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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The Soviet Space Program
Page
THE
CONCLUSIONS
DISCUSSION
I. .AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS TO
IL SOVTET SPACE FLIGHT PROGRAMS
Vertical
Early Unmanned
Lunar
Planetary Probes
Man-in-Space
The "Cosmos"
Soviet Space
III. SUPPORTING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES . 9
Propulsion
Guidance and
Instrumentation
Tracking and
Data
Rendezvous, Docking, and
Life Support
VI. FUTURE OBJECTIVES AND17
Manned Lunar fra
Man-in-Space
Scientific Satellites
Military Goals
The Possibility of International
V. PROBABLE MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVTET23
Implied Costs of the Program to23
Implied Costs of the Future24
Tableoviet Space
Tableossible Chronologyoviet Lunar26
Tablether Possible Soviet Space27
Figurepace Launch Facilities. Tyuratam Missile Test Range
Figureuspect Space Launch Facilities
Figureypical Orbital Paths of Soviet Earth Satellites
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THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM
THE PROBLEM
To evaluate tbe current status of tbe Soviet space program and to estimate its progress over theoears.
CONCLUSIONS
underlying motives of the Soviet leaders inspace program, as for all major programs, are tosecurity of the USSR and to increase its power andadvantages over the US where possible. In makingabout the specific projects to be included in theirSoviet leaders will continue to be guided by such generalas the political and military gains that are likelyfrom particular space accomplishments and theeconomic limitations that determine the range ofWe believe that these considerations, as well asto achieve scientific gains, will incline the Sovietsspace program of much broader scope than in the past,to accomplish spectacular "firsts"
evidence as to the future course of the Sovietis very limited. Our estimates are thereforeon extrapolation from past Soviet space activities andas to likely advances in Soviet technology.
Soviets have recently expanded their unmannedprogram, in part because future Soviet^space missionsa considerable increase in scientific data.will continue to be used to collect data on thespace environment and to test new space componentsfor manned space vehicles. In addition, the Sovietsan unmanned soft landing on the moon or thean unmanned satellite around the moon at any time. They
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will probably continue to launch probes to Mars and Venus. As greater propulsion capabilities are developed, more extensive and complex scientific investigations of interplanetary space will be undertaken. However, the high failure rate in Sovietattempts to date indicates difficulties which may handicap or modify their future program for deep space exploration.
manned space flights are likely in the coursenext few years. Using space systems presently available,will probably begin, within the next year, tosatellites having some maneuverability while in orbitperform rendezvous, docking, and transfer operations.probably undertake manned flights of increasingand couldwo-roan capsule at any time.be technically feasible for the Soviets to put up aspace station orannedsing first-generation ICBM boosters andrendezvous techniques.ilitary booster of aboutpounds thrust becomes available in the next year orbooster could be used to accomplish the same feats in amanner.ultimillion pound thrust spacebeing developed now, the Soviets couldpace station. )
Soviet statements indicaterogram forlunar landing is under way in the USSR, but weconfirmation that it is currently being pursued. Theleaders have not committed themselves publicly to awith the US, and it is highly unlikely that they will dothe prestige attached to the first manned lunarits probable political impact, and its importance forin space, would probably lead the Soviet leadershipunless the cost were considered prohibitive or theto have an insurmountable lead. On the basis ofwe cannot say definitely at this time that thetoanned lunar landing ahead of or in close cora-
-petition with the US, but wc believe the chances arc better than even that thisoviet objective. Given their ability to con-
SECRET
centrute human and material resources on priority objectives, we estimate thattrong national effort the Soviets coulda manned lunar landing in the.)
the basis of evidence presently available, wc aredetermine the existence of Soviet plans or programs foruse of space. The limitations of this evidence,such that our chances of identifying military programsWe believe that the USSR almost certainly isfeasibility of space systems for military support anddefensive weapons. Moreover, it is possible that spacewhich is totally new to human experience, willopportunities for military application. Sovietto develop military space systems will depend oncost and effectiveness as compared withthe political and military advantages which couldand the Soviet estimate of US intentions andcomparable Gelds. We believe that the USSR will producethose military space systems which it finds to beadvantageous in comparison with other types of weaponsequipment. (Paras.
emphasis than heretofore will probably bemilitary applications of space vehicles, both to meetrequirements and to keep pace with militarythe Soviets expect the US to undertake. The firstspace vehicles are likely to be earth satellites usedsupportearly warning (EW),communications, or navigation. We believe thatcould be launched at any time; some recenthave carried out cloud photography and possiblyreconnaissance missions. Other possibledevelopments include an orbital bombardmentand an orbiting satellite inspection system. However,not believe that Soviet space technology has progressedfor the USSR to have made the decision to proceedprograms for offensive or defensive
H. Within this decade, the basic factors of reaction time, targeting flexibility, accuracy, vulnerability, average life, and positive control for an orbital bombardment system almostwill not compare favorably with ICBMs. We believeoviet decision to develop and deploy an orbital bombardment system would depend in large part upon the extent to which these drawbacks can beemonstration of an orbital bombardment satellite could occur at any time, but we believe that in the near term its military effectiveness would be minimal If the Soviets decide to develop an orbital bornbardment force, it would be precededevelopmental system of limited military effectiveness which could appear as early )
L In sum, we estimate that Soviet space efforts in the next decade are likely to include increased man-in-space activity, some military support systems, scientific satellites, interplanetary probes, and lunar exploration. Specific major developments which could occur within the period of the estimate are manned space stations in earth orbits and manned lunar landings. In addition, demonstrations of developmental space weaponsmay occur. We believe that Soviet scientific andcapabilities are adequate to accomplish these objectives. However, this Soviet program will be vastly more expensive than it has in the past. It will be competing directly for the scarce skills and resources also needed in the ICBM, air and missile defense, and economic programs. Nevertheless, wethat the Soviet leaders are committedontinuing space program of sizable proportions as an element of national power and prestige. )
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DISCUSSION
I. AIMS AND ACHIEVEMENTS TO DATE
ong before tbe USSR successfully launched Sputnik J. the Soviets announced that the goal of their space program was manned interplanetary travel The space activity which they have sinceis consistent with this goal, but would also be consistent with other objectives. The announced goal, therefore, sheds very little light on the specific objectives of the Soviet space program.
A review of Soviet space accomplishments to date makes it clear that the USSR has been engagedell-planned, long-term program, heavily emphasizing manned space flight. The political impact of the first Sputnik had great influence on tbe subsequent course ot the program. This initial success probably led the Soviet leadership to allocate resources to the program very generously and led them to seek additional spectacularn some respects subordinating other objectives to cold war objectives. Successful space ventures have been used to support claims of military strength, scientific and technical advancement, and the general superiority of Soviet society.
The Soviet approach has contributed to an impressive record of pioneering achievement over the past five years. The Soviet recordorbiting the world's first earth satellite and by far the heaviest satellites; launching the first vehicle to impact the moon; launching the first vehicle to transfer from earth orbitrajectorylanet; the first successful orbiting and recoveryan; and, most recently, the first concurrent orbital flight and recovery of two manned satellites. These successes represented technical achievements of the first order. They were made possible in large measure by the availability of the first-generation Soviet ICBMeryvehicle using clustered engines to achieve considerably higher thrust than any US booster now operational.
The collection of scientific data by Soviet space vehicles was fairly limited and selectivehere was an apparent lack of systematic and comprehensive in-flight- measurement of the spaceneeded for future space ventures, but this need was at least partly met by US data available to the USSR, primarily through COSPAR Beginning inhe Soviet program was apparently broadened so as to place greater emphasis upon the collection of data on the space environment of the earth. We believe this broaderwas undertaken to remedy whatever weakness in this area might adversely affect Soviet near-term plans for space exploration.
"he Soviets almost certainly have investigated the feasibility of developing space systems for military and perhaps economic purposes.
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We have no flrm evidence that the Soviets have launched any space vehicles specifically for military purposes, but their space experiments have produced information which would be useful in the development of military space systems. At least the initial testing of such systems would probably be conducted under the guise of scientific experiments. Despite the absence of specific intelligence, therefore, we believe that the Soviets could be proceeding actively to develop space systems for reconnaissance, surveillance, and other military purposes. Some of the Soviet developmental work could also have commercial applications, as in communications satellites.
II. SOVIET SPACE RIGHT PROGRAMS' Vertical Firing*
space exploration began9 with verticalto Investigate near-earth space and the effects of thaton biological subjects. The purposes of these firingsatmosphere research, photographing the earth's cloud cover,biology, 'flic firstaltitudes of aboutauticalinvolved the collection of geophysicaleries of geophysical and biological experimentswith vertical firings to.sed as specimens in tests of sealed cabins, pressure suits,methods, and re-entry techniques. The data obtained in thevertical firings contributed directly to the development ofequipment and recovery techniques for Soviet manned
Earl/ Unmanned Satellites *
I. and III. launched7eresatellites designed to collect geophysical data onand to provide some biological data. After these threelaunchings until the spring2 were devoted to lunarexploration, and particularly to the man-ln-space program.
Lunar Exploration
than vertical firings, the only Soviet spice9 were those related to lunar exploration. Lunikwas launched in January,ear miss, and wentorbit. Lunik II successfully impacted on the moon inof these flights provided some data on the nature of spacethe earth und the moon. Three weeks later the Sovietssent Lunik Tilircumlunar flight and obtained theof the hidden side of the moon. Inhe Soviets
a tabular summary of Soviet apace flights lo date, nn Tut>lr> l,
launched another lunar vehicle which failed to reach the moon. Since this flight the Soviets have made no further attempts to launch atoward the moon. Although the Soviets have achieved some"firsts" In their lunar program, there haveumber of failures, estimated at aboutercent of the launchings attempted.
PI an dory Probes
favorable opportunity torobe to Mars occurredfallnd to Venus inn0 thetwice unsuccessful in launching probes toward Mars.he Soviets failed in an attempt toenus probeVII They succeeded later in tbe month with Sputniklost contact with the probe early in its flight, and thus failedtheir major scientific objectives. The next favorablea Venus shot occurred in the summern latethe Soviets made three attempts torobe toeach case. Ihcy succeeded inatellite In parkingalfunction of the fourth stage, failed to launch tbeVenus. Theyimilar failure in attemptinga Mars probe from an orbiting satellite in October.ovember, but failed in yet another attemptovember.
Man-in-Space
major emphasis of the Soviet space program has beenmanned space flight0 three heavy satellites. Sputniks IV.VI. were orbited for the purpose of checking out such designas stabilization and control, life support equipment,and re-entry and recovery. In addition.arriedvariety of biological specimens. Sputniks IXere prototype tests, probably simulating In allfirst inan-ln-space shot except that the passenger In each casedog. Two weeks biter came the flight of Major Gagarin in Vostokrecoveryingle orbit around the earth. In AugustTitov In Vostok II remained aloft more thanoursrbits around the earth. After the Titov flight, theno more manned snots forear.
his program was resumed onhen Major Nikolayev was orbited in Vostok m. and aboutours later. Lt. Col. Popovich followed in Vostok IV. The two were brought downfter somerbits inours, and Popovich afterrbits inours. We believe that the Soviets attempted to put the two satellites into nearly identical orbits. They were able to orbit the space ships in close proximityt one point, after which the distance between them widened.
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or decking maneuvers1 were not attempted, norbelieve that they were even contemplated. However, orbitingat tbe same time and in nearly identical orbital planes isfirst step to the development of such techniques, and isimpressive achievement in itself. The long duration of theenabled the Soviets to acquire extensive physiologicaldata. This achievement attests to the reliability ofspace boosters, guidance equipment, life support systems, andtechniques. However, we do not believe that theserepresent any startling advance or breakthrough in Sovietor technology, or that any hew space equipment orinvolved.
The "Cosmos" Series
Latehe Sovietsew series of space launchings, the unmanned "Cosmos" series, with the stated purpose of collecting astrophysical and geophysical data, and of testing satellite structures. The first two launchings were unsuccessful. Sinceotal of II "Cosmos" satellites have been successfullyfromYarrom Tyuratam. Our evidence on the "Cosmos" series indicates that two programs are involved.
The satellites launched from Kapustin Yar have transmitted data on near-earth space compatible with the Soviet claimcientific collection effort, probably including data on nuclear tests. This effort probably reflects, at least inoviet desire to maintain theof the USSReading scientific nation. Tbe vehicles have an estimated payloadounds, indicating the useooster smaller than the first-generationhey have all been orbited at aangle of inclination.
The "Cosmos" satellites launched from Tyuratam appear to have been primarily associated with the man-in-space program.ICBM boosters were employed to put Vostok type vehicles (weighing0 pounds) into orbitngle of mclination. These vehicles were later recovered. The first twoserved to check out equipment and collect data for flights ofnd IV. Q
as used in this estimate, rendezvous Is the operation of modifying tbe orbit or trajectory of one ot more space vehicles, for the purpose of bringing and maintaining them la close proximity. This operation requires some maneuvering while In orbit. In contrast to co-orbitlng by precise launching of tbe second vehicle. By docking Is meant tbe establishmenthysical contact between two orbiting vehicles, and byeant the physical movement ofequipment from one orbiting vehicle to another.
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ever, we do not know the contents of the recovered capsules; their size and payload capabilities would have permittod other missions.
Soviet Space Failures
The USSR has announced the successful launching ofpace vehicles and has never admitted to any launcliing failures. However, surveillance of Tyuratam and Kapustin Yar Range space operationsatio of failures to total launching; on the orderhepace effort has achieved the highest degree of success, with only two failures occurring duringunchings. Neither of these failuresanned vehicle. In contrast, the lunar and interplanetary programs haveery high failureto be aboutercent. The many failures to launch interplanetary probes from parking orbitow reliability for the injection stage. Lunar mission failures appear to be attributable to defects in the upper stage propulsion system. Tbe Injection systems have all had difficulty early in their development, but these difficulties have now been overcome with the exception of those In the planetarystage. These latter difficulties, which have persisted for the past two years, may handicap or modify the future Soviet program for deep space exploration.
In addition to launching failures, the Soviets have been forced to cancel oc postpone launchings, and some of the space vehicles which were successfully launched had component malfunctions.as probably intended to bit the moon, but missed. The deorblting systems contained in Sputniks xv and VI failed to function successfully. Commuriicalions with Vexuk II were lost shortly after its successful launch towards Venus. Each of these launchings was publicizeduccess, although each probably failed to achieve the majority of its planned objectives.
III. SUPPORTING SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL CAPABIlfTIES
'In csUmattneaUute rate.have counted aa failures onlyhich art actual launching occurred bul the vehicle ru lost or destroyed by malfunction, or. In the case of planetary probes, an earthas acblt?cd but the lilt ttace failed to Inject into planetary trajectory
its inception, the USSR's space program has beento its military missile program. The two programs havesame boosters and launching facilities, and are mutuallyin other respects as well. We believe that many of theand technicians who are working on apace projects arein the Soviet missile program. According tos one large team in Russia that handles all space projects.key men are hi charge of guidance, tracking, and othereach of the projects. Itery large team and it can well take
care of several projects Ine have no distinction between military and civilian projects."
The Soviet apace effort appears to be well-programed andThe group responsible for coordination at the national level has not been identified. We believe that initially the Interagencyfor Interplanetary Communications, headed byedov. was charged with prime responsibility for Soviet space programs, including their coordination and control, but its functions have apparently been curtailed. More recently, there are indications that the Soviet space program may be directedtate Commission, possibly chaired by D. F. Ustinov, reporting directly to the Council of Ministers. Thisis probably responsible for the selection and planning of specific missions, for budget allocation, and for evaluation of results. Below this level, responsibility for the design, development, and fabrication of space vehicles is probably assigned to the State Committee for Defense Technology. Scientific support for the program is centralized in tbe Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Medical Sciences, which are also probably responsible for the design and development of certain supporting systems such as life support apparatus.
Official secrecy has prevented the identification of moreew of the key personalities in the Soviet space program, but their achievements leave little doubt that many men who occupy the first rank in Soviet science and technology are involved in tbe Soviet space effort. The announcement of awards tongineers, scientists, and technicians for developing the Vostok indicateserynumber of personnel is involved directly in space projects. We have not been able to determine tbe total manpower employed in the space program or to identify all of the scientific and technicalInvolved. These tasks are further complicated by the intermingling of the space program with the missile program
of the major facilities involved In the Soviet spacehave been identified. These include tracking facilities, theand Kapustln Tar testocket engine plantissile airframe development center (Plantta space flight training installation at Tomolino nearalso develops life support and safetyndKurornoch static engine test complex near Kuybyshev. Exceptall of these are also heavily engaged in the Soviet missileWe believe that most ot the facilities engaged In the spaceremain to be Identified Moreover, supporting the work ofcomplexesast number of institutes,hich togetherarge portion of thetechnical resources of the USSR.
' For space launch facilities at these test ranees, seend 2.
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We believe that Soviet capabilities in the basic and appliedare adequate to support an ambitious space program for the nextears. This judgment ii based on Soviet space achievements to date, andomprehensive review and evaluation of current and probable future capabilities in the major fields of science directlyto the space program. Pertinent Soviet scientific capabilities are considered at least adequate in most cases and are improving in all fields.ew fields the Soviets are considered to be outstanding,in lunar, ionospheric, physiological, and mathematical research.
The USSR is enlarging and improving its conventionalprogram and facilities with meat emphasis on astronomical and astrophysical subfields of value to the space program, including celestial mechanics, moon and planet Investigations, solar research, and meteorites. The Soviet radio astronomy program, which hasfor improved deep space tracking and communications, in addition to its utilityowerful scientific research tool, has reached large proportions and is being pursued and expanded vigorously.
In recent years the Soviets have also greatly expanded theirprograms and ground-based facilities and haveumber of investigations of the upper atmosphere and space designed to determine the environment for future space flights as well as for basic research Important to long-distance communications and other practical development. Soviet capabilities for investigating all types of radiation, interplanetary matter, the ionosphere, and magnetic fields in space are improving and should keep pace with the growing needs of the space program. Moreover, tbe Soviets are also closely following US developments in these areas.
We have found evidence of Soviet deficiencies inew of the scientific fields which directly support the space effort: meteorltic studies, organic chemistry, and glass fiber research. In each of these areas, the Soviets areetermined effort to overcome their handicaps by concentrating their efforts on the pertinent scientific problems and by exploiting foreign research. We know of no scientific weaknesses that are likely to be limiting factors on future Soviet programs.
Difficulties in the Soviet space program are more likely to arise from technological than from scientific limitations Requirementsmore demanding than were dictated by the early needs of military rocketry must be met in confronting the future challenge in space. Such missions asarge space station or manned lunar flight will be far more complex, expensive; and demanding than past Soviet spac- achievements.
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Propulsion Systems
The first-generation ICBM (termed Category "A" andy US Intelligence) has been the workhorse of the Soviet space program to date. This reliable, powerful booster, with an estimated sea level thrustounds, has enabled the Soviets to orbit the heaviest earth satellites Employedowerful upper-stage propulsion unit, il has enabled the USSR to place0 pounds into orbit at an altitude ofiles. Additional spectacular "firsts" such as the orbiting of two meningle capsule are still within the capabilities of this booster system, and it will probably be used in various space activities for the next few years.
A new two-stage Soviet ICBM (termed Category "C" ory US Intelligence) has been observed in flight testing on the Tyuratam range for moreear. We have been unable to determine the size or thrust of this vehicle. It Is possible that it is considerably smaller than the first-generation ICBM, and that Ithrust ofounds. Alternative calculations suggest that it islarger,hrust as highillion pounds.
If thesarge vehicle, we believe that the Soviets are developing yet another ICBM to deliver very large payioads of upT yield, and that they will begin test-firing the new vehicle within the next year oreasonable range for the thrustew ICBM booster capable ofT payioads is one to one-and-one-half million pounds. Faculties at Tyuratam already exist to accommodate boosters of this size.
ooster would allow the USSR toumber of space missions which are beyond the capability of the first-generation ICBM booster. Heavier planetary probes could be launched, facilitating unmanned planetary exploration. It could also be used tor docking and transfer operations involving heavier weights of men and material. Ifooster becomes available within the next year or so, it could be used for the establishmentanned space station oranned clrcumlunar flight somewhat earlier thanate estimated for these accomplishmentswtimiliion pound thrust space booster (see.
The heavier payload requirements of some of the spectacular space missions which might be undertaken within theoears will require boosters with thrusts ot several million pounds. The USSR will probably attempt to achieve such thrusts by clustering several engines. We believe that for this purpose the Soviets wouldingle engineinimumounds thrust. The single engine
- thrust estimated for known Soviet propulsion systems or for moremilitary boosters would be too small.
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ur evidence docs not indicate whether the Soviets have begun static testingarge single engine suitable for use as the building blockultimilUon pound thrust propulsion system. However, considering Soviet requirements, their capabilities in this field, and the limited evidence, we estimate that flight testingew large engine could begin at any time. Unless the Soviets plan toingle engineooster for space missions, it is possible that single engine flight testing would be omitted. In either case, we believe that an engine clusterotal of several million pounds of thrust could be initially test flown in
lustered booster could subsequently be combined with suitable upper stages to support Soviet development of long-lived manned earth satellites for use as space stations and observatories. It would permit the Soviets to place0 tons in near-earth orbit, either for use aspace station ortepanned lunar flight. Any delay in the development ofulumilbon pound booster would result in corresponding delays in advanced space programs.
New Upper Stages. The development of unproved upper stages Is also indispensable to successful accomplishmentanned lunar landing. There is no evidence that the Soviets have undertaken the development of upper stages which utilize high-energy propellants. However, they almost certainly are investigating the advantages of higher specific impulse fuels for use in future propulsion systems. The specific impulse generated by the oxygen-amine fuels now in use could be Increased by about one-third with oxygen-hydrogen or fluorine-hydrogen. We believe that the Soviets could begin test launches of an oxygen-hydrogen system at any time, andluorine-hydrogen system ineriod Upper stages of these types, when employed with theooster, could increase its payload capacity for near-earth satellites toounds. For manned lunaroperations, the Soviets probably would combine these advanced upper stages with new, large boosters (see
ater time period, perhaps toward the end of the present decade, the Soviets could probablyuclear-hydrogen powered upper stage available for first flight tests.ystem could produce more than twice the specific impulse ot present fuels, and would befor orbiting very heavy payioads, for deep space probes, and farmissions.
The Soviets are actively engaged in the Investigation of electric propulsion systems for advanced upper stage vehicles.he USSR will probably have an electric propulsion device capable ofhrust_ofpound.evice could be usedin orientation control systems for the proper positioning ot antennas or optic systems, or to prevent orbit decay of long-lived vehicles
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from atmospheric drag. Systems capable of thrusts up to one pound could be available ineriod. These systems would be relatively heavy, and for this reason they would be confined to specialized uses such as deep space probes during the period of this estimate.
Guidance and Recovery
oviet space operations to date have been planned so as to make repeated use of established ground equipment and methods for guidance, control, and recoveryAll satellites launched from Tyuratammall fractionngle of inclination to the Equator. Thus, only minor alterations in techniques and coordination of facilities have been necessary for the various types of orbital missions accomplished to date. The launching of all "Cosmos" satellites from Kapustin Yar at an approximateangle of inclination to the Equator also has facilitated standardization of operations. Space operationsother orbits will require addition or relocation ot rangeand guidance equipment We believe that the Soviets could do this at any time.
Soviet space vehicles launched from Tyuratam have thus far used the basic first-generation ICBMradio-inertialduring the boost phase. Although the Soviets have an all-inertialoperational with their missiles, they may choose to continue with the radio-incrtlal system for space ventures. The Vostok recoverable vehicles probably used an earth fixed reference system using optical and gyroscopic sensors. In addition, the manned Vostoksystem which enabled the pilot to assume control at will. The system has so faratellite under only one set of conditions of time and place. The evidence does not indicate whether the system as designed could perform in any more generalized situations.
orientation system used in orbiting and recovery ofhas probably been adopted for the earth orbit portion ofprobe operations. Although Soviet tracking appearsaccurately defining the spatial location of the vehicle, theorientation required for fully successful Mars or Venus probesbeyond the capabilities of an earth fixed reference system. Weevidence that the Soviets haveystem based onor stellar attitude control.
Instrumentation
Soviets have competent scientists and engineers in thefield, but they do not have enough to provide theof instruments and the number of refinements desirable for
For typleal orbital paths of Soviet earth satellites, aee Figure
some advanced scientific space programs. By closely loUowlng Western developments In the field of instrumentation and by concentrating Bloc resources on priority programs, the Soviets have been able to meet the needs of then- space programs. They will probably be able to provide the instrumentation adequate for the space ventures which could be undertaken in the period of this estimate.
Tracking ond Communications
The chief limitation on Soviet capabilities for tracking andwith space vehicles Is the lacklobal tracking network capable of continuous observation and communications with satellites and space probes. Facilities in the USSR are adequate to determine the initial trajectoryigh degree of accuracy. To extend theircapability, the Soviets rely on specially instrumented ships,to some degree the lack of land facilities However, the value of these ships is limited, because of the dlfQculty of accurately determining their positions. Thus far. Soviet capabilities in this field have been generally adequate for the missionsthey have probably to some extent shaped those missions.
The Soviets haveapability for tracking anddata to lunar distances, but they were less successful with the deep space shot to Venuso date, we do not know the degree of success they are experiencing with the Mars probe launched lAlthough they can probably overcome the communicationsexperienced with the Venus probe, they have not yetracking system with the sophistication necessary for deep spaceTracking stations in other hemispheres wouldajor aid to mid-course guidance and to achieving better terminal accuracy. There is evidence that the USSR Is seeking to acquire sites for space tracking stations in Chile. Indonesia. Africa, and Australia.
A major element in tracking, control, and communications la the provision of adequate power supplies for the space vehicles themselves. Soviet space vehicles have notapability for sustained communications over long periods of time. We believe, however, that this apparent weakness can be overcome. In addition to improvements likely in solar batteries and other power sources, the Soviets probably are developing nuclear-power sources for use in space vehicles. In the near future, they couldeactor-type power supply with an output of several hundred watts.4 output could be Increased toilowatts, andt could possibly be further Increasedactor
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Data Processing
Advanced data processing techniques are required for the rapid detennination of orbits and trajectoriesarge number ofof space vehicles. The ability of the Soviets to process data for such missions as re-entry and extra-terrestrial launches from parking orbit indicates that high performance computers are beingropaganda film on the Titov flight revealed that an advanced Soviet digital computer, capable0 arithmetic operations per second, was employed in space-track computations and data handling-Computers of lesser performance are probably used for prelaunchand other operations where speed is not so vital.
The Soviets will probably continue to seek Increased computer reliability and speed of operation, and will seek to reduce size, weight, and power requirements. The Soviets have in operation at least one computer capable0 operations per second, and are probably developing computers capableperations per second. Ineriod, the Soviets could probably have computers utilizing only solid-state devices capableillion operations per second. In developing computers for space vehicles, they will probably achieve
"'some success in micro-mlnlaturization.
Rendezvous, Docking, ond Transfer
believe that over the next few years the Soviets willexperiments directed toward the development ofand transfer techniques. The recent launching of twointo similar orbits at the same time may haveirst stepdirection. Within about the next year, the Soviets couldrendezvous operations employing space vehicles havingwhile in orbit. Docking operations, which mightan initial demonstration of the transferan from oneto another, could probably be achieved shortly thereafter.to transfer men and materials in quantities sufficient forspace stations, the Soviets would probably require considerable
| experience, heavy satellites,ew large booster.ould probably be achieved in
Life Support Systems
believe that the Soviets nowartially closed-cyclesystem which, with their current payload capability, wouldorbital rnisskms of up toays. With modification ofvehicle, this system could support two menhorter period.
! Missions of overays duration wouldeliable, fullyycle ecological system, capable of supporting more than one man. -L. Barring any unexpectede do not expectevelopment Attainmentapability to orbit larger
payioads would ease some o( ihe present constraints on the size and weight of life support systems, making possible the development or manned space stations. These could serve as orbital laboratories, for obtaining more knowledge of the space environment and for testing life support, navigation, coaununlcauons, and operational techniques.
IV. FUTURE OBJECTIVES AND CAPABIIITIES
It seems clear lhat the underlying motives of the Soviet leaders in planning their future spacein planning for other types of 'nationalto enhance the security of the USSR and to increase its power and prestige, gaining advantages over the US where possible. Tn making decisions about the specific projects to be Included in their future space program, the Soviet leaders will continue to be guided by such general considerations as: the political benefits that are likely to result from particular space accomplishments; themilitary value of the space projects which are considered, planned, or undertaken; and the technical and economic limitations thatthe range of their choices. We believe that these considerations, aa well as the desire to achieve scientific gains, will incline the Sovietsuch broader space program loan in the past. Whether particular projects will be pursued, however, will depend on the Soviet view of their potential contribution to national power and prestige, weighed against the cost of accomplishing them.
Thus far. the space accomplishments which have yieldedpolitical benefits to the USSR have been achieved by exploiting the superiority in propulsion attained In the Soviet missile program. With existing technology and hardware, the Soviets could accomplish several additional feats which still lie beyond US capabilities. As more advanced space systems become available, the range of possibilities for novel space missions will widen. However, with the increasingot future spaoe operations, the accomplishment of spectacular "firsts" will become much more difficult. Their achievement andwill continue to influence Soviet planning, but they will probably be increasingly conceived as partsong-range integrated program.
Our evidence as to the future course of the Soviet space program is very limited Soviet propaganda dealing with future space activities has canvassed the whole range ofOur estimates are therefore based largely on extrapolation from past Soviet spaceand on judgments as to likely advances in Soviet technology. Considering the available evidence and Soviet capabilities, thisprobably willariety of specific objectives. It probably will be characterized by an expansion of man-in-space activities and
by the acquisition of basic scientific information needed for future space missions Greater emphasis than heretofore will probably be
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placed on military applications of space vehicles, both to meet specific Soviet requirements and lo keep pace with military programs which the Soviets expect the US to undertake Unmanned lunar exploration will probably soon be resumed, and interplanetary probes launched when favorable opportunities occur.
Manned lunar Landing
Some Soviet statements indicaterogramanned lunar landing Is under way in tbe USSR, but we have no confirmation that it is currently being pursued. In view of the limitations in our present intelligence collection capabilities,rogram could be well under way in the USSR without our knowledge. Most of the activity uniqueanned lunar program would to date haveof laboratory and ground development preparatory to the night testing of major system components. However, if the Soviets arewith the US, some flight testing clearly associatedanned lunar landing should begin within the next few years. In our view, the minimum time between the first recognizable test flightsanned lunar landing attempt would be about twocould occur if, in its first test flights, the booster were employed with the upper propulsion stages and the lunar landing craft.
The top Soviet leaders have not committed themselves publicly to competition with the US Inanned lunar landing, and it is highly unlikely that they will do so. From their statements, we know that Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders are concerned about the great expense and risks involvedanned lunar program. On the other hand, they almost certainly would expect Soviet prestige and influence to sutler if the USSR failed to engage the US in the race to the moon, or if its program lagged far behind. Moreover, later manned interplanetary operations would be facilitateduccessful manned lunar landing. We think these latter factors would lead the Soviet leadership to compete, unless the cost were consideredor the US seemed to have an insurmountable lead. On the basis of present evidence, we cannot say definitely at this time that the Soviets aim toanned lunar landing ahead of or in close competiUon with the US, but we believe the chances are better than even that lidsoviet objective.
We cannot estimate with confidence the method which the Soviets would employ to accomplish this feat. However, we believe that they are more likely to dispatch the lunar vehicle from an orbiting earth or lunar satellite than toirect flight from the earth. Either approach will require major new vehicle development, facility construction, and supporting activities in many other fields. However, the method to be employed would probably not be apparent until late in the program.
Aii appearance of activities leadingunar landing should provide indications as to the progress ofrogram.2 on, manned satellites, including multimanned vehicles, would be orbited (or the purpose of extending the capability of life support systems, developing radlatlOD shielding, and conducting studies ofBoth manned and unmanned satellites would be used to develop advanced guidance equipment and new re-entry techniques for the higher speeds Involvedeturn flight from the moon. Aamount of unmanned lunar exploration would be required The Soviets may attempt soft landings of instrumented packages on the moon at any time, and unmanned satellites could be placed in orbit around the moon or launchedircumlunar flight. Assuming that we have correctly estimated the dates of availability of multi-million pound thrust boosters and advanced upper stages, the Soviets could accomplish the following: in, they couldland an unmanned mobile exploratory vehicle on theanned circumlunar flight could be achieved;anned satellite could be placed in lunar orbit Ln.
In addition to the space flights requiredunar program. concurrent research and development would be required on propulsion, guidance, and supportinganned lunar landing vehicle as well as the chemical propulsion stages required to take off from the moon must also be developed. Finally, the expansion of groundfacilities will probably continue over the next several years. Given their ability to concentrate human and material resources on priority objectives, we estimate thattrong national effort tbe Soviets couldanned lunar Landing in the
Man-in-Spoce
believe that there willonsiderable Increase inactivity. Within about the next yeur the Sovietsbegin to employ manned satellites having somewhile in orbit, to perform rendezvous, docking, and transferThey will probably undertake mannedflights ofand couldwo-man Vostok capsule at any time.it is technically feasible to putmall mannedanned circumlunar flightsingICBM boosters and earth-orbit rendezvous techniques. If abooster ofillion pounds thrust becomes available inyear or so. this booster could be used to accomplish the samea less complex manner.ultimillion pound thrust space booster
abular summary of tbe accomplishments believed lo be consistent with such an effort, see Table. For other possible Soviet space missions, see Table.
- ll i
is being developed now, the Soviets could0 ton manned space station.
Soviets may attempt manned circumlunar and lunarflights In connectionanned lunar landing program,such flights would not be essential to accomplish theis possible that such flights would be undertaken even if alanding were not planned. Although many similarbe involved, these ventures would be considerably lessterms of propulsion and the other requirementsandingMoreover, if the Soviets should conclude that the USthe manned lunar landing competition, they might reasonSoviet manned lunar flights without landings wouldthe US triumph. Similar considerations would apply toultimanned space station.
Scientific Satellites
Soviets will continue to conduct scientific experimentsThey will do this to enhance their capability in spaceprovide some data for the world scientific community, and towhich they believe will not be available to them fromjoint programs. Because the US scientific satellite program isand Its results widely distributed, the Soviet programcontinue to be smaller than the US program. While theprogram probably serves basic scientific objectives. It ismuch of this effort will be in support of more specific futurethe lunar program and possible military supportwill probably continue to launch probes to Mars andgreater propulsion capabilities are developed, more extensivescientific investigations of interplanetary space will be
Military Goals
the basis of evidence presently available, we are unablethe existence of Soviet plans or programs for theof space. The limitations of this evidence, however, are suchchances of identifying military programs are poor. Wethe USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility offor military support and offensive and defensiveit Is possible that space exploration, which is totallyhuman experience, will offer unforeseen opportunities forSoviet decisions to develop military space systemson their expected cost and effectiveness as compared with alter-
mm i
native systems, the political and military advantages which could be gained, and the Soviet estimate of US intentions and capabilities in comparable fields. We believe that the USSR will produce and deploy those military space systems which it finds to be feasible andin comparison with other types of weapons and military
Military Support Systems. We believe that the first Sovietspace vehicles arc likely to be earth satellites used in variousroles. We do not believe that the Soviets have as yet launched geodetic, communications, or navigation satellites for military purposes. Since they have had the capability to accomplish some of thesefor some time and apparently have not done so, they probably have felt no pressing requirement in these fields. However, the Soviet views on requirements probably are now changing. The recovered satellites in the "Cosmos" series probably accomplished cloudand could have performed photographic, electronic, and nuclear reconnaissance, at least experimentally. In addition, one "Cosmos" satellite launched from Kapustin Yar probably monitored the radiationoviet nuclear test in space.
Soviet scientists and military experts almost certainly recognize that earth satellitesreater potential than conventionalfor some forms of reconnaissance, early warningeather surveillance, and communications. In view of the US ICBM threat, we believe that an EW satellite isost pressing requirement in this field. The Soviets may also develop reconnaissance satellites. Although their intelligence on deployment of fixed US targets Isadequate, such satellites could provide some useful information on certain mobile forces and could perform poststrike reconnaissance. Targeting requirements may also lead the Sovietseodetic space program. However, this would require Improvements in trackingand the establishment of tracking facilities outside of the Soviet Bloc, particularly in the Southern Hemisphere. The Soviets may also develop navigation satellites to improve the effectiveness of their missile submarine forces, as well as communications satellites.
Space Weapons. There is no evidence that the Soviets aresystems for space warfare, but they are almost certainlythe feasibility of such systems, and they arelose watch on US developments in this field. Soviet military writings and public statementsrowing concernilitary threat from space, and imply that US developments cannot be safely ignored by the USSR. However, we do not believe that Soviet space technology has progressed sufficiently for the Soviets to have made the decision to proceed with large scale programs for offensive or defensive space weapons
Offensive Weapon Systems. The Soviets have the capability to develop an orbital bombardment satellite and might decide to launch andpace weapon at an early date for propaganda or politicalemonstralion ofatellite could occur at any time, but we believe that in the near term its military effectiveness would be minimal.
Within this decade the basic factors of reaction time, targeting flexibility, accuracy, vulnerability, average life, and positive control for an orbital bombardment system almost certainly will not comparewith ICBMs. We believeoviet decision to develop and deploy an orbital bombardment system would depend in large part upon the extent to which these drawbacks can be overcome. II the Soviets decide to develop an orbital bombardment force, it would be precededevelopmental system of limited military effectiveness which could appear as early
SUtements by the aircraft designer Mikoyan indicateuborbital vehicle,ikoyan has stated that boosters can easily be developed or adapted for launchthat trajectories would be in the upper atmospherend that the "Cosmoplane" wouldurther development of supersonic aircraft. The military attractiveness ofystem stems from the rccoverability of the vehicle and the many purposes to which it can be put. As compared with an orbital bombardment vehicle, it provides increased accuracy, positive control, and greater reliability. We have no evidence of research and development on this vehicle, but assuming that it is now underrototype could be tested
Defensive Weapon Systems We believe that the USSR willa capability to counter reconnaissance satelbtes Surface-launched nonorbiting missiles are the simplest approach to the neutralization problem, and the most likely to be used by the Soviets throughout this decade. Byystem using radar and passive tracking facilities, missiles, and warheads from existing defensive systems, they might be able to intercept US satellites now. and they wouldapability to do so within the next year or so.
The Soviets may be developing orbiting systems for antisatellite employment.4 the Soviets couldendezvous techniqueonmaneuvering satellite forore sophisticated system with an inspection, neutralization and damage assessment capability could be achieved later in theore complexdesigned toingle satellite against multiple targets for any purpose would take considerably longer to accomplish.
The Possibility of International Cooperation
Economic pressures and the broader range of the US spacewill tend to make International cooperation attractive to the USSRumber of areas, but political and military considerations willlimit Soviet participation In joint space ventures. There may be cooperation Ln such fields as weather satellites, and possibly other selected satellite programs. However, the political prestige at stakeunar race is likely to preclude cooperation in this area, even though it is by far the most costly of the possible new programs.
The Soviets wouldignificant degree of Internationalonly if the economic burden of their space program becomes so heavy that this program or key economic and military programs were jeopardized. Under such conditions the Soviets would preferto competing unsuccessfully or at toorice. Prior tonegotiations the Soviets would probably try to achieve some spectacular successes so as to maximize their bargaining position and to appear as the nation making major concessions.
V.E MAGNITUDE OF THE SOVIET EFFORT
Implied Costs of the Program to Date
The Soviets have done much to make their space program as economical as possible. They have kept unique vehicle development and facility costsinimum by utilizing military hardware and facilities as much as possible. Their payload instrumentation has not required costly miniaturization and has been less varied than that of US payioads. They have concentratedimited number of major space missions, and the total number of launches has been only about one-third that of the US. Nonetheless, the cost of the Soviet space program has been very great, and it has required the use of largeof scarce resources and hardware.
We have no Soviet data on the cost of their space program. In view of the differences in technology and operational philosophy, it Ls difficult to estimate an equivalent dollar cost even for the part of the Soviet program which is clearly visible and* uniquely space-related,he vehicles and payioads actuallyigure0 million toillion iseasonable niinimum (produced-in-the-US) cost for the vehicles and payioads launched as ofther costs, such as research and development, provision of supporting facilities and equipment, and astronaut training, cannot be estimated in detail, but we believe that their addition would resultotal expenditure on the order of at5 billion. It the Sovietsanned lunar landing program which hastage somewhat comparable to the US program, we estimate that it would have required by
an additional expenditure on the orderillion. This wouldthe cost to date oruJUmiluOn pound booster for flight testigh energy upper stages, lunar reconnaissance systems, advanced manned spacecraft, and associated technology and faculties.
Implied Costs of the future Program
We believe that the Soviet leaders are committedontinuing space program of sizable proportions as an element of national power and prestige. Although the Soviet program to date has not been inexpensive, the feasible space missions envisioned for the future will be vastly more expensive and more demanding in terms of both skills and resources. Moreover, the Soviet space program will be competing directly for the scarce skills and resources also needed in the ICBM, air and missileand economic programs. Thus, we believe that more than ever before the future course of the Soviet space program will reflect the impact of economic considerations.
A manned lunar landing is probably the most ambitious and costly goal in space which the Soviets might undertake durings. If the Soviets undertake manned lunar landingew of thespace projects within their capabilities, the produced-in-US cost would probably be on the order ofillion per year. Ii they shouldidely varied program, annual outlays would be on the order ofillion. From the Soviet point of view, expenditures ofoillion per year,the most advanced technology which the USSR can provide, could not occurore inconvenient time. The burden of mili tary programs has slowed the growth of the investment programnd this burden will probably not lessen for several years. The allocation of large quantities of highest quality resources to lunar, planetary, and military space programs would have even more serious effects on the investment program.
In light of these considerations, we believe that the Soviets will seek to limit the costs of their space program, and yet accomplish the major objectives they consider to be of greatest national importance. We think that for the next decade these objectives are likely to include increased man-in-space activity, some military support systems,satellites, interplanetary probes, and lunar exploration. Specific major developments which could occur within the period of the estimate are manned space stations in earth orbits and manned lunar landings. In addition, demonstrations of developmental space weapon systems mayhe cost of such an effort, while very large, would likely fall towards the low side of the annual rangeillion.
TABLE I
SPACE VEHICLES (Current o*)
ORBITAL PERIOD
Sputnik 1
PpUtolk 11
II
UhA I
Lunik III
Sputnik IV SlMitiWk vVI
Sputnik VII (Vettik I)
Sputnik VIII (Veriik U) Sputnik IX Sputnik X
Sputnik XI {Vottot; I)IIII) Sputnik XIIIputnik XIV (Coora II) Sputnik XV (CttoUH III) Sputnik XVI (Cosmos IV)Sputnik XVJI (Cosmo* VJ Sputnik XVIII (Cosmo- VI) Sputnik XIX (Cctnn VII) -
xxno
XXI (Votok IV) Sputnik XXII (Co*rno* VIII) Sputnik XXIIIik no XXIV(Vcoik IV)
xxv (iwk v)
XXVI (CosnmfvUk XXVII (Coimc X) -Sputnik XXVin (Cm XI) Sputoik XXIX Sputnik XXX (Mors I) Sputnik XXXI
JUJMARKS
snuery Decoyed80 Liner probe fiO" in sotorLtmr9
Circuit*lunar
nbout02 Itnuvored0 Destroyed onecern-
0 Ruled to Uuoen Venus
Decoyed1robe toward Venus1 Rcc-wrcd1 fuwvtro!11 Dturrd2 New Jo enrth orbit Now in enrth orbit Covered2 Nowerth orbit7252 Recovered7
Now inifb
Venus probe failure Venut probe failure Vent* probe failure2 Reoorered2 Neorrooe fiiijre Lnunehfd probesr* probe failure
referf pnyloed.
- Soviet* bsve rwt naoounced pnylond neigbU of "Cowaon" ncriej inuUiin Pnylond weigbta for tbis eerie* ore estimated,
from TyuroUm. AB olbnr "Coemoo" oettUitn* hnre been Uuoched from KnpusUo Yor.
TABLE ?
POSSIBLE CHRONOLOGYOVIET LUNAR PROGRAM
We have estimated the chances as better than even that the Soviets will attempt toanned lunar landing ahead of or in close competition with the US, and we believe thattrong national effort they could accomplish this feat. The following table estimates approximate dates for specificrequired for Soviet achievementanned lunar landinghich we regard as the earliest possible date- All of the dates estimated except those for astrophyslcal studies are predicated on the development and use of equipment specifically designed for the manned lunar landing mission.
4 67
Astrophyslcal Studies
Systematic radiation and meteor!x
Systematic lunar exploration'x
Flight Test ol Propulsion Systems
Large singler better)*
Large booster (cluster of single engines)
High energy upper stage
Development of propulsion for:
change of
eartO landing retrosystem
lunar uwitmp retrosystem arid takeoff
Flight Test ot Lunar Spacecraft in
Establishment of Cong-Range
Rendezvous, Docking, and Transfer Wsing Large Clustered Booster)
Synchronous launch
Rendezvous of
Docking and transfer of men and
Flight Test of Guidance
Ejection guidance
Mid-course, terminal, and re-entry
Earth Re-entry At Lunar Return Speed
3 * S 6 7
Final Preparatory Mate
Manned x
Manned lunar satellite x
Manned FtloM lo Moon. Landing, and
Return
' There it evidence of limited acUvlUes In these Gelds Lunar exptoraUon would Include unmanned soft landings, unmanned eareumJunar flights, and ocma/ined lunar satellites.
"There is some evidence suggesting italic testing
'These missions are not believed to be essential toanned lunar landing, but might be undertaken oa system tests or to achieve"firsts."
TABLE 3
OTHER POSSIBLE SOVIET SPACE MISSIONS
We have estimated that the chances are better than even that the Soviets willanned lunar landing ahead of or In close competition with the US. In addition, the Soviets will probably undertake other programs including scientific satellites, military support satellites, and interplanetary probes. This table lists space missions estimated to be within Soviet capabilities, but we do not believe that all these missions could be accomplished within the time periods indicated. If the Soviets are not committedunar race with the US. other programs will probably receive greater emphasis.
DATE
UNMANNED SATELLITES
Space Science Operation!'
Magnetic measurement
Radiation measurement
Study of electromagnetic<
Study of upper
tudy of
2 on
Later In decade
rbital astronomical observatory
HOllaryerni
Early warning satellite
Reconnaissance
efensive space weapons systems *
nspection of single nonmaneurenngill More sophisticated satellite with Inspection, neu initiation, and damage assessmentffensive space weapons systems
(i) Demonstration of orbital bombardment1 Developmental system of limited cffecUveness
. srxriET-
DATK
UNMANNED SATEJJJTKS (Continued)
Commercial or Military Application
Meteorological satellites
COuunurilcaUons satellites
Geodetic satellite*
NavigaUoo satellite*
KAN-IN-SPACE
Manned Earth Orbital Flights
Orbit of muitimanned spacecraft
Rendezvous and
(J) Demonstrationday life support
ransfer of man from gne space vehicle to another
Manned
Wanned Lunar Flights
UNMANNED LUNAR AND PLANETARY EXPLORATION
Circumlunar, Lunar Satellite, Lunar2 on
Probe* to Mana
Probes ta More
of data is also performed by manned satellites.
this decade, tbe Sonets are most likely to use surface-launched missiles to neutralize enemy satellites However, orbiting systems may be developed for Inspection, damage assessment, and neutralization.
' Demonstration for pro pug an Oa or political reasons could occur at aoy time, but military eRectlrcoess vould be minimal.
'These estimates are based on the availabilityultimillion pound spaee booster. If the OSSRrsvgeneratlon ICBM booster orilitary booster of about onealf million pounds should become available In the neat year ormall manned space stationanned circumlunar flight could be achieved.
present propulsion systems, payioads could not Include necessarysystems. These events are more likely loen moreboosters and upper stages become available, possibly In the neat year or so
Election of Vehicle from
Original document.
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