Created: 2/21/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

no. 79










THE WEEK INnf ormat :on as0 ESTeb)



decision to withdraw "several thousand" Soviet milnary personnel from Cuba probably vaa prompted by his desire toajor irritant in US-Sovietwhich. In his view, might cause another flare-up of the crisis and Jeopardize prospects for new negotiations on such issues as Berlin. The decision also suggests that the main lines of Soviet-Cuban relations in the lmnedlate future finally have been worked out after protracted and difficult negotiations.

At Geneva, the USSR has continued to stall ona nuclear teat ban, while urging other delegations to press tho US to reduce its terms for an agreement.

Moscow is maintaining its ambivalent attitude toward

the new Iraqi Government. /

Soviet Embassy in Bagnaad Slated that Soviet mllliaTyald would continue, the Soviet party central coraniltte sharply denounced the new regime's suppression uf Iraqi Ctunnmn ists.



weather thisIts potential consequences for thecausing concern throughout the Sino-Soviet bloc. It is too early to assess the effects on farm output for the entire year, but it seems clear that anperformance Is not likely, even if favorable weather ensuen. Unusually severe weather in Eastern Europe is also causing serious problems for industry and la threatening fulfillment of some of3 economic





The new regime in Iraq, having repressed bothand Qasimlst opponents, Is turning to somewhat longer range problems, such as that of negotiating with the Kurds. Differences within the government are likely to become more pronounced, especially since non-Baathlsts are

showing resentment over the predominant role tha Baathlata

have taken thus far


The rift between the Pathet Lao and the neutralistforces under Kong Le has deepened followingey neutralist field commander. Kong Le hasthe bulk of his forces to improve his defense against the Pathet Lao's superior military strength. /


Junta leader Pak Chong-hui's offer to withdraw from politics gives civilian leaders an opportunity to take the Initiative in the transition to representative government. However, long-standing factional disputes handicap thepoliticians. Pak may be counting on wrangling among them to open the wayew movement to draft himnity candidate for president.


The diplomatic struggle over Britain's role in Western Europe has continued during the past week and become, if possible, more complicated than before. There are still efforts within the Common Market to devlso an economic and political alternative to Britain's full membership,

but London itself is skoptlcal that an acceptable formula

will be found, f



Increasing political maneuvering is further straining Argentina's fragile stability. ey problem is the role to be played by the Peronists, who comprise about one quarter of the electorate, in the June general elections. This issue has caused serious divisions among the Peronists them-selves, as well as among other political and military groups,


President-elect Bosch, just returnedwo-month trip abroad, has attacked what he calls "vested interests" and may be preparing action that would leadajor political crisis. ress interview, described i

Has "disappointinglye claimerj,

tnat ne had obtained "three times as much aid" in Europe as he had in the US. Bosch's remarks on the proposed constitution, which he said should beave an Impression that he backs those features that appear hostile to private property, business, and foreign He is apparently already at sword's point with members of the outgoing regime, and therehance that

violence or assassination attempts may occur at his




Week by week Sukarno is committing Indonesiaand more deeply to blocking the creation of aout of Malaya, Singapore, and theBorneo territories. In Indonesian eyes, thefederation appears to be part of anotherto prevent Indonesia from taking its rightfulthe dominant power in southeastern Asia. At the the campaign against Malaysia serves Sukarno'spurposes by keeping the army busy with anand by taking public attention from chronic




Relations With the Bloc

Cuba's difficulties in meeting its trade obligations with several bloc countries have been suggested by several recent reports. According to

ir*UB ufjwicaiiun which went to Cuba lastwas forced to return home without accomplishing itsbecause ofayment moratorium in connection witb current debts to Hungary. Payments were scheduled to beginut the Castro regime reportedly is insisting that all repayment of Cuban debts to blocbe deferred

claimed that Cuban

ueuvs iu the European blocstand at more

million, and r

estimated the1 Moscow0 million and to Pelping5 million.

Internal Resistance

Reports that anti-Castro forces within Cuba plan to launch an "all-out" attack against the regime on the evening ofebruary mayew attempt by Castro to trap his opponents. He has used such tactics on previouswith considerable success.

Tbe rumors of theuprising appear similar to earlier onesebellion would occur onanuary. In the present version,attacksuban cities, communities, andare planned. The rebels then would attempt to hold whatever areasbour period while calling for US

A number of high Cuban military officers and Cuban exiles in the US are said to be involved in the plans. It is not known If there is any connection between tbe present report and that furnishedewly arrived Cuban refugee onebruary who saidsuicide attack" on the Castro regime would be launched within the next few days.

Efforts toevolt would have little chance of success without outside help. In the past Castro's forces have promptly suppressed the slightest indications of popular protest and in several instances have unearthed antiregime plots long before tbey matured.

Tbere is no otherevidenceenuine revolt Is being contemplated at this time. Scattered acts


of sabotage and insurgenthas increased noticeably since the beginning of the year, but there is no evidence that theylanned,campaign aiming ateneral uprising.

On the other hand, the regime's security and military forces evidently area high degree of vigilance which may be at least partially attributable to the recentin activity by anti-Castro dissidents.

Subversion in Latin America

A group of sixhave completedtraining inin Cuba now is inpreparing toand organize aeffort there,p

i nc fij'gfTHtinea arc

have left for Cuba last August.

Another Argentine trained in Cuba last year reported after leaving Cuba in January that there had been somef bis countrymen undergoing guerrilla training there at various times during the latter half

Other sources allege that Castro has claimed thatfollows Venezuela in Cuba's program to develop revolutions in Latin America. Toward this end Cubans have worked closely for some time with an extremist faction of the Peronist John William Cooke, former chief of the Peronist party in Argentina, reportedly spends much of his time in Cuba. Hisesident of Uruguay, has been active in recruiting candidates for guerrillacourses ln Cuba andclose contact with the Cuban Embassy in Montevideo, where travel arrangements for tbe trainees are arranged.


decision to withdraw "several thousand" Soviet military personnel from Cuba, which was conveyed to the US onebruary, probably was prompted by his desire toa major irritant In US-Soviet relations which, in his view, mightew flare-up of tbe crisis and jeopardize prospects for resumingon such issues as Berlin. His concern to prevent further damage in his relations with President Kennedy has beenin Soviet propaganda wbich consistently distinguishes between "sober voices" In the US administration and "madwho are ready to risk World War III.

The Soviet premier hadPresident Kennedy onovember that Soviet groundunits in Cuba would be"in due course." Tbe three-month delay in carrying out this commitment probably was due partly to Moscow's wish to avoid any appearanceurther hasty retreat under US pressure following tbe removal of the strategic missiles and theet bombers. probably felt alsourther substantial reduction in the Soviet military presence in Cuba would seriouslythe USSR's already strained relations with the Castro regime.

The decision to withdraw troops now suggests that the main lines of Soviet-Cubanin the period immediately ahead have finally been worked outeriod ofin Moscow and difficult negotiations with the Cubans.3 protocol to the Soviet-Cuban trade agreement,ew long-term credit to Cuba, was signed in Moscow on 7 Moscow and Havana also announced onanuary that the USSR, at Cuba's request, had agreed toechnical specialists to Cuba during tbe following two months.

Divisive Tactics

The drumfire of Soviet criticism of President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer continues. Moscow is seizing on anywbich can be used todifferences among the Western allies. Sovietclaims that Bonn hasUS proposals for aNATO nuclear force and, at the same time, has refused to divert arms purchases from the US to France. Moscowthat Bonn's position has displeased the French and that British arms manufacturers will be the losers in West Germany's maneuvering between Washington and Paris. Moscow continues to expand on the prospects forSoviet-British trade.

De Gaulle is coming under increasingly direct Soviet Izvestia'scommentator, N. Polyanov, called upon tbe "people in tbe Elysee Palace" to revise their policies and to realize that France's chances ofeading role in Europe will not be enhanced by an attempt "to restore the Carolingian Empire wbich has long since collapsed." Prayda charged onebruary that De Gaulle now bas aligned himselflass which has always opposed an alliance with the USSR.

Geneva Talks

The Soviet delegation at Geneva has continued to stall on considerationuclear

test ban and to maintain its "take It or leave it" attitude on Khrushchev's offer of two or three on-siteear. These tactics are aimed at generating concern on the part of other delegations, particularly the eight neutrals, over lack of progress in tho hope that they will Increase pressure on tbe US to reduce its termsreaty.

Chief Soviet delegate Kuznetsov has shown no interest iseeting of the three-power test-ban subcommittee ofnation disarmament conference.

lished in Pravda On ebruary condemned the regime's "mass reprisals" against Iraqiand pointed out that this "bestial reaction" contradicts the policies proclaimed by the new government. The Soviet Embassy in Baghdad, on the other hand, publicly denied that the USSR had protested suppression of the local Communists. The embassy spokesman professed to have "no worry about the future/ indicated that Soviet military aid will be continued under the agreements signed with the Qasim regime, and claimed that the new government had made It clear that it wants this aid to be continued.

There have been no further hintsom-

promise might be reached on the number of inspections. Moscow TASS, however, reported aby the UAR delegate at Geneva that the parties should meet each other's positions half way and agree to "four to five" Inspections.

The central committee state* ment was similar to earlierstatements protesting the banning of the Algerian and Tunisian Communist parties ln that it avoided any directon the Iraqi Government and contained no warning that governmental relations would be affected. In denying that this statement constituted Moscow's official view, the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad took refuge in tho old canard that "Prawda doesn't represent the official views of the Soviet Government."

is maintaining its ambivalent attitude toward the new regime in Baghad. On the one hand, the Soviet partycommittee statement pub-

isits Violent assaults on the new regime as "vicious fascist elements" and urging the Kurds to Join other anti-regime forces in opposing the

government. Moscow radio felt moved onebruary, however, toeuters report that it is interfering in Iraq's internal affairs by calling on the Kurds to rise against the new regime.


The Soviet leaders used the state visit of King Savang and Premier Souvanna Phouma of Laos to emphasize tbe USSR's constructive role In the Laotian settlement as evidence of Its constant "striving for

peacefuloviet propaganda gave extensive

coverage to the six-day visit, and Moscow radio for theranday series of special broadcasts toAsia.

The Joint communique^at the end of the visit endorsed standard Sovielon general disarmament, banning nuclear weapons and tbelr transfer to nOnnuclenr

powers, and liquidation of foreign military bases. The statement expressing hope that the Slno-Indlan border dispute will be settledby talks" presumably was Included on Soviet Initiative since the Laotians have shown no previous interest in this question.


weather thiswith its potential consequences for toecausing concern throughout thebloc. It la too early to assess the likely effects on farm output for the entire year, but it seems clear that anperformance is not likely, even if favorable weather ensues. In addition toproblems, unusually severe weather in Eastern Europe is causing serious problems for

industry and is alreadyfulfillment of some of3 economic plans.

Extreme cold and heavy snowfall in Eastern Europe have

increased the requirements for fuel and power In industrial plants and homesime when rail and water transport of fuel have become more difficult. Water supplies have been reduced, some power lines have broken,

and coal mining has been slowed. Some factories have boon forced toshut down or to curtailand some schools and other institutions havo been closed.

Restrictions have been imposed on the use of electricity in factories, households, and other establishments, and measures have been taken to ensure the movement of coal and otherfreight by rail. and transport workers and troops have been used to clear roads and rails.

Severe cold in the has made the distribution of already short fodder more acute, and there are some reports that livestock have frozen to death. Although the heavy snow cover may havo protected winter grain fromudden thaw could result in substantial flood damage.

Weather conditions this past fall and winter have also been unfavorable in the USSR, particularly for the Important winter grain crop--aboutercent of the annual total. In some of the principal winter grain areas, drought and low temperatures during the fall

months combined with sudden thaws and heavy rains later in the winter to cause damage which might prove substantial. Considerable reseeding is likely to be required this spring.

The livestock sector may also be suffering setbacks. Severe cold is complicating the task of stretching already Inadequate feed supplies to cover record numbers ofa condition that could lead to distress slaughtering.

In the Far East, bothChina and North Vietnam have complained of worsening drought conditions this winter. Peiping has characterized the drought in North China as "the worst inears" and has said that it is getting "worse with each passing day." Kwangtung Province, in South China, is also suffering from abnormally dry conditions, according to Peiping, and cultivation of the early crops is alreadyinto difficulties.

The main threat to the wheat crop in North China will come in about two months when the wheat emerges from its dormancy, but rice and miscellaneous grain crops in South China are In more Immediate danger because they mature earlier. Weather observations

substantiate tile Chinese reports of unusually dry weather and indicate that rainfall in Kwangtung during December was only about six percent of normal for that month.

Authorities in Northhavo admitted that the worsening drought is causing "major difficulties" inareas. Hanoi has further revealed that peasantsumber of areas" have become so discouraged over persistent drought conditions that they have given up the struggle and left the farms for other employment. With3 crop year offoor start, Hanoiontinuing tight food supply after three consecutive years of mediocre harvests.



new Iraqi regime, having repressed Communist and Qasimist opponents,umber of other, somewhat longer range problems which require immediate attention. Among tbe most important of these is its relations with Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani's rebelliousettlement of Kurdish relations with the Iraqi state is likely to be difficult, since the country's new rulers mustto pose as Arab nationalists who will not sacrifice Arab "interests."

Tbe regime bas taken pains tolanket of "positive neutralism" over its nakedof local Communists. Foreign Minister Sbabib and Minister of State Hazim Jawad in press conferences have stressed the country's excellent relations with tbe USSR and alleged that the quarrel with local Communists is that they were Qasim supporters. The regime has Ignored broadcasts by the clandestineran radio in Leipzig. This radio, operated by the Iranianhas called for aKurdish rebellion and has characterized the Iraqias "an oppressive,and atrocious enemy" brought to powerblack fascist coup."

Non-Baathist elements have expressed some resentment over the Baathist predominance in tbe

government, and sharpwithin the regime is likely once its component groups begin to discuss longer range aims and policies. Tbe fear of aof the Communists will tend to keep Baathist and non-Baathist nationalistsomplete falling out, however.

Publicly, Cairo continues to cite the Iraqi coup aa anto be followed by people under the remaining "reactionary" regimes in the aroa.

In Syria, meanwhile,for "unity" with Iraq have been held in tbe wake of Syrian Foreign Minister Mahasin'sebruary declaration in favor of "federation" with Iraq. The Syrian press has also reacted favorably. The Iraqis areembarrassed by the Syrian overture and have limited themselves to expressions relating to general Arab unity and protestations of their high regard for Naslr's CAR.

Leaders of Syria's feuding Baathist factions are attempting to establish close ties with their Iraqi brethren. Michel Aflaq's group, whichoderately pro-Nasir line, is likely to be favored by the Iraqis over Akram al-Hawrani's strongly anti-Masir faction, T


The rift between neutralist and Pathet Lao forces In Laos has deepened and become more open since the assassination onebruary of Kong Le's field commander ln the Plains des Jarres, Colonel Ketsana. spokesmen have publicly accused the Pathet Lao of the killing, although the reaction of Kong Le, the neutralistleader, thus far has been generally restrained.

Tho Pathet Lao's military position is considerably stronger than Kong Le's and for hotter defense he has concentrated bis troops In the northern andportions of the Plalne des Jarres. Token neutralist forces remain as far east as Ban Ban, but Kong Le probably controls only the area extending from the Plalne des Jarres airfield west to Muong Soui on Route 7.

Neither Kong Le nor the Pathet Lao leaders appear to be planning major military moves at this time, although the heightened tensions between them couldlash.






im on



leader Pak Chong-hui's offer ofebruary tofrom politics in order to stabilize the political situation in South Korea gives civilian leaders an opportunity to take the initiative to assure atransition to representative government.

In return for thisGeneral Pak has demanded assurances from all leading civilian politicians that they agree to uphold the principles of the revolution and that the participants in the military government be safeguarded against retaliation, Pak would continue to head the government until elections are held later this year and has pledged that he would carry out impartially the return to civilian rule.

Pak's terms are likely to be acceptable. Until the old-liiBpoliticians nowpolitical life sort themselves out, however, they will have difficulty taking advantage of the offer. The civilian leaders are divided by long-standingfactionaland personal distrust. Their initial efforts tonified opposition party have faltered over the problem ofarty leadership. Each group fears that it would be shut out of real influence unless Its man secured the top post. None of the major groups, however, has closed the door to further negotiations.

Ho Chong appears to be the most likely figure around whom the politicians might coalesce. Heormer Rhee lieutenant who broke with the ex-president after serving as acting prime minister. As mayor of Seoulo gained

considerable popular prestige for his honesty and ability. His performance as head of the provisional government that took over after Rhee's ouster0 further enhanced his stature.

Ho has made some efforts to unite the elements opposed to the military regime, and he recently called for another attempt tooalition party. His efforts probably are being undercut by former president Yun Po-sun, who reportedly wants to lead any coalition himself. As athe major contending groups may remain Independent but settleoint candidate, possibly Ho, for this spring's presidential elections. evelopment would appreciably Improve prospects for atransition to the new government.

At the same time, however, thereossibility tbat Pak's offer Is less than sincere and that he oxpects the civilian leaders to fail in their attempts to organize. He may believe that inituation ho would he tlie only ftcrep! able choice to head the new government.

Pak's withdrawal willevere blow to the regime-sponsored Democratic-Republican Party, which now lacks any other potential candidate of comparable stature. Party leader Kim Chong-pll Is attemtping to preserve his organization and his position ln it by placing his supporters in key posts but his own future is in doubt. Tbe party could be counted on toove to draft Pakavorable opnor-tunity arose.


diplomatic struggle over Britain's role in Western Europe has continued during the past week andcomplicated than There are still efforts within the Common Market toan economic and political alternative to Britain's full membership, but London itself is skeptical that an acceptable formula will be found.

math. West German officials have recently said that the interim UK-EEC economic ties under consideration are in the nature of free-trade-area These the US has always opposedorm of tariff discrimination.

Despite the strong lead taken by Bonn and Brussels and the basic similarity of their proposals for effecting anarrangement for Britain, anything like an agreed position among the "friendly five" has yet to emerge. Belgian and Dutch officials have held several meetings in order to reconcile their differences, but there has been no coordination with Bonn. London is maintaining its bilateral contacts with both endeavors, but has beenby the results so far.

Plans for any earlyof the Six and Britain in the Western European Union (WEU) framework have reportedly been dimmed by French insistence that Paris would be represented ateeting only on condition there be no discussion of the Brussels talks or their after-

talks Frenc issue to prevent

press reports that Paris oeiioves "financial arrangements" would have to be the first part of any agreement with Britain. Although "the problem of the sterling area" waa neverconsidered in the Brussels

the this

nea to rogaya reserve "trumpK-EEC agreement.

rne French, press has quoted "authorized official sources" as saying any association agreemontwlth Britain would have to be preceded by SBC ratification of the African association convention and settlement of outstandingregarding the EEC's common agricultural policy.

Atebruaryof the Outer Seven ministers, Austria announced its intention to pursue its bid forwith the EEC, despite the resolve of the other members to resume talks with the Commononly when France givesof good faith. Vienna has long been convinced of De Gaulle's special sympathy forsympathy he has also managed to convey to Copenhagen. Denmark's economic needie with the Common Market la scarce-ly less pressing than Austria's.




politicalis further straining Argentina's fragileey problem is the role to

be played by the Peronists, who comprise about one quarter of the electorate, in the Juneelections. This issue has caused serious divisions among the Peronists themselves, as well as among other political and military groups /"

Peronlst political parties. They also fear that Interior Minister Martinez' strategy based on splitting the Peronlst vote will be Just asas that of Frondlzi, who was ousted after the Peronlst victories In

non-Peronlst political parties arefor Peronlst supportational front, counting on tbe government to keep thefrom presenting candidates for top government posts. To curry Peronlst favor, of seven political parties demanded in late January that the government remove the legal ban against open Peronlst political activity. Thesecorrectly anticipated that tbe government would maintain the ban, whicb, if lifted, would Jeopardize their own fortunes. The Peronists are exploiting this opportunistic gambit, and are claiming thatercent of the electorate support their demands to campaign on anpro-Peron ticket.

The armed forces have made clear that they will not accept return of the Peronbut will agree to the Peronists' campaigningasis of Peronism without Peron. Some military officers, especially those retired last year, believe that even this strategy is too risky, given the present disarray ofost

impressive victories Inst March were on tho UP ticket In the Buenos Aires metropolitan area.

It is unlikely that Peron would feel bound by anyof this kind. Afor Peron in Madrid has denied that Peron agreed to any electoral deal, and Indicated that instead Peronists wouldtrategy ofplanning" until the This apparently could Involve recourse toaction If it appeared likely to succeed.


Bosch of the Dominican Republic, Just roturnedwo-month trip abroad, has attacked what he calls "vested interests" and may be preparing action that would leadajor political crisis. ress lntoryiew, onebruary, described| as "disappoint-

inglye claimed that he had obtainod "three times as much aid" in Europe as in the US.

Bosch's remarks on theconstitution, which he said should beave an impression that he backs those features that appearto private property,and foreign investment. He is apparently already at sword's point with members of the outgoing roglme, and therehance that vlolonce or assassination attempts mayat hisforebruary.

on theution "can only havein frightening the business and propertied classes." In general, his remarks appeared to clash with, and may damage the fruits of, his own efforts in the US and Europe to getaid for the Dominican Republic.

The majority of Dominicans favor, or have become reconciled to, the need for social andreform. Members of tbe propertied classes andleaders of the outgoing administration,were deeply alarmed over the new constitution draft's lack of specific guarantees for property rights and over its broadif fully used would amountadical reform.

Officers of the armed forces almost unanimously expressed their apprehensions that the proposed constitution would discourage foreign investments necessary to the country'sprogress, and many of tbe military termed it a "Communist document." The armed forces, although they still appeared disposed to support thegovernment at the time of Bosch's return, have been put on their guard and will be alert to any trend they considerto lead to the left.

Military leaders also are expressing increased concern over the role of BrigadierAntonio Imbert and Luistwo survivors of tbe group which assassinated dictatorthe rapid growth of the national police force and over tho force'sto acquire woaponsariety more properly associated wltb tho mission of tbe armed forces. The military officer corps objects to the largeby the police, which in turn reduce budgetneeded by the armed forces to complete their transformation

into small but well-equipped and trained units.

Despite the complaints of the military, which they will probably raise with Bosch when he takes office, Imbertdoes not appear ready to relinquish tho power tbat he has gainedembor of the outgoing regime. Imbert already bas indicated his intention to use the pollco to oust Bosch if he feels it is necessary to do so.

Feb 63


f 16

Bosch's unstablehas already causedin pre-inaugural Upon his election last December, he apparently had few plans worked out in detail for taking control of tbe One of the purposes of his trip abroad appears to have boon to gain time to formulate policies for his administration.

the Dominican military relegated to the background, security preparations for the Inauguration have provedto arrange. [



As tho fifth largestIn the world and with strength unequaled in Southeast Asia, Indonesia appears to be increasingly obsessed byol of great-power status. President Sukarno and other Indonesian leaders regard as inimical any development which might retard Indonesian evelopment is the proposed Federation ofwhich is to be composed of Malaya, Singapore, and the British territories of Sarawak, Brunei, and North Borneo, and is scheduled to be formed by this August.

Indonesia's Motivation

Sukarno, who sees himselfctivinely inspired leader who will lead "his people" to national unity, apparently is also dreaming of presidingew Indonesian empire. His favorite character In the Hindu epic drama, to which he is devoted, Is the "warrior king."

A significant factor in expansionist thinking apparently is the belief that Indonesia ultimately will have to defend itself and the surrounding area against Chinese Communistor even attack.

Indonesian interest in the Borneo territoriesogical area of expansion is stimulated by geographic contiguity,claims, and ethnic ties with two of the area'sMalays and the indigenous tribes people.


Indonesians' emotions on the Borneo issue are the more Intense because thephilosophy and emotional bias of most of Indonesia's leaders and of much of thepublic are almostopposed to theof Malaya's leaders. foreign policy, although officially nonaligned, has strong anti-Western undertones. Malaya still associates itself closely with the West, and the backers of the Malaysia concept intend that the federationimilar posture. Malayan Prime Minister Rahman in particular appears to Djakarta toool of the British.

Domestically, tbe anti-Malaysian campaign serves Sukarno much as did the campaign to take over West New Guinea. Perhaps most important, it channels the energies of the anti-Communist army and the Communist Partyommon goal. Sukarno retains hisposition in great part by balancing off these two major internal power factors, and he has long insisted that in the interests of national unity he wants them to work in the same direction rather than counter to each other. An anti-Communist army which is notwith external military operations apparently poses in Sukarno'shreat to his personal position, to national unity, and to his political aspirations.

At the same time Sukarno almost certainly believes that

Moreover, Indonesla's massive purchases of arras, chiefly from the Soviet Union, made it possible for Sukarno to settle the West New Guinea dispute ln his favor and have enabled him to strike hisattitude toward Malaya. Indonesia may well cite its anti-imperialist policy on Malaysia as an argument tothe USSR to reschedule and extend payments onf>-million debt for arms purchases.

An ever-present motivation for all Sukarno's externalis the need to divert attention from Indonesia's chronic economic problems-problems for which he has little taste and less talent.

Indonesia's Timing

Tlie timing of Indonesia's moves and the change inpolicy from the vaguely stated and generalized opposition to Malaysia last fall to Intense hostility in mid-January seems to have resultederies of factors. Foremost would

Feb 63


2 of 8

appear to be the abortive Brunei rebellion of last December.

8 and Malayan expansionist designs on Sumatra at that time. Ho added that Rahman's hostility toward Indonesia indicated that be might beool ofconspiracy" against Indonesia.

Sukarno stated2 February speech that Indonesia considers Malaysia asof the Indonesianthe product of the brains and efforts of neocolonialism" meant to protect the economic investmonts of the imperialists. He reiterated Indonesia'swith the "struggle of the people of North Borneo."

Indonesian Military Moves

a policy appears to have been initiated almost immediatelyanuary, when IndonesiaK note regarding the Brunei revolt

suoanario announced Indonesia's policy ofagainstall opposition short of war. At that time he denounced Malaya as an accomplice of the neo-colonlallsts andand accused tho Malayan Government of hostility toward Indonesia.

Since then the level of vituperation has risen almost dally. Subandrio warned onebruary that incidents and even war with Malaya might follow the establishment of the Malaysia Federation. Heeries ofacts by Prime Minister Rahman which included active support of Indonesian rebels in tbo provincial rebellion

In mid-January both Subandrio and National Security Minister Nasution

thatnaepenaence seeKers"

in the North Borneo territories request military training,

Indonesia would comply. ground forces inBorneo consist of eight infantry battalions, one of whichommando unit.

Onanuary Indonesia announced that it was carrying out air and naval patrols of its sea borders with Malaya, and its land boundaries with British Borneo.! '

current intelligence weekly summary


special articles

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: