NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
OA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
Trends in Soviet Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa
Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INIELLIGENCE
Concurred in by tba UNITED STATES INTELUGENCE BOARD Ai Wawalad2
Ihe fo/fowmg intelligence organualions porliopated in lha preparation of Hut
Ihe Centroiondo-oo. Deport -fc. No^. are*
Direclor or IrviHLger-c. ond Retearch. Department Q( Stole Director, Defcm* Inlelligence Agency
Chief ol Slofl lor InKlllgente. Deporimerl of the Army
A^lRon. Chlsf of No-ol Op*oilonlepoMmen.ihe No-y
Aiiliianl Chief ol Stall, Intelllgente, USAF
DWotfor forr Jam Siofl
Director of Ihe National Security Agency
Ihc AJoeuc Energyto fta UMI. end tr* AiMuom
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
rends in Soviet Policy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I- THS CURRENT SOVIET
n. INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY
Other Policy g
Hi. PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET
ANNEX A: BLOC TRADE AND ECONOMIC
ANNEX B: BLOC MILITARY
ANNEX C: AFRICAN STUDENTS TRAINED IN THE BLOC
ANNEX D: THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN
TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
To estimate the general features of Soviet policy toward the newly independent states and the remaining colonial regimes south of the Sahara over the next two or three years.
Soviet Union sees Africa as an area of greatfor the Bloc and the international CommunistFrom the Soviet viewpoint, Africa is undergoing thesocial and economic changes which operate to thethe power position of the USSR and. in the long run.the prospects for actual Communist seizures ofSoviets anticipate that in the near future African andInterests will come Into new conflicts and that theexploit these conflicts to undermine the Westernimprove their own position. )
the next several years, the Soviets willestablishing their own presence throughout Africa andtheir base of operations through diplomatic,economic contacts. Both Bloc economic assistancetrade are likely to grow gradually and involve moreassistance has not bulked large fn the Bloc's aidbut it is likely that new opportunities will
are formidable obstacles to the expansion ofThe Soviets have not had the West's long experience
tropical Africa, and they are handicappedhortage of trained personnel. Moreover, thc Soviets have begun to realize that they cannot rely on traditional Marxist analysis to cope with such African phenomena as race consciousness, tribalism, Pan-Africanism, and Africanhe gains made by the Bloc thus far have come on the initiative of strongly nationalistregimes which wished to redress the imbalance created by Western influence, but these regimes have also shown concern lo limit thc Bloc presence. )
D. Thc Communist movement in Africa south of the Sahara is embryonic; it is not likely to grow rapidly for some time. Nevertheless, the Soviets have already begun to create the basisommunist movement by training cadres, infiltrating the trade union movement, and encouraging the growth of radical nationalist parlies and factions. In the meantime, Sovietis to work through existing polilical organizations andespeciallyiew to placing Communist adherents in positions of influence. By this means, lhe Communists may be able lx> capture power through penetration of the governmental or party apparatus, even in thc absence of supportass party. )
The Soviets see Africa as an area of great potential opportunity. The revolution against the colonial system and the emergence of new nations appear to them to mark the accelerated decline of Western imperialism and to offer theumber of natural allies against the West. From the Soviet viewpoint. Africa is undergoing the kind of social and economic changes which will operate to the advantage of the power position of the Soviet Union and. in the long run. will advance the prospects for actual Communlit seizures of power.
Current Soviet policy towards the colonial and former colonial areas dates from the, when the Soviets drastically altered their previously hostile attitude toward national movements and leaders. At that time they decided to associate themselves with thc independence movements, regardless of their political composition or leadership, and to accept the emerging statesorce in world politics, in pursuing relations with these states the Soviets have been willing to subordinate the objective of promoting local Communist movements. The result hasolicy of expediency and opportunism based on collaboration with existing regimes with little regard for their political orientation.
I. THE CURRENT SOVIET APPROACH
The Soviets believe that the achievement of political sovereignty ln most of tlte continent presents them with some important advantages. Intense antlcolonialism offers the Soviets an Issue for miking common cause with African leaders. The Soviets clearly believe that this general question can be kept in the forefront of international affairs, especially In the UN, and convertedew drive against Western economic as well as political influence. The Soviets also view thc emergence of neutralism In Africa as an asset, since nonallgnmentole for the Blocounter to Western predominance. In general they expect that any enlargement of the Bloc's role willurther diminution of the Western positiononsequent gain for the Bloc In thc broader East-West confrontation.
The Soviets also see certain favorable conditions In the internal situation In most African countries. With the achievement ofthe African leadersew set of problems, primarily social and economic in nature, which will keep African politicstate of ferment for many years. Over the long run. each new state will come under mounting pressure to demonstrate economic progress, and the Soviets believe lhat this situation will offer new chances for the Bloc tooothold and Influence the general course of developments. One way of doing this is to exploit the African respect for Soviet economic
progress by pressing African States to adopt the Communist approach to problems of social and economic development.
he various advantages which the Soviets perceive in Africa are offset, however, by formidable obstacles. The Soviets lack severalassets. They have not had the West's long experience in tropical Africa. They are handicappedhortage of trained and experienced personnel able to move with assurance in the complex world of African politics. Even the question of anticolonlalism, which has provided an entry point for the Bloc, also sets boundaries on the degree of influence that Africans are willing to grant the USSRreat extent Bloc gains in Africa have come on the initiative of African regimes which wished to redress the Imbalance created by Western influence, but these same regimes have also shown concern to limit the Bloc presence.
G. Their experience in Africa thus far. especially in the Congo crisisrobably has also Impressed the Soviets with certain factors which tend to narrow their freedom of action. First, the Congothe limited assets which the Soviets can bring lo bear inocal contest. Second, the Sovietslash with the Interests of most African States when they seek the decisive role in situations of Immediate concern to Africans, or when Moscow adopts policies which Inject the East-West confrontation directly Into African affairs. Finally, the Congo affair indicated that even when thc Soviets align their policies with African regimes they still find themselves competing forwith other African States.
he Soviets also recognise that most African regimes are dominated by nationalist intelligentsia, and that this group is likely to remain In power for some time, regardless of shifts in local political alignments. As thc recent experience in Guinea pointed up. even those African leaders who are sympathetic to the USSRharp distinction between the USSRenefactor and local Communists who threaten party or governmental control and authority As in otherareas of the world, the acceptanceole for the USSR has not necessarilyimultaneous gain for Communist Ideology On the contrary, the majority of the African intelligentsia has rejected Soviet concepts as well as Western Ideologies and haspecialhis has proved difficult for the Soviets to cope with because, while they wish to encourage thc preoccupation of African intellectuals withhey are bound lo reject any forms of socialism which challenge Soviet claims Id' be the authoritative voice for "scientific socialism." For the present, however, the Soviets are refraining from repeated sharp criticism of "African socialism" andairly tolerant attitude, in order toonflict with
nationalism which might inhibit thc more immediate Soviet objectives in the area.
II. INSTRUMENTS OF SOVIET POUCY Political Activities
The primary purpose of current Soviet political activity in Africa is to undermine and eventually dislodge Western influence. The primary means to this end is still the exploitation of African nationalism, which the Soviets believe will come Into new and violent conflict with Western interests. The Soviets assume that thc issues of colonialism and. more recently, "neocolonialism" areseful bridge between Soviet and African interests. The Soviets will attempt toonflictAfrica and the West by pressingigorous "nationalstruggle" in the remaining colonial areas, and exploiting racial tensions in south and central Africa.
The USSR anticipates that both of these questions will cause grave problems for the West and that, as tensions and violence mount, the Bloc can score major gams In Africa, particularly In developing itswith conservative as well as with radical African States. If African governments move to give larger material aid to independencein the Portuguese colonies or to native movements in central and southern Africa, the Soviets will probably seek to Involve themselves in support of such eftorts.
will continue to pay special attention to Guinea, Ghana.
to the Soviet position in these countries, the Soviets continue to regard them as essential factors in their further strategy. The Soviets have declared that these states are suitable candidates for the status of "nationalormula contrived to permit the closeof certain states with the Bloc, even though these states are not under Communist control. By including them under this rubric, it fs hopedoctrinal gap can be bridgedorm of government encouraged which would facilitate'a nonviolent and gradualof these countries into full Communist states. The unprecedented invitation of thc governing parties in Ghana. Guinea, and Mali to attendd Congress of the Soviet Party underlines the hopes which the Soviets have of bringing the radical African States Into thefold by absorption.
he preference shown to the African "radicals" has not meant that the Soviets are willing to write off the remainder of the new African States. The USSR has been eager to enter into relations with almost all African countries and extend some economic and technical assistance.
thc Soviets have concentrated on the Monrovia group, and their offers have met with some receptivity in Niger. Dahomey. Senegal, and Cameroon. The Soviets have also maintained relations with suchanti-Communist regimes as those in the Sudan, Ethiopia, and Togo. In general, the Soviets have been concerned to establish lhcir respectability and usefulness to these governments and to undermine, even If onlymall degree, the monopoly of Western influence.
Economic Rc/ofiom 1
Economic aid and assistance is still the primary means of Soviet entry to Africa. The USSR recognizes that, because of the backward, subsistence nature of African economies, its own trade and aid will have little Impact on the population at large. Soviet policy, however, is aimed at leadership elements who are preoccupied with developmental problems revolving around the need for capital investment funds and the difficulty ln acquiring these funds from domestic savings.the national movement In Africa has almost everywhere produced expectations for economic improvement as an Immediate benefit ofindependence. Thc Soviets are exploiting this situation with prompt offers of trade, aid, and technical assistance, while at the same Ume emphasizing the undesirablllty of relying on Western economic assistance alone. The Soviets are convinced that this approach will eventually break down barriers to Soviet penetration, because most African States, anxious to balance Western influence, are prepared to minimize the risks of involvement with Bloc economies.
Soviet Bloc trade with sub-Saharan African countries hassignificantly over thc past three years, although It rose from very low levels and still representsmall share of total African trade and an even smaller share of Bloc trade.1 total trade between the areas amounted0 million, comparedilliono far. trade with the Bloc hasignificant factor only ln the trade of Guinea and Mali. Aboutercent of Guinea's trade went to the Blocnd Mali sold aboutercent of its principal crop, peanuts, to the Blocimilar share plannedhile Bloc exports to tropical Africa have increased steadily. African exports have tended lo fluctuate primarily because ofBloc purchases of cocoa, copper, and cotton The criticalof future trade levels is Bloc willingness to absorb larger quantities of peanuts, coffee, and cocoa in exchange for machinery, oil. and industrial materials. There may be some further Increases, but any long continued steep rise In total Bloc-African trade seems unlikely.
on Soviel Bloc economic credits, trade, snd technical assistance nre provided In Annex A.
This docs not preclude sharp statistical rises in the cases of countries which have noi yet taken up active trade with the Bloc.
enerally Bloc aid commitments in Africa are characterizedreat number and variety of small-scale developmental projects mostly In light Industry. There has been less opportunity, and apparently less Inclination, to follow the Soviet practice In other areas of concentrating on large projects for maximum political impact. This kind of program Ls apparently In accordance with the interests of the recipients and designed with some reference to repayment possibilities. In deference to African desiresapid expansion of agricultural producUon and crop diversification, the Bloc assistance also includes agriculturaland equipment, specialists to advise on planning, surveyand train agricultural technicians. Among the more expensive projects which the Bloc has undertaken or proposed are In thcof transportation facilities; the Bloc isailroad In Guinea and Mali and plans to modernize ports In Guinea and Somalia.
n particular, the Bloc hasetermined effort to expand Its activities in connection with civil air services. Soviet or Czech aircraft arc operating on airlines in Guinea and Mali and some aircraft have been provided to Ghana All three countries use Bloc flight andcrews, which will be replaced by national crews now being trained by Bloc technicians. In addition, the Bloc has stepped up Its efforts and achieved some success in obtaining overflight and landing rights for Bloc airlines. The agreement with Sudan this spring gives theotential for extending their air service to east and central Africa. Both the support for local civil air and extension of lis own services provide the Bloc with additional Instruments for establishing its presence. Bloc air services Into Africa alsoapid and relatively secure means of access for Bloc personnel and equipment which might beln some future crisis situation.
Kenya when it becomes independent
hus far the Bloc has extended0 million in credits to sub-Saharan Africa, but onlyillion of this has been drawn Two-thirds of the credits have been concentrated In Guinea. Ghana, and Mall In these three countries Bloc credits promise to provide over the next severalignificant portion of thc imports required to carry out current domestic development programs. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia, are the only other states which have accepted Bloc offers of credits and no significant progress has been made In their Tlie Bloc has had some success In eroding the resistance to Bloc relations by the Afro-Malagasy Union countries. Economic relations have been established with Dahomey, Niger,nd Cameroon; thc Bloc has made overtures for extending economic assistance to these states as well as tentative offers to Nigeria, and Tanganyika, and to
y the end ofoviet Bloc economicwere on assignment in the six African countries receivingBloc economic aid. Aboul two-thirds of them were in Guinea. Tropical Africa thus accounted for aboutercent ofdd Soviet Bloc technicians In all underdeveloped countries. Most of these technicians are employed on particular projects financed under Bloc lines of credit. In Ghana, Guinea, and Mall, however, many Soviet Bloc technicians are in positions where they mayore general influence on thc course of economic development. Forungarian economist drew up the new five-year development plan for Ghana. Several East Germans are employed as advisers to the Ghana Trades Union Congress, which is the only labor organizationajor government-controlled organization In Ghana. In Guinea, aboutzech technicians are employed as advisers In thc Ministries of Plans, Commerce, Rural Economy, and Finance. Approximatelyoviet, East German, and Czech technicians occupy important positions hi the Ministry of Public Works. East Ocrman and Czech technicians are helping lo establish an information serviceews agency in Mall. Bulgarian specialists serve as advisers in the Ministry of Public Works, Housing, and Energy Resources, and also are engaged In organizing the Mali State Trading Company.
Thus far military assistance has not bulked largo In the Bloc's aid program ln Africa, but it Is likely that opportunities will arise in the future. The Bloc has provided most of the equipment foran force in Guinea andorce of similar size in Mall. Sometalks have been conducted with the Sudan and Somalia. The Bloc has encouraged long-range training programs aimed atontinuing dependence on the USSR. The Soviets arc probably aimingosition of strong influence over the military establishments on the calculation that In some states these mayecisive factor in internal politics. The most recent evidence of Soviet Interest In using military assistance to promote their objectives is seen In the Congo, wheresuggestions have been made to the Congolese military that Soviet assistance would be provided if the Congolese Army wished lo overcome the Katanga secession by military means.1
Although the Soviets have not reaped all the political dividends they probably expected. It does not seem likely that they will make major changes in their foreign economic program in Africa. Their effort to date is not large in comparison with Western programs or wllh Sovlc^programs for other areas. The Soviets evidently recognizeoreign aid and assistance program in Africa is almost mandatory unless they are prepared lo leave lhe field to thceduction in their present modest program would risk isolating the USSR from the
A table ot military aid andt Annex
mam stream of African developments and, as the Soviets themselves have said, wouldeturn of Western predominance.
ls likely that Soviet economic programs In Africa willin volume and in the number of countries Involved, but asubstantia) increase in the amounts of aid supplied does notThe Soviets, of course, will be prepared to exploit anywhich develop, but the Bloc is incapable of replacing morefraction of Western trade, aid, and investment ln Africa. Inspread their influence as widely as possible in Africa, the Sovietsavoid large and costly projects in single countries andinsteadultiplicity of smaller projects In several countries.
Other Polky Instruments
The Bloc will supplement its growing diplomatic and economic effortide variety of other means to penetrate Africa. The Bloc's cultural exchange program continues to expand, and in some cases where economic relations are not firmlyultural agreement has proved the initial entry point for the Bloc. As ofhe Soviet Union and the Eastern European Satellites had signedultural pacts with nine African States, including new agreements with Dahomey. Senegal, and Cameroon. Although these agreements vary In scope, most of them provide for academic scholarships, cooperation in cultural and information fields, and exchanges in printed materials, radioand films.
The Bloc's propaganda has also expanded rapidly.imited audience. Bloc broadcasts beamed exclusively to Africa increased by almostercent in thc first six months2 and hadercent by2 over the ends ofhe Bloceek to Africa. Current Bloc activities also pointonsiderable expansion of Communist materials for distribution. The Bloc has made its news services available in Ethiopia. Sudan, and Upper Volta, but only Ghana, Guinea, and Mali make substantial use of Soviet material.
Thc'Bloc has taken advantage of the lack of adequate Indigenous professional and technical personnel to offer training to Africanin recentotal oftudents from sub-Saharan Africa have enrolled for study in either the USSR or the European
ajority of these students are under scholarship grants provided for by governmental agreements. Where such agreements do not exist, students have been recruited by Communist-supported local organizations. The Bloc program is by no means an unqualified success.
'A table or the number of sludents from African countries ls provided In Annex C.
There are growing numbers of disillusioned African students in Bloc countries. Nevertheless, as indicatedecent conference in Belgrade of African students studying abroad, many have already been heavily indoctrinated.
The Cammuniit Movement'
The Communist movement In Africa south of the Sahara is still embryonic. There areew organized Communist partiesby Moscow and some other parties which are Communist influenced and have received support from the USSR. But as an organizedCommunist parties, cither overt or covert, have had little Influence on African developments, and nowhere do theyignificant political force.
The Soviets in recent years have done little to remedy thisOn the contrary. It seems likely that they have deliberatelyan Immediate effort to promote an African Communist movement. Two reasons have probably led to this approach. First, thc local assets for promoting an effective organization are still lacking, and thcof such assets has been recognized In Moscowong-term project. Second, tlie developmentoviet sponsored movement wouldefinite handicap for Soviet policy operations In moat African States. In Guinea. Mall, and Ghana, where all political opposition ls suppressed, the emergence of an open Communist movement would not only be unsuccessful but would probably seriously undermine the position of the USSR In these countries.
This approach does not mean, however, that thc Soviets are willing to abandon the political field In Africa. Indeed, It ls Soviet doctrine that Communist parties must eventually emerge throughout theBut In the interim thc Soviets willontinuationroad "national front" permitting local Communists to work through existing political organizations and movements In this way the Soviets expect Communists to exert some immediate influence on government policies without running the risks of open conflicts
The Soviets are preparing the groundworkore activeefiort eventually. They are trying to use their student exchange program to recruit disciplined and trained cadres. In addition the Soviets are concentrating on trade unionsarget for penetration and^ Infiltration. They have promoted extensive exchange visits with labor leaders, maintained contacts between local unions and theWorld Federation of Trade Unionsnd have established training schools In the Bloc for trade unioninally, the Soviets will encourage thc growth of radical nationalist parties and fac-
A detailed nurvey ot the Communlitnnex I>
lions throughout Africa, with thc hope that the Communists can even-tually gain dominant influence in them. In some African States, the Communis Ls may be able to capture power through penetration of the
governmental or party apparatus, even in the absence of any base of
Communist criticisms of Soviet policy for lack offor excessive reliance on the USSR's diplomatic influence pointextension of Sino-Soviet disagreements to Africa. Specific casesrivalry have already evolved In Africa: in one instance,and terrorist Cameroon Peoples Union (UPC) in CameroonChinese influenceesult of disenchantment withadvice. In general, however, Communist China is too remoteresources too limited to compete effectively with the USSR forover African governments or within radical African circles,the militant Chinese line may In time attract some supportcadres in the nascent Communist movement. The Sovietsconfronted by another Communist rival for Influence inwhose "righlwing" brand of "socialism" has someseveral countries. Thusommunist movement develops inAfrica it-is likely to be heterogeneous, reflecting the strainsIn the Communist camp.
III. PROBABLE TRENDS IN SOVIET POLICY
Soviets probably consider their efforts to expand theirand Influence in Africa haveet gain, despitea slower pace than they may haveew yearshave passed from the role of passive observer to activeAfrican affairs and to some extent they have helped to furtherof Western influence Nevertheless, there have beenof Soviet impatience over the pace of Africaninitial successes in Guinea. Ghana, and Mali have not beenby other breakthroughs, and even in these three states thereindication of disenchantment with Soviet policy. Thebegun to realize lhat they cannot rely on traditionalto cope with such African phenomena as racePan-Africanism, and Africanurrentare. therefore, marked by some concern and uncertaintyhow to proceed.
his uncertainty also reflects the USSR's awareness that its prospects over the next few years depend greatly on new opportunities arising out of local developments. In east and central Africa thefor the Soviets may be fairly promising, particularly If they arc able toosition of influence in Kenya and thus win ain that pail of Africa. Tlic instability of the Congo situation also
couldhance that the present governmentadicalwould turn to Moscow for support against Katanga. The active revolt ln Angola may provide the Soviets an opportunity to Involve themselves with arms aid, perhaps through other African States, In South Africa there Isommunist apparatus wliich may over timeactor of some importance as an Instrument of Soviet policy.
he Soviets seem to recognize that African politics will befor many years to come andlexible Soviet response will be required. It Is likely that the Soviets will be chary of excessively committing their resources or their prestige In an area which in their view does not at present offer opportunities for decisive gains in Uie Kast-West conflict. Atore militant Communist line would jeopard!xe current positionsighly doubtful promise of success. At the same time, the Soviets do not Intend lo isolate themselves from an Important area. Thus the Soviets probably believe that they have little choice but to continue along the line of their present efforts, varying their tactics and gradually building up Communist strengthiew to exploiting more effectively the opportunities which seem bound to arise in Africa.
BLOC TRADE AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC CRKDITS TO SUB-8AHARAN AFRICA JULY2
(MILLION US 1)
Somali Republic Sudan TOTAL
DRAWINGS TOTAL PERCENT OP
includingCommunal credits ofoilliw. toUuii.co, iindillion to Mall.
SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS IN SUB-BAHAKAN AFRICAN]
I'tiimato, ofrmrileriod ofmonth, or more. Numbersrounded to tlic nearest live. Tbo total figure lias rluelwittti; for example. a, of Jane IW! there neroechnicians and in De..
l include(orhniciiiii. from Couimuiiiu China in Guinea andn Mali
SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH SUU^AlURAN AFRICAH
AncoU Cameroon Congo Republic Ethiopia
TOTAL SOVIET BLOC EXPORTS
(MILLION US SI TOTAL SOVIET BLOC IMPORTS
Iliac Ei port* Import.
Soviet Woenunl ol the toul Hade of lub-Siih.trau Mrirnt. roj" tries
Tropicaler. oral ol Soviet lUoc trade with allc nun If In
countries where trade with the Blocminimi
BLOC MILITARY ASSISTANCE
TOTAL (MILLION USS)
Gbana Guinea Mail
Includinga Eatlvm European Satellite*.
Since0 pilot*umber of mechanic*
Rone to the USSR from Somalia (or miliiary ttalning.
MAJOR BLOC ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT DELIVERED
Guloea Mali lihiiiin
COUNTRY GUNS CARRIERS PIECES VEHICLES CRAFT SMALL ARMS
ACADEMIC STUDENTS FROM SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES TRAINED IN THE SOVIET2
Number* arc rouuded lo tlte nearest five.
IncludingludeiiU in Communist
THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
eographical basis, Soviet subversive assets in Africa form no consistent pattern, although certain salient points of strength emerge in each of the continent's major regions. Organized parties known to be recognized by Moscow exist only in the Sudan, the Republic of South Africa, and Basutoiand. There areumber of nominally Communist parties whose status and relations with Moscow are highly uncertain.
In Sudan, the small Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) exercises an influence greater than its numericalould Indicate, especially on students and in the trade unions. The SCP has recently abandoned fruitless efforts lounited front" of all the outlawed opposition parties and Is devoting itself to independent subversive efforts.
In East Africa, the two main areas in which the Communists appear lo have been laying the groundwork for subversive activity are Kenya and Zanzibar. The extremist faction of thc Kenya-African National Union (KANU) headed by Oginga Odinga has been financed by Communist funds. Oginga and KANU leader Jomo .Kenyatta are competing with each other for support of young Kikuyus by awarding them scholarships to study in the Bloc.
Zanzibar, despite its relatively small size and importance, may be the sceneoncerted efiort at Communist infiltration. The Zanzibar Nationalist Partyn Arab party which forms part of the governing coalition,ubstantial and apparently well-financed pro-Communist wing. There has also been Communistof the Zanzibar trade unions,ontinuing heavy influx of Communistanzibar Communist Party has recently been formed, and its establishment was noted by the Soviet press.
In West Africa, the main islands of potential Communist strength are the three radicalGuinea, andof which have single-party, authoritarian political systems resembling those of the Communists in someudgment on the relativeof Communist penetration among the three poses some difficulties. Guinea hasariness of the dangers of Communist subversion, especially since theI "teachers'he solidarity of the ruling party's leadership behind Sckou Touie at that
time would seem to Indicate thai Lhc control of that party had not been greatly affected by the heavy Soviet influence during the preceding three years. The degree of Communist penetration In Mali has been perhaps the most difficult to judge, in part because publicmedia arc under thc control of pro-CommunLst elements, and have given most of the regime'sarked pro-Communist slant. The extremist faction Ln the ruling Unionwhich Justice Minister Madeira Keita is generally considered to beumber of fairly vocal pro-Soviet ministers and poUtbureau members Although it is this element which seems to have Uieof power In the party, there are apparently conservative elements of some Importance still in the regime.
In Ghana, Communist influence on both thc government and the Convention People's Party (CPP) has grown considerablymong the most significant fields in which penetration has occurred arc: (a) the public Information media, whichairly consistent pro-Soviet line; (b) the trade unions, whose head. John K. Tettegah. has been one of the major pro-Soviet influences on the regime; (c) thc CPP youth organization, the Ghana Young Polneersnd (d) the ideological training program for younger CPP members, which appears in some respects to be little moreeries of clandestine Communist study groups. Left wing elements in Uie CPP may have received an important check with the detention of InformationTawta Adamafto and CPP General Secretary Henry Cofne-Crabbe for alleged involvementlot against Nkrumah's life, but Uie full implications of these developments are not clear. Communistin Ghana has also been significant because Ghanaian contacts with radical nationalist movements throughout Africa have given the Soviets access to areas with which direct contacts would otherwise have been difficult.
Throughout French-speaking West Africa, there is probably aof the old Communist apparatus which came into existence at the time of thc alliance between the Rassembtement Democratique Africain (RDA) and the Communists in thes and which continued on In the trade unions after the RDA-Communlst split tn thes. The strength of these elements is difficult to gauge, but there isa fairly steady recruitment of young people into radicaltided in large part by Communist-pen ct rated studentin France It is not certain to what extent this has produced effective clandestine organizaUons. There has been no full-fledged Communist Party in the French-speaking,.areas. However, theParti Africain de I'Independenceow renamed theParly, Is active In exile and has recently been upgraded by the Bloc press to the statusMarxist-Leninist" Party.
mayubstantial opportunity to thethe next fewmall Nigerian Communist Parly, ofstatus, has been formed The most important channels forof Communist and pro-Communist Influence have beenIndependent United Labor Congress (IULC) and thcCongresshcallying point for theelements
exception to the situation in West Africa is Cameroon,crypto-Communist or Communist-infiltratedevidencebeenUPC. began an armed rebellionhe UPC split, and one faction has resumedBut the rebellion itself has never been stamped out,it is confinedairly restricted area. Thc Sovietsappear to have written off thc UPC rebels, but thehowever, are still training some rebel cadres.
The death of Lumumba and the detention of Gizenga In the Congo eliminated the principal instruments of Communist Influence. No Communist Party is known to exist.adical government come to power in Leopoldville, however, It is probable that Communist organizations would reappear.
The Soviets may have their greatest potential opportunities in Southern Africa. In the Republic of South Africa the basic strategy of the clandestine but active Communist Party ls to exploit the country's racial tensions in order toront of opposition parties under Communist leadership. The South African Communist Party (SACP) already substantially controls the African National Congress (one of the leading non-European political organizations)umber of other front organizations. In Rasutoland, the Communist Party of Lesotho was created1 with thc assistance of the SACP. The party hasfarwin control of the country's leading nationalist organization, the Basutoland People's Congress.
The main Communist effort in lhe Portuguese areas hasngola. The Popular Movement for Angolan Liberationn Angolan nationalist organization, appears to be heavily penetrated by Communist or pro-Communist elements. Theainhas been Its lack of participation in the Angolan rebellion, which has so far been dominated by the non-Communist Union of Angolan Peopleseaded by Holden Roberto. Because of this lack of
vany popular base in Angola, the MPLA's objective, at least untilhas been lo bringerger or some other form ofbetween itself and thchls move has been supported by many non-Communist African leaders. There have recently beenthat the MPLA has redoubled ils efforts to put Ils own forces In the field in Angola No Communist activity of this scale has ap-
penred in the Mozambique nationalist movement, but some Communist contacts apparently have been made with the movement formerly known as Mozambique National Democratic Unionof which refused to take part in the Mozambique Liberation Front formed in the summern Portuguese Ouinea. Amilcar Cabral, head of the leading nationalist party, the African Independence Party for Portuguese Ouinea and Cape Verdeas long maintained close relations with the Slno-Sovlel Bloc, which supplies him with most of his finances and arms.
alagasy Republicomewliat confusing picture of Communist activity. An official Malagasy Communist Partyhose status in the international movement Is not clear, may be covertly run by tho Malagasy Government. The real center of Communist activity apears to be an opposiUon party, the Party of thc Independence Congresshich has been variously describedommunist-infiltrated partyrypto-Communlst Party.
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t AttflMm Chief ol Seal tor IweU-gence. Deporlw of tbe Army, lor iho Deportment ol ihe Army
d- AMhlanl Chiel ol No.ul Oporolioruor Ihe Deportmenl of Ihe
e. Mmlont Ch.el ol Stofl, Intelligence. USAF. lor lhe Deportmenl of
Director for Inlelbgenee, Joint Stofl, for the Joint Slot)
of Intelligence. AEC, 'or thenergy
Director, FBI, for the Federol lureou of otiori
ctor ol NSA. for the Nolionol Security Agency
|. ireclor for Cenlrol Reference. OA for ony other Deportment or
Thu copy may be retained, or deitroyed by burning in accordance with applicable lecuriiyr returned to the Centra- Intefligento Agency by arrangement with the Oflice ol Central Reference.
When ihii document it ditieminoted ove'tecn, the overtettioy retain ileriod not in eaten of one year. At iSo end af thn period, me document ihould either be deitreyed. relumed to the Ic-worc^ng agency, or per-"iiii.oi ihould be requeued ol the 'orword-ng agency io retain it In accordance -Hh
title of thi* document -Sen uiedfrom tha tent ihovld be clat-
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Notional Security Council Department ol Stole Deportment ol Oof erne Atomic Ene-gy Commiision Federal Bureau of InnuigoiionOriginal document.