Created: 4/17/1963

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SUBJECT 1 Haitian Exile Activity Afpdnet Duvaller Go temp ant

X* This nemorendun auanarlaea tba meeting vhicb took place In tba office of the President'a Special As blatant for Rational SecurityMr. McGeorge Bundy, on IS April,5 Others ia attendance: for tha Department of State: Assistant Secretary Edwin Kartln and Deputy Director for Caribbean and Mexican Affairs, Mr. Kennedy Crockettj for the Central Intelligence Agency: Mr. Kiehard Helna, Colonel J. C. King, and Raymond Q. Recce.

2. At Mr. Bundy'a invitation, Mr. Helms outlined the progress that had been achieved in recent contaota vlth various Haitian axilsa in tha United States vlth respect to their organisation and plans for action afp.ir.st the Duvaller Qosemeent. He described the Fusion Group'sthe linking up of the Parti Nationals, the UDH and various Independents. He also notedeparate source of

had produced evidence of a

developing relationship between these two and various American private

interests for an antl-Duvsliar coup. There were also

Independent0 not associated with either of these two efforts


i)mi>?syrs outside of the country, such as Father Blssainthe's Toung Turk" group


In New York. Mr. Helms concluded by noting that tba Chief of Operations

of the Fusion Group, General Cantave, had departedpril, for the Dorainican Republic to survey conditions on-the-spot.

3. CIA was now in the position ofecision or guidance with respect to the continuation of tbe exploratory and elicitation activity which had been accomplished.

U. Mr. Martin carman ted that he recognized that considerable progress had been made by tbe Riga ad group in organising Haitian exile activity, but he was inclined to place greater Bignificance on assets in being within Haiti rather than outside and on denonstrable contacts by the outside elements with those in the country, which could be activated in accordance with the previously known plan. He was not convinced that the Hlgaud group roally had these contacts in ansense, nor was he convinced that the Rifpud groupetailed plan which could be judged on its merits Inf success or failure. Kr. Martin was doubtful of tho wisdon, ultimately, of basing Haitian exile activity on the assurance of support from Juan Bosch in tbe DDRinican Republic Thia would be intervention and the net effect, he felt, would go against tha United States. Mr. Martin also raised the question of whether it would be possible to stage an effective novo against Duvalier in the near future because of the decimation that had taken place among the high-ranking nilitaryonsequence of the abortivepril Aroy leader coup. He also raised the question

regarding the bona fides of various participants. In particular, ho

ossible double agent and asked whether the

repeated tripe of Pi airebrnar wife between Port-au-Prinoe and Puerto 3loo bad been explained satisfactorily.

5* Mr. Kartln alao indicated hie doubts with regard to Oeneral Magloire's role in the Fusion activity as financier and wire-puller. He placed significant emphasis upon the participation In the anti-Duralier activity of Francois La Tortus.

Colonel King sustained the feasibilityilitery Move into Haiti fron the Dominican Republic overlandorce of between one hundred and five hundred individuals.

Mr. Martin expressed his agreement with the low opinion held by Mr. Helas of Dejoie'e capability to actnifier in Haitian politics. However, he stated, that it waa hla understanding that Bosch preferred Dejoie to any other Haitian exile candidate. Bocca pointed out that Pierre Blemod niaaelf bad indicated doubt that Dejole bad had any assurance of support or, for that utter, hadirect meeting with Bosch. It was agreed that Dejoie was attempting to make use of discussions he had had with the Don lnlean president during the period he was in exile.

8- It appeared that there waa agreementall the participants


tbat If assistance vera togiven to tbs anti-Duvalisr effort outside tbs country, the group with greatest promise of success waa the Fusion Group now led operationally by Cantave in which the Jtigauds and Hodrlguea (with respect to whom Mr. Martin also expressed his personal doubts)eading part.

9. Five aation steps were agreed upon fbr lnnediato iaplomenta-

a. In response to Mr. Martin'sountry evaluation of the remaining anti-Ouvalier capabilities of Amy leaders identified in

Secure an evaluation froa oppositionists inside the country of their preference and relatione with exile leaders and scvenents outside Haiti. Hadhere was singled out as one to be queried in this respeot.

o. areful debriefing of General Cantave and get his estimate of tho possibilitiesuccessful antl-Duvaliar sffort upon his return froei his current inspection.

SI Check specific Latin American leaders with respect to their attitudes and support fbr Pierre Rlgaud and the UDH. (Thiseferencetatement contained in the


briefing paper tabled by CIA which indicated that Pierre ftigaud claimed to have the support of Pepe Figueres, Muaos Marin and HomuOo Betancourt.) This will be carried outlindfor information by the Department of State.

e. Cheek with Sacba Volman regarding the results of bin personal inspection on behalf of Juan Bosch of the situation in Haiti.


Distribution! r. Bundy^ Mr. Martin Mr. MoConeelms Col. Xing Mr. Rocca

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