Created: 12/5/1962

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The Soviet Space Program




The loltowmg inteltigineo organizations porhcipoteflf in In* prepc-robon of this etlima'o,

The Cemrol Intelligencend theanliationi o* the Deport-menH ol Slote, Delenie, thehetheForce. AEC, and NSA.


Director ol Intelligence ond Beiooreh. Deportment ot Stat* Oredor, Delcv.ABw,7

Aitvan* Owl ol Staff tor rJrJige-xe.lrr

Aibtiord CW olOpera-ion*eportment o' tSo Navy

' ol Sloff, Inteiltgenre, USAF

Director lo- Intelligence. Join) Staff

Ihe Atomic Eneigyhe US 8

Director ol tho National Security Agency


The Awiiani Director. Federal Bureoj of Invait.ooTion, the tvbjecr being outUde ol

hil t-iL."


The Soviet Space Program









Early Unmanned

Lunar Exploration

Planetary Probes


The "Cosmos"

Soviet Space Failures



Guidance and

Tracking and


Rendezvous, Docking, and Transfer

Life Support


Manned Lunar18

Man-ln-Space 18

Scientific Satellites

Military Goals 20

The Possibility of International 23


Implied Costs of the Program to23

Implied Cosls of the Future24

Tableoviet Space Vehicles 25

Tableassible Chronologyoviet Lunar26

Tabicther Possible Soviet Space 27

Figurepace Launch Facilities. Tyuratam Missile Test Range

figureuspect Space Launch Facilities

Figureypical Orbital Paths of Soviet Earth Satellites





To evaluate the current status of the Soviet space program and to estimate its progress over theoears.


underlying motives of the Soviet leaders inspace program, as for all major programs, are tosecurity of the USSR and to increase its power andadvantages over the US where possible. In makingabout the specific projects to be included in theirSoviet leaders will continue to be guided by such generalas the political and rniUtary gains that are likelyfrom particular space accomplishments and theeconomic limitations that determine the range ofWe believe that these considerations, as well asto achieve scientific gains, will incline the Sovietsspace program of much broader scope than in the past,to accomplish spectacular "firsts"

evidence as to the future course of the Sovietis very limited. Our estimates are thereforeon extrapolation from past Soviet space activities andas to likely advances in Soviet technology.

Soviets have recently expanded their unmannedprogram, in part because future missionsa considerable increase in scientific data.will continue to be used to collect data on thespace environment and to test new space componentsfor manned space vehicles. In addition, the Sovietsan unmanned soft landing on the moon or thean unmanned satellite around the moon at any time. They



will probably continue to launch probes to Mars and Venus. As greater propulsion capabilities are developed, more extensive and complex scientific investigations ol interplanetary space will be undertaken. However, the high failure rate in Sovietattempts to date indicates difficulties which may handicap or modify their future program for deep space exploration.

manned space flights are likely in the coursenext few years. Using space systems presently available,will probably begin, within the next year, tosatellites having some maneuverability while in orbitperform rendezvous, docking, and transfer operations.probably undertake manned flights of increasingand couldwo-man capsule at any technically feasible for the Soviets to put up aspace station orannedsing first-generation ICBM boosters andrendezvous techniques.ilitary booster of aboutpounds thrust becomes available in the next year orbooster could be used to accomplish the same feats in amanner.ultimillion pound thrust spacebeing developed now, the Soviets couldpace station. )

Soviet statements indicaterogram forlunar landing is under way in the USSR, but weconfirmation that it is currently being pursued. Theleaders have not committed themselves publicly to awith the US, and it is highly unlikely that they will dothe prestige attached to the first manned lunarits probable political impact, and its importance forin space, would probably lead the Soviet leadershipunless the cost were considered prohibitive or theto have an insurmountable lead. On the basis ofwe cannot say definitely at this time that thetoanned lunar landing ahead of or in closewith the US, but we believe the chances are betterthat thisoviet objective. Given their ability to con-


centrate human and materia! resources on priority objectives, we estimate thattrong national effort the Soviets coulda manned lunar landing in the.)

the basis of evidence presently available, we aredetermine tho existence of Soviet plans or programs foruse of space. The limitations of this evidence,such that our chances of identifying military programsWe believe that the USSR almost certainly isfeasibility of space systems for military support anddefensive weapons. Moreover, it is possible that spacewhich is totally new to human experience, willopportunities for military application. Sovietto develop military space systems will depend oncost and effectiveness as compared withthe political and military advantages which couldand the Soviet estimate of US intentions andcomparable fields. We believe that the USSR will producethose military space systems which it finds to beadvantageous in comparison with other types of weaponsequipment. (Paras.

emphasis than heretofore will probably bemilitary applications of space vehicles, both to meetrequirements and to keep pace with militarythe Soviets expect the US to undertake. The firstspace vehicles are likely to be earth satellites usedsupportearly warning (EW),communications, or navigation. We believe thatcould be launched at any time; some recenthave carried out cloud photography and possiblyreconnaissance missions. Other possibledevelopments include an orbital bombardmentand an orbiting satellite inspection system. However,not believe that Soviet space technology has progressedfor the USSR to have made the decision to proceedprograms for offensive or defensive


this decade, the basic factors of reactionflexibility, accuracy, vulnerability, average life,control for an orbital bombardment system almostwill not compare favorably with ICBMs. We believeSoviet decision to develop and deploy an orbitalwould depend in large part upon the extent to whichcan beemonstration of ansatellite could occur at any lime, but wein the near term its military effectiveness would bethe Soviets decide to develop an orbital bombardment force,be precededevelopmental system of limitedwhich could appear as early )

sum, we estimate that Soviet space efforts in theare likely to include increased man-in-space activity,support systems, scientific satellites,and lunar exploration Specific majorcould occur within the period of the estimate arcstations in earth orbits and manned lunar landings.demonstrations of developmental space weaponsmay occur. We believe that Soviet scientific andcapabilities are adequate to accomplish thesethis Soviet program will be vastly more expensivehas in the past. It will be competing directly forskills and resources also needed In the ICBM, airdefense, and economic programs. Nevertheless, wethat the Soviet leaders are committedontinuingof sizable proportions as an element of nationalprestige. )





Long before the USSR succcssiully launched Sputnik I, the Soviet* announced that the goal of their space program was manned interplanetary travel. The space activity which they have sinceis consistent with this goal, but would also be consistent with other objectives. The announced goal, therefore, sheds very little light on the specific objectives of the Soviet space program.

A review of Soviet space accomplishments to date makes it clear that the USSR has been engagedell-planned, long-term program, heavily emphasizing manned space flight. The political impact of the first Sputnik had great influence on the subsequent course of the program. This Initial success probably led the Soviet leadership to allocate resources to the program very generously and led them to seek additional spectacularn some respects subordinating other objectives lo cold war objectives. Successful space ventures have been used lo support claims of military strength, scientific and technical advancement, and the general superiority of Soviet society.

The Soviet approach has contributed to an Impressive record of pioneering achievement over the past five years. Tbe Soviet recordorbiting the world's first earth satellite and by far the heaviest satellites; launching the first vehicle to Impact the moon; launching the first vehicle to transfer from earth orbitrajectorylanet; tlie first successful orbiting and recoveryan; and, most recently, the first concurrent orbital flight and recovery of two manned satellites. These successes represented technical achievements of the first order. They were made possible in large measure by the availability of the first-generation Soviet ICBMeryvehicle using clustered engines lo achieve considerably higher thrust than any US booster now operational.

The collection of scientific data by Soviet space vehicles was fairly limited and selectivehere was an apparent lack of systematic and comprehensive in-flight measurement of the spaceneeded for future space ventures, but this need was at least partly met by US data available to the USSR, primarily through COSPAR Beginning inhe Soviet program was apparently broadened no as lo place greater emphasis upon the collection of data on the space environment of the earth We believe this broaderwas undertaken to remedy whatever weakness In this area might adversely affect Soviet near-term plans for space exploration.

The Soviets almost certainly have investigated the feasibility of developing space systems for military and perhaps economic purposes.

Wc have no firm evidence lhat the Soviets have launched any space vehicles specifically (ot military purposes, but their space experiments have produced information which would be useful In the development of military space systems. Al least Lhe Initial lesUng of such systems would probably be conducted under the guise of scienlific experiments. Despite the absence of specific intelligence, therefore, we believe that the Soviets could be proceeding actively to develop space systems for reconnaissance, surveillance, and other military purposes. Some of the SovlcL developmental work could also have commercial applications, as in communications satellites.


Vertical Firings

space exploration began9 with verticalto investigate near-earth space and the effects of thaton biological subjects. The purposes of these firingsatmosphere research, photographing the earth's cloud cover,biology. The firstaltitudes of aboutauticalprobably involved the collection of geophysicaleries of geophysical and biological experimentswith vertical firings to,m.used as specimens in tests of scaled cabins, pressure suits,methods, and re-entry techniques The data obtained in Ihevertical firings contributed directly to the development ofequipment and recovery techniques for Soviet manned

Early Unmanned Satellites'

I. and III, launched7eresatellites designed to collect geophysical data onand to provide some biological data. After these threelaunchlngs until the spring2 were devoted to lunarexploration, and particularly to the man-in-space program.

lunar Exploration

than vertical firings, the only Soviet apace9 were those related to lunar exploration. Lunikwas launched in January,ear miss, andnik IT successfully impacted on the moon inof these flights provided some data on the nature of spacethe earth and tlie moon. Three weeks later the Sovietssent Lunik niircumlunar flight and obtained theof the hidden side of the moon. Inhe Soviets

'abular nummary of Soviet apaceto date, see Table I.


launched another lunar vehicle which failed to reach the moon. Since this flight the Soviets have made no further attempts to launch atoward tlie moon. Although the Soviets have achieved some"firsts" in their lunar program, there haveumber of failures, estimated at aboutercent of the launchings attempted.

Planetary Probes

avorable opportunity torobe to Mars occurred In the fallnd to Venus in In0 the Soviets were twice unsuccessful in launching probes toward Mars,he Soviets failed in an attempt loenus probe from Sputnik VII. They succeeded later in the month with Sputnik VIII, but lost contact with the probe early in Its flight, and thus failed to achieve thrir major scientific objectives. The next favorable opportunityenus shot occurred In the summern late August-early September, the Soviets made three attempts torobe to Venus; in each case, they succeeded Inatellite in parking orbit, but duealfunction of the fourth stage, failed to launch the probe toward Venus. Theyimilar failure in attempting toars probe from an orbiting satellite in October.ovember, but failed in yet another attemptovember.


he major emphasis of the Soviet space program has been given to manned space night.0 three heavy satellites. Sputniks IV, V, and VI, were orbited for Lhe purpose of checking out such designas stabilization and control, life support equipment, retro rocket operation, and re-entry and recovery. In addition.arge variety of biological specimens. Sputniks IX and X, launched inere prototype tests, probably simulating in all respects tlie first man-in-space shot except that the passenger In each caseog. Two weeks later came the flight of Major Gagarin in Vostok I, with recoveryingle orbit around the earth. Inajor Titov in Vostok U. remained aloft more thanoursrbits around the earth. Alter the Titov flight, the Soviets undertook no more manned shots forear.

II. This program was resumed on IIhen Major Nikolaycv was orbited In Vostok III, and aboutours laler, Lt. Col. Popovich followed in VostokThe two were brought downfter somerbits inours, and Popovich afterrbits inours. We beheve that the Soviets attempted to put the two satellites into nearly Identical orbits. They were able to orbll the space ships in close proximityt one point, after which the distance between them widened.

ot docking maneuvers' were nol attempted, norbelieve that they were even contemplated. However, orbitingat the same time and in nearly identical orbital planes isfirst step to the development ol such techniques, and isimpressive achievement in itself. The long duration of theenabled the Soviets to acquire extensive physiologicaldata. This achievement attests to Uic reliability ofspace boosters, guidance equipment, life support systems, andtechniques. However, we do not believe lhat theserepresent any startling advance or breakthrough in Sovietor technology, or that any new space equipment orinvolved.

The "Cosmos" Scries

Lateie Sovietsew series of space launchings, the unmannederies, with the staled purpose of collect mg astrophysics! and geophysical data, and of testing satellite structures. The first two launchings were unsuccessful. Sinceotal ofCosmos" satellites have been successfullyfrom Ka-pustin Yarrom Tyuratam. Our evidence on the "Cosmos" series indicates that two programs arc involved.

The satellites launched from Kapustin Yar have transmitted data on near-earth space compatible with tho Soviet claimcientific collection effort, probably Including data on nuclear tests. This effort probably reflects, al least inoviet desire to maintain theof the USSReading scientific nation. The vehicles have an estimated payloadounds, indicating Uie useooster smaller than the first-generation ICBM. Tticy have all been orbitedngle of Inclination.

The "Cosmos" satellites launched from Tyuratam appear to have been primarily associated with Uie man-in-space program.ICBM booslers were employed to put Vostok type vehicles (weighing0 pounds) into orbit at aangle of Inclination. These vehicles were later recovered. The first twoserved to check oul equipment and collect data for flights ofnd IV. f"

3 How-

'As used in tela estimate, rendezvous Is tbe operation ot modifying tbe orbit or trajectory ot one or more space vehicles, for the purpose of bringing and maintaininglose proximity. This operation requires some maneuvering while In orbit, in contrail lo eo-orbiUng by precise launching of the second vehicle. D, doc king is meant the eaUbllshmenthysical contact between two orbiting vchictcs. and by transfer is meant the physical movement of persons or equipment from one orbiting vehicle lo another.


ever, we do not know the contents of the recovered capsules; their size and payload capabilities would have permitted other missions.

Soviel Space failures

The USSR has announced the successful launching ofpace vehicles and has never admitted lo any launching failures. However, surveillance of Tyuratam and Kapustin Yar Range space operationsatio of failures to total launchings on the order ofhe man-in-space effort has achieved the highest degree of success, wilh only two failures occurring duringaunchings. Neither of these failuresanned vehicle. In contrast, the lunar and interplanetary programs haveery high failureto be aboutercent. The many failures to launch interplanetary probes from raking orbitow reliability for the injection stage. Lunar mission failures appear to be attributable lo defects in tho upper stage propulsion system. The Injection systems have all had difficulty early in their development, but these difficulties have now been overcome with the exception of those in the planetarystage. These latter difficulties, which have persisted for the past two years, may handicap or modify the future Soviet program for deep space exploration.

In addition to launching failures, the Soviets have been forced to cancel or postpone launchings, and some of the space vehicles which were successfully launched had component probably Intended to hit the moon, but missed. The deorbiting systems contained in Sputniks TV and VI failed to function successfully. Communications with Venik II were lost shortly after its successful launch towards Venus. Bach of these launchings was publicizeduccess, although each probably failed to achieve the majority of Its planned objectives.


its inception, the USSR's space program has beento its military missile program. The two programs havesame boosters and launching facilities, and are mutuallyIn other respects as well. We believe that many of theand technicians who are working on space projects arein the Soviet missile program. According tos one large team in Russia that handles all space projects.key men are in charge of guidance, tracking, and othereach of the projects. Itery large team and it can well take

1 In estimating the failure rate, we have counted as failures only operations in which an actual launching occurred bul Ihe vehicle was tost or deslroyed by malfunction, or. In the case of planetary probes, an earth orbit was achieved but the last stage tailed to Inject Inlo planetary trajectory.


care Of Strand projects ine have no distinction between military and civilian projects,"

The Soviet space efTort appears to be well-programed andThe group responsible lor coordination at the national level has not been identified. We believe that initially the Interagencyfor Interplanetary Communications, headed by L. I. Sedov, was charged with prime responsibility for Soviet space programs. Including their coordination and control, but its functions have apparently been curtailed More recently, there are indications that the Soviet space program may be directedtate Commission, possibly chaired by D. F. Ustinov, reporting directly to the Council of Ministers. Thisis probably responsible for the selection and planning of specific missions, for budget allocation, and for evaluation of results. Below this level, responsibility for the design, development, and lubrication of space vehicles is probably assigned to the State Committee for Defense Technology. Scientific support for the program is centralized in the Academy ol Sciences and the Academy of Medical Sciences, which are also probably responsible for the design nnd development of certain supporting systems such an life support apparatus.

Official secrecy has prevented the identification of moreew of the key personalities In the Soviel space program, but their achievements leave little doubt that many men who occupy the first rank in Soviet science and technology are Involved in the Soviet space effort. The announcement of awards tongineers, scientists, and technicians for developing the Vostok Indicateserynumber of personnel is involved directly in space projects. We have not been able to determine lhe total manpower employed in the space program or lo identify all of lhe scientific and technicalinvolved. These tasks are further complicated by the intermingling of the space program with the missile program.

Several of the major facilities involved in the Soviet spacehave been identified. These include tracking facilities, theand Kapustin Yar lestocket engine plant) atissile airframe development center (Plantta space flight training inslaltaUon at Tomollno near Moscow (which also develops life support and safetynd probably the Kuromoch static engine lest complex near Kuybyshcv. Except for Tomollno, all of these are also heavily engaged in the Soviet missileWe believe that most of the facilities engaged in the spaceremain to be Identified. Moreover, supporting the work of the major complexesast number of institutes, laboratories, design bureaus,hich togetherarge portion of the scientific and technical resources of the USSR.

' For space launch (acuities at these test ranges, seend 2.


We believe that Soviet capabilities in Uie basic and appliedare adequate to support an ambitious space program for the nextears. This Judgment Is based on Soviet space achievements to date, andomprehensive review and evaluation of current and probable future capabilities in the major fields of science directlyto the space program. Pertinent Soviet scientific capabilities are considered at least adequate in most cases and are improving in ail fields.ew fields Uie Soviets are considered to be outstanding,hi lunar, ionospheric, physiological, and mathematical research.

The USSR is enlarging and Improving its conventionalprogram and facilities with most emphasis on astronomical and astrophysical subficlds of value to the space program. Including celestial mechanics, moon and planet investigations, solar research, and meteorites. The Soviet radio astronomy program, which hasfor unproved deep space tracking and communications, in addition to its utilityowerful scientific research tool, has reached large proportions and Is being pursued and expanded vigorously.

In recent years the Soviets have also greatly expanded theirprograms and ground-based facilities and haveumber of investigations of the upper atmosphere and space designed to determine the environment for future space flights as well as for basic research important to long-distance communications and other practical development. Soviet capabilities for Investigating all types of radiation, interplanetary matter, Uie Ionosphere, and magnetic fields in space are improving and should keep pace with the growing needs of the space program. Moreover, Uie Soviets are also closely following US developments in these areas.

We have found evidence of Soviet deficiencies Inew of the scientific fields which direcUy support the space effort: meteoritie studies, organic chemistry, and glass fiber research. In each of these areas, the Soviets areetermined effort to overcome their handicaps by concentrating their efforts on the pertinent scientific problems and by exploiting foreign research. Wc know of no scientific weaknesses thai are likely to be limiting factors on future Soviet programs.

Difficulties in the Soviet space program are more likely to arise from technological than from scientific limitations. Requirementsmore demanding than were dictated by the early needs of miUtary rocketry must be met in confronting the future challenge in space. Such missions asarge space station or manned lunar flight will be far more complex, expensive, and demanding than past Sovietchievements.


PropoUion Systems

The first-generation ICBM (termed Category "A" andy US Intelligence) has been the workhorse of the Soviet space program to date. This reliable, powerful booster, with an estimated sea level thrustounds, has enabled the Soviets lo orbit the heaviest earth satellites. Employedowerful upper-stage propulsion unit, It has enabled the USSR lo place0 pounds into orbit ot an altitude ofiles. Additional spectacular "firsts" such as the orbiting of two meningle capsule are still within tlie capabilities of this booster system, and It will probably be used In various space activities for the next few years.

A new two-stage Soviet ICBM (termed Category "C" ory US Intelligence) has been observed in flight testing on the Tyuratam range for moreear. We have been unable to determine the size or thrust of this vehicle. It is possible that il is considerably smaller than the iiril-generation ICBM, and that ithrust orounds. Alternative calculations suggest that it islarger,hrust as highillion pounds.

If thesarge vehicle, we believe that the Soviets are developing yet another ICBM to deliver very large payloads of upT yield, and that they will begin test-firing the new vehicle within the next year oreasonable range for the thrustew ICBM booster capable ofT payloads is one to one-and-one-half million pounds. Facilities at Tyuratam already exist to accommodate boosters of this size.

ooster would allow the USSR toumber of space missions which are beyond the capability of the first-generation ICBM booster. Heavier planetary probes could be launched, facilitating unmanned planetary exploration. It could also be used for docking and transfer operations involving heavier weights of men and material. Ifooster becomes available within Ihe next year or so. it could be used for the establishmentanned space station oranned circumlunar flight somewhat earlier thanate estimated for these accomplishmentsultlmlllion pound thrust space booster (see.

The heavier payload requirements of some of the spectacular space missions which might be undertaken within theoears will require boosters with tlirusls of several million pounds. The USSR will probably attempt to achieve such thrusts by clustering several engines. We believe that for this purpose the Soviets wouldingle engineinimumounds thrust. The single engine thrust estimated for known Soviet propulsion systems or for moremilitary boosters would be too small.


ur evidence does not indicate whether the Soviets have begun static testingarge single engine suitable for use as the building blockullirmllion pound thrust propulsion system. However, considering Soviet requirements, their capabilities In this field, and the limited evidence, we estimate that flight testingew large engine could begin at any time. Unless the Soviets plan toingle engineooster for space missions, it is possible that single engine flight testing would be omitted. In either case, we believe that an engine clusterotal of several million pounds of thrust could be initially test flown in

a clustered booster could subsequently be combinedupper stages to support Soviet development of long-livedsatellites tor use as space stations and observatories. Itthe Soviets to place0 tons in near-earth orbit,use aspace station ortepannedAny delay In the development ofnultimillionwould result In corresponding delays In advanced space programs.

Upper Stages. Tlie development of improved upper stagesindispensable to successful accomplishmentannedThere is no evidence that the Soviets have undertakenof upper stages which utilise high-energythey almost certainly am investigating the advantagesspecific impulse fuels for use in future propulsion systems.impulse generated by the oxygen-amine fuels now tn useIncreased by about one-third with oxygen-hydrogen orWe believe that the Soviets could begin test launches ofsystem at any time, anderiod. Upper stages of these types, whentheooster, could increase its payload capacity forsatellites toounds. For manned lunaroperations, the Soviets probably would combine these advancedwith new, large boosters (see

ater time period, perhaps toward the end of the present decade, the Soviets could probablyuclear-hydrogen powered upper stage available for first flight tests.ystem could produce more than twice the specific impulse of present fuels, and would befor orbiting very heavy payloads. for deep space probes, and formissions

The Soviets ore actively engaged in the investigation of electric propulsion systems for advanced upper stage vehicles.he USSR will probably have an electric propulsion device capable ofhrustound.evice could he usedin orientation control systems for the proper positioning of anlennas or optic systems, or to prevent orbit decay of long-lived vehicles


from atmospheric drag. Systems capable of thrusts up to one pound could be available Ineriod These systems would be relatively heavy, and for this reason they would be confined to specialised uses such as deep space probes during the period of this estimate.

Guidance and Recovery

oviet space operations to date have been planned so as to make repeated use of established ground equipment and methods for guidance, control, andll satellites launched from Tyuratammall fractionngle of inclination to the Equator. Thus, only minor alterations In techniques and coordination of facilities have been necessary for the various types of orbital missions accomplished Lo date The launching of all "Cosmos" satellites from Kapustin Yar at anngle of inclination to the Equator also has facilitated standardization of operations. Space operationsother orbits will require addition or relocation of rangeand guidance equipment. We believe that the Soviets could do tlus at any time.

Soviet space vehicles launched from Tyuratam have thus far used the basic first-generation ICBMradio-inertlalduring the boost phase. Although the Soviets have an all-inertialoperational with their missiles, they may choose to continue with the radio-inertlal system for space ventures. The Vostok recoverable vehicles probably used an earth fixed reference system using optical and gyroscopic sensors. In addition, the manned Vostoksystem which enabled the pilot to assume control at will. The system has so faratellite under only one set of conditions of time and place. The evidence does not indicate whether the system as designed could perform in any more generalized situations.

orientation system used in orbiting and recovery oflias probably been adopted for the earth orbit portion ofprobe operations. Although Soviet tracking appearsaccurately defining the spatial location of the vehicle, theorientation required for fully successful Mars or Venus probesbeyond the capabilities of an earth fixed reference system. Weevidence that the Soviets haveystem based onor stellar attitude control.


Soviets have competent scientists and engineers in thefield, but they do not have enough to provide theof instruments and the number of refinements desirable for

typical orbital pathn ot Soviet earth satellites, ace Figure 3.



some advanced scientific space programs. By closely following Western developments in the field of instrumentation and by concentrating Bloc resources on priority programs, the Soviets have been able to meet the needs of their space programs They will probably be able to provide the Instrumentation adequate for the space ventures which could be undertaken in the period of this estimate.

Tracking and Communication*

The chief limitation on Soviet capabilities for trucking andwith space vehicles is the lacklobal tracking network capable of continuous observation and communications with satellites and space probes. Facilities in the USSR are adequate to determine the initial trajectoryigh degree of accuracy. To extend theircapability, the Soviets rely on specially Instrumented ships,to some degree the lack of land facilities. However, the value of these ships Is limited, because of the difficulty of accurately determining their positions. Thus far. Soviet capabilities in this field have been generally adequate for the missionsthey have probably to some extent shaped those missions.

The Soviets haveapability for tracking anddata to lunar distances, but they were less successful with the deep space shot to Venuso date, we do not know the degree of success Ihey are experiencing with the Mars probe launched 1Although they can probably overcome the communicationsexperienced with the Venus probe, they have not yetrackbig system with the sophistication necessary for deep spaceTracking stations In other hemispheres wouldajor aid to mid-course guidance and to achievuig better terminal accuracy. There Is evidence lhat the USSR is seeking to acquire sites for space tracking stations in Chile, Indonesia, Africa, and Australia.

major element in tracking, control, and communications Isof adequate power suppbes for the space vehiclesspace vehicles have notapability forover long periods of time. We believe, however,apparent weakness can be overcome. In addition toin solar batteries and other power sources, the Sovietsdeveloping nuclear-power sources for use In space vehicles.near future, they couldeactor-type power supply wilhof several hundred watts.4 output could be increasedkilowatts, andt could possibly be further increased


Data Processing

Advanced data processing techniques are required for the iBpId determination of orbits and trajectoriesarge number ofof space vehicles. The ability of the Soviets to process data for such missions as re-entry and extra-terrestrial launches from parking orbit Indicates that high performance computers are beingropaganda film on the Titov flight revealed that an advanced Soviet digital computer, capable0 arithmetic operations per second, was employed in space-track computations and data handling. Computers of lesser performance are probably used for prelaunchand other operations where speed Is not so vital.

The Soviets will probably continue to seek increased computer reliability and speed of operation, and will seek to reduce size, weight, and power requirements. The Soviets have in operation at least one computer capable0 operations per second, and are probably developing computers capableperations per second. Ineriod, the Soviets could probably have computers utilizing only solid-stale devices capableillion operations per second. In developing computers for space vehicles, they will probably achieve some success in mlero-miruatumalion.

Rendezvous, Docking, ond Transfer

believe that over the next few years the Soviets willexperiments directed toward the development ofand transfer techniques. The recent launching of twoInto similar orbits at the same tune may haveirst stepdirection Within about the next year, the Soviets couldrendezvous operations employing space vehicles havingwhile in orbit. Docking operations, which mightan Initial demonstration of the transferan from oneto another, could probably be achieved shortly transfer men and materials in quantities sufficient forspace stations, the Soviets would probably requireheavy satellites,ew large booster. Such aprobably be achieved in

Life Support Systems

believe Uiat the Soviets nowartially closed-cyclesystem which, with their current payload capability, wouldorbital missions of up loays. With modification ofvehicle, this system could support two menhorterof overays duration wouldeliable, fullyecological system, capable of supporting more than oneany unexpected breakthrough, we do not expect such Attainmentapability to orbit larger


payloads would ease some of Uie present constraints on tlie size and weight ol life support systems, making possible the development of manned space stations. These could serve as orbital laboratories, for obtaining more knowledge of Uie space environment and for testing life support, navigation, communications, and operational techniques.


eems clear that the underlying motives of the Soviet leaders in planning their future spacein planning for other types of nationalto enhance the security of the USSR and to increase its power and prestige, gaining advantages over the US where possible. In making decisions about the specific projects to be Included in their future space program, tlie Soviel leaders will continue to be guided by such general considerations as; the political benefits that are likely to result from particular space accomplishments; themilitary value of the space projects which are considered, planned, or undertaken; and the technical and economic limitations thattlie range of their choices. We believe thai these considerations, as well as the desire to achieve scientific gains, will incline the Sovietsuch broader space program loan in the past Whether particular projects will be pursued, however, wit] depend on the Soviet view of their potential contribution to national power and prestige, weighed against the cost of accomplishing them.

Thus far, the space accomplishments which have yieldedpolitical benefits to the USSR have been achieved by exploiting the superiority in propulsion attained hi the Soviet missile program. With existing technology and hardware, the Soviets could accomplish several additional feats which still lie beyond US capabilities. As more advanced space systems become available, the range of possibilities for novel space missions will widen. However, with the Increasingof future space operations, the accomplishment of spectacular "firsts" will become much more difficult. Their achievement andwill continue to Influence Soviet planning, bul they will probably be Increasingly conceived as partsong-range integrated program.

Our evidence as to the future course of the Soviet space program is very limited. Soviel propaganda dealing with future space activities has canvassed the whole range of possibilities Our estimates are therefore based largely on extrapolation from past Soviet spaceand on judgments as to likely advances in Soviet technology. Considering the available evidence and Soviet capabilities, thisprobably willariety of specific objectives. It probably will be characterized by an expansion of man-in-space activities and by the acquisition of basic scientific information needed for future space missions. Greater emphasis than heretofore will probably be


placed on military applications of spare vehicles, both to meet specific Soviet requirements and to keep pace with military programs which the Soviets expect the US to undertake Unmanned lunar exploration will probably soon be resumed, and interplanetary probes launched when favorable opportunities occur.

Manned Lunar Landing

Some Soviet statements indicaterogramanned lunar landing is under way in the USSR, but we have no confirmation that It is currently being pursued. In view of the limitations in our present intelligence collection capabilities,rogram could be well under way in the USSR without our knowledge. Most of the activity uniqueanned lunar program would to date haveof laboratory and ground development preparatory to the flight testing of major system components. However, if the Soviets arewith the US, some flight testing clearly associatedanned lunar landmg should begin within the next few years. In our view, the minimum time between the first recognizable lest flightsanned lunar landing attempt would be about twocould occur if. In lis first test flights, the booster were employed with the upper propulsion stages and the lunar landing craft.

The top Soviet leaders have not committed themselves publicly to competition with the US Inanned lunar landing, and it is hlglily unlikely that they will do so. From their statements, we know that Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders are concerned about the great expense and risks involvedanned lunar program. On the other hand, they almost certainly would expect Soviet prestige and influence to suffer if the USSR failed to engage the US In the race to the moon, or if its program lagged far behind. Moreover, later manned Interplanetary operations would be facilitateduccessful manned lunar landing. We think these latter factors would lead the Soviet leadership to compete, unless the cost were consideredor tin' US seemed to have an Insurmountable lead. On the basis of present evidence, we cannot say definitely at this time that the Soviets aim toanned lunar landing aheadr hi close competition with the US, but we believe the chances arc better than even that thisoviet objective.

We cannot estimate with confidence the method which the Soviets would employ to accomplish this feat. However, we believe that they are more likely lo dispatch the lunar vehicle from an orbiling earth or lunar satellite than toirect flight from the earth-Either approach will require major new vehicle development, facility construction, and supporting activities in many other fields However, the method to be employed would probably not be apparent until late in the program.

n'- ol activities leadingunu landing siiould provide indications as to the progress ofrogram.2 on. manned satellites, including muJtimanned vehicles, would be orbited for the purpose of extending the capability of life support systems, developing radiation shielding, and conducting studies ofDoth manned and unmanned satellites would be used lo develop advanced guidance equipment and new re-entry techniques for the higher speeds Involvedeturn flight from the moon. Aamount of unmanned lunar exploration would be required. The Soviets may attempt soft landings of instrumented packages on the moon at any time, and unmanned satellites could be placed In orbit around the moon or launchedircumlunar flight. Assuming that we have correctly estimated the dates of availability of multi-million pound thrust boosters and advanced upper stages, tlie Soviets could accomplish the following: In, they couldland an unmanned mobile exploratory veliicle on tlieanned circumlunar flight could be achieved;anned satellite could be placed in lunar orbit tn.

In addition lo the space flights requiredunar program, concurrent research and development would be required on propulsion, guidance, and supportinganned lunar landing vehicle as well as the chemical propulsion stages required to take off from the moon must also be developed. Finally, the expansion of groundfacilities will probably continue over the next several years. Given their ability to concentrate human and material resources on priority objectives, wc estimate lhattrong national effort the Soviets couldanned lunar landing in the


believe that there willonsiderable increase inactivity. Within about the next year the Sovietsbegin to employ manned satellites having somewhile In orbit, to perform rendezvous, docking, and transferThey will probably undertake manned flights ofand couldwo-man Vostok capsule at any is technically feasible to putmall mannedanned circumlunar flightsingICBM boosters and earth-orbit rendezvous techniques. If abooster ofillion pounds thrust becomes available inyear or so, this booster could be used to accomplish the samea less complex manner. ultimillion pound thrust space booster

'abular summary of lhe accomplishments believed to be conautent with such an effort, are Table. For other possible Soviet up ace missions, sec Tablel

is being developed now, the Soviets couldon manned space station

Soviets may attempt manned circumlunar and lunarflights in connectionanned lunar landing program,such nights would not be essential to accomplish tlieIs possible lhat such flights would be undertaken even if alanding were not planned. Although many similarbe involved, these ventures would be considerably lessterms of propulsion and the other requirementsandingMoreover, if the Soviets should conclude that the USthe manned lunar landing competition, they might reasonSoviet manned lunar nights without landings wouldthe US triumph. Similar considerations would apply toultlmanncd space station.

Scientific Satellites

Soviets will continue to conduct scientific experimentsThey will do this to enhance their capability in spaceprovide some data for the world scientific community, and towhich they believe will not be available to them fromjoint programs Because the US scientific satellite program isand Its results widely distributed, the Soviet programcontinue to be smaller than the US program, widle theprogram probably serves basic scientific objectives. It ismuch of tins effort will be In support ol more specific futurethe lunar program and possible military supportwill probably continue to launch probes lo Mars andgreater propulsion capabilities are developed, more extensivescientific investigations of interplanetary space will be

Miliiory Goals

the basis of evidence presently available, we arc unablethe existence of Soviet plans or programs for theof space. The limitations of this evidence, however, are suchchances of identifying military programs are poor. Wethe USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility offor military support and offensive and defensiveit ts possible that space exploration, which Is totallyhuman experience, will offer unforeseen opportunities forSoviet decisions to develop military siiacc systemson their existed cost and effectiveness as compared with alter-



native systems, the political and military advantages which could be gained, and the Soviet estimate ot US intentions and capabilities in comparable fields. We believe that the USSR will produce and deploy those military space systems which It finds to be feasible andin comparison with other types of weapons and military

Military Support Systems. We believe that the first Sovietspace vehicles are likely to be earlh satellites used in variousroles. We do not believe lhat tlie Soviets have as yet launched geodetic, communications, or navigation satellites for military purposes. Since they have had the capability lo accomplish some of thesefor some time and apparently have not done so, they probably have felt no pressing requirement in these fields. However, the Soviet views on requirements probably are now changing. The recovered satellites in the "Cosmos" series probably accomplished cloudand could have performed photographic, electronic, and nuclear reconnaissance, at least experimentally. In addition, one "Cosmos" satellite launched from Kapusttn Yar probably monitored the radiationoviel nuclear test in space

Soviet scientists and military experts almost certainly recognize that earth satellitesreater potential than conventionalfor some forms of reconnaissance, early warningeather surveillance, and communications. In view of the US ICBM threat, we believe lhat an EW satellite isost pressing requirement in this field. Tbe Soviets may also develop reconnaissance satellites. Although their intelligence on deployment of fixed US targets Isadequate, such satellites could provide some useful information on certain mobile forces and could perform postsfcrike reconnaissance. Targeting requirements may also lead the Sovietseodetic space program. However, this would require improvements in trackingand the establishment of tracking facilities outside ofSoviet Bloc, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere. The Soviets may also develop navigation satellites to improve the effectiveness of their missile submarine forces, as well as communications satellites.

Space Weapons. There is no evidence that the Soviets aresystems for space warfare, but they are almost certainlythe feasibility of such systems, and they arelose watch on US developments in this field. Soviet military writings and public statementsrowing concernilitary threat from space, and imply that US developments cannot be safely ignored by the USSR However, we do not believe that Soviet space technology has progressed sufficiently for the Soviets to have made the decision to proceed with large scale programs for offensive or defensive space weapons


Weapon Systems. The Soviets have the capabilityan orbital bombardment satellite and might decide to launcha space weapon at an early date lor propaganda orA demonstration olatellite could occur at anywe believe that in the near term Its military effectivenessminimal.

this decade the basic factors of reaction time,accuracy, vulnerability, average life, and positive controlorbital bombardment system almost certainly will not comparewith ICBMs. We believeoviet decision to developan orbital bombardment system would depend in large partextent to which these drawbacks can be overcome. If theto develop an orbital bombardment force, it would bea developmental system of limited military effectiveness whichas early

Statements by the aircraft designer Mikoyan indicateuborbital vehicle,ikoyan has stated that boosters can easily be developed or adapted for launchthat trajectories would be in the upper atmospherend that Uie "Cosmoplane" wouldurther development of supersonic aircraft. The military attractiveness ofystem stems from the recoverability of the vehicle and the many purposes to which it can be put. As compared with an orbital bombardment vehicle, il provides increased accuracy, posiUvc control, and greater reliability. We have no evidence of research and development on this vehicle, but assuming that it is now underrototype could be tested

Defensive Weapon Systems. We believe that the USSR willa capability to counter reconnaissance satellites. Surface-launched nonorbitlng missiles arc the simplest approach to the neutralisation problem, and the most likely to be used by the Soviets throughout this decade. Byystem using radar and passive tracking facilities, missiles, and warheads from existing defensive systems, they might be able lo Intercept US satellites now. and they wouldapability to do so within Uic next year or so.

The Soviets may be developing orbiting systems for antisatellite employment.4 the Soviets couldendezvous techniqueonmancuvering satellite forore sophisticated system with an inspection, neutralization and damage assessment capability could be achieved later in theore complexdesigned toingle satellite against multiple targets for any purpose would take considerably longer to accomplish



The Possibility of International Cooperation

Economic pressures and the broader range of the US spacewill tend to make International cooperation attractive to the USSRumber of areas, but political and military considerations willlimit Soviet participation in Joint space ventures. There may be cooperation In such fields as weather satellites, and possibly other selected satellite programs. However, the political prestige at stakeunar race is likely to preclude cooperation in this area, even though it is by far the most cosily of the possible new programs.

Tlie Soviets wouldignificant degree of internationalonly If the economic burden of their space program becomes so heavy that this program or key economic and military programs were jeopardized Under such conditions the Soviets would preferto competing unsuccessfully or al toorice. Prior tonegotiations the Soviets would probably try to achieve some spectacular successes so as to maximize their bargaining position and to appear as the nation making major concessions.


implied Costs o' lie Program to Dote

Tho Soviets have done much to make their space program ns economical as possible. They have kept unique vehicle development and facility costsinimum by utilizing military hardware and facilities as much as possible. Their payload instrumentation has not required cosily miniaturization and has been less varied than that of US payloads. They have concentratedimited number of major space missions, and the total number of launches has been only about one-third that of the US. Nonetheless, the cost of the Soviet space program has been very great, and it bas required the use of largeof scarce resources and hardware.

We have no Soviet data on the cost of their space program. In view of the differences in technology and operational philosophy. It is difficult to estimate an equivalent dollar cost even for the part of the Soviet program which Is clearly visible and uniquelyhe vehicles and payloads actuallyigure0 million toillion iseasonable minimum (produced-In-the-US) cost for the vehicles and payloads launched as ofther casts, such as research and development, provision of supporting facilities and equipment, and astronaut training, cannot be estimated In detail, but we believe that their addition would resultotal expenditure on the order of at5 billion. If the Sovielsanned lunar landing program which hastage somewhat comparable to the US program, we estimate lhal il would have required by


an additional expenditure nn the order5 billion. This wouldthe cost to date ofultunlllion pound booster for flight testigh energy upper stages, lunar reconnaissance

systems, advanced manned spacecraft, and associated technology and


Implied* Coils of the Future Program

We believe that the Soviet leaders are committedontinuing space program of sizable proportions as an clement of national power and prestige. Although the Soviet program to date has not been Inexpensive, the feasible space missions envisioned for the future will be vastly more expensive and more demanding in terms of both skills and resources. Moreover, the Soviet space program will be competing directly for the scarce skills and resources also needed In the ICBM, air and missileand economic programs. Thus, we believe that more than ever before the future course of the Soviet space program will reflect the impact of economic considerations.

A manned lunar landing is probably tlie most ambitious and COsUy goal In space which tlie Soviets might undertake durings. if the Soviets undertake maimed lunar landingew of thespace projects within their capabilities. the produced-ln-US cost would probably be on the order ofillion per year. If they shouldidely varied program, annual outlays would be on the order ofillion. Prom the Soviet point of view, expenditures ofoillion per year,the most advanced technology which the USSR can provide, could not occurore inconvenient time. The burden of military programs has slowed the growth of tlie investment programnd this burden will probably not lessen for several years. The allocation of large quantities of highest quality resources to lunar, planetary, and military sj>ace programs would have even more serious effects on Lhe investment program.

In light of these considerations, we believe that the Soviets will seek to limit the costs of their space program, and yet accomplish the major objectives they consider to be of greatest national Importance. Wc think that for the next decade these objectives are likely to include increased man-tn-spacc activity, some military support systems,satellites, interplanetary probes, and lunar exploration. Specific major developments which could occur within the period of the estimate are manned space stations In earth orbits and manned lunar landings. In addition, demonstrations of developmental space weapon systems may occur. The cost of such an effort, while very large, would likely fall towards lhe low side of the annual rangeillion,

'2 A
















in solar orbil


September 1MB















VII (Venlk 1)


to bunch VenmDecayed1

VIII (Vcoik II)


prebe toward Venus







Mtofc I)






Cosmo* I)




XIV (Cosmo* II)



lo earth orbit


in earth orbit

XVI (Cosmo. IV)'



XVII (Cosmos V)


In earth orbit

XVIII (Cosmos VI)




XIX (CosnwB VU)







XXI {VoMok IV)




XXII (Cosmos VIII)



in earth orbit



probe failure




probe failure

XXV (Vcnik V)



probe failure

XXVI (Cosmos IX)'





XXVII) (Ctena, XI)


in earth orbil



probe failure

XXX (Mui I)



probe toward Mars



probe failure

refer toof payload.

Soviet* have not announced payload weight* of "Cosmos" nnta taUUilo. Payload weight* for this seriw areiiii.:iitrl from Tyurslain. All other "Ccnram" entelhtee have bten Isuncl-ed from Kepuitin Yar.


TAB It 2


3 4 5 6 7

We have estimated the chances as better than even that the Soviets will attempt toannedling ahead of or in close competition with the US, and we believe thattrong national effort they could accomplish this feat. The following table estimates approximate dates for specificrequired for Soviet achievementanned lunar landinghich wc regard as the earUest possible date. All of the dates estimated except those for astrophysics! studies are predicated on the development and use of equipment specifically designed for the manned lunar landing mission.

Astrophyslcol Studies

Syaleinullc radiation and inclCOliUc


Systematic lunar exploration'...

TOM Test of Propulsion Systems Large single0 pound*

thrust or better)'

Large booster (cluster ot single engines)

High energy upper stage

Development ot propulsion tor:

change o( trajectory

earth landing rclrosystcm

lunar landing retrosysteni and takeoff Flight Test aj Lunar Spacecraft In Karth


EstablUhment of Long-Range Tracking


Eendetvovs. Docking, and Transfer {Using Large Clustered Booster)

Synchronous launch

Rendezvous ot vehicles

Docliing and transfer of men and

Flight Test of Guidance

Ejection guidance

Mid-eoursc, terminal, aad re-entry guid


Earth Re-entry At Lunar Return Speed

ISC2 ) 4 S ISM 7

*'inai preparatory Phase

Manned x

Manned lunar sateUltc* x

Manned Flight to Moon, Lending, and

Return . ..

a evidence of limiudin theseunar exploration would include unmanned son landings, unmanned circumlunar flights, and unmanned lunar satellites.

lievidence auggeaUng staUc tesUng In IMi.

'These mission* arc not believed lo be essential toanned lunar landing, but might be undertaken aa system teats or to acbleve tie. nlflcant -Anti,"


We have estimated that the chances are better than even that the Soviets willanned lunar landing ahead of or in close competition with the US. In addition, the Soviets will probably undertake other programs including scientific satellites, military support satellites, and Interplanetary probes. This table lists space missions estimated to be within Soviet capabilities, but we do not believe that all these missions could be accomplished within the time periods Indicated. If the Soviets are not committedunar race with Ihe US. other programs will probably receive greater emphasis.



Science Operations'

(II Magnetic measurement ,

adiatlon measurementtudy ot electromagnetichady ot upper atmosphere

of meteorites


arly warning satellite

Reconnaissance satellite .

Delerutvo space weapons systems

(II IrupccUon of single nonmaneuverlng satellite (III More sophisticated satellite with inspection,uauon. and damage assessmentSeiuite apace weapons systems

(il Demonstration of orbital bombardment satellite -ill) Developmental system ofreeenew




Commfidal or UUUary Application


Communications satellites

Ocodetle satellites



Manned earth Orbital Flights

(It Otbit of muJUmanned spacecraft

endezvous and

day life support system

of man from one space vehicle toManned Space Station

Manned Lunar Flight*

tit Ctrtumlanar

fit Lunar aatoUlU


Circumlunar. Lunar Satellite, Lunar Soft tending

Probes fo Man ond Venus

Probes fo More Mutant Planets

Solar Probe

Ejection ol Vehicle from Solar System


mm mt



n 1M23-

Collection oflso performed by manned satellites

' In this decade, the Soviets are most likely to use surface launched missiles to neutralise enemy satellites. However, orbiting systems may be developed for Inspection, damage assessment, and neutralisation.

Demonstration for propaganda or political reasons could occur at any time, but military effectiveness would be minimal.

estimates ore based on the availabilityullimilllon pound space booster. If tho USSRirst-generation ICIlM booster orilitary booster of about onealf million pounds should become available In the next year ormall manned space stationanned circumlunar flight could be achievedI0M.

present propulsion systems, payloads could not Include necessarysystems These events are more likely to occur when more power ful boasters and upper stages become available, possibly in the next year or so

Figure 2





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