TELEGRAM
inrormation report
TELEGRAM
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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CONTKUI*
NO
rrllMS MTHISTEB KEHRU'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT oate DISTr, ECEMBERATO-AL^KASIR
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LS unevaluated INFOBMATION. SOURCE GBADINCS ABE DCflrVlTIVt.
RATAN KUMAR NEHRU, SECRETARY GENERALINDIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY, AND^ASOKEf KUMAR SEN, INDIAN EFT CAIRO ONOVEMBER AFTER DELIVERING ANEHRU TO NASIR ABOUT INDIA'S DISPUTE WITH CHINA.) MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
PRIME MINISTER NEHRU WAS CONCERNED ABOUT ANY UAR PRESS STATEMENT* FAVORABLE TO THE CHINESE, WHICH THE CHINESE HAVE NOW REPLAYED. NEHRU WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT ARTICLES UNFAVORABLE TO HIMSELF IN THE CAIRO PRESS. UAR INFORMATION MEDIA HAVE STRONGLY FAVORED INDIAN SIDE OF CASE.)
THE UAR AND OTHER NON ALIGNED COUNTRIES WITH NO IMMEDIATE
CLAUDICATIONOiSSEUINAHON COMTKOLS
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THREAT FROM CHINA WERE ASKED TO DENOUNCE CHINESE AGGRESSION.
U. NEHRU DID NOT DECLARE WAR ON CHINA BECAUSE HE FEARED INVOCATION OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE CLAUSE IN THE SINO-SOVIET TREATY.
5. NEHRU VIEWED THE BANDARANA1KE PROPOSALEC WER CONFERENCE OF MEDIATORS (PORT GBLD WILL FWDjMOST OF THE COUNTRIES ASKED TO PARTICIPATE WERE UNDER DIRECT THREAT FROM THE CHINESE.
< NEHRU WAS AWAREECRET BURMESE-CHINESE AGREEMENT WHEREBY BURMA HAD AGREED TO REFUSE TO COOPERATE WITH ANY COUNTRY WHICH TOOK AN UNFRIENDLY POSITION TOWARD CHINA.
NEHRU FELT THAT INDONESIAN PRESIDENT SUKARNO WANTED FOR INTERNAL REASONS TO STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THE CHINESE AS OPPOSED TO THAT OF THE INDIANS.
NEHRU FELT THAT ALLEIGHBORS WERE AFRAID TO RAISE THEIR VOICES AGAINST CHINA. SECRETARY GENERAL NEHRU MCNTIONED AFGHANISTAN IN PARTICULAR.
NEHRU WAS AWARE THAT YUGOSLAV PRESIDENT TITO COULD NOT TAKE AN OPEN MAJOR STEP TO HELP INDIA AS TITO OID NOT WISH TO EMBARRASS THE SOVIET UNION.
OPINION IN INOIA AS NASIR DID AT SUEZ. NASIR SAID THIS POINT WAS PART OF SECRETARY GENERAL NEHRU'S PRESENTATION. IT SOUNDS MOREASIR ELABORATION.)
WAS AWARE THAT HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ROUSE PUBLIC
COMMENT:
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Cl>ll >ICaT okpisuh'naton
THE ENVOYS EXPIADTKD TBS MILITARY POSITION AKD FRONTIER CIAIMSAP. THEY MADE THE POLTTT TEAT THE CjBTJMB GOAL HAS TOTRATEGIC JUMPiaO OFF FOIKT FOB SUBOECjUEKT OPERATIONS AQAIHST INDIA.
12.
3RIENDLY.
NASIR'S PRIVATE REACTION HAS THATTIElBtr
OR INTERKATIONAL SUPPORT. HASIB
FOOLISH ADD HAIVE EVER TO BAVE DEFENDED OH THE SOVIETS FOR PROTECTION. SASIR'S STATED REACTION HAS THAT HE WOULD "DO HIS BEST" TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAROMMENT: THE JJJDIAH REQUEST HAS HOT FOR MILITARY AID BUT
THOUGHT india bad hade TOO
kaid;akd that therefore it would be extremely difficult to bouse support
among the, not. auge ccuktries^J
13
end op message
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Original document.
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