3
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Supersede*f)
Soviet Military Capabilities and
'Milium nioTniDUTioM
SvbmUntd by ihm DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD A* tadtaMd owW3
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate!
The Centra! Intelligence Agency ond Ihe intelligence organiiations ol 'heof Stole. Detente, iho Army, rho Novy. lhe Air Force, AlC. and NSA.
Concurring:
Direclor ol Intelligence ond RMearch, Depc-lmenl of SJote Director. De'ente Intelligence Agency
Awisionl Chic* ol Sioff lor Intelligence, Deportment of Ihe Army AwiMont Chief ol Naval Operationseparlmenl of the Novy Assistant Chief o> Staff. Intelligence, USAF Direclor for Intelligence. Joint Staff
Tho Atomic Energy Commission Representative lo theirector of lhe Notional Security Agency
Abstaining;
The AuLikint Director, Federol Bureau of Investigation, the subject being outside of hit jurisdiction
effecting the Notional Dflleoteof
within th*M_
nHMlei^oT^evelation of which In any manner to an
I HI JLUlLf"
tm-^rWPoM
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Soviet Military Capabilities and
TOP SIX Kf.fr
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TIIE 1
SCOPE 1
SUMMARY AND 1
Military Policymaking
Recent Course of Militaryi$
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21
L SOVIET MILITARY
A. Basic Views on War and Military
IS
D. Problems of Future MilitarySOVIET HIGII COMMAND STRUCTURE
AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET ARMED
IN MILITARY
V. FORCES FOR LONG RANGE
Policy Toward Long Range Striking Forces
Ballistic
and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
Launching
Range
Q. Intercontinental
H- Space
I. Implications of
VI. AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
Capabilities and Future
SCCRCT' TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
Page
VII. THEATER FIELD
Missile and Air
Air
Nuclear
V. Capabilities (or Theater
VIII. NAVAL
A. Submarine
U. Surface
for Naval
IX. SPECIAL
and Biological
ANNEX A: TABLES ANNEX B: TABLES
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APITOEB FORi HISTORICAL-REVIEWSOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND
THE PROBLEM
To review significant developments in Soviet military thinking, policy, and programs, to assess the current Soviet militaryand to estimate main trends in Soviet military capabilities and policies over the next five years.
SCOPE NOTE
This estimate presents our main conclusions on the broad range of major Soviet military problems. It includes, inter alia, summary versions of recent National Intelligence Estimates,as appropriate, devoted to individual military missions and other related questions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Baiic Vfaws an War
A. The Soviets see military power as serving two basicdefense of their system and support for its expansion. Thus, one of the most important objectives of Soviet military policy is to deter general war while the USSR prosecutes itspolicies by means short of actual hostilities involving Soviet forces. The Soviets recognize that their deterrent must bein the sense that it rests upon powerful military forces. They also recognize that deterrence may fail in some key confrontation in which either they or their opponents come to feel that vital interests are under challenge. Against this contingency they wish toombination of offensive and defensive capabilities which will enable them to seize the initiative if possible, toenemy nuclear attack, and to go on to prosecute the war. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their military planning or their general policy upon the expectation that they
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will be able to achieve, within the foreseeableilitary posture which would make rational the deliberate initiation of general war or conscious acceptance of grave risks ofar. )
number of Soviet statements in recent years havethe view that limited war involving the majorwould inevitably escalate into general war. Whilearc intended in part to deter the West from localforce, this official view alsoenuine Soviet fear ofof becoming directly engaged in limited warSoviet and US forces. This probably also extends toof Soviet forces with certain Allied forces in highlynotably Western forces in the European area.they might employ their own forces to achieve localsome area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged thateither because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear powersome other reason, would not make an effectiveThey would probably employ Soviet forces asif some Western military action on the periphery of thcthe integrity of the Bloc itself. Should thedirectly involvedimited war with US or Alliedbelieve that the Soviets would not necessarily expand itinto general war, but that they would probablythat force which they thought necessary to achieveobjectives. They would also seek to prevent escalationmeans. )
Soviets recognize another type of limitedwar of nationaln whichanti-Western forces challenge colonial or pro-Westerna primarily internal struggle. The Soviets have renderedassistance in some such conflicts, and little or none inupon such practical factors as accessibility, thcdefeat, and the attitude of other powers involved. Inthe USSR has given military assistance to friendly,regimes. As new and favorable opportunities arise, thewill continue to oiler these various kinds of assistance.however, that they will remain chary of any greatof prestige to the support of belligerents over whom
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they do not exercise substantial control or in circumstances in which they feel that winning is unlikely, and they will seek to avoid risk of widened hostilities which might result from "wars of national liberation." )
General Trends in Military Doctrine and Policy
D. Current Soviet military policy stems from Khrushchev's plan, announced ino cut back the size of the armed forces and to place main reliance on nuclear and missile forces. The plan rellected his vieweneral war is almost certam to be short, with victory decided in the strategic nuclear exchange, and with conventional armsuite secondary role. Khrushchev's plan was accepted only reluctantly by the military leadership; both the plan and its strategic justification have since undergone substantial modification. Present Soviet military doctrine holdseneral war will inevitablythe massive use of nuclear weapons; it will begintrategic exchange, and its course and outcome may well be decided in its initial phase. Hence, doctrinal discussionthe importance of seizing the initiative by pre-emptive attack if, in the Soviet view, general war becomes imminent and unavoidable. However, tlie current doctrine holds thatonflict will not necessarily be short, and it supports both the building of strategic attack and defense capabilities and the maintenance of large theater and naval forces. )
E. The Soviet leaders evidently believe that thc presentmilitary relationship, in which each side cantrong deterrent upon thc other, will probably continue for some time to come. However, they almost certainly regard the present strategic posture of the USSR as inferior to that of the US, and they are aware of the continuing buildup of US forces forattack programmed for the next few years. In this situation, they probably do not expect to be able tolear strategic superiority over the US, but we believe that the Soviets are far from willing toosition of strategic inferiority. Our evidence does not indicate that the Soviets are attempting to outstrip or even match the US in numbers of weapons for in-
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tercontinental attack; we believe, however, that they willto offset US superiority by other means.1 )
SovieU mayossible solution lo theirwith thc USombination of antimissileplus very effective though numerically inferiorstriking forces. Wc believe that deployment ofdefenses may be the largest new Soviet militarythc period of this estimate. Hardened ICBM's andsubmarine missiles will contribute to SovietIn addition, over thc next few years thcwill probably come to include new large ICBMs,very high-yield warheads or capable of global ranges.tlie USSR is almost certainly investigating thespace systems for military support and offensive and )
statements and military writings suggest thatleaders see in technological achievements the meansthey may improve their total strategic position relativeof the US. They have made scientific mililnry researchdevelopment of new weapons matters of highemonstrated ability to concentrate human andresources on priority objectives. If they develop newor new weapons which give promise of military andthey will seek to add them rapidly to theirto gain maximum benefit from them. Thus, during theyears, we expect the Soviets to be working on even moreweapons with which they may hope to enhancecapabilitiesater date.1
USSR's military programs and space effectsdemands upon Soviet resources. The effort lostrengthen all arms of the Soviet forceshard on resources available for investment and consump-
lstant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, agrees that tne SovieUdo noi expect to be able toosition ofu?Elc superlortly over the US during the Ume period of this estimate and lhal they are far from willing loosition of strategic inferiority. However, be believe* that the USSR Is pursuing an Intensive research and developmenl effort In the hope of attaining technological breakthroughs which, when translated Into weaponwill resultlear ilraiegic superiorityater date 'See lhe Assistant Chief uf Staff, Intelligence. USAF, footnote lo Conclusion B.
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tion goals to whicli the leadership is strongly committed. Thus, Khrushchev may once againeduction in resourcesto theater forces on the grounds that growing nuclear capabilities will permit this cutback without endangering Soviet security. But whileeduction would reduce expenditures for military pay and release manpower to the economy, It would not significantly reduce the demands of the defense establishment on critically scarce, high quality resources and highly skilled manpower. )
I. Despite the possibilityuture reduction in theater forces, Khrushchev'sebruary speech indicates that the Soviethas recently taken economic decisions which reaffirmpriorities at thc expense of consumer aspirations; beyond this it mayecision to increase military spending above previously planned levels. Tho Soviet economy is capable ofeavier military burden, but not without sacrifices in the program to raise living standards and perhaps alsoin the future rate of industrial growth. For the present, the Soviets appear lo have chosen to risk these consequences, but we believe that the problem of resource allocation will continue to plague the Soviet leadership.
J. Soviet military policy will continue to be shaped, not onlyariety of strategic, technical, economic, and political factors, but also by differing views about the relative importance of these factors, and shifting compromises among these views.e-suit, wc believe that the numerous aspects of this policy will not always be wholly consistent with each other, and that forceand future programming will reflect neither astrategic doctrineirm timetable for achieving specific force levels. We do not believe that the Soviets conceive of existing weapon systems as the answer to their militaryor that they have fixed and inflexible plans for their force structure in thc period five toears from now. Barring some major technical advance in weaponry, we believe that Sovietpolicy is likely to continue along curront lines, and that for at least the next few years large standing forces of all types will be maintained. Even in the absence of such an advance,we cannot exclude the possibility of new departures inpolicy, perhaps resulting in major changes in the composi-
5
tion of lhe Soviet military establishment und in the relativegiven to forces designed to accomplish thc major military missions. )
forces for long Range Atlack
K. Although missile forces for attack on Eurasia conunucmajor emphasis in thc building of long-rangehas evidently shifted to forces for intercontinentalICBMs. Wc estimate Soviet ICBM strength2perational launchers,ewhardened launchers. Byhe force,0 silos. Thc Sovietestimated for thc next two years will consist primarilyequipped with warheads in the low megatonew missiles with very high-yield warheads.that the major trends in this force? will be:the force to some hundreds of launchers; hardening of aportion of thc force; and availability of someof delivering very high-yield
)
"The Assistant Chiel of Staff foi Intelligence. Department of the Army, dlascnls to thu projccUoii ol lore*ince the Soviet 1CDM launcher construcuon program lor second Generation system* hu been under way for nearly three years; resulted in only sumoperational launchers, it appears most unrealistic to him to estimate thatoperational launchers will becomeduring tne next IC to IT month* He therefore estimates ai IoUowi
Including Hardfew) I
Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAT. believe* that availableollectedong period of time,or differingof the magnitude ol lhe Soviet ICHM program and lhe approximate Ume required lor site construcuon. Experience has shown that even with the beat available intelligence, and where evidence appeared to be complete, continuing analysis has IndicatedRM launch sites exist which were not initially identified Because of the hlitory ofUM location* and the ahaenee of complete, up-to-date Intelligence, he believe* that undetected launcher* Indegrees of construction, now exist al the confirmed complexes. Further, he also believes there are additional complexes mostly under construction al yet unidentified locations. He would therefore estimate the number of operaUonal ICHMncluding those at thc Tyuratam teat ranee. Uirough mid-IBM a* follows:
Including Hard
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I. The Soviets now have uperational aboutf Ihem nuclear-powered- which carry atotal ofissiles designed for surfaced launching. The USSR is developmg longer range missiles for launching from submerged submarines. Inthe Soviets have developed submarine-launched cruisewhich are probably designed primarily for use against ships but could be employed against land targets. Inhe Soviets will probably have more than two dozen nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and aboutuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. By that time, they will probably haveroutine submarine patrols within missile range of the US.)
M. Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of its equipment, basing and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasianthan for intercontinental attack. However, the Soviets have giver; considerable emphasis to aerial refueling and to Arctic training. Excluding combat attrition, we estimate that thecould putircraft over North America on two-way missions; of these, about half would be heavy bombers. Long Range Aviation now compriseseavy bombers and tankers andet medium bombers and tankers. We continue loradual decline in numericalortion of the BADGER medium bomber force will be replaced by the new supersonic BLINDER, already in units, but ourdoes not indicate that any new heavy bomber is beingfor operational use. Byong Range Aviation will probably compriseeavy bombers andediums.' )
iChief of SUA. lnieUlgcncc, USAF. does not consider lhal thi* paragraph accurately reflects the capability of the USSR to jut aircraft over North America on two-way missions He believes that with due cc Moderation of all relevant factors, such as numbet of aircraft in Long Range Aviation, numbers of aircraft tanker coiiSgured and peak availability rate, the Soviets cotdd commit aboul 7SO aircraft to InlUal two-way attacks on North America. From thU number committed,ombers could reach North American targets.
The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, further estimatesollow-on heavy bomber will probably be Introduced Inhedevelopment ot large aircraft capable of supersonic speed, nnO research
(Footnote continued an following page >
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N. We estimate that the Soviet MRBM and IHBM force now comprisesompleted launch positions, deployed for the mast part in western USSR within range of NATO targets in Europe. The bulk of these launch positions arc soft,ew silo-type hardened sites are probably operational. We believe that deployment of soft sites will have been virtually completed early this year, leveling of! ataunch positions; the hardened component of the force will continue to grow, probably reachingaunchers int is possible that as many as half of the soft launch positions ore alternates, in wluch case thc first salvo capability of the force would besmaller, although still large enough to devastateEurope. G3)
O. In the event of general war in the period of this estimate, the USSR would almost certainly employ against theixed force of ICBMs, missile submarines, and bomber aircraft. By thehe USSR will haveubstantiallyICBM and submarine-launched missile capability tonuclear weapons against the US, in addition to its already formidable forces for strikes in Eurasia. Significant portions of these forces will be relatively invulnerable to attack. Tbcwill beosition to strike pre-emptively at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and they will have some prospectortion of their own force could survive an initial US attack and retaliate with high-yield weapons. With the forces which we estimate, however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing force of US hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclearvehicles. )
(Footnote continued from preceding pace.)
in applicable materials,nd other component* substantiate- thc Soviet*n large luperkonic vehicles and suggest an intent to increase their strategic attack capability by auch means. The DOUNUb'lt probably ha*ost uacrul purposel for many components,tructuinl design which are directly applicableollow-on heavy bomber capable of supersonice estimate* thc total Soviel heavy bomber and tanker strength will remain atircraft throughout tbe period ot this estimate, present strength level* being maintained by theof modest numbersew heavy bomber.
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Airforces
P. The significant improvements in the Soviet air defensenoted during recent years will be extended during the next few years, and successful penetration by manned bombers will therefore require increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defense capability can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ, including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetration tactics, and electronic countermeasures. Even in such circumstances, the Soviets would probably expect toumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce thc weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until thc USSR is able toubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.
Q, The major development which wc foresee in Soviet defense is the adventapability against ballistic missiles. For more than five years, the Soviets have beenigh priority and extensive program to develop antimissile defenses, and we estimate that several different ABM systems are underWc believe that3 the Soviets will achieve somecapability with an ABM system now being deployed around Leningrad. We have no basis for determining itsbut doubt that it would be effective against missiles employing decoys or other countermeasures. The USSR isalso developing an antisatcllite system.
R. To counter the more complex long-range ballistic missile threat of the, the Soviets may seek to improve the Leningrad system, or mayore advanced system, or both. In any case, the USSR is likely lo defer additional ABM deploymentetter system is available. If the Sovietsan ABM system which they regard as reasonably effective against long-rangeigorous deployment program will probably be undertaken. We believe thatrogram would contemplate thc defense ofrincipal Soviet cities and
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would require some five or six years to complete. We have no basis for judging whether or when the Soviets would consider their ABM system effective enough to warrant the initiation ofrogram.
Thcafor Forces
S. The longstanding Soviet concern with concepts and forces for campaigns in adjoining theaters, especially in Europe, has resultedormidable theater force, strong in armor,mobility, and units in being. The tactical nuclear delivery capabilities of these forces are still limited, but they have been improved markedly over the past few years. In offensiverapidly advancing theater forces would be in constant danger of outrunning their logistical tail, which is heavilyon railroads. Finally, tho Soviets have traditionally exercised very strict supervision over the actions of theirbut existing command and control systems do notthis strict supervision over the widely extended deployment required on the nuclear battlefield or under the threat of use of nuclear weapons. )
No vol Force i
T. The USSR's capabilities to conduct naval warfare in the open seas rest primarily upon the submarine force, which is capable ofarge-scale torpedo attack and mining campaign against Allied naval targets and sea communications in the eastern North Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. Itsfor operations near the continental US are more limited, but are growing. Capabilities against carrier task forces have been improved by thc conversion of jet bombers to employ anti-ship missiles, by the introduction of submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles, and by increased air reconnaissance of open ocean areas by Long Range and Naval Aviation. The Soviets have also placed increasing emphasis on improvement of ASW forces in coastal areas and in the open seas. We believe the Soviet Navy is capable of carrying out fairly effective ASW operations in coastal areas, but that itegligible ASW capability in thc open seas. Despite the effort which they almost certainly are devoting to this problem, wc believe that over the next five
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years, tho USSR will be able to achieveimited capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance onoperating in the open seas." )
Assistant Chief of StafT. Intelligence, USAF, would delete the last sentence snd substitute the following:
While over the next five years, lt is probable that thc USSR will haveimited ASW capability In thc open seas, it must be recognised that the eftort being applied by thc USSR toward solution ot thc ASW problem will reducedeficiencies and possibly could result In marked Improvement In Soviet open seas capabilities.
DISCUSSION
I. SOVIET MIUTARY POLICY
A. BosJc Views on Wor and Military Policy
Tlie Soviets see military power as serving two basic purposes:of their .system and support for its expansion. Thus, one of the moat important objectives of Soviet military policy ls to deter general war while the USSR prosecutes Its foreign policies by means short of actual hostilities Involving Soviet forces. Military power Is constantly brought Into play in direct support of these policies, through thc threats which give force to Soviet political demands, through Lhc stress onpower which Is intended to gain respect for the Soviet state and Its Communist system, and through the military aid and support rendered to allies, friendly but neutral regimes, and anti-Western movements.
The Soviet leaders reallr* that their deterrent must be credible in thc .sense that IL rests upon powerful military forces, Moreover, they recognize that deterrence may fail in some key confrontation In which, despite their best efforts to retain control over risks, either they or their opponents come to feel that vital interests are under challenge. Against this contingency they wish toombination of offensive andcapabilities which will enable them to seize the Initiative Ifto survive enemy nuclear attack, and to goon to prosecute thc war.
3 The Soviets evidently believe that the present overall militaryin which each sklc cantrong deterrent upon the other, will probably continue for some time to come. The Soviets are vigorously pursuing programs of research and development in advanced weapons, hoping If possible totrategic balance favorable lo them. It is possible that same future technological breakthrough or advance would persuade them that they hadecisivewhich permitted them tolfTerent view of the risks of general war. Wc do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their military planning or their general policy upon thc expectation that they will be able to achieve, within thc foreseeableilitary posture which would make rational thc deliberate initiation of general war or conscious acceptance of grave risks ofar.
umber of Soviet statements in recent years have expressed the view that limited war involving the major nuclear powers wouldescalate into general war. While such statements are intended Ln part to deter the West from local use of force, this official view alsoenuine Soviet fear of the consequences of becoming directly engaged in limited war involving Soviet and US forces. This probably
olso extends to involvement of Soviet forces with certain Allied forces ir. highly critical areas, notably Western lorces in the European area. Nevertheless, they might employ their own forces to achieve local gains in dome area adjacent to Bloc territory If they judged that the West, either because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or lor some other reason, would not make an effective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as necessary ll some Westernaction on thc periphery of the Bloc threatened the integrity of thc Bloc itself. Should the USSR become directly involvedimited war with US or Allied forces, we believe that the Soviets would not necessarily expand it immediately into general war. but that they would probably employ only that force which they thought necessary to achieve their local objectives. They would also seek to preventby political means.
Recent Soviet military writings call for professional study of thc problems of nonnuclear combat, which could lead to some modification of the official view on limited war. However, we believe that thenow being devoted to this problem is primarily responsive to indications of US interest in building NATO's capabilities for nonnuclear combat. In our view, it does not reflect any new Soviet conclusion that thc USSR can now launch such wars without great dangers ofescalation.
The USSR has regularly recognized the importance of the "war of nationaln which pro-Soviet or anti-Western forces challenge colonial or pro-Western regimesrimarily internalin practice, Soviet behavior has followed neither the course of full support to all these wars, as Soviet propaganda often alleges, nor the course alleged by Khrushchev's Chinese critics, who claim that he withholds support entirely because of exaggerated fears thatonflict mighteneral war. The USSR has rendered activeIn some eases, such as Laos and Yemen, and little or none in others, such as Algeria and Angola, depending upon such practical factors as accessibility, the risk of defeat, and the attitude of other powers involved.
The USSR has alsoecent willingness to provide some non-Bloc recipients of its military aid with more advanced equipment than heretofore. In some cases, notably Cuba and Indonesia, Soviet personnel have been employed to man this equipment, and areindigenous specialists to operate it. Thisignificant departure from previous Soviet practice, which may be extended to Other areas in the future.
As new and favorable opportunities arise, the Soviets will continue to offer these various kinds of assistance, and they may do this more frequently and aggressively in the future if their efforts to expand
14
Soviet influence by political and economic means encounter continued frustration. Wc believe, however, thai thc Soviets will remain chary of any great commitment or prestige to the support of belligerents over whom they do not exercise substantial control or in circumstances in which they feel that winning is unlikely, and they will seek to avoid risk of widened hostilities which might result from "wars of nationaln particular, we believe that the Soviets will be very reluetanl to commit their own forces openly in conflicts where tbey wouldirect confrontation with US forces.
oviet Military Policymaking
application of these basic attitudes lo particularto the allocation of resources does, of course, pose seriousA number of additional factors have long aflccted theof Soviet military policy. Geography and the traditions boundhistorical experience have inclined the Sovicls toward awith Western Europetress on large-scaleThe capabilities and structure of US and otherinfluence directly both thc size and shape of Soviet forcesa general upward pressure upon requirements in all fields.most important is thc technological and economic base ofwhich constantly offers prospects for more effectivealso determines the extent to which these opportunities can bewithout tooacrifice in other programs.
factors, pointing in many contradictory directions, dofor easy or unanimous decisions. Indeed, we have cleardisagreement, compromise, and even reversal in the formulationpolicy in the last three years. This process ofthe USSR appears in large part lo involve the same problemsUS decision-makers. In addition, however, certain specialout. Fully informed Soviel military discussion, formaller circle than in the us. Beyond thc politicalsome military officers,imited number of scientistswe know of no body of civilian advisers or publicists incomparable to the social scientists involved in thc evolutionmilitary thinking. This is in part due to the great Sovietsecurity, which has the additional effect of reducing the flowwithin the officer corps.esult, the Sovietlo experience special difficulty in adjusting their doclrineto the rapid changes characteristic of the postwar period.major influence of World War ll commanders and theof the Soviet experience in that war also contribute to ato new concepts which is evident in professional discourse.
Military programs have become more complex and expensive, and the professional recommendations of thc military leadership on military problemsreater impact on economic and foreign policyFurthermore, the political climate which has developed under Khrushchev is one which permits continuing discussionariety of problems, and the military leaders have used this opportunity totheir views. With military and economic debates proceeding simultaneously and in close dependence on each other, il seems likely that the arguments of the marshals have been supported by thoseleaders who did not wish lo permit programs for consumer goods In impinge upon, allocations to heavy industry.
Wc do not believe that lhc military aspires lo an independent political role within the political system, and if it were to, partyand controls appear strong enough to defeat any efforts in this direction. But if, as we expect, the military and economic choices facing thc USSR become more acute, the senior officers will probably find themselves more deeply involved in matters of general policy.
C.Recent Course of Military Policy
The most Important viewpoints in the controversy over military policy of lhe lasl few years have been those represented by Khrushchevew military theorists, on the one hand, and the majorily of thc senior military leaders, on the other. Three major differences have distinguished Khrushchev's approach to defense policy from that of the military leaders. First, Khrushchev is heavily concerned with the political uses of military power, whereas the professional responsibilities of lhe marshals require them to look in the first instance to actualcapabilities. Second, Khrushchev has assertedeneral war Is almosi certain lo be short, with victory decided in the strategic nuclear exchange and with conventional arms, particularly theater forces,uite secondary role. Most military leaders, on the other hand, appear to believe that general war would probably, but not certainly, be short but that, in any event, its conduct would require high force levels for most of the traditional service arms,ulti-million man army. Third. Khrushchev is far more concerned than the marshals to keep military expenditures in check In order to meet what he regards as pressing needs in the civilian economy.
All these considerations were involved in the reorganization ot the armed forces which Khrushchev inaugurated inhe essence of his plan was to place main reliance on nuclear missile forces and, on this basis, lo reduce military manpower substantially and to accelerate the retirement of older weapons. This, he asserted, was the force structure best suited both lo deter war and to light one itmoreover, it would release men and money for the civilian economy.
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rom Klirushchev himself wc know that this plan and Itsjustification were accepted only reluctantly by the militaryA controversial discussion ensued, encouraged by the regime, In which high officers debated, polemicized, nnd explored thc military implications of modern warfarear more systematic fashion than previously. Several schools of thought became apparent, but aview soon emerged which accepted the likelihood that the Initial phaseeneral war would be decisive, but wont on to argue thatelatively short war would require large forces of all types capable of defeating comparable enemy forces, overrunning base areas, and occupying territory in Eurasia. This discussion also focusedon the enormous difficulties of mounting major militaryafter receiving the full weiRhtestern first strike, and the resulting importance. If ln the Soviet view war became Imminent and unavoidable, of seizing the strategic initiativere-emptive attack.
t present, official military doctrine holdseneral war will inevitably involve the massive use of nuclear weapons, will begintrategic exchange, and will develop almost simultaneously along fronts of engagement as well. Strategic missile forces win play the primary role. Tlic course and outcome of thc war may well be decided in Its initial phase by strategic nuclear weapons. Howovcr, thc Soviets hold thatonflict will not necessarily be short, and envisage the possibilityong war Involving protracted operations in Eurasia. Therefore, while current doctrineilitary policy ofstrategic attack and defense capabilities. It supports as well thc maintenance of large theater and naval forces, for use both In the initial and the possible subsequent phaseseneral war.
e believe that debate continues in thc USSR, not only over subsidiary propositions, but perhaps over some of thc contral tenets of this doctrine. The course of the debate was heavily influenced byeventshich. Intruding upon the discussion,some of Khrushchev's contentions and permitted the mlUtary to retrieve some concepts which hu- had discarded. Thusffair cast doubt on the adequacy of Soviet air defenses, on the efficacy of Sovicl security, and on the wisdom of Khrushchev's efforts to relax tensions in relations with the US. In the following year, the US took decisions to slop up both its strategic attack and general purpose forces. In Vienna, Klirushchev determined that Lhc US did not regard the relationship of military power as requiring it to make majoron the Berlin question. All these developments called intothe adequacy of tlic Soviet military posture, both for supporting foreign policy and for conducting general wur If necessary. In Lhcsc circumstances. Khrushchev made such demonstrative military moves as thc public suspension of the manpower reductions and theof nuclear tests.
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t about thc same time, another burden was laid on Sovietpolicymaking. Far some months, US public disclosures had hinted that Soviet ICDM strength might be much smaller than had previously been believed. Beginning in the fallhe US began to assert this conclusion with great conviction, and to assert more strongly that the US waa thc strategic superior of the Soviet Union. From USand behavior, the Soviets could almost certainly Judge that their security had been penetrated in an Important way, probably one which, by permitting the US to locate Soviet targets,angible effect upon the military balance. Their fears lhat no major Western concessions on Berlin would be forthcoming must have been strengthened. And the Image of Soviet superiority, which tbey had heavily exploited to document their claims of the inevitable triumph ot their system, was badly damaged.
It was against this background that the USSR took its decision to deploy strategic missiles to Cuba This moveost ol policy considerations and judgments which are not yet fully clear. In its military terms, however, it appears to haveesponse lo the question ol how to create new opportunities for Soviet foreign policy by improving the strategic position of the USSRls the US, at some acceptable cost and at some early date. Even deployment at the levels detectedignificant Increase in first strikeor general nuclear war. and the Soviets may have intended to follow this up byarger missile force as well as abase.
Khrushchev, however, probably considered its main impact to be psychological. At one level, the deployment and its acccptunce by the US was Intended lo demonstrate Soviet might and US inability toit, thereby reversing the tendency of world opinion to regard the West as strategically superior. At another, however, it was intended to increase the deterrence laid upon thc US in cold war confrontations. Khrushchev evidently felt that, despite all the military problemsin making effective strategic ate of Cuba in wartime, thewouldowerful Impact on US opinion which would reduce resistance to his political demands, in the first instance thoseBerlin.
D. Problems of Futvra Military Policy
Cuban adventure and Ita outcome both highlightedthe dilemma of thc Soviet leaders. Both theits reversalacit public admission lhatosition of strategic Inferiority. Among its other results,fiasco has almost certainly thrown the Soviets back ontore-evaluation of their strategic posture.
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already under way will largely govern tlic sizeof Soviet strategic forces through aboutdecisions taken this year could significantly affecl forceWc arc unlikely to learn directly of such decisions.thc physical activities which might reveal their nature willnot be apparent for another year or more. In consideringforce levels,s therefore necessary to explore the variousnow open to the USSR
with tbc continuing buildup of US forces forattack programmed for thc next few years, Sovietbeide range of alternatives. At one extremean attempt to achievelear superiority over tlic US inoffensive weapons that they wouldigh assurance ofUS nuclear striking forces prior to launch. At the otherwould be the acceptance of continued strategic inferiority,coupled with genuine efforts to reach agreement with thearms control.
first of those extreme alternatives is probably nowunattainable. Thousands of Soviet missiles would be requiredthe Sovietigh assurance of destroying even theof US nuclear forces programmed for the mld-lSGO's. Wc dothat the Soviet leaders would be prepared totrainmagnitude upon the Soviet economy. In addition, thealmost certainly expect the US to detect such an effort,to step up its own program so as to raise Soviethigher. Moreover, US warning capabilities, fast reactionmobile forces (airborne bombers and missile submarines)reduced Soviet capabilities, against US retaliatory forces. Wethat thc Soviels will continue lo cslimate that, throughoutof this estimate, the US will retain retaliatory capabilitiesnot be eliminated by such striking forces as tbe USSR
second of these extreme alternatives might bethe Soviet leaders. Even If current strategic weaponsallowed to level offhc Soviets would possess adeterrent force. Moreover, they might hope to reduce USmeans of disarmament agreements. But the main appeal ofwould be economic; resources would In Ume be madeto reverse the current slowdown ln economic growth.have seen as yet no persuasive indications that Lhe USSR Ismove very far in this direction. The Cuban venture hasal least to date, the Soviet leaden are far from willing toposition of strategic Inferiority.
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these extreme alternatives, we believe that tliealmost certainly considered an effort to attain rough parityUS In intercontinental weapon systems. Soviet militarycertainly have urged enlarged and improved forces ofmissile submarines.ajor Soviet effort to attainthe near term would requireubstantial increase in thebudget or sharp cuts in other types of forces. Moreover,would almost certainly reason lhat the US would detect ansuch magnitude, and thai they could have no assurance ofintensified ruce which would ensue. Our evidence does notthat the Soviets arc attempting to match the US in numbersfor Intercontinental attack; we believe, however, that theyto offset US superiority by other means.
Soviet statements and military writings suggest that the Soviet leaders see In technological achievements the means by which they may improve their total strategic position relative to that ot the US. This consideration may lie behind lhe testing of very high-yield weapons, the claimed developmentlobal missile, thc high priority given to thc antimissile program, and thc Soviet interest in miliiary spaceBy such means, the Soviets may attempt to attain rough parity or even superiority In the total strategic context, although they remain numerically Inferior in delivery vehicles. Hardened ICBMs and submerged-launch submarine missiles will contribute to Sovietcapabilities In addition, over the next few years the ICBM force will probably come to Include new large missiles, armed with very high-yield warheads or capable of global ranges. Moreover, the USSR is almost certainly investigating thc feasibility of space systems for military support and offensive and defensive weapons.
In defense against strategic atUtck, the major new clement is the antimissile program, where deployment of one system has already begun at one location, and research and developmentore advanced capability la continuing. The Soviets mayossible solution to their strategic confrontation with the USombination of anti-missile defense plus very effective though numerically Inferiorsinking forces. The technical difficulties as well as the great expense of any extensive anUmissile deployment will beinfluences Nevertheless, we believe that deployment of Antimissile defenses muy be the largest new Soviet military program in thc period Of this estimate
Although wc believe that Soviet military policy is most likely to continue along current lines, wc cannot exclude lhc possibility of new departures in military policy, perhaps resulting in major changes in the composition of the Soviet military establishment and In theemphasis given to forces designed to accomplish lhe major military missions. Drastic cuts in thc theater field forcesossibility;
20
while Khrushchev's proposals for manpower reductions have been shelved for the present, economic pressures and developments Intechnology almost certainly will cause this subject to beIt is also possible that thc increasing involvement of the USSR in the more remote areas of the world will lead to theof new capabilities for distant, limited military action. In this connection, the SovieU may attempt to acquire base and logisticalrights in key non-Bloc countries, but we have no evidence that the USSH has raised this question with these countries.'
n general, Soviet military policy will continue to be shaped, not onlyariety of strategic, historical, technical, economic and poliUcal factors, but also by differing views about the relativeof these factors, and shifting compromises among these views.esult, we believe that the numerous aspects of this policy will not always be wholly consistent with each other, and that forceand luture programming will reflectully-integrated strategic doctrineirm timetable lor achieving specified force levels. In any case, we do not believe that the Soviets conceive ofweapons systems as the answer to their military problem or that they have fixed and Inflexible plans for their force structure in tbe period five toears from now. They have debated and revised some of their ideas, and they will probably do so again. Tbey have made scientific military research and the development of new weapons matters of high urgency, and theyemonstrated capability lo concentrate human and material resources on priority objectives. If they develop new concepts or new weapons which give promise of military andadvantage, they will seek to add them rapidly to their arsenal and lo gain maximum benefit from them. Thus, during thc next five years, wc expect thc Soviets to be working on even more advanced weapons with which they may hope lo enhance their capabilitiesater date."
II. SOVIET HIGH COMMAND STRUCTURE
c believe that during the post two or three years thc Soviel miliiary high command structure has been modified to speed the process of initiating or responding to strategic nuclear attack. The growth of nuclear and missile forces on both sides has almost certainly persuaded thc Soviets to establish the command and conlrol channels necessary for thc swift initiation of military operations upon thc decision ol the political leadership.
iscussion of the lltnltalions imposed on such Soviet overtures by the receptivity of other countries, sec NIE lo-ffij. "Bloc Economic andated
reference to. see the Assistant Chief of Slaff Intetll-Bcnce, USAF, footnote to Conclusion E.
We have Information, some of il from classified documents and some from public statements, aboutupreme Military Councilupreme High Command. Khrushchev is chairman of theand Supreme High Commander. Theody of high-level patty, government, and military officials, has existed since before World War II toorum for discussion and decision on major issues of military policy. The Supreme High Command directed military operations during World War II with Stalin al its head, but wasIhereuflcr. Such information as we have suggests that steps have been taken in recent years lo designate membership in the Supreme High Command and to develop procedures to permit the quickby this body of top level conirol of military operations undershould events so dictate.
Adjustments in the Structure of the Soviet high command have apparently been closely related to the growth of the USSR's strategic defense and long-range missileew rocket command0 andain component of the Soviet armed forces. This change followed by about five years the elevation of lhc Soviet air defense component to similar status. At present, there are five major force components administered by mam directorates or equivalent headquarters within thc Ministry of Defense: ground, naval, air. air defense, and rocket.
Highly centralized civilian control over the Soviet militaryis exercised through the Council of Ministers, which includes the Minister of Defense The Minister ts assisted by the jnlfiedStall of the armed forces, which formulates the overall military program and would probably constitute the principal headquarters element of the Supreme High Command in lime of war. Party and government leaders reportedly participate regularly in lhe deliberations of the Supreme Military Council. Additional channels for exercising parly control over the military include the Main Political Directorate of the armed forces and the numerous parly officials who arc assigned to all levels of thc miliiary establishment.
The flow of operational orders from the Minister of Defense to the Soviet armed TOrCCS follows no rigid Or consistent paltern.in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, Long Range Aviation, the Air Defense Forces, and the Navy are believed to have directcontrol over the forces assigned to them. On the other hand, ground force components are operationally controlled by thcof the Military Districts and the Groups of Forces. TheIn Chief Of thc Air Force similarly has no direct operational control over air components. The operations of other Ihan Long Range Aviation air elements are controlled by the commands or farces to which they areommanders of Groups of Forces, Military Districts. Air Defense Districts, Fleets, and Airborne Forces.
'27
III. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
The urgent need (or additional manpower in the economy and the rising cost ofarge military establishment have brought about substantial reductions in Soviet military manpower since the Korean War. Wc estimate that9 these reductions had lowered the number of men under arms from5 toillion men. Inhrushchevrogram aimed at further reducing military manpowerillion men. Infter approximately half of the projected reduction ofillion men had been made, the program was suspended, allegedly in response to the US military buildup prompted by Soviet pressures in Berlin. Wc believe that the force level now stands at aboutillion men, of whichillion are in the theater ground forces.*
The early reductions were achieved without overt signs ofby military leaders, who were apparently persuaded thatmodernization and re-equipment programs had provided sufficient increases in firepower to offset thc cuts in personnel. However, the military leadership raised strenuous objections to0 proposals. These objections were elaborated during an extendedamong senior officers over the nature of modern war and the role and doctrine of theater warfare.
oth political and military lenders acknowledgeand costly demands for advanced weapon systems arcSoviet resources without easing the burden of maintainingforces. Tho effort to modernize and strengthen all armsSoviet forces simultaneously squeezes hard on resourcesinvestment and consumption goals to which the leadership laMoreover, itonstant upward pressure onof the military establishment. This isarge extentmissile forces for strategic oilense and defense appear tonumbers of operating, maintenance, and supportingthere will probably be some reduction In the size ofof forces as older weapon systems are retired, there Li nothat normal reductions of this sort will free enoughto operate the growing missile forces. Therefore,Soviets decideeliberate program for compensatingin other forces, thc continued expansion of missile forceslines will tend to push military manpower strengthevels, and will require Increasing numbers ofas welt.
'For estimated personnel strength of lhe Soviet Armed Forces by million, see Annex A. Table 1.
" We estimateersonnel are now In the missile components of lone-range striking snd air defense forces; on Uie basis of preiient trends, this total may bey inLd-UHM. See Annex A. Tableootnote c.
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hus, Khrushchev may once againeduction in resources devoted to theater forces on tbe grounds that growing nuclear caps-blhtii'S will permit this cutback without endangering Soviet security. If this occurs, tlie mam candidate for reductions will still be the ground forces, with their very large numbers of units and men The program of accelerated retirement of older equipment of other force components, such as obsolescent aircraft and surface nuval ships might also beWc believe, however, that for at least the next few years large standing forces of all types will be maintained, although probably with some change in the distribution of manpower among the various components.
IV. TRENDS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES
oviet defense expenditures,ecline. have increased steadily in Ihe past five years. (Our estimates of Sovietexpenditures include thc casts of the military establishment,weapons, and all spacehe main impetus for growlh has been provided by operational programs for strategic attack and air defense forces and by the program of research and development, each of which has doubled In estimated cost during the past five years. The costs of thc ground nnd naval missions, which together accounted for almostercent of total expendituresave changed much less over the same period and2 accounted for approximately one-third of the total. The shift In the shares of total defensebetween tho various missions82 Is indicated in the following tabic.
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET DEFENSE EDS ND ITU USB) BY PEItCENT
Strategic Attack
Air Defense Mission *
Naval Mission .
Oround Mission
Expenditures not Allocable lo Missions
* Includes expenditures for reserve and security forces, research andcommand and support, and space programs No research and development expenditures have been allocated to the missions.
ur calculations of both Soviet military expenditures and GNP are subject to considerable margins of error, but on the basis of all available information on Soviet programs and costs, we estimate thatotal Soviet defense expenditures were aboutillion rubles. This Is one-third higher than thc level estimatedecause GNP has also been expanding, this level of defense expenditures con-
tinues to represent on the order of one-tenth of estimated Soviet ONP ln ruble prices. Thb share Is roughly thc same as that devoted toin Uie US. and represents in terms of UR prices and production coals the equivalent ofillion, or about four-fifths ofUS expenditures.
owever, the real impact of defense expenditures on the Soviet economy is greater than this comparison implies. The growth inexpenditures during the past five years has been accompaniedhange in the structure of these expenditures. The development, procurement, and maintenance of defense hardware including nuclear weapons represented about half of these expendituresnd nearly two-thirds2 defense consumed aboutercent of nonagiicultural production in the USSK. whereas It consumed aboutercent of such production in thc US. Similarly, defense consumed more thanercent of total Soviet production of durable goodss compared with aboutercent In the US. Moreover, although wc cannot measure the eflect, Soviet advanced weapons and spaceprobablyuch higher proportion of critically scarce, high quality resources and highly skilled manpower than Is the case in thc US.
from Soviet discussions Indicates an Increasingthe Impact of military requirements on the nationaldefense burden not only Impedes the Industrial investmentwhich underlies general economic growth, but It stands inof Khrushchev's repeated attempts to make largeragriculture, on which his promises of higher living standardsdepend. Khrushchev clearly had these problems Inhen heilitary reorganization witheconomizing effects.
0 proposal offeredartial solution toof rising defense costs. It promised ultimately toexpenditures by about two billion rubles; these savingsresulted primarilyower bill for military pay andThe main benefit to the economy would have been themilitary manpower. However, the competition between militaryprograms is most acute in the machinery Industry, whichhardware to thc armed forces and Investment goods toagriculture. Military deliveries from this Uidustry rose bypercent8hile production for theubstantially slower rate. Perhaps more important,of Soviet advanced weapons in comparison with otherreveals that thc defense establishment enjoys first call onresources ofmaterials andtrained technicians, leading scientists and design engineers.
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This priority has significantly hampered the effort to modernize and automate Soviet Industry on which the USSR's program for higher labor productivity and future growth heavily depends.
Thc future military programs of the Soviet leaders depend on their view of tlie requirements both forar while they push for poUtical gains in the East-West competition and forar if one should nonetheless occur. To date, however, they have found their military power insufficient to enable them to accomplish their political objectives, notably In the case of Berlin. Moreover, the tenor of recent statements suggests that, as the Soviets observe the programmed growth of Western power, the question of the USSR's ability toeneral war Is being posed more sharply than ever. For both these reasons, the Soviets evidently feel themselves under heavy pressure to make further increases In their military allocations. This, however, would require them to stretch out, probably quitethe time periods over which they hope to achieve other national goals.
Thereumber of ways In which the Soviets, faced with these difficult choices, might ease the prospective military burden on the economy. Khrushchev might revert to thc force structure which he advocated0 and try again to putizable reduction of ground forces. Thc USSR might trim its space program byfor example, not to compote with thc USanned lunar landing, it might confine itself to tactics which carried less dangers of military confrontation, meanwhile settlingilitary strategy which stressed deterrence ratherull war-fighting capability. Or, it might try torotracted relaxation of tensions In hopes ofeduction in Western defense efforts, and pcrhups even improving the relative Soviet military position, lt is conceivable,contrary lo most present Indications, that the pressures for higher military spending could cause the USSR to be more forthconibig in disarmament negotiations.
he November plenum of thc Central Committee singled outreorganization as the means to stimulate economic growth, and thereby demonstrated an unwillingness to make major changes in the pattern of resource allocations. Khrushchev confirmed thisin his speech ofebruary, in which he warned consumers against early hopes of high living standards because of the growing needs of defense His speech indicates that the leadership has recently taken economic decisions which reaffirm military priorities at theof consumer aspirations; beyond this it mayecision to Increase military spending above previously planned levels The Soviet economy is capable ofeavier military burden, but not without sacrifices In the program to raise living standards and perhaps also reductions in the future rate of Industrial growth. For
26
thc present, thc Soviets appear lo have chosen to risk thesrbut wc believe that thc problem of resource allocation will continue to plague the Soviet leadership.
V. FORCES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK
A. Soviel Policy Toward long Range Striking Forces
he Soviets regard forces for long range attack as essential for supporting an aggressive politics! posture, deterring the West from resort to military action, andar as effectively as possible should one occur. In our view, they are attempting to build forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives, rather thanto achieve the very high degree of superiority required toeliberate attack on the West. In building these forces, the Soviets put initial stress onassive capability against Eurasia and its periphery. Intercontinental capabilities were notbut deployment of medium range delivery systems occurred earlier and in much larger numbers. Although MRBM and IRBM forces continue to grow, major emphasis bas evidently shifted to the buildup of forces for Intercontinental attack, primarily ICBMs. Other major recent developments are thc introduction of hardening for ground-launched ballistic missiles, efforts to improve missile reaction times, and thc development of submarine ballistic missiles suitable forlaunching. By these means, the Soviets are attempting to gear their long range striking forces better for cither pre-emptive or retaliatory operations.
B. /nfefconfinentoJ BallitSic Missiles "
In the past two years, thc pace of ICBM development andhas quickened noticeably. At the Tyuratam test range two newndbeen underThe more successful program has been the development of the second-generationhich probably became operational in the first half, Testing of theas been conductedlower pace The SS-8's relatively poor success record in the first half2 nnd the lack of any test-firings for six months suggest that the Soviets have encountered technical difficulties with this system.
Construction of deployment complexes for second-generation ICBMs has proceeded concurrently Willi development testing. This method, aimed at early achievement of an initial operationalalmost certainly relatesoviet decision to deploy thc flrst-gcneratlonystem in only limited numbers; from the history of
"For and performance of Soviet ICBMs. see Anne* B. Table 1.
77
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tin-rogram, we judge that this decision was taken in8lien tlic second-generation systems were probably being designed. Th*CBMery large vehicle ofbs. gross takeoff weight, with nonstorable Liquid propellants and radio-inertial guidance. Ground control and support facilities arclarge and complex, and include rail service direct to launchers. Tlie second-genera Honystem is simpler and considerably less bulky than thehe missileross takeoff weight ofbs. and employs storable liquid propellants. Of the known Soviet ICBM systems, thes by far the most widely deployed.
We have located someCBM complexes in the USSK. and, considering the nature of the evidence, we believe that no moreew others exist. Most of thesethan aareype clearly associated with theypicalomplex consistsail-served support area and as many asaunchers which arc deployed In pairs and are rood-served. Thewas first deployedoft configuration, but Ls now also being deployed in silo-type hardenedew of which arc probably already operational.
In addition toomplexes, the Soviets haveew complexesomewhat different type. Launch sites are soft, road-served, and probablyelatively smallabout the sire ofe have not definitely associated this type of complexarticular missile system. If theissile Is relatively small, the new type complexes are probably designed for that system. However. Ifs very large, they arc probably intended for the SS-7.
Wc are unable at this time to resolve the question of whether theCBM is relatively small or even larger thanf thes small, the USSK may have undertaken Its development along witho insure the availability oi at least one successful second-generation system. If thes large. It Is probably being developedelivery vehicle for very high-yield warheads, and presumably for space launchings as well. We Iiave no evidence of new deployment complexes suitable forarge ICBM.
stimated Force Levels tour estimates of Soviet ICBM strength arc derived primarily from the known magnitude of the program and the estimated lead times involved In new siteThc range of lhe estimates allows for the possibility ofsites and other unknowns, such as the present status of therogram. Evidence on second-generation deployment has led to an upward revision In our previous estimate uf operational launchers fore nowomewhat faster rate ot deployment activityigher number of launchers per complex than were cm-
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ployed in previous calculations, our revised estimates of numbers and types of operational ICBM launchers tos as follows:
OPERATIONAL ICBM LAUNCHEKS13
ENP-ia62 3
totals
Uncludlng Hard (Bfew) )
NOTE: Soft launchers probably have two missiles each toetire capability after some hours. We have no evidence as to whether hard launchersofire capability. The totals estimated In this tabic include launchers at the Tyuratam test ranee.
The Soviet ICBM force estimated for the next two years wil!primarily of second-generation ICBMs equipped with warheads in the low megaton range. Wc continue to believe, however, that the Sovietsequirementery large ICBM, capable of delivering veryCBM could be retrofitted with warheads having yields iri the lower portion of this range, but further tests would probably be required toew nosecone.
Apart from this possibility, the time at which the USSR could have onerational missiles capable of delivering warheads with yields
... *depends upon whether
or not theery large ICBM:
s in fact very large, we believe it could deliver suchIn this case, we estimateew suitable launchersoperational byn earlier capability could bedeployment oft thc fouraunchers in the fieldtwo or three test range launchers.
on the other hand,s relativelyew, very large
iCBMis probably under
development; we estimate that it could become operational in later more likely5 or thereafter. In either event wcthatew large ICBMs with very high-yield warheads could behe USSR in the nexl year or so."
Ufl toc InWUBenM. Department of the Army, ando/taff-USAF, dissent to ihese projectedI force levels. Sec their footnotes to Conclusion K, page 6.
ice. USAF. continues to esUmatcS could be ready for operational useurther, ho believes that in consideration of the large cost expended on theesearch .ndfteX mcnt proeram. including sllc development, and other perUncnt factors the oncra-Uonal deployment of theo only the four knownhe field
isthal
been constructed and remain undetected because or deficiencies in availableTherefore, he concludes that moreew large ICRM's wtthwarheads will be operaUonal by
mplications. We continue to estimate an ICBM force level forperational launchers, although, if thc Soviet goal is the lower side of this range. iL will evidently be reached considerably earlier than* Eventsncluding the Cuban crisis, probably caused the Soviel leaders to reevaluate their strategic weapon programs, and may have led to new derisions which could importantly affect the ICBM force in thes. We have no information as to lhc nature of such decisions, and arc unlikely to obtain Indications of resultant changesear or more. However, on the basis of present evidence, we believe that the major trends7 will be: growth of the force lo some hundreds of launchers; hardeningignificant portion of the force; and availability of some missiles capable of delivering very large warheads with yields of up
T.
C. Medium and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
We estimate that thc Soviet MRBM and IRBM forceompleted launch positions..RBMs probably constitute thc bulk of the force, but.RBMs may still be operaUonal. and.RBMs are inore thanercent of thc force is deployedroad belt In western USSR stretching from the Baltic lo the Black Sea,esser concentration of sites in the Soviet Far East. From present deployment areas, MRBMs can cover targets In Norway, most of Western Europe, Turkey, Japan, Korea, Okinawa. Alaska, andCanada. IHBMs can extend this target coverage to Include all of Spain, North Africa, Thule, Taiwan, and the northern Philippines.
Most of the MRBM and IRBM sites are soft, fixed, and road-served; each site consists of four launchrogram tohardened sites is underway: we believeew sllc-type sites are already operational, and that Lhis program is continuing.
"The Assistant Chief ol Staff for Intelligence, Department of Uie Army, believes lhat the force level Lt likely to be towards the low side of tha call matecd la this sentence. He believes tne upperoo highurelyforce, and much too lowounterfocce concept.
"Tne Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USA*', continues to esUmate tor the tongorce levelCBM -launchera. He would esUmate that operaUonal ICHM launchers for Uie periodoo be as follows:
Approximate
(Including hard
"For thc precise calculated maximum ranees and other chamclerlaUcs of these missile systems, see Annex B, Table 1.
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e believe that all hard sites and soft IRBM sites are normally manned and equipped with launchers so that each launch position is capable oi participating in an Initial salvo. Wc are uncertain,lhat this is true of all the soil MRBM positions. Soviet doctrine calls for alternate launch positions to which MRBM units could move lor subsequent firing of additional missiles. ay be that only about half of the soft MRBM positions are manned and equippedirst salvo, and that for subsequent firings their launchers and crews could move to other soft positions. On the other hand, it may be that all of the soft MRBM launch positions are equipped with launchers and crewsirst salvo, and thc units may be intended subsequently to move to unimproved alternate positions similar to the Installations constructed in Cuba. Bearing these possibilities In mind, we believe thai the present MRBM/IRBM force-estimatedoft launch positions andirst salvo capability as larger as low.
There is clear evidence that the Soviets intend lo provide aretire capability for this force. We believe that most if not all firing units using soft launch positionsecondecond salvo, and that some further reserve may exist. We have no evidence as to whether hardened launchers are provided with additional missiles.
We believe that the Soviet deployment of soft MRBM and IRBM sites will be virtually completed eaily this year, leveling oft ataunch positions. Thc hardened component of thc force willto grow, probably reachingaunchers inhus, we estimate that at that time the Soviet MRBM and IRBM force will compriseaunch positions. Considering thethat as many as half ot the soft launch positions may bewe believe this force mayirst salvo capability as highr as low.
neriod, the size of the MRBM and IRBM force may level ofl. as we have previously estimated, or it may continue to rise. We arc unable at this time tooviet force goal for these weapons, which have already been madeumbers considerably exceeding thosearlier estimates. In order toarger force of protected MRBMs and IRBMs, the Soviets may continue to build new hard launchers throughout thes. It is also possible that some soft sites will be deactivated. Finally,MRHM and IRBM models may be Introduced in the; these could include road mobile systems designed for greater flexibility of operalions.
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O. Miiji'fe launching Submarine* "
lhe second half ofs the USSR has beenproducing ballistic missile submarine systems capable ofland targets. The Soviets now have operationalubmarines; nine of these are of the "H" classand the rest are "Z" conversion and "G" class diesei-poweredThis force canombined total ofissiles. The effectiveness of these submarinesby their capacity to cany only two or three missiles each,range of the missiles, and the requirement for submarinesfor launching.
The USSR is developing longer range ballistic missiles forfrom submerged submarines. Our evidence is inadequate towhether the system under developmentanget Is possible that two separate systems of different ranges are being developed.jn. system becomes available, it will probably be retrofitted Into some portion of the existing force of "G" and "II" class submarines; we believe thaietrofit program could begin soon. Such missiles will probably also be incorporated into newly-constructed "H" class submarines.
. submerged launch system Is undereither instead of or In additions almostintended for useew, nuclear-powered class. In any case, new classes of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines will almost certainly carry submerged-launch missilesange of atnd possibly as much. There is evidence lhat the Soviets are constructing nuclear submarines of new classes whosearc as yet unknown lo us.
Soviets have alsoruise missile systemhich is now carried by aof converted "W" class submarines and six nuclear-poweredships. There is evidenceongermissile is also under development. We do not knowmissions thc Soviets contemplate lor submarine cruise missileof these ranges. From Soviet discussions of naval missileother evidence it appears that these systems are designeduse against ships, bul their effective use at extended range woulda Tarward observer within sonar or radar range of the target totarget data. On the other hand, these missiles could alsoorwardconduct low levelon land targets, and their employment would greatlyproblems.
- For estimated er*racUrttlie* aad performance of Soviet submarines, see Annex A.or characteristics and performance of naval-launchedee Annex II, Table 3.
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aking into account estimated Soviel capacily to constructsubmarines, and with allowance lor estimatedof torpedo attack types, we believeradual buildup of nuclear-powered missile launching ships will occur over the next five years.he USSR will probably have more than two dozen nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and aboutquipped with cruise missiles. Construction of diesei-powered ballistic missile submarines will probably continue for the next year or so, building upotal of moree estimate Soviet operational strength in missile-launching submarines over lhc next few years as follows;
SOVIET MISSILE SUBMARINES
j
Ballistic
" and/or successor) .
" and "Z"
Cruise
" class)
" class)
' We have previously estimated that construction of "O" class submarines would terminate by thc endecent evidence has Indicated, however, that this construction has continued. While we are unable to predict the future numbers of this class with certainty, our estimate reflects both Uie recent evidence and the possibility that construcuon will continue for about another year. The siae of Uie "G" class construction program will be influenced by Soviet decisions re-eardinc construction of nuclear-powered missile submarines.
E. Long Range Avialion
SovieL Long Range Aviation, by reason of its equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasian operations Ihan for intercontinental attack. We believe that as ofong Range Aviationeavy bombers and tankers andet medium bombers and tankers. Thc heavy bomber forceISON Jet bombersEAR turboprops. Virtually all of the medium bombers arc BADGERs; at lcaslew, supersonic BLINDERS have been delivered to Long Range Aviation units, and their introduction Is continuing.
We continue toradual decline in the numerical strength of Long Range Aviation. BLINDER, the only bomber inproduction for Long Range Aviation, is being producedate which is probably insufficient to offset the expected decline in BADGER numbers. Although research and development on heavy aircraft has continued and could be applicable to military purposes, our evidence docs not indicate that any new heavy bomber is being developed foruse. Although it remains possible that an advanced inter-
33
continental aircraft could enter operational service in the next five years, this now appears highly unlikely. We therefore estimate the probable composition of Long Range Aviation throughs follows: "
Bombers/Tankers
80
20
Bombers/Tankers
925
..
Missiles "
no large-scale bomber replacement program appearsunder way, the USSR has sought to extend the service life of itsaircraft and to Improve their effectiveness by the. supersonic missile, theotandoff capability in attacks against landOnly the BEAR appears capable of delivering this largethan halt of the BEARs have been equipped to deliverrather than bombs, and there are Indications tliot theprogram Lsew air-to-surface missile,LINDER in1 air show, is now being testedprobably be operationalt appears to be designedsupersonic speedange of several hundred miles.
Operations
major obstacle to the development of capabilities forattack by Long Range Aviation has been the limited rangeaircraft which make up the bulk Of the force. Consequentlyhave given considerable emphasis to aerial refueling andtraining. The USSR has not developed an aircraftuseanker, instead, BISONs and BADGERs are convertedas tankers with their bomber counterparts. BUNDERs couldalso refuel from these tankers. There is evidence that allregiments and some aircraft from about half of thehave trained in aerial refueling. Thc recent sighting of a
"The Assistant Chlet ot Start. Intelligence, USAF, dissents to the estimates on havey bombers In this paragraph. Sec bis footnote to Conclusion M.nd 8.
"For estimated characteristics and performance of Soviet alr-to-surface missile systems, see Annex B, Table 5.
BEAR equippedose probe Indicates the possible development of an in-flight refueling capability for this aircraft, but we have no evidence as to how many BEARa have been so modified.
Even with aerial refueling, the range capabilities of Long Range Aviation for intercontinental atiack remain limited. Refueled BADGERs on two-way missions from Arctic bases could cover many targets in Alaska, Canada and Greenland, but could reach only the northwestern portion of thc continental US. The BLINDER is even more limited as to range. The BISON would require both Arctic staging and In-flight refueling for extensive coverage of US targets on two-way missions, and many of these target* would be al oxtreme ranges. BEARs could cover virtually all US targets on two-way missions from Arctic bases. They could reach targets In northeastern US directly from their home bases, but would have to stage through thc Arctic for extensive coverage of US targets when carryingissiles or bomb-loadsbs. The recently observed BEARose probe was also configured to carry air-to-surfaco missiles; modification of BEAR fur in-flight refueling would obviate lhe nccessily for Arctic staging.
We believe that the Soviets would plan to commit their entire heavy bomber forceortion of their medium bomber force to initial attacks on North America. In the posl two years, the numbers of heavy bombers engaged In Arctic training have Increased, while participation by medium bomber units has declined. Analysis of this trainingsuggests that the Soviets might plan to commit as manyircraft through relatively few Arctic bases in Initial attacks on North America.ariety of operational factors but excluding combat attrition, we estimate that thc Soviets could putombers over North America on two-way missions; of these, aboul half would be heavy bombers.10
The Sovietsarger potential for bomber attacks against the US. but to exercise It they would need lo employ BADGERs onmingions and to use crews which had noi participated In Arctic trainUig. As Soviet ICBM forces grow, such use of the medium bomber force becomes increasingly unlikely."
"The Assistant Chief of SttS. Intelligence. USAF. disserves with Judgments expressed In this paragraph. See hii footnote to Conclusion M,nd 8.
"The Assistant Chief of StafT. Intclllccnee, USAF, agrees that the need for the medium bomber force will diminish at sometime lit Uie future because of the increasing size of the ICOM force. Further, In Uie immediate future, he considers that the need for these bombers in attacks against Eurasia Is decreasing because of thc growingUM strength. He also notes that Uie SovieU aralarge numbers of medium bomben and training then expensively Hetherefore, lhal medium bombers will be used on one-way mission) In any attack on the US but that the number so uUIiacd will diminish in lime.
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H. Space Syiferm
the basis ol evidence presently available, wc are unable tothe existence ol Soviet plans or programs (or thc militaryspace. The limitations o[ this evidence, however, are such thatof identifying military programs are poor. We believe thatalmosi certainly is Investigating the feasibility of spacemilitary support and offensive and defensive weapons. Sovietto develop military space systems will depend on theirand effectiveness as compared with alternative systems, themilitary advantages which could be gained, and the SovietUS intentions and capabilities in comparable fields. We believeUSSR will produce and deploy Uiose military space systemsfinds to be feasible and advantageous in comparison with otherweapons and military equipment.
this decade, the basic factors of reaction time,accuracy, vulnerability, average life, and positive controlorbital bombardment system almost certainly will not comparewith ICBMs. We believeoviet decision to developan orbital bombardment system would depend In large partextent to which Ihese drawbacks can be overcome. Aan orbital bombardment satellite could occur at any time, butthat in the near term Its military effectiveness would bethe Soviets decide to develop an orbital bombardment force, itprecededevelopmental system of limited militarycould appear as early5
f. Implications of Capabilities
Thc capabilities of Soviet long-range striking forces will be only lnunction of the numbers of weapons available, their performance, and lhe adequacy of supporting elements. Equally critical will be the way in which the Soviets employ their striking forces, their ability to maximize the effects of these forces under the various circumstances in which war could begin, and their assessment of Western capabilities and plans.
Should the Soviets conclude that the West was Irrevocablyto an imminent nuclear attack on the USSR, they would launch their available ready forcesre-emptive attack designed to blunt the expected Western blow. The mixed forces which they have available for such operations would permit flexibility of tactics and complicate Western defensive problems, but would pose severe difficulties ofInitial missile and bomber attacks against the US wouldextenderiod of many hours, and those against Eurasia over atew hours.
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he Soviets would almost certainly wish to assign US targets to attack by submarine-launched missiles in the event of general war. Considering the absence to dale of patrols in US waters and the long time of transit from Soviet base areas, we believe Lhat at present Lhowould plan to employ few if any missile submarines in initial attacks against the US. Initiation of routine submarine patrols within missile range ol the US could change this situation, and we believe that same such patrolling activity will have been Instituted by tlies.
y thes. thc USSR will haveubstantially increased ICBM and submarine-launched missile capability lo deliver nuclear weapons against thc US, in addition to Its already formidable forces for strikes in Eurasia. Significant portions or these forces will be relatively invulnerable to attack. Reaction times will probably have been further reduced, and techniques for control and coordinationThc Soviets will beosition to strike pre-emptively at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and they will have some prospectortion of their own force could survive an Initial US attack and retaliate with high-yield nuclearWith thc long-range striking forces we esUmate that Lhey will have in thes, however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing numbers of US hardened, airborne. seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery vehicles.
VI. AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE FORCES"
USSR has continued to devote large-scale efforts toand modernizing its air defenseefenses againstespecially against medium and high altitude bombers,be strengthened by the widespread deployment of surlace-to-alrsystems. Improved interceptors with air-to-air missiles, andfor air defense warning and control. Antiaircraftwill be further Improved and extended, but the ma|or futurewhich we foresee is the adventapability againstmissiles.
A. Anlimitiila Program
more than five years, Uie Soviets have been conducUng aand extensive program to develop defenses against ballisticWe believe that they are developing several different ABMto defend against missiles of various ranges, but our evidenceto support an esUmate of the characteristics orany of these systems. Despite the Intensity ofnd re-
"uller treatment of thb subject, see. "Soviet Air sod Missile Defense Capabilities throughatedOP SECKCT
"For estimated strength and deployment of Soviet air defense equipment, see Annex A. Table 4.
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peated official claims, wc are not aware ot any Soviet breakthrough in ABM technology.
Defense Against Long-Range Missiles. Wo believe that theare deploying an ABM system around Leningrad which will achieve some operational capabilitye have no basis (or determining its effectiveness, but we think it unlikelyystem deployed at the current stage ofould be effective against missilesdecoys or other countermeasures.
To counter the more complex long-range ballistic missile threat of the, the Soviets may seek to improve the Leningrador mayifferent and more advanced system, or both. Should they follow the first course, deployment of the Leningradat additional locations would probably begin In thc near future if it has not already begun. If sites are under construction now, initial operational capabilities could be achieved at one or more additional locations in about two years, and subsequent Improvements wouldincrease the capabilities. We regard ll as more likely,that the USSR will defer deployment at locations otherew and better antimissile system ts available. In this case, the requirement forould probably delay theof deployment for another year or so. Initial operationalwould probably be achieved at one or more locations.
II technical achievements enable the Soviet* to develop an ABM syslem which they regard as reasonably effective against long-rangeigorous deployment program will probably be undertaken. Considering thc vast effort requiredarge program and the relative Importance of the various urban-industrial areas in thc USSR,igorous Soviet deployment program would contemplate the defense ofrincipal Sovielrogram of this scope almost certainly would require some five or six years from Its initiation to its completion. We have no basis for Judging whether or when the Soviets would consider their ABM system effective enough to warrant the initiation otrogram.
Defense Against Short-Range Missiles. There are indications that the Soviets have beer,odification of their standard antiaircraftissile system for use against short-range ballistic missiies such as the Honest John. Corporal, and Sergeant. We have no evidence of Soviet progress, but we estimate that an Improved SA-2having some effectiveness against tactical ballistic missiles could now be available. It ls also possible thai thc Soviets have chosen toompletely new system; if so, it could also be available this year. Wc believe that whatever system is developed will bo Intended primarily for the protection of field forces and for this use will be mobile. It will probably also be deployed at fixed sites In border areas vulnerable to short-range missUe attack.
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Systems. We believe that the Soviet leadersintend to acquire an antisatelhic capability. Although wcwe think It probableevelopment program exists.Soviets are utilizing components from existing systems, theyuble lo intercept current models of US satellites now, and theycertainly be able to do so within thc next year or so; in thisthe intercept problem could be solved by determining thethe target satellitesew passes.
urlace-lo-Att Missiles
For defense against aircraft, the Soviets now rely primarily on SAMs cmplaced near fixed targets, and upon fighters deployed to cover approach routes as well as gaps between missile defended locations. The Sovieis now have operational three types of SAM systems. Two of these,ndrc designed primarily for defense against medium and high altitude attacka; the third.s probably designed to provide improved capabilities at low altitudes. Tneystem is deployed only around Moscow, while SA-2's have been extensively deployed throughout thc USSR. The newest system,s in the early stages of deployment**
Deployment ofhc basic Soviet missile defense system, has beenassive scale. Moreites have been confirmed in the USSR; each site has six launchers, together with additionaltocfire capability. Most of these have been deployed in defense of population centers, industrial complexes, and government control centers. They also defend long-range missile sites, airfields of Long Range Aviation, nuclear production and weapon storageiMissile test ranges, and Industrial facilities. Several sites in border areas suggest that the Sovieis arc also deploying peripheralwhich may eventually extend from the Kola Peninsula along the western and southern borders of thc USSR into central Asia.the pattern of deployment, the length of time the program has been under way and the extent of our intelligence coverage, we estimate that moreites are operational In defense of morearget areas in the USSR and lhal the Soviets willotal ofites. Thiseployment program will probably be largely completed within thc next two years.
Theyslem is also being deployed to defend principal cities and major installations of theater field forces in the European Satellites.ites have been observed to date, and we estimate thatites will be deployed in the European Satellites during the next two or three years, including sites manned by Soviet field forces
Formated characteristic* and performance of these lyitems. set Annex B. Tabln 4.
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Attitude Defense. The USSR1 began deploymentSAystem. However, we have Insufficient evidence tofor thisypicalite consists ofpads. We have identified more thanuch sites, locatedMoscow and leningrad areas said in certain coastal regions,thc Baltic and Black Sea areas. We believe that thecontinue to deploy SA-3's to supplement existing SAMpriority to those coastal areas which they regard asto low levelobile version of the SA-3probably also be provided to field forces. The present Limitedhowever, does not provide sufficient basis for estimatingor pattern of futureeployment.
C. Fighter Aircraft
the Soviets are clearly placing heavy reliance onmissiles, they continue to maintain large numbers of fighterIn service. As ofc estimate lhatighters in operational units throughout thef these in Sovietf thc SovietIn Fighter Aviation of Air Defense (IA-PVO) with air defenseprimary mission. The remainder, which are In Tacticaltrained in air defense as well as ground support operations.fighter force has been reduced by about one-third over theyears, and weurther reduction on the order ofover thc next fivehe more advancedof new model fighters and improvements ln theirand control systems should more than offset reductions in numbers.
aythe subsonic FRESCOup over three-quarters of the Soviet force. However, sincehe Soviets have been working to improve thc all-weather capability of the force, bringing into servicell-weather interceptors anday fighters (FRESCOs and FARMERS) modified by Uie addiUon of airborne intercept (AI) radar. Under nonvisual conditions, the effectiveness of most of these aircraft is limited by lhe relatively short range of thc AI radar, by the continued reliance on gun armament, and by the restrictionead pursuit atUck.
n Lhe past fewew generation of supersonic, missile-equipped Soviet fighter has appeared in peripheral areas of the USSR and Eastern Europe. The delta-wing FISHPOT. probably the best
"etailed estimate of Soviet Sehter strength, see.imilar estimate on the European Satellites aad Asian Communist naUoos. sea Annex A. Table 6.
"The Assistant Chief of Stall, Intelligence. USAP. notes lhat Soviet fighter strength haa remained nearly the same sincend considers it may well belateau has been reached.
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opcrational AW light.t, has been phased into PVO units; the swept wing FITTER and thc delta-wing FISHBED C. whichapability, have gone largely to units of Tactical Aviation; thell-weather fighter has been identified in EastIn armament, fire control, and speed, these aircraft represent significant advances ovor the bulk of Soviet interceptors now in service.
hree new interceptor prototypes, al) equipped with improved AI radar and AAMs, were displayed in1 Aviation Day show: FIREBAR B, FLIPPER, and FIDDLER.s an interceptor version of the tactical strike/reconnaissance aircraft, FIREBAR A.elta-wing typeelatively short combat radius, ls cupablc of speeds in excess ofeet. FIDDLER has sufficient range and endurance tooiter. or more from base. It may be intended for use against alr-to-surface missile (ASM) carriers, but its potential for such missions Is currently limited by the shorter ranges of Soviet early warning radars.
believe that all three of these new fighters could startunits; we have limited evidence that FIDDLERFLIPPER may be In production now. Soviet productionaircraft has dropped sharply in recent years,n theohe annualtheas on thc order.
c have firm evidence on theAAMs in tlie Soviet fighter force and In several of the Satellitewell. We believe that three types are nown infrared homing missilend amay be either an Infrared homing missile or an all-weatherradar homing missUewo prototype AAM's1 (then FIDDLER and thenwe estimate that one or both could become operationalIt Is probable that these missiles have improvedhoming systems and that they carry substantially heaviersome of which could be nuclear. Soviet development ofover the next few years will depend primarily upon theof Interceptors equipped with suitable AI radar and fire
D, Antiaircraft Guns
99.
0 employ lar6Bofand fixed targets, primarily for defense
at low altitudes where fighter and missile effectiveness is poor.berof antiaircraft guns deployed with the Soviet forces, now about
taT" ofsee
SCCRCT
ias (Icclincd over lhe past few years and this trend is continuing. Because of the widespread deployment of SAMs, we believe that most of the remaining medium and heavy guns used in the defense of fixed targets in the USSR will be phased out over tlie next fewarge number of these probably will be held in reserve status near major target areas, and some will be retained to defend field forces. Continued transfer of some of this equipment to other Bloc countries is probable.
Equipment
We believe thateavy prune radars anduxiliary radars are deployed in various combinations atites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Radar coverage now extends over the enlire USSR and virtually all the remainder of the Bloc. Underconditions the Soviet system of early warning (EW) radars can detect and track aircraft at high and medium altitudes more. from Bloc territory; under virtually all conditions the system can detect and track such aircraft within. Maximum effective range of Soviet ground controlled intercept (GCI) radars is about. Future Soviet radar development will seek topresent limited capabilities against low altitude targets and alr-to-surface missiles. With the wider deployment of improved radars and automated control systems, thc total number of radar sites will probably decline.
The most important advance in Soviet air defenseand control over thc last few years has been the development and deployment of semiautomatic systems with data-handlingfor rapid processing of air defense information and data link equipment for vectoringystem similar in concept to the US SAGE system, but less complex, Is widely deployed In Western USSR. We believe that its original ground element has been replacedecond generation system, and that an improved semiautomatic fighter control syslem is being introduced. These new systems will probably also be widely deployed in the USSR and possibly in Eastern Europe within thc next few years.
radar could now give Moscow and many other targetsInterior more than one hour's warning of medium and highmade with Western bombers of2 type. Sovietsuch detection would be reduced by low level penetrations.bombers and ASMs now being added to Westernreduce this warning tune by as much asercent.more limited EW time available in Bloc border areas wouldeffectiveness of the defenses of even heavily defended targets in
such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles increase, and as Western ballistic missilesreater part of the threat, the problem of providing warning time will become more critical.
G. Current Capabilities and Future Trends
he extensive deployment of SAMs over the post four years has significantly improved Soviet air defense capabilities. Theseare greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers in daylight and clear weather at altitudes betweennd0 feet. Under such conditions, virtually all types of Woe air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to0 feet; thc FLIPPER will probably be able to execute attacks at0he capabilities of thc fighter force, composed largely of day fighters, would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poorin the increasingly widespread areas defended by SAMs, olr defense capabilities are virtually unimpaired by weather conditions and extend to altitudes of0 feet.
Despite its recent and considerable improvements, however, thc Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in copingarge-scale air attack employing varied and sophisticated tactics, even in daylight and within thc foregoing altitudes. In addition, the Soviet defense problem would be complicated by the variety of delivery systems which might be employed, including air and surface-launched cruise missiles and fighter-bombers. At altitudes beloweet, thc capabilities of thc system would be progressively reduced; beloweet, the system would lose most of its effectiveness. The Soviets will attempt to correct these deficiencies during the next few years by improving lhe capabilities of surrace-to-alr missile and fighter defenses for low altitude operations. Total system effectiveness will be increased by further application of automated command and control.
The significant Improvements In the Soviet air defense system during recent years will be extended during the next few years, and successful penetration by manned bombers will therefore requiresophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defensecan be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ. Including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetration tactics, and electronic countermeasures. Even in such circumstances, the Soviets would prob-
" Current operaUonalnterceptors (FISHBED. FITTER. FISH POT) are capable olynamic ollmb ond reaching albtudos of0 feel. Inlimb, the aircraft would be at these altitudeshort period of Ume (perhaps one to threeuring which It would have little maneuverability. The precision with which the climb must be planned and executed limits iu effectiveness as an intercept tauUc.
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ably cxpecL toumber ol the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that Ihey could reduce the weight of attackoint where thc resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until thc USSR is able toubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery
VII. THEATER FIELD FORCES" A. Ground Forces
The Soviet ground forces, which represent the largest part of the military establishment, are well-trained and equipped wiLh excellent materiel. Combat troops are distributed amongilitary districts in the USSR and three groups of forces in the European Satellites. The strongest concentrations are in East Germany and the western and southern border regions of theesser concentration is in the maritime area of the Soviet Far East. Most Soviet ground forces are organized into field armies with combat and service support for the line motorized ride and Unk divisions. Combat and service support is generally stretched thin, and thereow ratio of nondlvlsionalto the present divisional force. However, there are large numbers of artillery, missile, and antiaircraft artillery brigades and regiments which are either allocated to field armies or reUined under higher command headquarters. Combat air support is provided by units of Tactical Aviation, organized into tactical air armies under thecontrol of the military district or group-of-forces commander.
Of the nearly two million men in the Soviet theater ground lorces, about half are in line divisions and the remainder are In combat and service support elements. We estimate that there areine divisions, of which approximatelyre considered to be combat ready (atercent of authorized personnel strength ornd the remainingrc at low and cadre strength (estimated to range betweenndercent of authorized strength and hence requiring substantial augmenUtion before commitment toAt present.
ore detailed treatment ot this subject seeCapabilities of Soviet Theaterncludes secUons on UieSatellites, forces facing NATO, eross capabilities for theater campaigns, and capabillUes for distant military acilon.
"The number of divisions confirmed since1; most of Uie additional divisions Included In our esUmate are understrength units located In areas from which inlormaUon ls received only sporadically. Taking account of this and other factors, wc conclude that the current total of divisions could lieange, with thc most probable flpire beingetailed esUmate of ground divisions by locaUon and type, and their estimated strength, ace Annex A..
there are an estimatedankirborne divisions,otorized rifle divisions The present force levelut of aboutombat ready line divisionsow strength divisions since Khrushchev's announcement of force reductions inhe large number of cadre and understrength divisions retainedontinuing Soviet preference forery large and partly skeletal ground force capable of being rapidly fleshed out wiih
Weapons and Equipment. The program of modernization and reorganization has involved the introduction over thc lasl several years of more advanced designs ol practically all types of equipment, including surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. range, tanks, armored personnel carriers, nuclear-capable free rockets with ranges up tontiaircraft guided missiles, artillery and antiaircraft guns, recoil less antitank weapons,ide variety of transport vehicles. In some instances, thorn have been two successive generations of equipment since World War II. The increasing number of tracked and wheeledand amphibious tanks has greatly improved Sovietcapabilities, and we expect extensive equipping with the newarmored personnel carrier.
Present trends in lhe ground weapons development program pointontinuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. Specific areas of concentration probably will include light gun and missile weapons to defend against low flyingield antimissile system,weapons and equipment, weight reduction of existingand improved reconnaissance and communications. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are replacing medium and heavy antiaircraft guns; guided antitank missiles are being introduced and will probably replace some antitank guns.
S. fociicol Missile and Ait Support
their doctrine for theater operations in general nuclearSoviets continue to employ the combined arms concept, but Uieyto consider nuclear and missile weapons as the basic elementSoviet development of tactical guided missiles hasthe fire support available to fieldlthoughare probably the primary armament of these missiles,considerations might prescribe the use of chemical (CW) and(HE) warheads Road mobile surface-to-surface ballisticwith maximum ranges.nd SS-1A)have been available for several years. Thend SS-2arc intended primarilyround support role, and missileassigned to direct operational control of field commanders.
"For estimated characteristics snd performance of Soviet short-ranec missile systems, see Annex B, Table 3.
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Although there la little direct evidence on the deployment of these missiles, we estimate that nbouLrigades (with 6each) andattalionsaunchers each) arc now operational. These missile units arc believed to be in thc artillerystructure of major Soviet theater force commands, although none have been firmly Identified. We believe that the numbers ofndnits will remain fairly stable. However, the Soviets probably will soon begin replacing theith an improved follow-on system of similar range, as they have done with thc SS-1.
The number of aircraft ln Tactical Aviation was reduced by half0ince that time, It has been generally stabilized In overall strength, with phasing in of new model aircraft andreductions in older models.esult of reductions andSoviet Tactical Aviation Ls now mainly located in the areasmajor potential land theaters of combat About half its total strength is with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and most of theIs Ln western and southern USSR. Tactical Aviation willto receive new models and to decline In numbers ofprobably fromoyhc estimated current and future numbers of Soviet tactical aircraft appear low into estimated total ground forces and their likely missions in the event of general war.
A prime current deficiency of Soviet Tactical Aviation is thc lack of modern aircraft, particularly fighter bombers. For offensive tactical air support, thc Soviets still rely heavily on the obsolescent BEAGLE subsonic Light bomber, but It Is now being replaced by the FIREBARupersonic tactical fighter bomber. In addition, the FITTER and FISHBED C, while primarily interceptors, could also be employed for tactical support missions. Thc older types of Soviet tactical fighters, FAGOTs, FRESCOs. and FARMERS, were designed primarily asand have limited load-carrying and range capabilities when used Ln the ground support role. They canariety of missions in support of ground forces and can be equipped to deliver nuclear weapons, but the newer types of tactical aircraft mentioned above appear better suited to these purposes. At present, about three-fourths of thc fighters In Tactical Aviation are older types, mainly obsolescent, but the introduction of modern supersonic fighters has been accelerated, and these types now comprise about one-fourth of total estimated strength.
"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF. notes that combat elements of Soviet TacUcal AviaUon have not declined In total numbers sincend he does not agree there wiU necessarily be the future decline forecast here. If Uie Soviet Union markedly reduces the ground element of Theater Field Forces over the next few years, TacUcal Avialion mayomparable reduction, but probably not otherwise.
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of the Soviet tactical fighter units have beentrained only (or the Interceptor mission. Despite thethe older aircraft, however, most units observed have also beenequipped to perform ground attack missions and couldused for any one of several purposes depending on operaUonaldefending against air attack, providing close supportforces, or assisting ground operations by striking targetsenemy's rear. The Soviets have conducted some training inof nuclear weapons. In addition. Tactical Aviation. surface-to-surface cruise missiles (SHADDOCK,
C. Miliiary Air Transport
ight transports of the CAM, COACH,types, aboutonverted BULL piston mediumedium turboprop transports of thc CAT, CAMP, andore assigned by Military Transport Aviation to support oftroops. The assigned transports of the airborne troops areto airliftingle airborne division or theof two airborne divisions. Each divisional araaultbe limited toroops, Including headquartersrifle battalions, and light regimental support elements.and service support as well as transport vehicles of thenot be included. The mobility o* these echelons, oncetherefore be restricted,econd sortie of the entiredeliver the balance of the two divisions. Radii of thewould permit operations of this type to be conducted to aof.
hc probable addition in the near future of more transports will enhance Soviet capabilities to lift large numbers of troops or cargo to peripheral areas; In several years, the present lift capacity may be doubled. Soviet airlift capabilities also could be augmented byet and turboprop transports now in civil aviation; these aircraft have an airlift capability of nearly two additional divisional assault echelons.
O. Amph'bf'oui Capabilities
oviet amphibious capabilities remain quite limited They vary from one battalion in the Northern or Pacific Fleet area, to one regiment in thc Black Sea. and two regiments In the Baltic. Thc USSRotal merchant ship lift in all seas which Is theoretically sufficient to transport approximatelyotorized rifle divisions; however,ift would require port or other extensive off-loading faculties in the landing area. The Soviets may seek to further develop their amphibious lift capability, but significant improvement will depend upon their ac-
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quisitkm of additional amphibious craft, extensive training,eliable logistic support system. There are no Indications of such an improvement in the near future.
Nuclear Weapont
Tactical nuclear capabilities are still limited, but they have been improved markedly over the past few years Soviet military planners are nowosition to think In terms of committing upew hundred nuclear weapons, virtually all with yields in the kiloton range,ypical front operation. Limitations on the quantity and variety of nuclear weapons available to theater forces will have cased by thes. The Soviets are probably developing subkllolon weapons, but we have no present evidence of work on delivery systems designedfor such weapons.
The Soviets evidently consider CW munitionstandard and integral part of the Soviet arsenal for general war, to be used extensively in conjunction with nuclear and conventional weapons In support of front operations. Military forces of the USSR and Satellites regularly conduct training exercises Involving the offensive use of toxic chemical agents as well as defense against them. We believe, however, thatfrom Moscow would be required before operaUonalcould initiate Uie use of chemical weapons.
Although tactical nuclear delivery systems are Integral to Soviet theater forces, thc nuclear weapons themselves do not appear to be in their custody. In peacetime, such weapons are stored in depots operated by the Ministry of Defense and located within the USSR. Soviet procedures for controlling these weapons ensure the national leadership that they will not be used without authorization. Existing procedures, together with deficiencies in logistical support, appear to penalize tho Soviets In terms of operational readiness and rapid response for tactical nuclear weapons employment. There is evidence that the Soviets are considering steps to overcome these deficiencies; such steps could Include preparations to deploy tactical nuclear weapons lo theater forces during periods of heightened tension.
for Theater Operations
longstanding Soviet concern with concepts and forcesLn adjoining theaters, especially in Europe, has resultedformidable theater force strong in armor, battlefield mobility, andbeing. The tactical nuclear delivery capabilities of these forces,Improving, are still limited. In offensive operations, rapidlytheater forces are in constant danger of out-runningtall, which is heavily dependent on railroads. Finally,have traditionally exercised very strict supervision over the ac-
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Lions of Iheir subordinates, bui existing command and control systems do not permit the strict supervision over the widely extended deployment required on the nuclear battlefield or under the threal of use of nuclear weapons.
The statements of Soviet leaders, as well as the deployment and training of Soviet theater forces, make it clear that the principalor these forces in general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. The Soviets plan in the Initial dayseneral war to move massive theater forces rapidly toward the Channel coasL. and to secure thc exit of thc Baltic. This campaign would probably be augmented by operations in the Scandinavian area to acquire advance bases for the Northern Fleet. The Soviets evidently also contemplate operationsthe Mediterranean, and to secure lhc exit of the Black Sea. Other peripheral areas, such as the Middle and Far Easi, are apparently re-garded as having lesser priority for theater force operations. Soviet capabilities to conduct theater operations against North America are limited to minor airborne and amphibious attacks against Alaska and Arctic bases elsewhere.
The adjustments in Soviet theater forces in the past few years have not materially impaired their capabilities lo conduct nonnuclear operations. The USSR's highly mechanized forces have favorablefor thc dispersed operations required because of the constant possibility of escalation to nuclear warfare. Over thc past two years, Uie nonnuclear firepower of ground units has not been significantly altered, but the supporting nonnuclear firepower which can be delivered by tactical aircraft has decreased. There arc indications that thehave recently given recognition to the possibility of nonnuclear war with NATO forces in Europe. They probably intend Lo retainfor conventional warfare against NATO, but they do not appear to have revised their expectation lhat any major conflict with NATO would be nuclear from thc start or would probably escalate.u
Tlie Soviets have evidently not elaborated any doctrine for limited nuclear warfare by theater forces, involving the use of tactical weapons only. We think they would be severely handicapped in any attempts lo conduct such warfare at present Moreover, thus far the Sovietslo think that limited nuclear conflict In thc NATO area wouldcertainly escalate to general war.
"The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intemgcncc. USAF, believes that the material redaction Inf Tactical Aviation tn 1M0 and early lvftl markedly reduced Soviet capabilities for nonnuclear air support lor ground operations, since then. modcrnliaUon of tacUcal air equipment for nuclear warfare has not Impaired the residual quaUty or totality of nonnuclear capnbiliues for theater air support. Further, he notes the possibility of limited warfare involving Soviet forces has been no more than mentioned In Soviet wrtUnc. There ls no evidence that any limited war doctrine, whether nuclear or nonnuclear,irect confronta-Uon of Soviet and US or NATO forces, has been discussed.
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VIII. NAVAL FORCES
Until recent years, the Soviet Navy has been equipped and trainedrimarily defensive role. An intensive postwar shipbuildingconcludedurface fleet, including cruisers, destroyers, and escort ships, which was limited for effective operations to the range of shore-based aircraft. Even the Soviet submarine force, largest ever assembledation in peacetime, was composed for the most part of types capable of infesting the North Atlantic and the sea approaches to thc USSR, but lacking thc range for such extendedas patrols off the US coasts. However, in the past few years, thc Soviets have developed an increasingly diversified naval forceew emphasis on weapons and equipment of greater range and effectiveness.
Much of thc impetus for technological change in the Soviet Navy has come from the USSR's concern over the threat posed by US missile submarines and carrier task forces. To counter these forces at sea, the Soviets have introduced medium bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles, submarines equipped with cruise missiles, and new classes of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships. They have also Introducedmissile submarines which can carry the attack to the homelands of opposing naval forces; and improved types of attack submarines, both nuclear and diesel, for interdiction of sea communications and enemy naval forces. Soviet surface forces have also been greatly strengthened by the addition of missile armament to cruisers, destroyers, and patrol craft, and by the introduction of new minewarfare ships.
A. Submarine Force
Soviet capabilities for conducting operations at long distances from the Soviet coast rest primarily upon lhe submarine force. The numerical strength of this force has changed little in the past few years, and we believe that for the period of this estimate it will remain stableirst line ships. However, with thc continued introduction of missile armament and nuclear propulsion, the capabilities of this force are changing significantly. For example,he USSR had only aboutubmarines capable of conducting extended patrols off US coasts all of them diesel-powered, torpedo-attack types. The USSR now has moreubmarines with this endurance, includingships, aboul half of them armed with missiles.
Nuclear Submarines. We esttmalc that thc Soviet Navy now has aboutuclear-powered submarines operational. To date, we have identified three classes of Soviet nuclear-powered ships: the "H" class ballistic missile submarine; the "N" class torpedo attack submarine; and the "E" class which is equipped with cruise-type missiles. We believe that within the next few years other classes of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines will be in service, including both torpedo attack and missile-launclung lypes.
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wo Soviet shipyards are currently engaged In nuclearproduction: Severodvinsk ln the northern USSR, and Komsomolsk in the Soviet Far Kast. Considering the construction of nuclear-powered submarines lo date, our estimate of the USSR's capacity to produce and install nuclear propulsion systems, and our esUmate of the existing level of effort, we believe that the USSR is likely to build0 nuclear-powered submarines of all types per year. It is primarily on this basis lhat weuildup in the Soviet nuclear-powered submarine forceotal ofnonsidering Soviet requirements. It Is possible that they will seek to increase their production of nuclear propulsion systems andarger force. On the other hand,difficulties which they have apparently encountered with their nuclear power plants may retard the program somewhat.
Torpedo Attack Submarines, The Soviel force of attackIs capable ofarge-scale torpedo attack and raining campaign against Allied naval targets and sea communications in the eastern North Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. Its capabilities for operations near the continental US are more limited, but are growing. The bulk of the Soviet submarine force consists of diesei-powered. torpedo attack submarines, built for the most part ln the early ands. These includeW" class.Z" class.R" class, andQ" class submarines. Of these older ships, only the "Z" class submarines are believed capable of conducting patrols off of US coasts from bases In the USSR However,8 the Soviets have produced aboutiesei-poweredclass submarines andN" class nuclear-powered submarines, both of which have sufficient endurance to perform such missions.
Soviet construction of diesei-powered, torpedo attack submarines may continue for another year or so, but future emphasis probably will be placed on nuclear-powered types. In view of tlie expressed Soviet concern with US missile submarines, we believe that thc USSRtrong requirement for attack submarines designed primarily forwarfare. Thc "N" class, with its nuclear propulsion andsonar equipment, appears better suited to this role than any other class If the "N" class is not intended for such use. we believeew class of Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines, specificallyfor ASW, will appear within the next few years.
Missile Submarines Soviet leaders have repeatedly slated that nuclear-powered submarines armed with various types of missilesthe main power of their navy. We estimate that thc USSR now has operational aboutallistic missile submarines. Including both nuclear and diesei-powered types. These ships, their characteristics, and capabilities have been considered above) in terms of their contribution to Soviet long-range striking forces. In addition, it has become apparent within the past year that the Soviets arc giving
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considerable emphasis to the development and deploymenl, of submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles. We have nownits of the nuclear-powered "E" class, each equipped with. cruise missiles designed for low altitude flight at supersonic speed. Inthe Soviets have convertedW" class submarines to carry two or four such missiles each,esire to achieve an earlycapability. The Soviets are nowubmarine-launched cruise missile of. For the possibleof submarine-launched cruise missiles see
B. Surface Forces
Naval surface forces, which are heavily dependent upon land-based logistic and air support, appear suited primarily for defensive operations ln waters adjacent to the USSR Conventionally armed major surface units now compriseruisers,estroyers, andscort ships. In recent years, however, the Soviet Navy has considerably increased thc firepower of its surface forces by the addition of missile armament, including surface-to-air missiles, which has extended the potential scope of effective operations. The only known major surface combatant ships now being built in the USSR are guided missile destroyers. The "Kynda" class, armed with both surfacc-lo-surfacc and surface-to-air missiles, is being built at Leningrad,ew destroyer class, believed to be equipped with missiles of an unidentified type, is probably in production at Nikolaev on the Black Sea. The Soviets have alsoew older stdps Lo missile armament.
The Soviets now have operationalcslroyers, armed with cruise-type missiles for use against surface targets. Thesehips of the new "Kynda"f the "Krupnyy" class,f the earlier "Kildin" class. Thc "Kildin" and "Krupnyy" classes employurface-to-surface missiles, wluchpeed nearnd an effective range. With the use of forward observers, maximum range can be extended. We beucve that tlic "Kynda" class employs.n addition to theirarmament, stilps of these three classes also carry ASW gear. They arc probably intended primarily for operations against both surface ships and submarines in coastal areas, ciLhcr in defense of the sea approaches to the USSR or in support of theater field forces.
Other new construction during the past few years has involved small specialized craft for use in antisubmarine warfare, amphibious operations, minewarfare. coastal defense, and logistic support. Two classes of patrol boats equipped with surface-to-surface crulse-typcare now operational.
Wc believe thai thc numerical strength of Soviet surface naval forces will remain fairly stable over the next five years. Sovietof guided missile destroyers and of smaller specialized craft will prob-
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ably continue at about present levels. Modernization of destroyer types will also continue, and additional sur'ace ships will be retrofitted with missile armament. We estimate that byoviet first linestrength will consist ofissile destroyers,ruisersith3 conventionally-armed destroyers, andscort ships as well as moreissile patrol craft.
Soviet auxiliary fleet, composed primarily af older ships,augmented by newer tanker and cargo ships, and submarineis being reinforced by the addition of submarine tenders,and repair ships. Additional logistic support could bethe growing Soviet merchant marine. In terms of net tonnage,to thc Soviet merchant fleet1 fellhe0 increase, but were still well aboveprevious year. Thc decline1 was apparently aphenomenon,hift in production to moreships and to super tankersapacity0 tonsOur evidence indicates that the increase1 Increment. Tlic widespread Soviet fishing fleetslimited logistic support to submarines, and they haveutility for training, mlnewarfare, and collection of
C. Naval Avialion
Naval Aviationrastic reduction0 with the deactivation or transfer of all navalNaval Aviation is composed largely or Jet medium bombers;Includes Jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters.are focused primarily on reconnaissance and strikemaritime targets and on antisubmarine warfare. Air coveroperations would have to be provided cither by shipborneby fighters not subordinate to Naval Aviation.
f NavalADGER jet mediumequipped to deliver antiship air-to-surface missiles. Theseof two types; the subsonichichange of.oth are estimated toEPfeet against ships, and some of these missiles probably carryBADGERs can carry either two AS-l's or onef thc missile-equipped BADGERs are configured forand we believe that eventually allew of thesebe so equipped.
medium bomber strength will probably increasethe next five years. Wc believe that Naval Aviation hasfew BLINDER supersonic medium bombers, and they will probably
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appear in greater strength within the nexl few years. Some of these may be equippedew air-lo-surface missile, thcf It isfur antishlpping use; this system could become operational
of thc naval BADGERs which are not equipped wlUiassigned to reconnaissance units. Recent evidence indicatesand heavy bombersng Range Aviation have alsonaval recoiuiaissance missions; recent overflights of US carrieralso suggest an attack training mission for these aircraft.that the naval requirement for long-range aerialgrowing, and that It wil! be met olther by increased numbers ofin Naval Aviation, or by selective use of Long Range Aviationin this role.
D. CapabitMci for Nova/ Warfare
In recent years, the missions of the Soviet Navy have beento encompass strategic missile attack against foreign territory and operations against Weslern naval forces, while retaining the more traditional roles of interdicting Western scalines of communication, defending thc lltloral of the Soviet Bloc, and providing support for the seaward flanks of ground field forces. In waters adjacent to the USSR, all types of Soviet naval weapons could be brought to bear againstnaval forces. In the next few years, the Soviets almost certainly will give thc greatest emphasis to strengthening naval capabilities for long-range attack) and for defense against Western carrier task forces and missile submarines.
Against Carrier Task Forces. The Soviets evidently regard the carrier task forceajor strategic threat. Their capabilities against such forces have been improved by continued conversion of Jel medium bombers to carry antlshlp missiles and by thc introduction ofequipped with cruise-type missiles. In the European area. BADGERs with antiship missiles could operate against surface ships in the eastern North Atlantic, the Norwegian and Barentsnd much of the Mediterranean. These capabilities are. of course, subject toof detection and Identification. In thc past year or so,of open ocean areas by Long Range and Naval Aviation hasSubmarine operations against carrier task forces couldto US coastal waters.
Against Seatines of Communications. The threat of the Soviet submarine fleet to the vital seallnes of communication of the Free World is greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific. The capability of Soviet submaruies to interdict these supply lines would dependumber of factors: endurance of the submarines, transit lime to station, repair and overhaul requirements, logistic support, and the extent of opposition. Interdiction operations against North AL-
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SECRET-
lantic supply routes would bo undertaken largely by submarines of the Northern Fleet; this force includes aboutubmarines withendurance to operate in US coastal areas but which could operate in the Norwegian Sea and eastern Atlantic. Included ln these arc sixonversion" class SSG whichun. antishlpplng cruise missiles. Not considering combat attrition, aboutorthern Fleet submarines could be maintained on station continuously In thc eastern Atlantic approaches to the UK and Europe. This force might be augmented by submarines deployed from thc Baltic prior toSome coverage of the approaches to the Mediterranean could also be achieved. Thc Soviets could also maintain0 nuclear-powered and long-range dlescl-powered. torpedo-attack submarines on more distant stations for operations against shipping in thc western Atlantic. This number could be more than doubled if tlie Soviets were able to provide logistic support during Uie patrolorward base such as Cuba.
In the Pacific, Uie Soviets have someubmarines which they could use in an efiort to sever Uie US scalines of communications. While only one-third of this force has sufficient endurance to operate off Uie US west coast, the remainder can operate in those areas through which US seallnes of communications must pass to support our Pacific island bases and Asiatic allies. Included in theseubmarines in the Pacific, the Soviets now have six nuclear and three diesei-powered cruise-misslle-launchlng submarines. We believe the Soviels Intend to employ thesen an antlshipplng role but they could be employed against land targets. Considering the limitaUons oftransit time to station, repair and overhaul requirements and loglsUc support, the SovieU could now mainUinubmarines in the ocean area between Hawaii and Japan und about Ave ofl the US Pacific Coast.
ASW Capabilities. Since theie SovieU hove placed increasing emphasis on Uie improvement of ASW forces. They haveajor effort In Uie construction of ASW ships, particularly small coasUl types, and are testing new ASW seaplanes andew ASW aircraft may be introduced within the next few years. An ASW role may have been assigned lo Soviet "V" and "R" class sub-marUies. which feature improved sonar gear, as well as to the nuclear-powered "N" class. DclecUon equipment and weapons now in service include air-launched passive sonobuoys. airborne magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) equipment, mulUple tube ASW rocket launchers, and passive homing torpedoes. ASW exercises have expanded in scope, and training doctrine has become more sophistics led. We believe that the Soviet Navy is capable of carrying out fairly effective ASW operations in coastal areas.
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military writings reflect great concern with theby TJS missile submarines, and wc believe that in recentSoviets have emphasized improvement ol their ASWthe open seas. Much ol the new and improved ASWis in service or under development is probably designed forHowever, several years of intensive trainingcoordinated operations by submarines, surface ships, andbe required before the Soviets can effectively employ any newthey may develop. Moreover, although the Soviets maya long-range hydro-acoustic detection system, the USSR'ssituation would make it most difficult to maintainby this means over large ocean areas except in thePacific and in tlie Arctic. Wc believe lhat at presentNavyegligible ASW capability in the open seas.effort which they almost certainly arc devoting to Ihis problem,lhat over the next five years, the Soviets will be able loa limited capability to detect, Identify, localize, and maintainon submarines operating in the open seas."
IX. SPECIAL WEAPONS
A. Chemical and Biological Warfare
The Soviets have developed spray devices for disseminatingagents from aircraft; they are estimated to have CW-fillcd artillery shells, short range rockets, and warheads for tactical cruise andmissiles. Chemical munitions might be used in areas or enemy contact in ground combat, and against enemy Iroop concentrations, command posts, missile launch sites, and other key targets. Using air and missUe delivery systems, CW agents might also be used againsi naval concentrations.
Based largely on the capacity of CW storage sites, we estimate that thc USSR possesses an inventory of atons of toxic agents in bulk and in filled munitions. At least half of this stockpUe probably consists of nerve agents, principally tabunnd the remaining half of various older standard agents. We believe thatdevelopment could produce only small increases in the toxicity of known agents and that some research is being directed towardof new, lethal agents. The Soviets may develop nonlethal,agents, and at least one could be available for use
We bcUeve that the Soviet Union has an active BW research effort which is suitable toomplete BW program, but there ls insufficient evidence on which toirm assessment of Soviet BW offensive activities. However, the USSRomprehensive biological
-The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF. disagrees with judgments expressed In this sentence. See his footnote lo Conclusion T. page II.
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warfare defensive program wliich could lead to an offensive capability. The Soviets have conducted research on antipersonnel, anUHvestock' and possibly anticrop BW agents. Although we have identified no mass production facility for BW agents and have no evidence of Sovietof such agents, research laboratories and existing plants for the production of vaccines could provide these agents in quantity.
B. Electronic Warfare
he Soviets haveide range of active and passive ECM equipment, including improved chad, radar, and communications Jammers, and various deception devices to counter Western electronic sysLems. Soviet military ECM capabilities arc complemented by the unique Soviet experience in extensive, centrally controlled, selective jamming of Western broadcasts. At present, the USSR has ancapability for Jamming at those frequencies normally used by Western radars and long range radio commuiucations systems. Within thc period of this estimate, we believe lhat the various types of Soviet equipment, taken together will be able to produce signals for Jamming all frequencies likely to be employed by Western communications, radar, and navigation equipment.
hus Soviet capabilities to interfere with Western strategic and tactical communications appear formidable. The Soviet ground-based jamming capability is most effective withinuilcs of Soviet territory. In addition, the cutting of trans-Atlantic cables by Soviet trawlers has demonstrated the vulnerability of this Westernsystem. The Soviets are aware of at least some of the effects of high altitude nuclear bursts on radar and communications, and have continued their program for investigation of these effects
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[jje.tr fco 3ftfJt7
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ANNEX A
Personnel Strength of thc Soviet Armed Forces,2
Estimated Strengtli of European Satellite and AsianArmed Forces,2
Estimated Soviet Aircraft Strength by Role Within Major
Estimated Strength and Deployment of Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense3
Tablestimated Tactical and PVO Fighter Strengths
Table 6 Estimated Strength and Deployment of Soviet Groundand Tactical Aircraft.2
Table 7 Estimated Strength of Soviet Ground Farce Line Divisions,3
Estimated Soviet Naval Strength and
Estimated Strength of Ground and Air Forces of European Satellites and Asian Communist Nations.2
Estimated Strength of European Satellite and AsianNaval Forces,2
Estimated Characteristics and Performance of Soviet Postwar Submarines
Estimated Performance of Light Bombers,Aircraft, and Seaplanes
Estimated Performance of Soviet Transport Aircraft
Estimated Performance of Soviet Helicopters
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TOPSECRET"
TA1ILK i
ESTIMATED PERSONNEL STRENGTH OP THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
2 -
2
0
Ministry ol
HeudqutulerS
Research and Development
Tueater Field Forces
Ground Forces. Field
0
0
Tactical Aviation
Air Defense Forces
Surface-to-Air
Antiaircraft ArUUery (Cud)
Fighter Aviation of Air Defense
m
Warning and Control
LodK-TUngc Attach Force*
viation
Surfacc-lo-SurfaCe Missiles
ao.ooo
,, andaval Forces (excluding personnel ccunled elsewhere)
Forw* Afloat
Shore Establishment
Coastal Defense
Naval Aviation
Miliury Transport Aviation
Helicopters, Liaison, and Utility Aircraft
PreoperaUOnal Aviation Training
TOTAL
0
Security Forces (Not included iD tne above total)
border
Internal Troops
The estimates presented iu thi; table are general nppre-iiinatiOOS. The figure) arefrom estimates on order of battle and manning which vary markedly in adeqiuny. The evidence is normally best foi- combat unite and thaw elements immediatelyl tends to become much poorer for logistical and admra live elements. Wcargin of error lo each individual figure, but in some ca*e3 this error is likely lo be measured in tens of thousands. Wu think lhat the estimated totals likely lo been- percent Of 'hi! total number of uniformed personnel actually in the SovietestablUbraenl at present. In addition, there are atubstantial butnumber of civilians working for the Soviet military establishment.
Military scientific research and development in thc IfSSll is lately conducted by civilian agencies, in particularcademy ofhe Sute Coinrnillees for DefenseAvialion Technology. Sclent inc.Technical Mailers. Radio-Electronics, andand hy the MioisUy of Medium Machine Building (nuclearheof active duly military personnelc tin tliose primarily subordinate lo tho Ministry of Defense ond at missile (rat range, iu electronics, nuclear development, andtechnology. Olher miliiary personnel in Research and Development and alliedare counted In other categories.
This figure is baaed On she assumption that all Soft MRBM launching positions arc manned. If as many as half of Ihoae arc alternates (see, this figure would be.
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TAHLK
TUENGTU OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE ANU ASIAN COMMUNIST AHMED2
. -
Foacar,
(In-
Naval Aviation)
o Secinnr Folic KS)
F'lHCLil
Salelkie* (Rounded Toiala).
ono
A.tin (Rounded
firvt
!MWi
in
Cninj
wV w
Korea
Vietnam
i
|
fOP--SieRL-i-
i
ESTIMATED SOVIET AIRCRAFT STRENGTH BY ROLE WITHIN MAJOR COMPONENTS,7
Trrc Aihch.ft
Range
'i.y
m De-rertsL
I'..
*vwn
Aon
Tn
eonr
2
19G7
"
Jet
600
1 WW
'
2&0
;,.
heis *
t.:ii
ill
900
4O0
flight)
I'.-op and Turboprop(heavy)
IltlltOplCY'
ii
)
255
30
30
30
n.vssuuce *
80
(Rounded)
in:-
Assistant Chief of Stuff. Intelligence. USAF, believesollow-on heavy bomber* ill probably be introduced in about I'Hitherefore estimate that hssvystrength will remain ithrough1 out the perkid of this estimate. Sue hiso, paragraph M, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION'S- Further, the Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF, believes lhal fighter strengths ore likely lo remain ul or near prCscol lovrls; MC his fOOIikQtO lo p'gG 4ft,inally, he does not consider that the Soviet requirement for reconnaissance Hirers ft wil) dimmish ii? indicated in this table. If the Ught bombti rcconnalr&ancc aircraft phase nul^ he believes thisy luiignmenl of additional fighlers to reconnaissance roles.
transport and helicopter figures in parentheses are not Included in tlie totnls of the component under whioh
lit!'} ar.' listed. Ihey i. i: i,i,-k
' Includes ISO lighl transports- assigned lo administrative functions; noi showu elsenhere in those tables
<55
TABLE 4
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF SINO-SOVIET BLOC AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
I3
Aui
'
Con
Snw '
Sites
MODBl b
*
Moo ui. *
ONDART
m
HtAvr
USSR
USSR
USSR
# ii-
USSR
Conirii USSR
.
lira Europe Soviet Forces.
Europe Satellite Forces..
Communists
,
Air Defense '
(Ind. iu Fsr.
la operaUonal uniia cxdudioc UalDers, FIREBAR A, and FLASHLIGHT D. FISHPOT, FISHBBD D.
FRESCO D.nd E, FLASHLIGHTISnBED C, FITTER.
FAOOT, FRESCO, FARMER.
and EW and CCI radars. of Moscow, SAM withinm. and AA ruu? witliiull ol which aie included above in the figures (or western. nortbwmWu, sod west-central USSR.
Fifturw arc (or SA-I,nd SA-3.
66
-rep-SEGffer-
TAIILE ft
ESTIMATED TACTICAL AND PVO FIGHTER STRENGTHS*7
A-C
FRESCO Di'E
FARMER.
FLASHLIGHT A
FISIIBED C
0
t
5
O/FLIPPER'
FITTER
FISHPOT
FIREBAR H
FIDDLER
FOLLOW-ON AIRCRAFT
' twin
fl t E
I ii
STRIKE/RECCE AIRCRAFT STRENGTHS
,
D
im
W
these tabfc. take account ol current trends Inoule. evidence on aircraft prcductWnresearch andMe* ol Soviet technic* capabilities in design and development, and congestion. nrs.rd.nsoviet requirements for numbers and types of air defense and tactical aircrafteneral. The toul estimated
iod th" ,nestimates because our current evidence shows tbU
the USSRot ,el.nog oldernd lights rapidly or. wc had anticipated. Wc do not excludehe next few years the Soviet* mil returnokey of Sweeping reductions io older models; theseare hosed on thc assumption that during the period Under consideration there will be no drasticthe trends now
tCMdinterceptorround attack
Wend FLIPPER were. dffiiKned tooughly comparable mission,e spread figures in this category reflect our uncertainly as to thc current statin of FLIPPER The hither Oftures reHeet thc possibility that FLIPPER la in prcducuoo now and will enter unitshe lowerare.
unitsowever, if FLIPPER is not produced, the range of this estimate.
assumption that FLIPPER production docs net3 and that Uie aircraft does not ente.
would expect thc number ol FISIIBED D's to fall within
ulUpuipose fighter, no evidence of their development.
Follow-on aircraft which could appear toward the tad of the period of thb estimate Include an advanced all-weather
uiyct
The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence, USAF, believesontinuation of Soviet fighter stremrth atut present cvels is somewhat moreeast in the near term, ttuu, the downward trend presented in this table. With substitution of new models for older aircraft, the total number of Soviet operational Tactical and PVO fighter* bos held quite level, and may even be up slightly, over the pastonths.
TABLE 6
Divlsic
ESTIMATED STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET GROUND DIVISIONS AND TACTICAL AIRCRAFT.
TaWK
2
E NT
Fan-
CENT
Lo* j
Fiokt-
No
No.
Total
Reaiit
Ready
Read*
Tactical Aviation
Abea
Total
Tot.l
12
12
I'L
i:
100
i1
0
Low Strew oth
9 17
:so;
13
1 !
S
1 2
1
'2'.
10
10
Easternorthwest USSR.
to
-
West USSR
(Gi
Southwell USSR. SouthernSubtotal)
'SSH .
FE USSR
T0TAL3..
100
This subtotal comprise' these Soviet ground sod lactical air strengths in areas from which units could be employed against NATO.
The number of divisions firmly idcntiEtd since1; most of tho additional divisions which are included in our estimate are underetrength units located in areas from which information is received Only sporadically. Taking accoa.it of this and other factors, we conclude that the current total of divisions could beangeo ISO, with the most probable figure being.
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TABLE 7
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OP SOVIBT GROUND FORCEUNK DIVISIONS.3
Manning Level
Rifle Diva.
Diva.
Diva.
Actual *
Ready
anki
Medium
222
256
heeledacUed Veliicles Combat Support
51
263
124
Laun-
(Ices
mortars)
Antitank Guns.
a
15
24
cHimated number" of divisions of the severalnnex A.
The TOiUt'a of Soviet aootortud rite aad tank divts-xu are currently beUg re-eaaaWo*d. Prekraiaary infotsaatioo iixLeateaownward revision la tbe estimated authorised personnel slrenElli of each of these type* ot diviaiorin is likely to result from this No significant change in nsiimaled actual strength is Indicated, however.
Tbe figure* given are laUroated averages.
These artqulpcneat figara. Combat ready divWoas aaintaJn approximately these quantities in working, order at alt mars, bow strength divisions are believed to have lull TOE equipment readily available
-rep-sec Rcr-
ESTIMATED SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AND7 "l
Trre or SHIP
2
2
cine
LINE SUBMARINES
"
mnaile <B>
missile (E>
missilend Z-
missile (V7 coov.)
, F)
torpedo (W. RJ
torpedo (Q>
*
24
LINE SUBMARINES
torpedo (M)
1
LINESURFACESHIPS
f
LINE SURFACE
n
line submarines wc those ot modern construction The second line category lists units froiuoears old which, by virtue of age end design are considered useful only for Induing Or perhaps coastal defense. Some Of the second line1 probably be retired from service earliern an age criterieo.
Surface ship, which are at leastears old are carriedecond line status uuUl there Is evidence of theirIrom thc fleet or uotil they ere Gnally considered rcmorcd <iu thc absence of contrary evidence) whenears Old
of classes of nuclear submarines Identified lo date appear in parenthesis. Totals for future years Include submarines of follow-on classes which may be built during the period.
- We have previously estimated that construction cf "G" claw submarine* would terminate by the endecent evidence has indicated, however, that this construction has continued. While we are unable to prediot the future numbers of this class with certainty, our estimate reflects both the recent evidence and the possibility that; ni>oui hik.irct year. The site of the "G" claw construction program will be Influenced by BovWregarding construction ot nuclear-powered missile submarines.
"ft" class arc in the Northern Fleet and five in thc Black Sen.
70
TABLE 10
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE AND ASIAN COMMUNIST NAVAL FORCES.2
COUKT BY
.
Sam
UARINX5
10UB
ae
fabe
koi.
ia nr
SATELLITES
,
ASIA
Korea
am
72
IllUllillUl
SSS S SSS S SSSSS6Sgss2
a
O
0
U
z
is s= g8 io
= = 5 55
o o
or-
IS
*s;s
26 So XO SC
* o
i |
3
o
i
SCCRET
capacities ore lac minimum number* whirh cun be earned Any combination of lorpedces/mhee could be carried, substitutingmint* (or "neh torpedo.
time ci station and radii (distance to station) have been computed on the bails of various operational facloia, principally those relating to "Sea endurance" and "Fuel endurance."
Sea endurance ht defined aa the total length of timeubmarine eaa remain at tea without replcotshraent under combat ceediuoas and ia citicna'-ed en the baas of pertcnel endcranee, gsnoref habilabHily, food, spare parte, andotiaer Ihu fori. Thend "N" dawe* of nuclear prapclled submarine* are estimated loSee. endurance" of CO days. Theadf diesel powetM lubcoarincs are eili-tnated loSea endurance" of SO days, while thend "R" elaeaes are estimated loa endurance" cfkjt.
"Fuel endurance" la deSned as the lotnl length of timaubmarine can remain on patrol under combat operaUonal conditions without refueling. For dluel-powercd submarines, ft Is computed on the basis of fuel consumption resulting from an nibluartly assumed average transit routineour*ours snorkel,ours submerged operations daily; fuel consumption on station is computed on the bastsew hours of snorkel operations daily,only to maintain the state of charge of the mainbattery for submerged operation the remainder of the day.
Tbe endurance id Tiro am operating radii of ovclcersubmarines ore limited by factors other than fuel. For the purposes of Uua labia it has bee* arbitrarily assumed lhat Soviel nuclear-poweredwould transit to station taring the following criteria;
Speedit ir. area where ASW oppoatuoo is anticipated {assumed to be' time).
Speed ofts in areas where ASW oppositionnot axpeeled (about ri of transit time).
Selected distance* from Soviet ports:
- ii
mum
to
Inlet
cisco
mo
. K
end
of lOOn.m.
Three diYcrant eceivenioos have been observed on "W" class cruse missile launching swbmarir.es.ocieeilesoarl todasfta.
Aboutnit* of Uie "Q" class are believedhave been modified for closed-cycle operations of their diesel* while submerged withgen employed
as the oxidising agent. These modified units have on estimated submerged endurance of.aximum ipond of IGruising speed ofm. This endurance is In addition to that listed on the above table.
f ET-
TA BLE 1?
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF LIGHT BOMBERS. STRIKE. RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. AND SEAPLANES
Dksichation
INTO
Omu-
TlOff
(Las.)
WriOHT
Ridivs
at Tahget/
Max.
(Kts./
Ktb.)
at
T
(Ft.)
A *
3
0 0
O
0
evel sen level
High level bombing mission The BEAGLE canb. bombloaddiua olmalt part oi lhc Soviet BEAGLE lorce ia equipped with tip tanks. Range/radius of Up tank-equipped aircraft would.educed bombloadbs.
" Reconnaissance mission carrying tip tanks throughouteconnaissanceround attack mission.
MihcUying mission withines.
' There is some evidence that take-off weight may be less.
TOP OrCRCT
TOP GCCflCT
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT (Calculated in nccorrlnnr^ with USIIA, Basic Mission)
CAB
COLT
BULL
CRATE
CAMEL A
CAMEL B
COOT
CAMP
CAT
CLEAT
CUB
COKE
COOKPOT
CLASSIC'
TIOSaL
Date
9
:os:
M
vm iW
S.V.
Desio-nation
LI-2
Piston
Piston
TU-4
Piston
Piston
Piston
Turbojet
Turbojet
;.s
Turboprop
Turboprop
Turboprop
:u
Turboprop
Turboprop
Turboprop
Turbcfnn
To.-WS-i
(liis.)
0
pAiiATnoor
CaPaCIII
170
Combat
lilt lie
li
(rr)'
3
SCCREf-
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET HELICOPTERS-
CmaicTewsTie
OND
'
Data.
DeatgcaUe*
<r>
CQ
Plant
(m)
of Crew
.
Cargo (tba) (normal).
Cargo (Its)
speed {klsatets level)
speedt.
Celling (fl)
mo
Periccraacee quoted la for aorraal cargo load; alternate loads are shown to indicate capacity, but performance would dilter from that shows.
only in prototype version; operaUonal data nadatarwaUMd.
If avMeootassenger venins mayeals.An FAI record Hfl.
CCCTtH-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ANNEX B
Glossary of Missile Terms
Table I Long-Range Oround-Launched Surface-to-Surf ace MissileEstimated Characteristics and Performance
Table 2 Short-Range Ground-Launched Surlacc-to-Surface MissileEstimated Characteristics and Performance
Table 3 Naval-Launched Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics and Performance
urface-to-Air Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics and Performance
ir-to-Surface Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics and Performance
lr-to-Air Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics and
ANNEX B
GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS
Intttal OperaUonal Capability (IOC)Date the first operational unit is trained and equippedew missiles and launchers.
Maximum Operational Range
Surfacc-to-Surface SystemsMaximum range under operationalwith wurhcad weight indicated. For long-range ballisticthc maximum range figures disregard thc effect of thc earth'sIn general, ballistic missiles can be fired to ranges as short as approximately one-third the maximum operaUonal range without serious Increase in CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.
Surface-to-Air SystemsSlant ranges are indicated In the tables. For practical purposes, the slant range can be used as Uie horizontal radius of the defended area. Range will vary with the direction ofthe altitude, and the site of the attacking aircraft. Maximum alUtude Is not necessarily achieved at maximum range.
Air-to-Surface SystemsSlant range between launching aircraft and target at the instant of missile launch.
Air-to-Air SystemsSlant range between launching aircraft andat the instant of missile launch.
Circular Error Probable (CEP)The radiusircle In which,one-half of the Impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies arc somowhnt better than the accuracies specified In thc tables, which take into consideration average operational factors. For naval systems firing on coastal targets, an accurate determination of tho launching ship's position Is necessary to achieve CEP's of tho order indicated in the tables.
Warhead WeightThe weight of the explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism.
Heady Missile Rateready missile is an in-commisslon missile with warhead mated, mounted on an in-commisslon launcherrained unit which Ls considered ready to be committed to launch. Readyrate is the percentage of missiles on launcher which are "ready
Reliability, onThe percentage of ready missiles which will successfully complete countdowns and leave their launchers attimes orinutes thereafter.
Reliability, in FlightThe percentage of missiles launched whichas planned in the target area. within three CEP's of the aiming point).
Readiness ConditionsThc following conditions of readiness apply to aU ground launched ballistic missiles having ranges greater
ConditionLaunch crews not on alert. Nosecone and missile checked but not mated. Missile guidance system not adjusted for particularand missile not erected or fueled.
ContfHionaunch crews in launch area and on alert. MissUe and nosccone mated and checked but in prelaunch storage building.
aunch crews on station. Missile with nosecone erected on launch pad. Propellant facilities in position, attached, and ready to start propellent loading. Guidance system set.
aunch crew on station, missile propellent loading Guidance rechecked.
ReactionTime required to proceedeadiness condition to firing.
Refire TimeTime required to refire from the same pad or launcher.
LAUNCH Ell SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED
'Mi
CIIAnACTEUlSriCS ANI> PERFORMANCE
Initial OneraliiKiari
Miiv Opcriilioiuil Rouge
Accuracy (CEP)arhead. -
1
Crib- TnkcoiT Weighto'i lieu.
PrOptlhiiiia
Ready -Missilei'li.billtv, on Launcher..
Reliability, i" Flight
Reaction Timeromondition I:
Hold Time. ConditionTime
KlCVSTKIl
:i
SS-I
-
A
SS-G
B
SS-7
C-SS-8
Smaii.
LaRflK
IU58
laoi
half
-
U
V. 1 :lI
*
Ji
2
I
1
lo
or
Age
On" lor.
-
<
lirs.
lire.
hrs.
lira.
Im.
hrs.
hr*.
bra.
hr*.
bra.
Hr*.
hrs.
Hrs.
hrs.
hr*.
hra.
lir. '
hrs.
hr.
hr.
IS
10
n>.
us.
hr.
lira.
Im.
hr.
hra.
Hr.
hr.
lir*.
hn. '
hrs.
hrs '
hrs.
hrs.
Bl> ft, Iho SS-J, and possibly there dapluvi-ri in both soft and hard configurations
Early UMI oi Iho RS-fl indiralcdbs. -aa deliveredid.ealcchoiqun available at thai lime, the warhead lorr.eaerone wo* estimated toriga CUM- lU.OOU IIhOi pmmi lechnulogy. lhcrobably rsab warhead to thc same dnttane*rovided thai aaraiBBIw aweaad flight to-led.
Aa> bv asadirection rcfmuct Tba arroe seaM-fig andwe-ihl ba Carrted out ib light oa board IrHr nwlle.
Probably aora* what highf for missiles in tha hard (onSgu'auou
probably he tin- normal readiimi Condition for hardor the .oil uuiiliaU'aUOn of these
TABLE 2
SflOUT-RANCE GROUND-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
AMI Pb'HfOKMANC:!:
S-1A
Operalir>nol Copa-bilily
Man. Operational linage
Propulsion
Guidance
Accuracy
Warhead ,
Reliability
On launcher..
In flight
Reaction
Refire Time..
prior4
ballistic.
LOX-Aleohol.
radio-inertial,all-inertial
o.;&
taw (cw,
HE. nuclear)
ira, after arrival at prcsurvcyod site, can be heldr. forperiods and for limited periods5 minutes.
ours.
HE)
ISO (CWnuclear
sloe, liquid.
all-inertial.
l,U0ClV ornuclear)
2 hri. after arrival at prCSUrveyed site, can be heldO.mins. forperiods.
our'.
ballUUt.
iiouslor.
rodlo-lnerlihl.
CW. HE, nuclear)
rs. after arrival at presurveyed site, can be heldr. forperiods, and for5 mins.
ours
maysiicc ii raited)
aerodynamic, lowlo-
turbo-jet JP fuel,oxygen
unknown, possiblelink
i.hi food ta.'geloi.ro.
W, HE, or nuclear)
unknown
hr. afterresurvcyed sile.
jnkiionn
of the SS-ther lhan range arc unknown, bui they will probably bo similar to, or improvementof theSS-lB.
Wc estimate that Ibe USSR haiehicle-mounted, taclicnl cruise missileange ofon. for delivery of HE or nuclear payloads. Olher characteristic* are unknown, but they may be Similar lo Urate of thearried by Soviet guided missile patrol cruft.
r-iiEcuclearill probably bo increased.esult of1 nuclear tests.
TABLE 3
NAVAL-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
Characteristics ano Pkiu-oumakcx
Operational Ca-
ballistic
Operational
wllh forward ob-
supersonic
Altitude (ft.>
With ra-
with active
(CEP)
command and terminal bom ine ISO ft. against ships;
t
homing
t. with terminal iioming againstm against land targets
nm
m ot less thanm range to as muchm
ull.
Wcifcht
maximumHE or nu-
(HE)
(HE or nuclear)
nuclear) stor.%
mot
* w
stur. liquid fueled roeket
85%
on launcher..
in Flight
lo more than 30
Time
mins
mins.
mind
mins. to launch 1
mini.
The USSR is developing longer range ballistic missiles (or launching from submerged submarines. Ournadequate lo determine whether the system under developmentanget is possible lhat lw. separate systems of dlffereut ranges are being developed.
kit
TABLE *
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS' ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
DESIGNATION
Op Capability
Operational Rauco
EH. Altitude (ft.)Kff. Altitude (ft.)
35
..
scan/radio
scan/radio eoromand
ragmentation 1
(CEP inarhead Weight
in and
200
A ship-beme surf ace-to-air missile system, designatedas been observedhe KYNDA/KOTLIN conversion class destroyers. Wc havevidenee to es-tinmte characteristics.
arc based on originalWsiic. For thoseites modified for thc SA-2's GUIDELINE missile, characteristics will0 Of theystem.
altitude is not necessarily achieved at maximum rnegc.ill vary witli the siic, direction Of approach, and altitude of thc attacking aircraft.
" Wc have insufficient evidence to estimatehis system IS probably being deployed for low-altitude defense.
have tutue effectiveness up0 lect especially if equippeduclear warhead.
< This system prohahlyigh degree of effectiveness up to altitudes0 feet, with limited .aeirtiveuoss Up0 feet. Its capabilities would decrease rapidly at higherut there in some evideuce that it might be abiU to engage non maneuvering targets at altitudes a* nigheet.
in such factors as Siting conditions and target speeds iriil influence low-altitude capabilities Soviet doctrine suggests allocation of targetseet to AAA fire.
the original system was equippedsod FAN* SONG (formerly PRUITSKTjand FAN SONG radars appearedhrao new radars have improved somewhat Iho accuracy sod low-*lutude capability of the system.
'arheads are possible, although specific evidence ol their useInciting.
TOP SCCRCT
TABLE 5
AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
AS-1
AS-2
AS-3
350
not applicable
ioerUal
land targets BEAR:
I
Against
Ships
Against well-defrueri targets on laud
Accuracy (CEP at iubjc. range)
with ccmi-aciive homing
beam-riding
inertial with active radar terminal homing
ISO IWl
/it
(HEornucloar)
)
(He or nuclear)
on Launcher
in Flight
aotiBlu'p; could to BADGER:
against landADGER:
1
new oir-to-surfscc missilearriedLINDER "B" medium, bomber, was displayed in1 Soviel air show. We believe that thisrototype ot awhich could become operational
launchADGER must boat au altitude,0 feel, andpeednots.
TOP SECaii-fr-
AIFI-rOAIK MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
INTO OfCM
CAB
(UMj
Weiokt ti-aa.)
'illnn
Canarxa
W.M.
ALKALI
beam rider .
B FARMER E
tail
Soviet designation
"RhM".
D
TOLL
A NAB
homing...
C
'
lo clear air
semiactive radar horning or
fighter.
ISHPOT B
condition*Range ia lean al Ic. altitude and vnriee with lhe target dtttrmlaa lion capability of (enter.
weather
l>
FLIPPER
FIDDLER
AWL
srmioc-
radar homing
ASH
aemiao-tive radar homing
iu
tail
note
believe that thend theitalic* are capable
Warhead* ere esumnted aa HE blast fragmentation of carrying nuclear warheads.
The indicated langci
The mlsaile has been observed oo the lighter* haled above the tine; it is believed to be compatible wllh those listed below the line. All of thc fighter* in this column are limited to lead pursuit attacx with the exception of FIDDLERstimated to have airborne radar and fire control permitting universal nitoek.
The range will vary with the else, direction of approach,ltitude of the target aircraft, are nominal ay stem ranges for the indicated direction of approach.
limited to tail cone attack.
Oaer air mass is here defined aa absence of clouds aad pre*labors between missile and target. Tbe term te equally applicable to day or night operation* In addition aa infrared lyMcrodegradedrighlor attack angles dose lo the sua.
1 f LVLuTQ, T
IBRARY Mandatorv Review
Document
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3
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS CFMILITARY CAPABILITIES
AHDatedOP SECRET
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