pressure on" cannot be evaluated.
source describes at length thefunctions of Chinese Communist militaryCuba, confirming our earlier impressions thatCommunists areery minor rolemilitary picture in Cuba. He states, in fact,Is to be emphasized that in the military domain,is exclusively Cuban-Soviet." The Chinesemilitary personnel consist of onlyoento the Chinese Communist embassy who adviseforces ministry on the operation of theby Peiping to Cuba and, in addition, aboutCommunist pilot instructors at the Sanlos Banoa airbase. He does not know the quantities
of Chinese weapons in Cuba, but says they include bazookas, land mines, andm antiaircraft guns.
source's report on Castro's plans withto the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay and onmilitary activity in the base area ls consistentfrom other sources on this issue. Thebis report ls that the regime continues to regard"through the Unitedway in which it might fulfill Its aspirationcontrol of the base territory.
source describes several eventshim to conclude that the Cubans have beento avoid any incident near the base thatthe USrovocation justifying anCuba. He states that the Cuban military buildupbase area ls extensive and in depth, but defensive
in nature. This is generally confirmed by other sources, including extensive photographic reconnaissance of the area around the base.
source's general comments on thealliance are admittedly based on his ownIt is apparent that it ls the opinionIntelligent and perceptive individual. Healliance as an "unholy" one, with each sideto use the other for its own ends and eachmaneuvering to gain advantages over the other. Castro is trying to squeeze the Soviet Unionbit of economic support possible and "thethis and Castro knows it does." He saysls trying to make Castro expendable; "Castroand the USSR knows he knows it." In general,Castro remainstrong personal positionregime and Soviet efforts to control him orposition, the source implies, have not been
rs IS)Original document.