BLOC ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

Created: 1/10/1963

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The following intelligence organizations participated in thm preparation of this estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organizations of theof State, Dafenie, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and NSA.

Concurring:

Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of Stale Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army

Auiitant Chief of Naval Operation!epartment of the Navy

Auiitont Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF

Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff

Director of the Notional Security Agency

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

Bloc Economic and Military Assistance Programs

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

THE PROBLEM 1

SCOPE

L COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

IL CHARACTERISTICS OF BLOC AID

EFFECTIVENESS IN

IMPACT ON THE UNDERDEVELOPED

V. FACTORS AFFECTING THE FUTURE COURSE OF THEU

ANNEX A: Total Bloc Economic Aid to Underdeveloped Countries

ANNEX B: Estimated Value ol Bloc Military Assistance to Non-Bloc Countries

ANNEX C: Major Bloc Arms and Military Equipment, by

BLOC ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

THE PROBLEM

To evaluate Bloc economic and military assistance to thecountries and to estimate future developments.

SCOPE NOTE

We do not consider in this estimate programs of assistance tn Communist countries. "We nave accordingly omitted the Bloc program of aid to Cuba. At its outset, this program was in some respects of the same nature as those for other underdeveloped countries outalde the Bloc. With the establishmentpecial political relaUonship between Castro and the Bloc, however, aid to Cuba soon took on much the same character as aid among Blocn addition, we have concentrated upon the assistance programs of the USSR and the European Satellites, and deal only briefly with aid extended by Communist China.

CONCLUSIONS

loc foreign aid programs ln underdeveloped countries over the past nine years have achieved the Initial objectives of

'Bloctoiscussed In:be Situation andIn, -Tb. Military Buildup Inated IB;Castro* SubveisiTe Capa-bBtfej In Latinated flt will also be discussed In, "Potable Developments with Respect toehedJled lor early tnia year.

NOTE: The Economic Intelligence Committee provide* regular (actual report-ins oi significant developments ln Bloc economic relations with underdeveloped BDOUea Theae are provided ln bi-weekly reports and semi-annual compilations (Theeries and theeries. reipocUvely).

gaining entry to these countries, breaking the Western monopoly of political influence, and greatly raising Bloc prestige. They have established the image of the USSRreat power which is willing and able to come to the aid of the newly independent countries and to provide an alternative to dependence on the West. They have provided the Bloc with some opportunity to exert influence over the policies of the recipients and have helped to increase the general effectiveness of Soviet foreign policy.)

B. The results of the programs, however, have in many cases been less satisfactory than the Bloc probably expected. The Bloc has not been able to displace or seriously weaken Westernmost recipient countries have assumed the stance of non alignment, and they let their own national interestswhether or not they support Bloc positions in foreignMoreover, the leaders of these countries are strongly nationalist, are little disposed to adopt Communist models, and have frequently cracked down on local Communist parties.)

economic aid extended toas totaled5 billion, of which abouthas been drawn. The peak years to date werewhich extensions ranged00 millionExtensions2 were down tosonsiderable lapse of time betweenactual drawing. Drawings have increased02 Military aid during the same periodto be5 billion; deliveries usually followcommitments and we believef committedaid has been delivered. Deliveries were highest inbecause of the massive shipments of military supplies (Paras.

Bloc almost certainly will continue substantialover the next several years. Foreign assistancea mark of great power status which the USSR wouldto give up, lest it surrender an important field ofto the "imperialist" adversary and lose an opportunitySoviet interests. It is possible that, during the next

several years, economic considerations will Impel the Bloc toprojected economic aid programs to closer scrutiny.of allocation of resources are likely to increase as deliveries of heavy industrial equipment under existing commitmentswith high priority internal programs- Our evidence istoonfident judgment as to whether the sharp decrease in aid extended2 resultedecision to reduce the burden of aid, the adoptionore selectiveor reflected fewer opportunities for new agreements of the kind which the Bloc wishes to enter into. However, wethat the Soviets will notajor cut-back in aid for economic reasons; they will probably do so only If, for morereasons, they alter their overall policy towards undeveloped countries. They will be watchful for opportunities in Africa and Latin America and, we believe, will remain ready to make heavy commitments to individual countries whenever particularlyopportunities arise. )

We believe that the Soviets will continue to place great stress on military aid, which has the advantage of being cheaper and quicker to implement than economic aid and which involves the recipientontinuing dependence for spare parts,and technical aid. We expect them to add new types of advanced weapons to the list already available to recipients, and to seek new customers for military assistance. The Soviets in recent years have allowed their own personnel to man these advanced weapons pending the availability of trained indigenous specialists, and we believe that they will do this in certain coses even when this exposes their own personnel, albeit incognito, to combat situations. It is also possible, although as yet we have no evidence of this, that the Soviets will request client states to grant them military support faculties or try to develop their local military presenceay which would assist them in bringing military power to bear in crises at locations remote from tho USSR. We believe it unlikely, however, that the recipients would wish to compromise their neutrality and expose themselves to future military hazard by entering into such arrangements.)

DISCUSSION I. COMMUNIST OBJECTIVES

ccording to Marxist doctrine, In the inexorable course of history colonies are destined to throw off their fetters, to oust the colonial powers and,art of the Inevitable decline of imperialismuccession of revolutionary processes, to become part of the Communist world. Though this remains the long range Communist view, Soviet policy has shifted with changing circumstances, and variousleaders have differed and continue to differ as to the correct tactics to follow in order to further this goal.

n the early postwar years, Communist policy tn underdeveloped areas relied primarily on open attempts by local Communist movements to seize power. Flagrant examples of this policy were the armedin China, Indo-China, the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma. At the same time, the USSR paid little attention to the opportunities for establishing Influence with new governments by tbe more conventional methods of International politics.

owever, apart from the case of China and, lateresser extent, Indo-China, this approach was not successful and in tha early fifties the Soviets found themselves In needew policy which would help to restore the tarnished prestige of communism In these countries and overcome tho USSR's diplomatic isolation from these areas. the Soviet economy hadovel which permitted new forms of competition with the West, while the development ofalliances armed with advanced weapons was making It imperative for the USSR to find ways of advancing Its cause which minimized the danger of military conflict. Accordingly, more realistic policies were developed by Stalin's successors, who came to realize that foreign aid was an Important Instrument for the purpose of competing with the Westorld scale.

ccording to the new Une, the nationalist governments ofcountries were to be accepted and acknowledged and thecountries were to establish diplomatic relations with them and offer them trade and economic assistance. Simultaneously, local Communist parties were to be restrained from revolutionary activity that would give offense to the nationalist governments. The short-term objectives of the new policy were to gain entry to these countries for the Bloc, toosition which could be used to influence the policies of the recipients, and to reduce and if possible eliminate Western Influence. The long term goal was gradually, by fostering internal change and

a close association with the "socialisto bring these countries eventually under Soviet control.

The Soviets believed that animosities against the former colonial masters and the desire for rapid economic advance were so widespread and deep in the underdeveloped countries that Communist aid would accelerate developments in their favor throughout the area. They soon established the idea that the USSR had arrived on the world sceneajor supplier of investment and arms to which ancountry, whether violently anti-Western or merely anxious to balance Western ties with Eastern ones, could turn for assistance. In actual practice, the programs have been determined both by the advantages perceived by the Soviets ln particular cases and by the willingness of these countries to accept Bloc aid.

These programs have placed the Sovietsosition to apply some political pressure against the recipient governments. From time to time they have pressed for support of Soviet foreign policy positions. Thoy have also urged these governments to allow the local Communist parties to operate, to reduce economic ties with the West, and even to imitate Soviet-type institutional forms in their internal admlrustratlon. Nonetheless, the Soviets generally have avoided makingrerequisite of assistance that recipient governments should make any specificmoves favoring Communist causes. Nor liave they actually cut on* aid programs to force compliance with political demands. Even at the present time, when new efforts are being made to build local Communist strength in the ex-colonlalcountries and "bourgeois nationalist" leaders are coming in for occasional sharp criticism by Bloc spokesmen,programs are generally not exploited to try to work immediate political changes in the receiving country.

Communist China has in recent years raised objections to the aid programs of the Soviet Union. These objections have become part of the general SLio-Soviet controversy, but wereause of thatIndeed, China has extended aid, thoughmaller scale, on much the same basis and for much the same purposes as the USSR. As the Sino-Soviet dispute deepened, however, the Chinese increasingly saw Soviet aid as serving particular Soviet interests which did not coincide with Chinesessistance to India. They also resented the size of Soviet aid to non-Bloc countries as compared to aid to China.other elements in tho Communist movement have similarChina has found the Sovietseful target for ideological attack, because it allegedly helps to consolidate the power of nationalist regimes which are the enemies of local Communist parties and which obstruct the eventual communizatlon of the recipient countries.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF BIOC AID PROGRAMS

hen the Soviets began their economic and military aid programs, the Bloc has extended aboutillion of credits and other forms of aid to somenderdeveloped nations. Of this, aboutercent has been extended by the Soviet Union itself, while theSatellites and Communist China have providedercentercent respectively. The aid has been usedide varietyeavy industrial development, as ln India, large projects for power development, as ln Egypt, and the development offacilities and light Industry, as in Afghanistan and Guinea. It has also included extensive technical assistance and the provisionide range of armaments manufactured in the Bloc. Though the scale of the programs is substantial, it is nevertheless small into comparable programs of the West. Furthermore, total Western assistance to recipients of Bloc aid Is greater than that extended by the Bloc countries. The greatest Bloc efforts have been concentrated ln key countries, such as the UAR, India, and Indonesia, which are of particular Importance in their respective areas of the world.

Economic Aid. Bloc economic aid extended to non-Communist countries has totaledillion, of which only about one-fourth has beenespite the large number of recipients, almost two-thirds of this total has been allocated to fourthe UAR, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. In the first few years of thethe main effort was made In Asia and the Middle East. In recent years, in response to opportunities in the newly-Independent countries in Africa, the program has been extended to that areaumber of credits for small scale projects. In addition, the Bloc has for some time tried to extend its program into Latin America, and there have been recent signs of greater receptivity in that area, particularly in Brazil.

Apartew small grants, primarily from Communist China, almost all economic aid extended by the Bloc countries has been in the form of interest-bearing credits. Interest rates on Soviet loans are seldom higherercent and are sometimes lower. Satellite rates, however, are occasionally higher. Repayment may be made lncommodities and Is generally scheduled2 year period. The first payment often is not due until after the completion ofprojects.

Though the Bloc countries advertise their credits ashey do maintain some control over their programs. No advance conditions are demanded, and they leave to the recipientthe Initiative for suggesting the uses for which aid is to be put.

see Annex a.

However, few of the credits can be drawn upon before teams of Bloc engineers and designers make surveys and draw up detailed plans for specific projects. The credits are tied to these specific projects, for which the equipment and materials must be purchased from the lending Bloc country. Moreover, the credits are virtually all made for use ln the publicractice by which the Soviets hope toocialist system.

These economic programs are slow.in implementation. Out of5 billion assistance extendedrawings have totaledillion. There Isag of several years between the announcement of the credit and its actual use. The main reason tor thisunique to Bloc foreign aidthatand installation cannot take place until each project Isby both tho lending and the recipient country and the necessary technical surveys are completed. Accordingly, most drawings on credits In the Initial period are made for survey and design work.

To date slightly more than half of the economic credits have been for industrial development, though only in India has the aidbeen concentrated almost exclusively ln this field. Many of the remaining credits have been used for major multipurpose projectshe Aswan Dam, which will simultaneously serve purposes ofirrigation, and hydroelectricor transportation facilities, and for the development of mineral resources. Most Bloc credits to the UAR. Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq. Indonesia, Guinea. Ceylon, and Ghana are scheduled for such uses. Though these projects will be important eventually for the development of industry In these countries, they are oriented more at this stage toward resource development. Show projects of little economic value account formall part of Bloc aid programs.

Technical Assistance. Technical aid has constituted an Important part of the aid programs ever since their initiation. The Soviets have hoped Uiat technical aid would provide valuable opportunities forinfluence ln these countries. In the hut halfhereloc nonmilitary technicians innderdeveloped countries. Of thisereere from the European Satellites,ere from Communist China. In addition, much effort has been expended on training nationals from these countries hi BlocSpecial universities have been established for this purpose in the USSR and Czechoslovakia, and by the end20 students from the underdeveloped countries had received academic and technical training In Bloc Institutions.

The Soviets attach great importance to the establishment of technical training institutes in the recipient countries. Suchhave been established in India and Burma and are either planned or

being organized ln several countries In Africa. Bloc-built Institutions ln some cases are the only centers of tochnlcal training now planned for these countries. Another Important aspect of the technical aid effort Is on-the-job training in Bloc countries. Indian workers were trained ln the USSR during the construction of the Bhilai steel null, and Egyptian technical personnel were trained ln the USSR during theof the nuclear research reactor provided by the Soviets.

ilitary assistance hasajor part ofaid program from its beginnings, and In recent years hasmost dynamic aspect of the assistance effort. Bloc shipmentsto serve the same broad political objectives as assistancedevelopment. They offer an opportunity for quickerand for exploiting or creating tensions between recipientand their neighbors, between recipient countries and the West,among Western powers. Moreover, military aid Is frequentlyto the task of associating the USSR with strong nationalistor ambitions, such as the Indonesians' desires to acquireOulnea.

Soviets perceive in military aid certain particularwhich economic assistance does not provide. Thoy cansolo supplier to an underdeveloped country which, becausero-Western neighbor, cannot procure elsewhereand quantity of arms It desires. Even more thanarms assistance offers an opportunity to establish aon the Bloc because of the recipient's need forparts, and technical support. Moreover, these programsBloc toelationship, through their own techniciansthrough personnel brought to the Bloc for training, with anIs likely toubstantial role hi tbe future politics ofcountry.

e estimate commitments under Bloc military assistancewith non-Bloc countries to date at5f which aboutercent has already been delivered, primarily to Indonesia, Iraq, tlie UAR, and Syria. Deliveries were highestargely because ot the massive shipments to Indonesia. At the end2 thereilitary technicians innderdeveloped countries, almost all of them Soviet nationals. In the early years of the program, the Bloc provided military assistance at very little cost to Itself byprimarily obsolescent weapons made available by its own 'Seend C.

Equipment hu been valued at overage prices contained ln contract* between the Bloc and the recipient countries. In most cases the recipients are granted dUcoants. frequently as much aaercent, so that obligations incurred by tba roclplenU axe, lo that extent, leas than contract values.

modernisation programs. Beginningowever, ihe USSR began to provide advanced anna and weapon systems, such aset fighters. TU-I6 medium Jet bombers, and surface-to-air missiles, many of which are still being phased in to Bloc forces and some of which have been withheld from China. The USSR has not only provided training in the use of advanced weapons but has apparently been willing In some cases to man tho weapon systems in crisis situations when trained Indigenous personnel were unavailable.

loc Capabilities. New extensions of economic aid tocountries have dropped sharply from the high pointew commitments In that year totaled nearly SI billion, fell slightlynd were less than half as largehis decline in part reflects dwindling opportunities for new agreements of the kind which the Bloc wishes to enter Into. At the same time, however, drawings under existing commitments have risen from year to year, reaching0 milliont the present time, the USSR Is having difficulty ln meeting its goals for domestic growth and the growing needs of Its Bloc partners for economic support. The Soviet leaders have given occasional signs of impatience ln the last two years about tho political results of the program and this has probably enhanced concern over the demands of the aid program for items already in short supply in the USSR

the aid programs pursued thus far are welleconomic capabilities of the USSR and the other Bloccost Is much less than that of major Soviet domesticrepresents annuallyraction of one percent of totalThe bulk of military aid has come from existing surpluseconomic program impinges primarily upon tho machineryof the Bloc, which are already hard pressed to meetmilitary goals, but deliveries of capital equipment to datesmall.

III. EFFECTIVENESS IN IMPLEMENTATION

pursuing their assistance programs, the Bloc countriesnumber of advantages over the West. Their governments are ablemajor decisions quickly, without having to subject them todebate, and they are able to negotiate aid credits with ared tape. Throughout the underdeveloped world. US concernand orderly change, for the sensibilities of European allies,the security of Western investment olten inhibits US ability loto rapid changes. The Bloc is much less subject to suchand can give prompt support to radical or revolutionaryIt is able to move particularly quickly with militaryonly In negotiation but also in implementation. In Iraq, the Soviets

exploited the aftermath of the revolt8 by offering substantial credits.9 the Bloc took advantage of the break between France and Guinea to develop close relations with the latter and to offer It aid.

these advantages, the Soviets run Into many of theexperienced by Western countries. They have discoveredshortcut or way to avoid the long process of technicalapproval, and general bureaucratic delay which Is endemicaid programs. Their technicians turn out to have theof human frailties and experience many of the sameadjustment as do Western technicians in foreign lands.egative impact on tho local populace. Contrary toheld Impression, proficiency in foreign language appears toexception among Bloc technicians rather than the rule.from the USSR and Eastern Europe, moreover, arc just asas those from the West to the rigors of tropical climates,demand special living conditions for themselves.

Bloc aid programs are not immune to the negotiating delays and lags in Implementation which characterize Western assistance efforts. While Bloc projects usually Involve supervision of construction and Installation by Bloc technicians, much of the actual work is done under the direction of the recipient country. To the extent thatforroject is assigned to the recipient country, the Bloc's control is weakened and there often result delays and errors for which the Bloc must share the blame. Many of thegovernments, moreover, have been unwilling or unable tosufficient domestic resources to development projects.umber of countries, such as Afghanistan, Guinea, and Indonesia, the USSR has found it necessary to provide commodities for sale in the domestic market ln order to help raise the local currency portions of these projects.

Major Soviet engineering projects, such as the Bhilai steel mill in India, aro usually of excellent quality. This does not always hold true, however, of all Bloc projects or of many products of Bloc Industry. Thus the Egyptians appear to be dissatisfied with some of the heavy machinery delivered by the Soviets in connection with tho Aswan Dam project An automatic telephone installation in Baghdad isype which Western countries have not installed in several decades; it breaks down frequently and rarely gives the subscriber the right number on the first try. Soviet Jeeps sent under the military assistance program proved inadequate to the Indonesian roads and climate. In general, recipient countries long familiar with Western products have often been disappointed with the quality of Bloc equipment which has not measured up to Western standards.

IV. IMPACT ON THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The economic and military assistance programs havebrought Important returns to the Bloc countries in terms ofprestige. In particular, their willingness to undertake such major projects as the Aswan High Dam haseep impression, not only in the recipient countries, but more generally in theareas. The general effect has been to raise Soviet and Bloc prestige greatly since the Inception of the programs, and to convince the leaders and people ol these countries that the USSR is willing and able to contribute substantially to their development. This result far outweighs minor complaints over specific aspects of the programs.

Many underdevelopedndia, Egypt, and Indonesia, have come to count upon Bloc aid as an important part of their internal economic development. In smaller countries in primitive stages of economic development, such as the newly Independent countries of Africa, even relatively small amounts of aid have made an important local impact The programs have helped the USSR to establishfrom which it can exert influence over future developments.like the US, the USSR has found that such influence is limited.

Through the military aid program the Soviets now have established important relationshipsumber of military establishments ln these countries. Thus. Afghanistan's armed forces are completelyon the USSR for military equipment and training. In some cases, training of military specialists from the underdeveloped countries may eventually bring some political influence with it. In addition, the Soviets, by strengthening the armed forces of such countries as Egypt and Indonesia, have disrupted the balance of forces in these areas and havo greatly stimulated tensions with neighboring countries. For example. Bloc-equipped Egyptian forces are currently backing thegovernment ln Yemen, in opposition to indigenous forcesby other Arab countries.

Despite these achievements, Bloc aid programs have in general not succeeded ln displacing or seriously weakening Western influence in the recipient countries. It is true that the programs have in many instances encouraged nationalist leaders to be bolder and more assertive against the West. For example, Bloc aid unquestionably stiffened Sukarno's posture against the Dutch. However,umber ofinstances, relations with the West were far worse when the Soviets began their assistance programs than they are today. Bloc military and economic aid has been unable to offset larger political factors leading to improvements In Western relations with thosecountries which at various times seemed to be potential SovietEgypt in the aftermath of Sues, Iraq in the period after

Qassim's assumption of power, and Guinea in the period immediately following the French withdrawal.

the programs have not succeeded in aligning thethese countries with those of the Bloc, and Indeed the leadersfirm in their determination to he independent of eitherto accept aid from both sides. These leaders have remainedany Bloc attempts to use aid programs te undermine theirTheir inclinations toward neutrality have beenthe example of Nasser's ability to bargain with both sides andone off against the other. In fact, instead ot tending towardwith the Bloc, these countries have been concerned moremovements, such as pan-Arablsm and pan-Africanism,relationships with other "nonaligned" countries.

the programs have not produced conditionsto the eventual establishment of the Communist system.Chinese have feared. Bloc assistance has frequently strengthenedof the nationalist leaders of those countries, who In someEgypt, Iraq) suppress local Communists. The programsgreatly increased local receptivity to the establishment ofinstitutions. Most of the present leaders In underdevelopedin any caso favor socialist economies, but these arenational brands which will enhance rather thanindependence.

V. FACTORS AFFECTING THE FUTURE COURSE OF THE PROGRAM

We think lt certain that the Bloc will continue its aid programs over the next several years. In the first place, assistance tocountries hasark of great power status which the USSR would be unwilling to sacrifice. Soviet leaders probably do not believe that economic and military aid will quickly bring recipient countries into close association with or membership in the Bloc.they have found their efforts effective in breaking down themonopoly of influence and realize that thoir withdrawal would leave the West unchallenged Ln this important field of competition. Thecontinue to expect, moreover, that the positions they win through assistance, in conjunction with improvements In their power position and favorable trends In world politics, will eventually produceIn the underdeveloped countries confirming the Marxist prognosis of Communist triumphorld scale.

Aid policy will vary ln accordance with the opportunities which arise, the resources available, and the evolving Soviet attitude toward tha underdeveloped nations. With respect to opportunities, the Soviets will probably be watchful in Africa, where the uncertainties of domestic and regional politics and the prospective travails of southern Africa

and tha Portuguese colonies may turn up inviting prospects. In Latin America, they will hope to repair the setback suffered In the Cuban crisis byreater foothold on the continent. Offers of assistance willart of this effort. In particular, the Soviets can be expected to press then: aid on Brazil whichey country where they probably see good opportunities. While the example of Cuba has underscored Moscow's readiness in Latin America as elsewhere to provide anto dependence on the US, the Soviets have as yet made little progress in Latin Americahole.

It is possible that, during the next several years, economicwill Impel the Bloc to re-examine its programs of economic aid and to adjust their future scope. Commitments alreadywillubstantial increase ln deliveries, particularly of heavy industrial equipment. While such deliveries are not large relative to total production, they compete with high priority interna! programs which have alreadytrain on production capacity. Wa think it likely that problems over allocation of resources in the Bloc will increase over the next year or two as the Bloc countries strive to meet ambitious commitments In domestic investment, higher living standards, and expensive military and space programs. In theseforeign aid expenditures may come under more severe scrutiny.

Nevertheless, we believe that any such re-examination would leadajor cutback in the program only if the Soviets decided, on more general grounds, to alter their overall policy toward the underdeveloped countries. There is some evidence of disappointment in Moscow with these countries, and we cannot exclude the emergenceoreand selective Soviet approach, which wouldore forthcoming attitude towards Soviet interests and perhaps greater tolerance of local Communist parties. Such an approach would treat some of the non-Communist governments of recipient nations more as obstacles to be overcome than as potential assets to be cultivated, and mightubstantial reduction in further economic assistance to them. Ifhift ln Soviet policy should occur, however, we think that the USSR would stillubstantial aid program and would remain ready to make heavy expenditures in individual countries whenever particularly favorable opportunities arose.

Cost considerations will be of less importance in determininglevels of military aid. and we believe that the Bloc will continue to press arms assistanceariety of potential customers. Moreover, present trends suggest that the USSR will continue to expand the Ust of advanced weapons available to non-Bloc customers as these countries seek to modernize their forces. To make these weapons operative, it will probably be willing in some cases to provide Soviet personnel to man them even when this requires that they be exposed, albeit without

acknowledgement, to combat situations. We believe, however, that the USSR will not transfer nuclear warheads or weapon systems designed solely for use with such warheads.

n our military estimates of recent years, we have pointed to the possibility that the USSR might try to develop forces particularly suited for use in limited actionsistance from the periphery of the Bloc. In this connection, we have noted thatolicy would require foreign bases or some regular provision for logistical support andThe local military disadvantage at which the USSR found Itself during the Cuban crisis may move the Soviets to serious efforts in this direction. If so, the readiest opportunities for base or logistical support rights would probably be found among those non-Bloc countries which are recipients of Soviet military aid. We tiavc no evidence,that the USSR has raised these matters with any of these countries, and lt is unlikely that their governments would wish to compromise their neutrality and expose themselves to future military hazard by entering Into such arrangements.

5

d

i a

ANNEX C

MAJOR BLOC ARMS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT, BY RECIPIENT lUSMW*

1st AS

TrpsourpMBPT ohan- ITAR Stiua Vuim Ixou

Mo-xocco

Armaments

tanks. .

200

i tanks

v.:

elr-pto-pellcd iwsaiilt (tuns..

ArUBary: 6ahf, anti-tajik, antiaircraft, truok-tnouuMd re-

360

Infantry support:

enUtaok reeouleea.

antiaircraft ice-

china fit*, mor-

man)

tunny many

Infantry naaporu:

rifles, machine

man?

Trucks and other mnrti

Naval Vessels

Sverdlor-claai llxht

rjy-clsss OMtroy-

en

10

3

Itiea-elsas racort

Submarines

T -ii

Bubmarine abaters

motor torpedo

POMG

Other: auxiliarysad

ass

350

3 JO

many many

16

oo

76

300

SOTOif

U0

W

no

47

tone

1

13

6"

1*

II"

10

*omo

loouwtM at *aa of laBIe.

major bloc arms and military equipment, bv rkcipiext irss-uhu

lFnm

o? EaoiMiBwr

lug Stma Ynu Ivou

1

TtM6 Jei medium

bomber

et tight

bomber

etet lighten.el flght-

Other: conjet

Guided MWIa

Air-to-Surface

Surface-to-air-

.-fx-

.

Air-to-air-

H

128

I]

d'

ie .i

3

aorac

..ii'ir

JO'

.2

an order, all or some o( which has not yet been delivered.

tbe number ofaircraft equipped withut oot in addition to those feted undor aircraft.

UdieaUog tberisce-to-air battalions supplied.

Indicating tbe number of Komar-daja boats (Quipped withbate*.

-J*fwl* air-tcalr mkmuee, betlc addiuoo

' Itdieatfag tbe Dumber of launchers supplied.

NOTE: In addition, to the deliveries haled. Alg.rin has received Aveome imonntl carters, some trucks end other vehicle, and many morlars and machine guns a. well aslaces of field artillery. Oliana has alao bean thi recipient of some rlllaa. maebioermored personnel carriers and other equipment.

wx

Mi

t.^iaW by the CentralAQtiu, Thi,far.UoW^ onddW fdpiem and oftrn

by

following offldaU within iheir .especth* . ,

ft.Director of Inrnl-iflonc, ond Research, for the Deportment of Slot. : b. DUector, Defenw Intelligence Agency. for the Office of ihe Secretary of

Uv, OnfeetM

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