B. Chalmers Wood
Director, Working Group, Vietnam
Transmittal of Memorandum Concerning Manpower Utilization in South Vietnam
Attached for your background information you will find setting forth thervSrious eroTTPB^involved in the Cities in Southattempted to set as clearly as possible the various objectives and missions of each of these activities with some emphasis on how they are coordinated and how they fit into the over-all picture.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
for release date.0
i:li!td 'si* BBroKi,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. B. Chalmers Wood
Director, Working Group, Vietnari
Transmittal of Memorandum Concerning
Manpower Utilization in South Vietnam
Attached for your background information you willaper setting forth the various groups Involved ln the CIDG activities in South Vietnam. We have attempted to set forth as clearly as possible the various objectives and missions of each of these activities with some emphasis on how they are coordinated and how they fit into tho over-all picture.
FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS)
William E. Colby
SUBJECT: Hanoower Utilisation ia South Viotnaa
Irregulars are participatingprotectioneeir nose areas iu Viotnaa. This figureto increase to approximatelyby tbe ooiyear lb6n. Since there areaaieta ppproxiaately
Vtatnaa this works out toot appro* .aatalvha*let. Thisinascule ogore Jor the 'y&TZ^lvcal
t supplemented by the approximately
j0 regular and seei-resular forces0 police Barvicee. tbe regular forces uuet concentrate on offensive actions, tbe protection of the population rests in tbe hands ofirregular forces. The task of protectionifficult ooorovinceho isfor an avoraeeeraooa In un average areaquare Alio*.
Taere Is nttac-ielrief description or tbe various countennaurgency activities bein? conducted laiotnaa.
recent rapidtrength of tbeDefense Groups (CIPO) elements2 toJanuaryheiiiot appearariatyo? differenthas given soae concern aa to the effect* of tfe<sirtln on tiae available resources of Vletnaa. It hassoaehe possibly uncoordinated aspect oforganizations which aigatastaae oravailable caapowcr resources. eviewpecificssituation however willoordinated concept lnof these forces end the fact that they will notadverse effect upon tbe total use of aonpower inin relation to the character of battle sain* onthia tixe.
Aray- *Rvyl" rorc*Vietnam totalled These were eupploaoatejoorly trainee
and0 Civil Guars and0 Self-
Corps. Taeee forces wore given priority In augmentation,
stepped-up training and improved equipment, so that they are
tocay at tho following strengths:
experience during this build up perioi reves-led, however, tnat these forcea were barely able to boll their own by acting as regular forcessjoj conventional tactics.
Since tbo nature oi tbe war becaae clearly a 'people'satherrSt becaae essential to engage tae population actively in its osn defense. For tile reason tbe pro-iraa of developing the Citizens* Irregular Dorcas wasn 1SSI. In order to increase the 'pooplo'B' content of these forces and to avoid the delays and failures which ha4 accompanied efforts toany national organisations, it vas decided that this effort to develop Citizens1 Irregular Forces should begin at the bottos rather than the top. An Intensive search thus took place Tor individuals anU leaders capable of participating in the development of the Citizens' Irregular Forces. It was apparent however that soue coordination *osn theof such forces, noons other things to maintain gvs approvaltheir growth. Since the 'people's' character vas paramount, anti since the organizational structure of th* Vietnamese Govern/tent as it affects the population isround the province snd district chiefs. It washat this coordination function should best be exercised through snd with these officials.esult each snd every Citizens' Irregular defense Force which viiBetail with the local province sod district chief and extensive efforts -sereo maintain their full awareness, control an'.', support of the Activity.
5. In orcer to provide the necaaais-s) tor nationalof-such forcos s. varietj of national level units was used, such as the Presidential Survey Office, tho Directorate General of Youth, and the Directorate of Social Affairs for the 'dignlaads. In all cases their contributionsarticular area situation wore funnelhrough the province ant- district chief. Since tho province and district chief also controlled tneps aad Civil Guard ana police in their areas, this brought about sn automatic coordination beteaen these seal-regular forces andirregular groups. Sincerovince chiefs are ailitory sen, they are well equipped to eaploy ant! coordinate these various groups. At tho nationaliailar total view van eel: by President Dies ani his brother Bgo Dlnb Nou.
6. concurrently with tne dovalopaont ol tne above too categories Ot forces, regular and irrel;ulnr, tho gvs itselfa nu.iher o: pro^raac ln tbe irrsjular hold. those wore later conaol' itonto the strategic llanlet i'rograa under which local defense forces vora built in saany arose, in part using veapossther equtpeent ivsilafcle to tlio ovnad bean free: by im roequippinf ol regular. equipment. ve do not have precise figures available as to the total numbersut ra are awarethey sro eutataatlal. these activities ar* also included is th* automatic coordination process, as tawy too are ooadqctady the province and district chiefs.
7. in the irregular field, tae basic conceptooprovidingocal defease. avsilabl*it impossible tor every citizen totbe
aeane for his own defease an' consequently efforts aro aa-lethose cltlrens, provideith protective shields,nucleus ofod trained sea la their co>vaunity. arlot which mlfihteople would surroundedrotective ijefeaso and wouldroup on trained la defense tecuniquea. ofo isheith suns, tbe ot!mra being;
arse} witho wapons, and tbe remainder ofn tbe defense work ln other wa>s. oere sufficiently concentrated effort can behas prove', desirable ana in *oai cases essential tofor*al unitsneijfh boringto operate lntoo ureas bet we an tn* defended aaaletc. (strike iea). -laore uninhabited sroae it has been essential topatrols or toaus to ponotrate aaontain or u. isa transient basiseneral territory oftien. (mountain scouts). since aoat of thoso forcenlocal, they obviously will involve nore peoplebe necessaryiore regular force available forvarious arena, wherever the threat ssl .ht bo toethe nooent. u of the totalsaniroa toe fact that tho re areietnaw organised *ato 'villages'. tneo the latter s. uvea averaje ofa per ua-ilot! total com both of tiieee figures are obviously opsn toonehe otaer.
s. the question lay tie aoru regular forces could not supply this type ot protection or atubstantial degree of it. eview oi the arituaetic again voulc indicate
tbo Solf-Cetonso Corps which normally la ae 'village*otal strength of Taking tae figurelllugee,olf-Dsfenac Corp* 4en per tbeopulationillage above isthis displays tao basis for the frequentlye Self-tmf^nse Corps is xoilce itits activity to tie eccupat:ooort at theasd th* rtefens* of its own security. Tao ;thusTillage chief ver, little handle
tor toe protection oi bis entir* village,s insteac used rotection for the auninlatrativw nucleus. Tae protection oi tbo population is consequentn the han't* of tho Irregular 'forces. The Civil Guar.l, souais ally under th* control of the Provinceetoly iO in total) and tnus each Provinceould normally oops to uave sosevnat lessivil Guar^saenattalion an: t, half to cover his area (averageveragequare ailes). The Segular Forces are obviously useo as tbe senile reserve with as offensive -aission against the essay wherever he con to found. To th* extent the nbovo Irregular forces can protect areas against eaeay attack, tho tegular Yorcee are freed far offensive roles rattier than static deienso osttleo.
d. The Police Services obviouslyossible tool lor population control in areas vrhore sufficient security can b* proviuo^ to permit theu to operate on other than nilitory or seir-iiefeuse basis. aa in the Soonusp lea, when a
egree of security is provided to an area the fc'overo*ent can b* expected toubstantial amount of the weapons glvon to the population of ttieir local defense. olice force would then fill the nseaocal control sec jams*.
10. Aaaiost this bachAttocasout will identify
the various types of Citizens' IrrwjfUlar 7orceshaveevoldpor. over the prist two years. Respite their variety of nomenclature they ere broughtiolo by the province And district chiefs.
STJSJ^CT: CounterInsurgency Activities in South Vletnas
Flnce the CITJG program involvesviae variety of programs (see below) all Ito meet specific needs of various rural areas la South Viotnaa, the CID3 approacharticular region is callcl aaevelopment projraii. CIDG trainingtiocs are thus called AreaCenters (ADC). At present, there areWC, aad by, areo be in exlstenca.BBBAt each AM, all ol the cffTj programs directeda particular area are carried oat. In soma cases, specific CXDQ groups are trained at soae distance fro* their hoae arena, but ae the aa-aber of ADC Increases, more and more CIDG training can be carried oat close to tbe bono aroao of tho various trainees*
A. Cino Activities to be Olvea Over to Special "orcea Control
By I ad been trained and anted, roe ban lot ailitla are sllply^people living in Vietnamese villages rho have volunteered to accept trainingpone la order to participate actively ln defense of their village and lnaedlnte areas. Is addltloa to defensive duties, hanlet ailitla carry oat aggressive patrolling In tho general area of their villages.
These troopsparamilitary forces wblcb have boon recruited fron local volunteers and have been given acre advanced training tban tnat given tbe ha* let ailitla. Thoy are organized and trained agcveealve patrol elenentn bat can be coamittod ia platoon or coopany strength as required. Strike force units patrol continuously throughout areas in vhlch CIDG prosrans are ln progress checking: village defeasas, weapons, andbnalet ailitla. Strike forces are prepared to aove quickly to assist any village under attack. They aro capable of conducting large-end saall-ecale raids and ambushes la VC controlled areas aad long suspected routes of VC aoveaent. most strike force personnel aro paid (currently by CXA) on tbe sane scale aa tne civil guard. trike force person nol have been trained as ofecember.
people to tieir cause. Tae mountain coswan-'o program alsoelate4 Intelligence network wntca is coordinated through the Vietnamese province and district chiefs, as ofeeoator, approximatelyH%tasa aountain coxsandos haC been trained withore ic training.
2* Popular yprce
Too popular. also Itnowne Force Popolairo, is an attoapt to estaliiish apresence in Vietnamese villages which have noton fortified under the strategic ha-alot program Specially selected youths, *iany o whoa have hat! relativesy the VC, are given weapons and civic action trAtnis^ prior to being sent to villages roaiovedheir ho-ae areas, where they helphy villages against VC incursionsro-OVK presence. This proara* has been lopleaented in central Viet nan ana, approximately | |personnel have been trained.
3. Trallwatcharo (border surveillance units)
tfeabora of the border surveillance uniteorefroa store promising olesente of the str-fco forces (see above) and other CIHG groups. It is planner that these units will fee usef? to check and report on infiltration of VC cadre into Sooth Vietnam froa Laos an: Casbo-iia. These units will reaain tn place along tae border only until border residents themselves can bo rf-cruited sn; integratedoaprohacsivo borcer nurveillance net. In those border areas where tuero is no permanent population, the ESI? will regain in place, establishing ties with those ethnic groups which constantly shift back nod forth across the ill-dofiaed border. Pour units of I Irten have been trelnoi.
Republican Yooth aavoaont (ttYfe)
The SYM wns started in5 and nowouths of both sexes. Of this nusber,
vr^lSic paraailitary training while JaY^ ueaboro have receivedilitary and civio action training froa CIA. The sain contribution of the ava has bean aati will continue to be assisting in the defense of the Strategic Haslets. In the 3olte region the BYS have replaces! asmy evil guard units ia defend;n& recestlyStrategic Harslets. In order to oxploit thopotential of theivic action cadre prograsy both AID and CIAbeen developed in conjunctionthe Selects-.', ertfa- oenbers oret vnrious area development centers in nodical, econo&lc, social and recreational techniques in order to ssslot the peasantry to japrove their living standards.
These teajua are too activated oaits of what vastotaybouiad aocaaaisa. (Planning farlaploaentedlae that it was thought ailViotnaa ot;.ht be lost to the coanunlsts.) Theseselectedecruited by aa area organizer andtraining at oae of tbe area developmentare directed by Vietnamese area orgaalnera who usecollect and act on their ovn intelligence and thatprovided by other clandestine parts o the Combat intelligence teams are composed of la Byecember,ana ha.', been trained.
he nuebor of personnel to be trained by the3 under CIDO/non-SalTCliDACX activities Are as follows:
9 0 0
Ca-MITTKE ON PROVINCE RniABILrPATIO-:;
SUMMARY KKrWll JO3
(Meeting or-^nn-ly aciie-rtuled for February a)
At toe re aw st of General Ad*GV, th- following Is to bo inserted Ir. lieu of tho first paratraph, page ft, Suxiary Report ofetlr^ of February
"-ener-al Adaws reported Shot general Harfcins hadai.and letter to Chief KAAG and the four Corps senior Advisors.letter placed command enpha.*ie on the Province Rehabilitation Frctraa.nted out the necessity for olose cooperation bitwer.. nilitary. civilian agamies Involved,"
Mr. Troehenrtnvented Colonel Schend, Mf.AU, on tlie latest Issue of the Status Report prepared by Colonel Sehaad'a section.
Ai^inda Item X Inte-lm report by Suhpoannittec on resources control.
Mr. Adkins,ported thnt although PSD was ln possession of so-ie iteua of Inforsationesulturvey conducted on resources control, he believed It would he preferable to postpone tite lnterlo report until theetlng. ?he Conolttoe so agreed.
Agenda Iter. II -- Plswsslon and acce^tar.cc of suoh province plana as .ue" ready for"s si on.
sta^ed he was sntlsfie several thousandnta coordinated with Spec! his understand!:i& that
Discussion of the plan for Kontust provinceAP portion was approved at theontinued. Mr. Phillips,
d relocation effort involving ed also that tlie plan had been tatlves, Ka added that It was oeran would be tailored to fit
Major Stoinbort, MAAU, opened the discussion of tho ilelkuplan. He summarizsd the Information felven at the priorase number of hamlets to be buiKj the nuabsr of barbed wire fences to be erectedt she nuaber of steal fence posts to be used, etc. Nr. Trueheart inquired whyfe0 dlltla were to be trained for thirty days whereas nllltla recruits in other provinces have received fifteen days training. Mr. Phillips, JSCK,elieved that the additional train in,,Bt^Sea^ffffT^Eeprovlnee chief's desires to blve (OS trainees additional political Durint tne discussion, the Cocwiitteo was informed that the province chief wanted to train moreilitia and that the excess over this number were to be tralnsd by Special Forces at Plsl Krone. Colonel Calloway pointed out th.it tho Special Forces capability at Plel Wrong, and at other cataps In the aren, was such that they could notore trainees without additional cadres. Rr. Phillips stated thateatins attended by hlniater Klsu (Civiclan for the training of additional cadres was outlined- It appeared, therefore, that additional cadres would be available in the future should Plel rtroTi, be called upon to undertake .nllitia training over and aboveHo scheduled by the province chief.
Theee approved the Ploiku province plan with the under-standint that the thirty-day training cycle for the railitia would be utilized fully and profitably.
Major Steinberg th-nintroduced the plan for the province of Phu Bon. He outlined the MAP support material to be furnished and the nurfaer of han.lets to be constructed in She two phases. Although weapons would not be required, since Specialprojects had made sufficient weapons available, tbe province chief did want fifty shotguns and fifty carbines to hold in ressrve should the need for thaw arise. Colonel Patton, MACV, co-iMtented that Special Fo.-cts wars setting nore deeply into the hamlet Militia training and observed thateasofficer in each pro/ince has to adapt himself to the province chief, the population, and the npeeifib problems. Therefore,sot approach was not possible since no two provinces or province chiefs or provlnoe populations were the sane.
The Co-.Lit tee approved the Phu Son province plan.
Discussion of tneprovince plan was reopened by Major Steinberg who pointed oit that regroupEent had reduced the nuaber of defended villagesid that this fioure was included in the total of 3I6 planned at'-ategle hamlets In this province. HAP support
uould be allocated for the excess over Its, that. strategic haslets.ould be broken down intonone, each with one squad ofit, andnone, each with twohree squads of militia.ere broken down intonone endn'ononone,epleted, the total of 3I6 will break down Into Rl inone,nnenone.
It was noted thattrategic hamlets had been completed in addition to theefended villages turned over to province oontrol. However, it is not planned to turn over any core Specialreated units until the prooedurea for the turnover proceaa proposed byave been accepted. Mr. True heart Inquired aa to the auount of ooney earmarked for the teacher training school. r. Philips reported that there was ar, extreme need for teachers end unless .lontatonards were trainee', as teaohera, it would be necessary to bring In outside Vietnamese teachers which ere also ln short supply. During the discussion, the Ccc<tee was informed ti.at theillages turned over to province control would not be eligible for emergency relief or brant In kind for the construction of hamlet defense perimeters.
Tho Darlae provino* plan was approved.
Major Blake, HAAG,lan to constructew strategic hamlets In ninh Duongn Tay Nlnh province. :ic suimfiarlrod tho forces to be Involvedhe cons-.motion phases. The purpose of the new harlots Is to clear the highwayth of Den Cat to Tay Minh. tart will be .irde to clear the highway fron Ben Cat north to Binh Long. The additional funds required are necessary for the additkxial teens, trainees, self-help projects and supplies for the bulldozers to be used to clear the land.
Mr. Ula*er, USO-i, outlined the economic projects planned for the newM would make available livestock, fertiliser,n an effort to make tho villagers sera self-sufficient,
Kr. Pike, USIS, reported that his agency had been asked to produco two editions of Klen tuoc for those two provinces. Ho stated that this effort would place an extreuely heavy burden on his agency's capability. HT. Trueheart suggested that USIS might get an agreement to do one edition for both provinces. Colonel Schsad, HAAG, suggested that tho publication night be alternated weekly batweon the two provincea. Given tills guidance, Mr. Pike will proceed to worktually acceptable agreement with the province officials concerned.
Colonel Cleland, KACV, submitted the revised raemorar.duoadditional ecmaents. Mr. Trueheart stated he wouldinen.oranduni and thatoxmlttaead conraents orshould phone them tc sir. Trueheart. The memorandum will thento the GVN under coveretter addressed to theInterior as Secretary General of tho Interninisterlal Corralttee
Agenda Item IV Other Business
GeneralCV,opyetter to Chief ISAAC and to the Senior Advieors in which Goneral Harkins expressed the desire that the addressees direct their attention to the Clear-arid-Holdin progress and plannsd within their respective areas. They Should make every effort to Insure that military forces provided are adequate, operational plan3 are sound, KAP supplies are properly
utilized and that there la continuous coordination.
military. civilian agencies involved. General Adans said that thc letter had been discussed with the (iVMopy had not
been made available to them. The Committee was of the opinion that
a copy might be sent to General To for his information.
Colonel Cleland reported on the JGS briefing. His notes will be put Into memo form for circulation to the Committee.
Colonel Kendrtek, Special Forces, submitted an interim report on the overall CUC effort.. He stated the report would be up-dated in the near future.
Colonel Schaad informed the Cotaaittee that carbines were toto hamlet
Tho Committee agreed to hold its next moating in theonferenceon Friday, February lq0 hours.Original document.