KEHOBAICJuM FOB: Director of Central Intelligence
Chraaolcgy of Bventa Leading to tha Transfer of Cuban Overflight Responsibility
the cow story and the desirability of ehangfng itcckhsed ferry flight enroute to Puerto Rico to thatoutine Air Force peripheral surveillanceon. Follovtng this discussion Mr. KcCone and Mr. Cllpatrlc mot vitfc higher authority regarding the type of cover story to be cnployed.
2. 2 tha Cover Conolttee art tn Dr. Charyk's offlca. Dr. Scovllla agreed ttiat In tbe long run the cow story statins, in case of mishap, that thaoutine Air Force peripheral surveillance mission, was probably the bettor of the two. Dr. Scovllla emphasizedAC pilot should not be used until be had received adequate training. There ma no conclusion reached aa to what organization should control and mrrmind theIA or SAC. Dr. Charyk then called Secretary OUuatrlc vho In turn contacted tho Dd. Dr. ScovlUo was informed that the ECI bad agreed to SAC 'running' the mission. Dr. Scovllla returned to tho office and advised the DCZ of tho fact that tho SAC pilots ware not current In5 configured ff-a. The Director telephoned Secretary Cdlpatrlo end stated that ho wold not agreeAC mission unless the pilot una thoroughly trained. Apparently laaodlataly following Mr. McCone's earlier ccecurronce. Secretary Odlpatrle advised Mr. McCeorse Bundy that Hr. KcCone had agreed that the mission would be flownilitary nightAC pilot.
SUBJECT: Tho Chronology of Bventa Leading to the Transfer
of Cuban Overflight Responsibility frca CIA to SAC
ctober MajorAC pilotat the CIA detachment at Edwards Air Force Base.
U Octoberooting with the DCI, DDCI,DAD/OOA It waa dadoed that If tha operation una tothen the mission would be flown by CIA under the However, If tie operation vaa to be overt,alaalon would be flown. Air Force pilot In uniform.
Onctober CIA waa advised by Secretary OUpatrlc that approval bad been granted by higher authority for SAC to fly the Cuban mission.
Onctober SAC received cable authorisation? HOjfl to execute tha Cuban mission from Sorth Edwards Air Fores Base.
Onctober Dr. ScovilOe telephoned Mr. Bundy to register his caution againstAC pilot until he hod been adequately trained.
3. Coctoberelephone conversation with Secretary Gilpatric, Dr. Scovllla again stressed his concern that the pilot bo adequately trainedlsslon. He further stated that the 5RQ bed not consulted CIA and In fact had made decisions without consulting or advising those (CTA) who vera responsible. Following this conversatian Dr. Charyk called Dr. ScoriUe and agreed that he would not approveAC mission unless the pilot had received adequate training. It abould be noted that the training syllabus which CIA felt necessary5 training of the SAC pilots consisted of ground echool for eight clossrooa hours, one transition flight of two hours including practice landings,ndecond daytime flight Una of four hours,hird flightours at night employing celestial SAC, however, launched Major Beyser on the Ik October mission with only three hours and forty-five nlnutea recurrence flight check at low altitude.
Onctober General Carter, as Acting DCI, forwarded tha menorandua to tha Honorable McGeorgo Bundy confirming the
SUBJECT: "Bm Chronology of Swnta leading to the Transfer of Cuban Owrfldght Beapauilbllity from CIA to SAC
transfer of ornmnrt aod control respocs ibtlity foracoDBBlaeaaae flights from CIA to SAC onctober. Oeneral Carter recorded, his objections tbat tbe decision for tbe change in tbe cow story vee interpreted to retire aa fiaaadlate aad ccnn?leto disruption of our eatabliohed ope rutins procedurea. General Carter attached for Mr. Bundy'sssassasssse' directing tbe subject transfer.
10. Oactober stoOeorga Bandy forwarded eto tbe Deputy Secretary of Defense end to the Acting Director of Central Intelligence which conflraed that the respcaaribiUty for the Cuban owjrfligbt bad been vested io tbc Department of Defense. He pointed out, however, that In hie jodgeesrt the responsibility for that ad sal on was not to be regardedinding pracedenoo and that the whole euesticn of roles aad responsibilities would be reviewed by the appropriate special group sod presented to higher authority for decision.
U. On lh October tho overflight Brian! on was launched from Edwards Air Force Base and recovered at McCoy Air Force Beaeuccessful overflight.
Onctober Oeneral rover, CUB SAO, called the CIA Detacbasat ccensnder to express his appreciation for CIA's excellent support la preparation ofor the lb October ntnsiou. Major Oeneral Compton and Major General Wilson also phoned their coetplisonte aad appreciation.
eeting atte House on the morning ofctober thereiscussion sod approval of two additional overfllghto of Cuba to be performed underr>Tifl and control. Oho additional flights were approved by higher authority. Immediatelyecond meeting was held in Mr* Bandy's office coo-slating of Mr. Bandy. Mr. McCcne, Mr. Cdlpatrio, Mr. Alexia Johnson, Genaral Taylor, and Oeneral, Carter. Biereeneral discussion of all of tbe facets of ecnmtnd and control for overflight opera-tloua as veiliscussion of cover plans. After thorough-
going exchangee of views, Ooaaral Taylor suggested that comaond aad control should be returned to the Central Intelligence Agencythat the military pilots reauired be furnished by SAC. He further suggested that tbe overall ccordiaotioo of all recon-naioeanco flights be handledingle coordinating agency.
SaBJBTTt 5he Chronology of Ivente leading to tha Trooafar of Cuban OrexflLtdrtQ CTA to SaC.
poaslbly SAC. ar. Gilpatric agreed bat thought that 5to should ba the coordinating After further disffuaalqn it waa the gsoerel ccoseneua of tho entire group (with the exception of Mr. Johnson who did not axpreae hiaeelf) that tha CIA ecmplex for overfltgit opera tl ana would remain intact and would exercise cciaaand and control of Cuban military orerfLlgbta executed by that complex; that 8ac would furnish the military pilots to CIA for CIA's use; that TOO would be the coordinating aganoy for
Cuban soawsm^uwmmoj matm* to ipatosai CIA capabUltles, 8AC capabilities, and CTKLAMF capabilities. It waa agreed that Dr. Cfaeryb would study tha on tire problem and ease upeooaaeoded plan. Dr. Chary* was not directed to Halt himself to tha above conceptit woe the com ensue of all proa ant, however, that tola oooeapt waa the ooa that appeared most workable and most lixaly to provide notional intelligence objectives.
ih* Onctober, since tha overflights of Cuba had reached oatrlgit overt nature, it waa decided by higher authority that for tha present,secoaalassnea of Cuba would ocntlnae under SAC direction and occaaond control.
gZKBSSJTLLB, JR. Deputy Director (Research)
DDCI Bxec Dir