NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
WTTOVEO MR RELEASE Gift BiSTO RtCRL-REViSW PROGM
Soviet Military Capabilities and
TABLE OF CONTEKTS
I. SOVIET MILITARY
Views on War and Military
Recent Course of Military
of Future Military
II. SOVIET HIGH COMMAND
Iir. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET ARMED
IV. TRENDS IN MILITARY
V. FORCES FOR LONG RANGE
Policy Toward Long Range Striking
and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles
I. Implications of
VI. AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE
c Fighter Aircraft
Capabilities and Future
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)
VII. THEATER FIELD
B Tactical Missile and Air
A. Chemical and Biological Warfare
ANNEX A: TABLES
ANNEX B: TABLES
i HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND
To review significant developments in Soviet military thinking, policy, and programs, to assess the current Soviet militaryand to estimate main trends in Soviet military capabilities and policies over the next five years.
This estimate presents our main conclusions on the broad range oi major Soviet military problems. It includes, inter alia, sujnrnary versions of recent National Intelligence Estimates,as appropriate, devoted to individual military missions and other related questions.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Sos.'c Wewj on War
A. The Soviets see military power as serving two basicdefense of their system and support for its expansion. Thus, one of the most important objectives of Soviet military policy is to deter general war while the USSR prosecutes itspolicies by means short of actual hostilities involving Soviet forces. The Soviets recognize that their deterrent must bein the sense that it rests upon powerful military forces. They also recognize that deterrence may fail in some key confrontation in which either they or their opponents come to feel that vital interests are under challenge. Against this contingency they wish toombination of offensive and defensive capabilities which will enable them to seize the initiative if possible, toenemy nuclear attack, and to go on to prosecute the war. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their military planning or their general policy upon the expectation that they
will be able lo achieve, within the foreseeableilitary posture which would make rational the deliberate initiation of genera! war or conscious acceptance of grave risks ofar. )
number of Soviet statements in recent years havethe view that limited war involving the majorwould inevitably escalate into general war. Whileare intended in part to deter the West from localforce, this official view alsoenuine Soviet fear ofof becoming directly engaged in limited waxSoviet and US forces. This probably also extends toof Soviet forces with certain Allied forces in highlynotably Western forces in the European area.they might employ their own forces to achieve localsome area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged thateither because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear powersome other reason, would not make an effectiveThey would probably employ Soviet forces asif some Western military action on the periphery of thethe integrity of the Bloc itself. Should thedirectly involvedimited war with US or Alliedbelieve that the Soviets would not necessarily expand itinto general war, but that they would probablythat force which they thought necessary to achieveobjectives. They would also seek to prevent escalationmeans. (Paras.
Soviets recognize another type of limitedwar of nationalin whichanti-Western forces challenge colonial or pro-Westerna primarily internal struggle. The Soviets have renderedassistance in some such conflicts, and little or none inupon such practical factors as accessibility, thedefeat, and the attitude of other powers involved. Inthe USSR has given military assistance .to friendly,regimes. As new and favorable opportunities arise, thewill continue to offer these various kinds of assistance.however, that they will remain chary of any greatof prestige to the support of belligerents over whom
they do not exercise substantial control or in circumstances in which they feel that winning is unlikely, and they will seek to avoid risk of widened hostilities which might result from "wars of national liberation." )
General Trandsiliary Doclrino and Policy
D. Current Soviet military policy stems from Knrushchev's plan, announced ino cut back the size of the armed forces and to place main reliance on nuclear and missile forces. The plan reflected his vieweneral war is almost certain to be short, with victory decided in the strategic nuclear exchange, and with conventional armsuite secondary role. Khrushchev's plan was accepted only reluctantly by the military leadership; both the plan and its strategic justification have since undergone substantial modification. Present Soviet military doctrine holdseneral war will inevitablythe massive use of nuclear weapons; it will begintrategic exchange, and its course and outcome may well be decided in its initial phase. Hence, doctrinal discussionthe importance of seizing the initiative by pre-emptive attack if. in the Soviet view, general war becomes imminent and unavoidable. However, the current doctrine holds thatonflict will not necessarily be short, and It supports both the building of strategic attack and defense capabilities and the maintenance of large theater and naval forces. )
E. The Soviet leaders evidently believe that the presentmilitary relationship, in which each side cantrong deterrent upon the other, will probably continue for some time to come. However, they almost certainly regard the present strategic posture of the USSR as inferior to that of the US. and they are aware of the continuing buildup of US forces forattack programmed for the next few years. In this situation, they probably do not expect to be uble tolear strategic superiority over the US, but we believe that the Soviets are far from willing toosition ol strategic inferiority. Our evidence does not indicate that the Soviets are attempting to outstrip or even match the US in numbers of weapons for In-
tcrcontincntal attack; we believe, however, that they willto offset US superiority by other means.' )
Soviets mayossible solution to theirwith the USombination of antimissileplus very effective though numerically inferiorstriking forces. We believe that deployment ofdefenses may be the largest new Soviet rriilitarythe period of this estimate. Hardened ICBM's andsubmarine missiles will contribute to SovietIn addition, over the next few years thewill probably come to include new large ICBMs,very high-yield warheads or capable of global ranges.the USSR is almost certainly investigating thespace systems for military support and offensive and )
statements and military writings suggest thatleaders see in technological achievements the meansthey may improve their total strategic position relativeof the US. They have made scientific military researchdevelopment of new weapons matters of highemonstrated ability to concentrate human andresources on priority objectives. If they develop newor new weapons which give promise of military andthey will seek to add them rapidly to theirto gain maximum benefit from them. Thus, during theyears, we expect the Soviets to be working on even moreweapons with which they may hope to enhancecapabilitiesater date.*
USSR's military programs and space effortsdemands upon Soviet resources. The effort tostrengthen all arms of the Soviet forceshard on resources available for investment and consump-
'The Assistant Chief or Start. Intelligence. USAF, agrees lhat the Sovietsdo not expect to be abte toosition of clear strategic superiority over the US durine'lhc lime period of thia csUmate and that they are far from willing toosition of strategic inferiority. However, he believer, that the USSR it pursuing an intensive research and development effort In the hope of attaining technological breakthroughs which, when transited Into weaponwilllear strategic superiorityslet dale. 'See the Assistant Chief ol Starr. Intelligence.ootnote to conclusion E.
tion goals lo which the leadership is strongly committed. Thus, Khrushchev may once againeduction in resourcesto theater forces on the grounds that growing nuclear capabilities will permit this cutback without endangering Soviet security. But whileeduction would reduce expenditures for military pay and release manpower to the economy, it would not significantly reduce the demands of the defense establishment on critically scarce, high quality resources and highly skilled manpower. )
I. Despite the possibilityuture reduction in theater forces, Khrushchev'sebruary speech indicates that the Soviethas recently taken economic decisions which reaffirmpriorities at the expense of consumer aspirations; beyond this it mayecision to increase military spending above previously planned levels. The Soviet economy is capable ofeavier military burden, but not without sacrifices in the program to raise living standards and perhaps alsoin the future rate of industrial growth. For the present, the Soviets appear to have chosen to risk these consequences, but we believe that the problem of resource allocation will continue to plague the Soviet leadership.
J. Soviet military policy will continue to be shaped, not onlyariety of strategic, technical, economic, and political factors, but also by differing views about the relative importance of these factors, and shifting compromises among these views. As awe believe that the numerous aspects of this policy will not always be wholly consistent with each other, and that forceand future programming will reflect neither astrategic doctrineirm timetable for achieving specific force levels. We do not believe that the Soviets conceive of existing weapon systems as the answer to their militaryor that they have fixed and inflexible plans for their force structure in the period five toears from now. Barring some major technical advance in weaponry, we believe that Sovietpolicy is likely to continue along current lines, and that for at least the next few years large standing forces of all types will be maintained. Even in the absence of such an advance,we cannot exclude the possibility of new departures inpolicy, perhaps resulting in-major changes in the
tion ot the Soviet military establishment and in the relativegiven to forces designed to accomplish the major military missions. )
Forces lor Long Range Attack
K. Although missile forces for attack on Eurasia continuemajor emphasis in the building of long-rangehas evidently shifted to forces for intercontinentalICBMs. We estimate Soviet ICBM strength2perational launchers,ewhardened launchers. Byhe force,0 silos. The Sovietestimated for the next two years will consist primarilyequipped with warheads in the low megatonew missiles with very high-yield warheads.that the major trends in this force7 will be:the force to some hundreds of launchers; hardening of aportion of the force; and availability of someof delivering very high-yield.a'
Assistant Chief of Staff lor Intelligence, Department of Ihe Army, dissents to Uils projection ot force levels. Since the Soviet ICBM launcher construction program [or second generation systems nas been under way for nearly thiec years and has resulted In only someperational launchers, It appears most unreallsUc to him to estimate thatperational launchers will become opera-Uonal during the nextoonths. He therefore estimates as follows:
'The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, believes that availablecollectedong period of time,asis for differingof the magnitude of the Soviet ICBM program and the approximate time required for site construction. Experience has shown that even with the best available intelligence, and where evidence appeared to be complete, continuing analysis has indicated that ICBM launch sites exist which were not mlUally Identified. Because of the history of expanding ICBM locations and the absence of complete, up-to-date Intelligence, he believes that undetected launchers Indegrees of construction, nov exist at the confirmed complexes. Further, he also believes there are additional complexes mostly under construction at yet unidentified -locations. He would-therefore estimate Ihe number Of Operational ICBM launchers, including those at the Tyuratam test range, throughs follows:
L. The Soviets now have operational aboutallistic missileot themcarry atotal olissiles designed for surfaced launching. The USSR is developing longer range missiles for launching from submerged submarines. Inthe Soviets have developed submarine-launched cruisewhich are probably designed primarily for use against ships but could be employed against land targets. Inhe Soviets will probably have more than two dozen nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and aboutuclear-powered cruise missile submarines. By that time, they will probably haveroutine submarine patrols within missile range of the US.)
M. Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason ol its equipment, basing and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasianthan for intercontinental attack. However, the Soviets have given considerable emphasis to aerial refueling and to Arctic training. Excluding combat attrition, we estimate that thecould putircraft over North America on two-way missions; of these, about half would be heavy bombers. Long Range Aviation now compriseseavy bombers and tankers andet medium bombers and tankers. We continue toradual decline in numericalortion of the BADGER medium bomber force will be replaced by the new supersonic BLINDER, already in units, but ourdoes not indicate that any new heavy bomber is beingfor operational use. Byong Range Aviation will probably compriseeavy bombers andediums' )
Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. does not consider thit this paragraph accurately reflects the capability of tho USSR to put aircraft over North America on two-way missions. Re believes that with due consideration of all relevant factors, aach as number of aircraft in Long Range Aviation. numbers of aircraft tanker configuredpeak availability rale, the Sonets could commitircraft to initial two-way attacks on North America. From this number committed,ombers could reach North American targets.
The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. further estimatesollow-on heavy bomber will probably be introduced inV Thedevc&pment of large aircraft capable of supersonic ipeed. andFootnote continued on fallowing
N. We estimate that the Soviet MRBM and IRBM force now comprisesompleted launch positions, deployed for the most part in western USSR within range of NATO targets in Europe. The bulk of these launch positions are soft,ew silo-type hardened sites arc probably operational. We believe that deployment of soft sites will have been virtually completed early this year, leveling off ataunch positions; the hardened component of the force will continue to grow, probably reachingaunchers int is possible that as many as half of the soft launch positions are alternates, in which case the first salvo capability of the force would besmaller, although still large enough to devastateEurope. )
(Footnote continued from preceding page i
pplicabletructures, and other components substantiate the Soviets Interest In large supersonic vehicles and suggest an Intent to incieasc their strategic allacK capability by such means. The BOUNDER probably haiost useful purposeest bed lor many components, aerodynamictructural design which are dirccUy applicableollow-on heavy bomber capable of supersonic speeds He esUmates the to:al Soviet heavy bomber and tanker Strength will remain atircraft throughout the period of this estimate, present strength levels being maintained by theof modest numbersew heavy bomber.
O. In the event of general war in the period of this estimate, the USSR would almost certainly employ against theixed force of ICBMs, missile submarines, and bomber aircraft. By thes the USSR will haveubstantiallyICBM and submarine-launched missile capability tonuclear weapons against the US, in addition to its already formidable forces for strikes Ln Eurasia. Significant portions of these forces will be relatively invulnerable to attack. Thewill beosition to strike pre-emptively at the fixed bases of an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and they will have some prospectortion of their own force could survive an initial US attack and retaliate with high-yield weapons. With the forces which we estimate, however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing force of US hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclearvehicles. )
Air ofio* Missile Deffnse forces
P. The significant improvements in the Soviet air defensenoted during recent years will be extended during the next few years, and successful penetration by manned bombers will therefore require increasingly sophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defense capability can be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will he able to employ, including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetration tactics, and electronic counter measures. Even in such circumstances, the Soviets would probably expect toumber of the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR is able toubstantial number of advanced ADM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery capability.
Q. The major development which we foresee in Soviet defense is the adventapability against ballistic missiles. For more than five years, the Soviets have beenigh priority and extensive program to develop antimissile defenses, and we estimate that several different ABM systems are underWe believe that3 the Soviets will achieve somecapability with an ABM system now being deployed around Leningrad. Wc have no basis for determining itsbut doubt that it would be effective against missiles employing decoys or other counter measures. The USSR isalso developing an antisatellite system.
R. To counter the more complex long-range ballistic missile threat of thes, the Soviets, may seek to improve the Leningrad system, or mayore advanced system, or both. In any case, the USSR is likely to defer additional ABM deploymentetter system is available. If the Sovietsan ABM system which they regard as reasonably effective against long-rangeigorous deployment program will probably be undertaken. We believe thatrogram would contemplate the defense ofrincipal Soviet cities and
would require some five or six years lo complete. We have no basis for judging whether or when the Soviets would consider their ABM system effective enough to warrant the initiation ofrogram.
S. The longstanding Soviet concern with concepts and forces for campaigns in adjoining theaters, especially in Europe, has resultedormidable theater force, strong in armor,mobility, and units in being. The tactical nuclear delivery capabilities of these forces are still limited, but they have been improved markedly over the past few years. In offensiverapidly advancing theater forces would be in constant danger of outrunning their logistical tail, which is heavilyon railroads. Finally, the Soviets have traditionally exercised very strict supervision over the actions of theirbut existing command and control systems do notthis strict supervision over the widely extended deployment required on the nuclear battlefield or under the threat of use of nuclear weapons. )
T. The USSR's capabilities to conduct naval warfare in the open seas rest primarily upon the submarine force, which is capable ofarge-scale torpedo attack and raining campaign against Allied naval targets and sea communications in the eastern North Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. Itsfor operations near the continental US-are more limited, but are growing. Capabilities against carrier task forces have been improved by the conversion of jet bombers lo employ anti-ship missiles, by the introduction of submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles, and by increased air reconnaissance of open ocean areas by Long Range and Naval Aviation. The Soviets have also placed increasing emphasis on improvement of ASW forces in-coastal areas and in the open seas. We believe the Soviet Navy is capable of carrying out fairly effective ASW operations in coastal areas, but that itegligible ASW capability In the open seas. Despite the effort which they almost certainly are devoting to this problem, we believe that over the next five
to detect, identify, localize, and maintain surveillance onoperating in the open seas.' )
Assistant Chief of Stan, Intelligence. USAF. would delete the last sentence and substitutelio wing:
While over the next five years, it is probable that the USSR will have onlyASW capability In the open seas, it must be recognized that theapplied by the USSR toward solution of the ASW problem will reducedeficiencies and possibly could result In marked Improvement In Sovietcapabilities. .
I. SOVIET MILITARY POLICY
A. Bene Viewi on Wot and Mililaty Policy
Soviets see military power as serving two basic purposes:of their system and support for its expansion Thus, one ofimportant objectives of Soviet military policy Is to deterwhile the USSR prosecutes its foreign policies by means shorthostilities Involving Soviet forces. Military power isinto play in direct support of these policies, through thegive force to Soviet political demands, through the stress onpower which Is intended to gain respect tor the Soviet state andsystem, and through the military aid and supportallies, friendly but neutral regimes, and anti-Western movements.
The Soviet leaders realize that their deterrent must be credible in the sense that it rests upon powerful military forces. Moreover, they recognize that deterrence may fail in some key confrontation in which, despite their best efforts to retain control over risks, either they or their opponents come to feel that vital Interests are under challenge. Against this contingency they wish toombination of offensive andcapabilities which will enable them to seize the initiative ifto survive enemy nuclear attack, and to go on to prosecute the war.
The Soviets evidently believe that the present overall militaryIn which each side cantrong deterrent upon the other, will probably continue for some time to come. The Soviets are vigorously pursuing programs of research and development in advanced weapons, hoping If possible totrategic balance favorable to them. It is possible that some future technological breakthrough or advance would persuade them that they hadecisivewhich permitted them toifferent view of the risks of general war. We do not believe, however, that the Soviets base their military planning or their general policy upon the expectation that they will be able to achieve, within the foreseeableilitary posture which would make rational the deliberate Initiation of general war or conscious acceptance of grave risks ofar.
A number of Soviet statements in recent years have expressed the view that limited war involving the major nuclear powers wouldescalate Into general war. While such statements are intended in part to deter the West from local use of force, this official view alsoenuine Soviet fear of the consequences of becoming directly engaged in limited war involving Soviet and US forces. This probably
also extends to involvement of Soviet forces with certain Allied forces in highly critical areas, notably Western forces in the European area. Nevertheless, they might employ their own forces to achieve local gains in some area adjacent to Bloc territory if they judged that the West, either because it was deterred by Soviet nuclear power or for some other reason, would not make an eftective military response. They would probably employ Soviet forces as necessary if some WesternacUon on the periphery of the Bloc threatened the integrity of the Bloc itself. Should the USSR become directly involvedimited war with US or Allied forces, we believe that the Soviets would not necessarily expand it immediately Into general war. but that they would probably employ only that force which they thought necessary lo achieve their local objectives. They would also seek lo preventby political means.
Recent Soviet military writings call for professional study of the problems of nonnuclear combat, which could lead to some modification of the official view on limited war. However, we believe that thenow being devoted lo this problem is primarily responsive to indications of US Interest in building NATO's capabilities for nonnuclear combat In our view, it does not reflect any new Soviet conclusion that the USSR can now launch such wars without great dangers orescalation.
The USSR has regularly recognized the importance of the "war of nationaln which pro-Soviet or anti-Western forces challenge colonial or pro-Western regimesrimarily internalIn practice, Soviet behavior has followed neither the course ol full support to all these wars, as Soviet propaganda often alleges, nor the course alleged by Khrushchev's Chinese critics, who claim that he withholds support entirely because of exaggerated fears thatonflict mighteneral .war. The USSR has rendered activeln some cases, such as Laos and Yemen, and little or none in others, such as Algeria and Angola, depending upon such practical factors as accessibility, the risk of defeat, and the attitude of other powers Involved.
The USSR has alsoecent willingness to provide somec recipients of its military aid with more advanced equipment than heretofore. In some cases. noUbly Cuba and Indonesia. Soviet personnel have been employed lo man this equipment, and areindigenous specialists lo operate it Thisignificant departure from previous Soviet practice, which may be extended to other areas in the future.
As new and favorable opportunities arise, the Soviets will continue to offer these various kinds of assistance, and thoy may do this more frequently and aggressively in the future if their efforts to expand
Soviet influence by political and economic means encounter continued frustration We believe, however, that the Soviets will remain chary of any great commitment of prestige to the support of belligerents over whom they do not exercise substantial control or in circumstances in which they feel that winning is unlikely, and they will seek to avoid risk of widened hostilities which might result from "wars of nationaln particular, wc believe that the Soviets will be very reluctant to commit their own forces openly in conflicts where they wouldirect confrontation with US forces.
oviet Military Policymaking
he application of these basic attitudes to particular situations and to the allocation of resources does, of course, pose serious policy problems. umber of additional factors have long affected theof Soviet military policy. Geography and the traditions bound up with historical experience have inclined the Sovietsilitary preoccupation with Western Europetress on large-scale ground combat. The capabilities and structure of US and other opposing forces influence directly both the size and shape of Soviet forces andeneral upward pressure upon requirements in all fields. most important is the technological and economic base of the nation, which constantly offers prospects for more effective weapons but also determines the extent to which these opportunities can bewithout tooacrifice in other programs.
hese factors, pointing in many contradictory directions, do not make for easy or unanimous decisions. Indeed, we have clear evidence of disagreement, compromise, and even reversal in the formulation of military policy in the last three years. This process of policymaking In the USSR appears in large part to Involve the same problems familiar to US decision-makers. In addition, however, certain special features stand out. Fully Informed Soviet military discussion, for example, seems tomaller circle than in the US. Beyond the politicalsome military officers,imited number of scientists and engineers, we know of no body of civilian advisers or publicists in the USSR comparable to the social scientists involved in the evolution of US military thinking. This is in part due "to the great Soviet emphasis on security, which has the additional effect of reducing the flow of information within the officer corps. esult, the Soviet military appear to experience special difficulty in adjusting their doctrine and concepts to the rapid changes characteristic of the postwar period. The continuing major Influence of World War II commanders and the vivid memories of the Soviet experience in that war also contribute to ato new concepts which is evident in professional discourse.
ilitary programs have become more complex and expensive, and the professional recommendations of the military leadership on military problemsreater Impact on economic and foreign policyFurthermore, the political climate which has developed under Khrushchev is one which permits continuing discussionariety of problems, and the military leaders have used this opportunity totheir views. With military and economic debates proceeding simultaneously and in close dependence on each other, il seems likely that the arguments of the marshals have been supported by thoseleaders who did not wish to permit programs for consumer goods lo Impinge upon, allocations to heavy industry.
do not believe that the military aspires to anrole within the political system, and If it were to. partyand controls appear strong enough to defeat any efforts in this
' direction. But if. as we expect, the military and economic choices facing the USSR become more acute, the senior officers will probably find themselves more deeply involved in matters of general policy.
c. The Reccni course of Military Policy
most important viewpoints in the controversy overof the last few years have been those represented bya few military theorists, on the one hand, and the majority ofmilitary leaders, on the other. Three major differencesKhrushchev's approach to defense policy from thatmilitary leaders. First. Khrushchev is heavily concerned withuses of military power, whereas the professionalthe marshals require them to look in the first instance to actualcapabilities. Second. Khrushchev has asserted that aIs almost certain to be short, with victory decided in theexchange and with conventional arms,uite secondary role. Most military leaders, onhand, appear to believe that general war would probably, butbe short but that, in any event, lis conduct would requirelevels for most of the traditional service arms, including aman army. Third. Khrushchev is far more concerned thanto Keep military expenditures in check in order to meetregards as pressing needs in the civilian economy.
ll these considerations were Involved in the reorganization of the armed forces which Khrushchev Inaugurated in0 The essence of his plan was to place main reliance on nuclear missile forces and, on this basis, to reduce military manpower substantially and to accelerate the retirement of older weapons. This, he asserted, was Che force structure best suited both to deter war and to fight one ifmoreover, it would release men and money for the civilian economy.
rom Khrushchev himself we know that this plan and itsjustification were accepted only reluctantly by the militaryA controversial discussion ensued, encouraged by the regime, in which high officers debated, polemicized. and explored the military implications of modern warfarear more systematic fasliion than previously. Several schools of thought became apparent, but aview soon emerged which accepted the likelihood that the initial phaseeneral war would be decisive, but went on to argue thatelatively short war would require large forces of all types capable of defeating comparable enemy forces, overrunning base areas, and occupying territory in Eurasia. This discussion also focusedon the enormous difficulties of mounting major militaryafter receiving the full weightestern first strike, and the resulting importance, if in the Soviet view war became imminent and unavoidable, of seizing the strategic Initiativere-emptive attack.
At present, official military doctrine holdseneral war will inevitably involve the massive use of nuclear weapons, will begintrategic exchange, and will develop almost simultaneously along fronts of engagement as well. Strategic missile forces will play the primary role. The course and outcome of the war may well be decided in its initial phase by strategic nuclear weapons. However, the Soviets hold thatonflict will not necessarily be short, and envisage the possibilityong war Involving protracted operations in Eurasia. Therefore, while current doctrineilitary policy ofstrategic attack and defense capabilities, it supports as well the maintenance of large theater and naval forces, for use both In the initial and the possible subsequent phaseseneral war.
We believe that debate continues in the USSR, not only over subsidiary propositions, but perhaps over some of the central tenets of this doctrine. The course of the debate was heavily influenced byeventshich, intruding upon the discussion,some of Khrushchev's contentions and permitted the military to retrieve some concepts which he had discarded. Thusffair cast doubt on the adequacy of Soviet air defenses, on the efficacy of Soviet security, and on the wisdom of Khrushchev's efforts to relax tensions in relations with the US. In the following year, the US took decisions to step up both its strategic attack and general purpose forces. In Vienna, Khrushchev determined that the US did not regard the relationship of military power as requiring it to make majoron the Berlin question. AH these developments called intothe adequacy ol the Soviet military posture, both for supporting foreign policy and for conducting general war if necessary. In these circumstances, Khrushchev made such demonstrative military moves as the public suspension of the manpower reductions and theof nuclear tests.
t about the same time, another burden was laid on Sovietpolicymaking. For some months, US public disclosures had hinted that Soviet ICBM strength might be much smaller than had previously been believed. Beginning ln the tallhe US began to assert this conclusion with great conviction, and to assert more strongly that the US was the strategic superior of the Soviet Union. From USand behavior, the Soviets could almost certainly Judge that their security had been penetrated In an important way. probably one which, by permitting the US to locate Soviet targets,angible effect upon the military balance. Their fears that no major Western concessions on Berlin would be forthcoming must have been strengthened. And the Image of Soviet superiority, which they had heavily exploited to document their claims ot the inevitable triumph of their system, was badly damaged.
t was against this background that the USSR took its decision to deploy strategic missiles to Cuba. This moveost of policy considerations and judgments which are not yet fully clear. In its military terms, however, It appears lo haveesponse to the question of how to create new opportunities for Soviet foreign policy by improving the strategic position of the USSRis the US, at some acceptable cost and at some early date. Even deployment at the levels detectedignificant increase in first-strikefor general nuclear war, and the Soviets may have intended to follow this up byarger missile force as well as abase.
hrushchev, however, probably considered its main impact to be psychological. At one level, the deployment and its acceptance by the US was Intended to demonstrate Soviet might and US inability tolt. thereby reversing the tendency of world opinion to regard the West as strategically superior. At another, however, it was intended to increase the deterrence laid upon the US in cold war confrontations. Khrushchev evidently felt that, despite all the military problemsln making effective strategic use of Cuba in wartime, thewouldowerful Impact on US opinion which would reduce resistance to his political demands, in the first instance thoseBerlin.
D. Problems o' Future Military Polity
he Cuban adventure and its outcome both highlightedeightened-the dilemma of the Soviet leaders. Both the deployment and Its reversalacit public admission that tho USSR wasosition of strategic inferiority. Among its other results, the Cuban fiasco has almost certainly thrown the Soviets backurther re-evaluation of their strategic
rograms already under way will largely govern the size and composition ol Soviet strategic forces through aboutut new decisions taken this year could significantly affect force levels thereafter. We are unlikely to learn directly of such decisions.the physical activities which might reveal their nature willnot be apparent for another year or more. In considering future Soviet force levels, it Is therefore necessary to explore the variousnow open to the USSR.
onfronted with the continuing buildup of US forces forattack programmed for the next few years, Soviet planners may beide range of alternatives. At one extreme would be an attempt to achievelear superiority over the US inoffensive weapons that they wouldigh assurance ofUS nuclear striking forces prior to launch. At the otherwould be the acceptance of continued strategic inferiority,coupled with genuine efforts to reach agreement with the West on arms control.
he first of these extreme alternatives is probably now regarded as unattainable. Thousands of Soviet missiles would be required to give the Sovietigh assurance of destroying even the fixed bases of US nuclear forces programmed for the. We do not believe that the Soviet leaders would be prepared totrain of this magnitude upon the Soviet economy. In addition, the Soviets would almost certainly expect the US to detect such an effort, and thereupon to step up its own program so as to raise Soviet requirements still higher. Moreover, US warning capabilities, fast reaction times, and mobile forces (airborne bombers and missile submarines) already have reduced Soviet capabilities, against US retaliatory forces Wethat the Soviets will continue to estimate that, throughout the period of this estimate, the US will retain retaliatory capabilities which could not be eliminated by such striking forces as the USSR could acquire.
he second of these extreme alternatives might be considered by the Soviet leaders. Even if current strategic weapons programs were allowed to level offhe Soviets would possess adeterrent force. Moreover, they might hope to reduce US superiority by means of disarmament agreements. But the main appeal of this alternative would be economic; resources would in time be madeto reverse the current slowdown in economic growth. However, we have seen as yet no persuasive indications that the USSR is prepared to move very far in this direction. The Cuban venture has indicated that, at least to date, the Soviet leaders are far from willing loosition of strategic inferiority.
etween these extreme alternatives, we believe that the Soviets have almost certainly considered an eflort to attain rough parity with the US in intercontinental weapon systems. Soviet military leaders almost certainly have urged enlarged and improved forces of ICBMs and missile submarines.ajor Soviet effort to attain parity in the near term would requireubstantial increase In the Soviet military budget or sharp cuts in other types of forces. Moreover, the Soviets would almost certainly reason that the US would detect an eflort of such magnitude, and that they could have no assurance of winning the intensified race which would ensue. Our evidence does notthat the Soviets are attempting to match the US in numbers of weapons for intercontinental attack; we believe, however, that they will attempt to offset US superiority by other means.
oviet statements and military writings suggest that the Soviet leaders see tn technological achievements the means by which they may improve their total strategic position relative to that of the US. This consideration may lie behind the testing of very high-yield weapons, the claimed developmentlobal missile, the high priority given to the antimissile program, and the Soviet interest In military spaceBy such means, the Soviets may attempt lo attain rough parity or even superiority in the total strategic context, although they remain numerically inferior in delivery vehicles. Hardened ICBMs and submerged-launch submarine missiles will contribute to Sovietcapabilities. In addition, over the next few years the ICBM force will probably come lo include new large missiles, armed wiih very high-yield warheads or capable of global ranges. Moreover, the USSR is almost certainly investigating the feasibility ot space systems for military support and offensive and defensive weapons.
n defense against strategic attack, the major new element Is the antimissile program, where deployment of one system has already begun at one location, and research and developmentore advanced capability is continuing. The Soviets mayossible solution to their strategic confrontation with the US in a- combination ofdefense plus very effective though numerically inferiorstriking forces. The technical difficulties as well as the great expense of any extensive antimissile deployment will beinfluences. Nevertheless, we believe that deployment of antimissile defenses may be the largest new Soviet military program in the period of this estimate.
lthough we believe that Soviet military policy is most likely to continue-along current lines, we cannot exclude the possibility of new departures In military policy, perhaps resulting In major changes in the composition of the Soviet military establishment and in the leta-tive emphasis given to forces designed to accomplish the major military missions. Drastic cuts in the theater field forcesossibility;
while Khrushchev's proposals (or manpower reductions have been shelved (or the present, economic pressures and developments Intechnology almost certainly will cause this subject to beIt is also possible that the increasing involvement of the USSR In the more remote areas of the world will lead to theof new capabilities for distant, limited military action. In this connection, the Soviets may attempt to acquire base and logisticalrights in key non-Bloc countries, but we have no evidence that the USSR has raised this question with these countries.'
general, Soviet military policy will continue to beonlyariety of strategic, historical, technical, economicfactors, but also by differing views about the relativeof these factors, and shifting compromises among thesea result, we believe that the numerous aspects of this policyalways be wholly consistent with each other, and that forceand future programming will reflect neither adoctrineirm timetable for achieving specifiedIn any case, we do not believe that the Soviets conceive ofweapons systems as the answer to their military problem orhave fixed and inflexible plans for their force structure infive toears from now. They have debated and revisedtheir ideas, and they will probably do so again. They havemilitary research and the development of new weaponshigh urgency, and theyemonstrated capability toand material resources on priority objectives. If theyconcepts or new weapons which give promise of military andadvantage, they will seek to add them rapidly to theirto gain maximum benefit from them. Thus, during the nextwe expect the Soviets to be working on even morewith which they may hope to enhance their capabilitieslater date."
II. SOVIET HIGH COMMAND STRUCTURE -
believe that during the past two or three years thehigh command structure has been modified to speed theinitiating or responding to strategic nuclear attack. The growthand missile forces on both sides has almost certainlySoviets to establish the command and control channelsthe swift initiation of military operations upon the decision ofleadership.
iscussion o( the limitations imposed on such So.ie; overtures by Uic receptivity of other countries, see. "Bloc Economic andaled
reference lo paragraph!ee the Assistant Chief of Staff.USAT. footnote to Conclusion E.
e have Information, some of lt from classified documents and some from public statements, aboutupreme Military Councilupreme High Command. Khrushchev is chairman of theand Supreme High Commander. Theody of high-level party, government, and military officials, has existed since before World War II toorum for discussion and decision on major issues of military policy. The Supreme High Command directed military operations during World War II with Stalin at its head, but wasthereafter. Such information as we have suggests that steps have been taken in recent years to designate membership in the Supreme High Command and to develop procedures to permit the quickby this body of top level control of military operations undershould events so dictate.
Adjustments in the structure of the Soviet high command have apparently been closely related lo the growth of the USSR's strategic defense and long-range missileew rocket command0 andain component of the Soviet armed forces. This change followed by about fire years the elevation of the Soviet air defense component to similar status. At present, there are five major force components administered by main directorates or equivalent headquarters within the Ministry of Defense: ground, naval, air. air defense, and rocket.
Highly centralized civilian control over the Soviet militaryis exercised through the Council of Ministers, which Includes the Minister of Defense. The Minister is assisted by the minedStaff of the armed forces, which formulates the overall military program and would probably constitute the principal headquarters element of the Supreme High Command in time of war. Party and government leaders reportedly participate regularly in the deliberations of the Supreme Military Council. Additional channels for exercising party control over the military include the Mam Political Directorate of the armed forces and the numerous party officials who are assigned lo all levels of the military establishment.
he flow of operational orders from the Minister of Defense to the Soviet armed forces follows no rigid or consistent pattern.In Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Long Range Aviation, the Air Defense Forces, and the Navy are believed to have directcontrol over the forces assigned to them. On the other hand, ground force components are operationally controlled by theof the Military Districts and the Groups of Forces Thein Chief of the Air Force similarly *has-no direct operational control over air components. The operations of other than Long Range Aviation air elements are controlled by the commands or forces to which they areommanders of Groups of Forces, Military Districts. Atr Defense Districts. Fleets, and Airborne Forces.
III. SIZE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
The urgent need for additional manpower in the economy and the rising cost otarge military establishment have brought about substantial reductions in Soviet military manpower since the Korean War. We estimate that9 these reductions had lowered the number of men under arms fromS toillion men. Inhrushchevrogram aimed at further reducing military manpowerillion men. Infter approximately halt of the projected reductionillion men had been made, the program was suspended, allegedly in response to the US military buildup prompted by Soviet pressures in Berlin. We believe that the force level now stands at about 3million men, of whichillion are in' the theater ground forces.*
The early reductions were achieved without avert signs ofby military leaders, who were apparently persuaded thatmodernization and re-equipment programs had provided sufficient increases In firepower to offset the cuts in personnel. However, the military leadership raised strenuous objections to0 proposals. These objections were elaborated during an extendedamong senior officers over the nature of modern war and the role and doctrine of theater warfare.
Asoth political and military leaders acknowledge that new and costly demands for advanced weapon systems are imposed upon Soviet resources without easing the burden of maintaining large theater forces. The effort to modernize and strengthen all arms of the Soviet forces simultaneously squeezes hard on resources available for investment and consumption goals to which the leadership is strongly committed. Moreover, itonstant upward pressure on the size of the military establishment This Isarge extent because Soviet missile forces for strategic offense and defense appear to require large-numbers of operating, maintenance, and supportinglthough there will probably be some reduction in the size of other types of forces as older weapon systems are retired, there is no present evidence that normal reductions of this sort will free enough military manpower to operate the growing missile forces. Therefore, unless the Soviets decideeliberate program for compensatingin other forces, the continued expansion of missile forces along present lines will tend to push military manpower strength back up towardevels, and will require increasing numbers of trained specialists as well.
estimated personnel strength of the Soviet Armed Forces by mission, sec Annex a. Table 1.
"We estimateersonnel are now in the missile components of lone-range striking and air defense forces: on the basis of present trends, this total may beyee Annex a. Table i, footnote c.
Khrushchev may once againeduction into theater forces on the grounds that growing nuclearwill permit this cutback without endangering Sovietthis occurs, the main candidate tor reductions will still be thewith their very large numbers of units and men. Theaccelerated retirement of older equipment of other forceas obsolescent aircraft and surface naval ships might also beWe believe, however, that for at least the next fewstanding forces of all types will be maintained, althoughsome change in the distribution of manpower amcng the
IV. TRENDS IN MILITARY EXPENDITURES
defense expenditures,eclineteadily in the past five years. (Our estimates of Sovietexpenditures include the costs of the military establishment,weapons, and all spacehe main impetus forbeen provided by operational programs for strategic attackdefense forces and by the program of research andof which has doubled In estimated cost during the past fivecosts of the ground and naval missions, which togetheralmostercent of total expendituresave changedover the same period and2 accounted forof the total. The shift in the shares of total" defensebetween the various missions8n tbe following table.
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET DEFENSE EXPENDITURES, by PERCENT
Air Defenseu n
Includes expenditures (or reserve and security forces, research andcommand and support, and space programs. No research and development expenditures have been allocated to the missions.
ur calculations of both Soviet military expenditures and GNP are subject to considerable margins of error, but on the basis of all available information on Soviet programs and costs, we estimate thatotal Soviet defense expenditures were about IB billion rubles This is one-third higher than the level estimatedecause GNP has also been expanding, this level of defense expenditures con-
Expenditures not Allocable to
llnues lo represent on the order ol one-tenth of estimated Soviet GNP in ruble prices. This share Is roughly the same as that devoted toin the US, and represents in terms of US prices and production costs the equivalent ofillion, or about four-fifths ofUS expenditures.
owever, the real impact of defense expenditures on the Soviet economy is greater than this comparison implies. The growth Inexpenditures during the past five years has been accompaniedhange in the structure of these expenditures. The development, procurement, and maintenance of defense hardware including nuclear weapons represented about half of these expendituresnd nearly two-thirds2 defense consumed aboutercent of nonagricultural production in the USSR, whereas it consumed aboutercent of such production in the US. Similarly, defense consumed more thanercent of total Soviet production of durable goodss compared with aboutercent in the US. Moreover, although we cannot measure the effect, Soviet advanced weapons and spaceprobablyuch higher proportion of critically scarce, high quality resources and highly skilled manpower than is the case in the US.
from Soviet discussions indicates an increasingthe impact of military requirements on the nationaldefense burden not only Impedes the Industrial investmentwhich underlies general economic growth, but it stands inof Khrushchev's repeated attempts to make largeragriculture, on which his promises of higher living standardsdepend. Khrushchev clearly had these problems inhen heilitary reorganization witheconomizing effects.
0 proposal offeredartial solution toof rising defense costs. It promised ultimately toexpenditures by about two billion rubles; these savingsresulted primarilyower bill for military pay andThe main benefit to the economy would have been themilitary manpower. However, the competition between militaryprograms is most acute in the machinery industry, whichhardware to the armed forces and investment goods toagriculture. Military deliveries from this industry rose bypercent8hUe production for theubstantially slower rate. Perhaps more important,of Soviet advanced weapons in comparison with otherreveals that the defense establishment enjoys first call onresources ofmaterials andtrained technicians, leading scientists and design engineers.
This prtority has significantly hampered Ihe effort to modernize and automate Soviet industry on which the USSR's program for higher labor productivity and future growth hearJy depends.
he future military programs of the Soviet leaders depend on their view of the requirements both forar while they push for political gains in the East-West competition and forar if one should nonetheless occur. To date, however, they have found their military power insufficient to enable them to accomplish their political objectives, notably in the case of Berlin. Moreover, the tenor of recent statements suggests that, as the Soviets observe the programmed growth of Western power, the question of the USSR's ability toeneral war is being posed more sharply than ever. For both these reasons, the Soviets evidently feel themselves under heavy pressure lo make further increases in their military allocations. This, however, would require them to stretch out. probably quitethe lime periods over which they hope to achieve other national goals.
Thereumber of ways in which the Soviets, faced with these difficult choices, might ease the prospective military burden on the economy. Khrushchev might revert to the force structure which he advocated0 and try again to putuable reduction of ground forces. The USSR might trim its space program byfor example, not to compete with the USanned lunar landing. It might confine Itself to tactics which carried less dangers of military confrontation, meanwhile settlingilitary strategy which stressed deterrence ratherull war-fighting capability. Or. it might try torotracted relaxation of tensions in hopes ofeduction in Western defense efforts, and perhaps even improving the relative Soviet military position. It is conceivable,contrary to most present Indications, that the pressures for higher military spending could cause the USSR to be more forthcoming in disarmament negotiations.
The November plenum of the Central Committee singled outreorganization as the means to stimulate economic growth, and thereby demonstrated an unwillingness to make major changes In the pattern of resource allocations. Khrushchev confirmed thisin his speech ofebruary, in which he warned consumers against early hopes of high living standards because of the growing needs of defense His speech indicates that the leadership has recently taken economic decisions which reaffirm military priorities at theof consumer aspirations; beyond this it mayecision to increase military spending above previously planned levels. The Soviet economy is capable ofeavier military burden, but not without sacrifices in the program to raise living standards and perhaps also reductions In the future rate of industrial growth. For
the present, the Soviets appear to have chosen to risk thesebut we believe that the problem of resource allocation will continue to plague the Soviet leadership.
FORCES FOR LONG RANGE ATTACK
A. Soviet Policy Toward longtriking forces
he Soviets regard forces for long range attack as essential for supporting an aggressive political posture, deterring the West from resort to military action, andar as effectively as possible should one occur. In our view, they are attempting to build forces which they regard as appropriate to these objectives, rather thanto achieve the very high degree of superiority required toeliberate attack on the West. In building these forces, the Soviets put initial stress onassive capability against Eurasia and Its periphery. Intercontinental capabUlties were notbut deployment ot medium range delivery systems occurred earlier and in much larger numbers. Although MRBM and 1KBM forces continue to grow, major emphasis has evidently shifted to the buildup of forces for intercontinental attack, primarily ICBMs. Other major recent developments are the Introduction of hardening for ground-launched ballistic missiles, efforts to improve missile reaction times, and the development of submarine ballistic missiles suitable forlaunching. By these means, the Soviets are attempting to gear their long range striking forces better for either pre-emptive or retaliatory operations.
ntercontinental Ballistic Missiles "
the past two years, the pace of ICBM development andhas quickened noticeably. At the Tyuratam testndbeen underThe more successful program has been thethe second-generationhich probably became operationalfirst halfesting ol theas been conducted atpace. Theelatively poor success record in thend the lack of any test-firings for six months suggest thathave encountered technical diSicultlcs with this system.
cf deployment complexes forhas" proceeded concurrently with development testing.aimed at early achievement of an initial operationalalmost certainly relatesoviet decision to deployystem tn only limited numbers; from the history of
"For characteristics and performance of Soviet ICBMs. ice Annexabic I.
therogram, we judge that this decision was taken in8hen the second-generation systems were probably being designed. TheCBMery large vehicle ofbs. gross takeoff weight, with nonstorabie liquid propellants and radio-inertlal guidance. Ground control and support facilities arelarge and complex, and include rail service direct to launchers. The second-generationystem Is simpler and considerably less bulky than thehe missileross takeoff weight ofbs. and employs storable liquid propellants. Of the known Soviet ICBM systems, thes by far the most widely deployed.
e have located someCBM complexes in the USSR, and, considering the nature of the evidence, we believe that no moreew others exist. Most of thesethan aareype clearly associated with theypicalomplex consistsail-served support area and as many asaunchers which are deployed in pairs and are road-served. Thewas first deployedoft configuration, but is now also being deployed in silo-type hardenedew of which are probably already operational.
In addition toomplexes, the Soviets haveew complexesomewhat different type. Launch sites are soft, road-served, and probablyelatively smallabout the size ofe have not definitely associated this type of complexarticular missile system. If theissile is relatively small, the new type complexes are probably designed for that system. However, ifs very large, they are probably intended for the SS-7.
We are unable at this time to resolve the question of whether theCBM is relatively small or even larger thanf thes small, the USSR may have undertaken its development along witho insure the availability of at least-one successful second-generation system. If thes large, it is probably being developedelivery vehicle for very high-yield warheads, and presumably for space launchings as well. We have no evidence of new deployment complexes suitable forarge ICBM.
Estimated Force Levels tour estimates of Soviet ICBM strength are derived primarily from the known magnitude of the program and the estimated lead tunes involved in new siteThe range of the estimates allows for the possibility ofsites and other unknowns, such as the present status of therogram. Evidence on second-generation deployment has led to an upward revision in our previous estimate of operational launchers fore nowomewhat faster rate of deployment activityigher number of launchers per complex than were
ployed in previous calculations. Our revised estimates of numbers and types of operational ICBM launchers tos as follows:
OPERATIONAL ICBM LAUNCHERS"
(Including hard launchers) .
Soft launchen probably have two missiles each toeflrc capability after some hours.have no evidence as to whether hard launcheneflre capability. The totals esUaated In Ibis table include launchers at the Tycntam test ranee.
The Soviet ICBM force estimated for the next two years willprimarily of second-generation ICBMs equipped with warheads In the low megaton range. We continue to believe, however, that the Sovietsequirementery large ICBM. capable of delivering very high-yieldTheCBM couW be retrofitted with warheads having yields in the lower portion of this range, but further tests would probably be required toew nosecone.
Apart from this possibility, the time at which the USSR could have ooerational missiles caoable of delivering warheads with .yieldsdepends upon whether or not theery large ICBM:
s in fact very large, we believe it could deliver suchIn this case, we estimateew suitable launchersoperational byn earlier capability could bedeployment oft the fouraunchers In the fieldtwo or three test range launchers.
on the other hand,s relativelyew. very large
] is probably under
development; we estimate that it could become operational inr more likely5 or thereafter. In either event, wethatew large ICBMs with very high-yield warheads could be deployed in the USSR in the next year or so."
-The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence. Department of the Army, and the Assistant Chief of Stall. Intelligence. USAF. dissent la these amftcM foice levels. See their footnotes to Conclusion K, page 6.
-The Assistant Chief ofntelligence, USAF. conUnucs to estimate that theould be readyJ. Further, he believes that. In consideration of the large cost expended on theesearch andprogram. Including stu development, and other pertinent factors, thedeployment of theo only the rout Wiownhe field, does not appear realistic. It is quite UMly in his opinion that other sites have been constructed and remain undetected because or deAdcndcs in availableTherefore, he concludes that moreew large ICBMs with very high-yield warheads will bo operational by
mplications. Wc continue to estimate an ICBM force level forperational launchers, although, if the Soviet goal Is the lower side of this range, It will evidently be reached considerably earlier thanventsncluding the Cuban crisis, probably caused the Soviet leaders to reevaluate their strategic weapon programs, and may have led to new decisions which could Importantly affect the ICBM force in thes. We have no information as to the nature of such decisions, and are unlikely to obtain indications of resultant changesear or more. However, on the basis of present evidence, we believe that the major trends7 will be: growth of the force to some hundreds of launchers; hardeningignificant portion of the force; and availability ol some missiles capable of delivering very large warheads with yields of upT.
C. Medium and Inlermediale Range Ballistic Mitsiles
We estimate that the Soviet MRBM and IRBM forceompleted launch positions.i.rlRBMs probably constitute the bulk of the force, but.RBMs may still be operational, and.RBMs are inore thanercent of the force Is deployedroad belt in western CSSR stretcluhg from the Baltic to the Black Sea,esser concentration of sites In the Soviet Fir East. From present deployment areas. MRBMs can covet targets in Norway, most of Western Europe, Turkey, Japan. Korea. Okinawa. Alaska, andCanada. IRBMs can extend this target coverage to include all of Spain, North Africa, Thule, Taiwan, and the northern Philippines.
ost of the MRBM and IRBM sites are soft, fixed, and road-served: each site consists of four launchrogram tohardened sites is underway; we believeew silo-type sites arc already operational, and that this program is continuing.
-Trie Assistant Chief of SUE for Intelligence. DeparUcent o( Useelieves that tbe forceis likely to be towards the low side*of tbe estimate presented In this sentence. He believes the upperoo highurelyforce, and much too lowounteiforce concept.
"The Assistant Chief ofntelligence. USAF. continues to estimate for ihe longorceofICBM launchers He would estimate that operational ICBM launchers for tbe periodo mid-lHT to be as follows:
(Including hard. )
Tor the precise calculated maximum ranges and other characteristics of tnese missile systems, see Annex n, Table 1.
ll hard sites and soft IRBM sites are normally
manned and equipped with launchers so that each launch position is capable of participating in an initial salvo. We are uncertain,that this is true of all the soft MRBM positions. Soviet doctrine calls lor alternate launch positions to which MRBM units could move lor subsequent firing of additional missiles. It may be that only about half of the soft MRBM positions are manned and equippedirst salvo, and that for subsequent firings their launchers and crews could -move to other soft positions. On the other hand, it may be that all of the soft MRBM launch positions are equipped with launchers and crewsirst salvo, and the units may be intended subsequently to move lo unimproved alternate positions similar to the installations constructed in Cuba. Bearing these possibilities in mind, we believe that the presentoft launch positions andirst salvo capability as larger as low.
here is clear evidence that the Soviets Intend to provide aretire capability for this force. Wc believe that most if not all firing units using soft launch positionsecondecond salvo, and that some further reserve may exist. We have no evidence as to whether hardened launchers are provided with additional missiles.
e believe that the Soviet deployment of soft MRBM and IRBM sites will be virtually completed early this year, leveling off ataunch positions. The hardened component of the force willto grow, probably reachingaunchers inhus, we estimate that at that time the Sonet MRBM and IRBM force will compriseaunch positions. Considering thethat as many as half of the soft launch positions may bewe believe this force mayirst salvo capability as highr as low.
neriod, the size of the MRBM and LRBM force may level off, as we have previously-estimated, or it may continue to rise. We are unable at this time tooviet force goal lor these weapons, which have already been made available in numbers considerably exceeding those predicted in earlier estimates. In order toarger force of protected MRBMs and IRBMs. the Soviets may continue to build new hard launchers throughout thet is also possible that some soft sites will be deactivated. Finally,MRBM and IRBM models may be introduced In thes; these could include road mobile systems designed for greater flexibility of operations.
D. Mistite Launching Submarines "
Since the second half ofs the USSR has been developing and producing ballistic missile submarine systems capable otland targets. The Soviets now have operational aboutallistic missile submarines; nine of these are of the "H" class nuclear-powered type and the rest are "Z" conversion and "G" class diesel-poweredThis force canombined total ofissiles. The effectiveness of these submarines is limited by their capacity to carry only two or three missiles each, the short range of the missiles, and the requirement for submarines to surface for launching.
The USSR is developing longer range ballistic missiles forfrom submerged submarines. Our evidence is inadequate towhether the system under developmentanget is possible that two separate systems of different ranges are being developed.m. system becomes available, it will probably be retrofitted into some portion of the existing force of "G" and "H" class submarines; we believe thatetrofit program could begin soon. Such missiles will probably also be incorporated into newly-constructed "H" class submarines.
. submerged launch system is undereither Instead of or in additionm.is almostIntended for useew. nuclear-powered class. In any ease, new classes of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines will almost certainly carry submerged-launch missilesange of atnd possibly as much. There is evidence lhat the Soviets are constructing nuclear submarines of new classes whoseare as yet unknown to us.
he Soviets have alsoubmarine-launched cruise missile systemhich is now carried by aof converted "W" class submarines and six nuclear-powered "E" class ships. There is evidenceongeraval cruise missile is also under development. We do not know definitely what missions the Soviets contemplate for submarine cruise missileof these ranges. From Soviet discussions of naval missile systems and other evidence it appears that these systems are designed primarily for use against ships, but their effective use at extended range woulda forward observer within sonar or radar range of the target totarget data. On the other hand, these missiles could alsoorwardconduct low levelon land targets, and their employment would greatly complicate defensive problems.
For eiUmateel charaelertsUcs and performance of Soviet submarines. see Annex A.or cnaraeicMslics and performance of naval-launched missiles, see Annex D. Table 3.
aking into account estimated Soviet capacity to constructsubmarines, and with allowance fororpedo attack types, we believeradual buildup of nuclear-powered missile launching ships will occur over the next five years.he USSR will probably have more than two dozen nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, and aboutquipped with cruise rnisslles. Construction of dlesel-powered ballistic missile submarines will probably continue for the next year or so. building upotal of moree estimate Soviet operational strength in missile-launching submarines over the next few years as follows;
SOVTET MISSILE SUBMARINES
" and/or 28
" and "Z" 43
" class) 9 20
- euui 22
We have previously estimated that construction or "G" class submarines would terminate By Ihe end3 Recent evidence has indicated, however, that this construction has continued. While we are unable to predict the future numbers of this class with certainty, our eaUmate reflects both the recent evidence and the possibility that coostrucUon wUI continue for about another year. The alse of theclass construction program will be Influenced by Soviet decisionsconstruction of nuclear-powered missile submarines.
ong Range Aviation
Soviet Long Range Aviation, by reason of ita equipment, basing, and deployment, is much better suited for Eurasian operations than for intercontinental attack. We believe that as ofong Range Aviationeavy bombers and tankers andet medium bombers and tankers. The heavy bomber forceISON jet bombersEAR turboprops. Virtually all of the medium bombers are badgers; at leastew. supersonic BLINDERs have been delivered to Long Range Aviation units, and their introduction is continuing.
We continue toradual decline in the numerical strength of Long Range Aviation. BLINDER, the only bomber inproduction for Long Range Aviation, is being producedate which Is probably insufficient to onset the expected decline in BADGER numbers Although research and development on heavy aircraft has continued and could be applicable to military purposes, our evidence docs not Indicate that any new heavy bomber is being developed foruse. Although It remains possible that an advanced inter-
continental aircraft could enter operational service in the next five years, this now appears highly unlikely. We therefore estimate the probable composition of Long Range Aviation throughs follows; "
no large-scale bomber replacement program appearsunder way, the USSR has sought to extend the service life of itsaircraft and to improve their effectiveness by them. supersonic missile, theotandoff capability in attacks against landOnly the BEAR appears capable of delivering this largethan half of the BEARs have been equipped to deliverrather than bombs, and there are indications that theprogram isew air-to-surface missile,LINDER in1 air show, is now being testedprobably be operationalt appears to be designedsupersonic speedange of several hundred miles.
major obstacle to the development of capabilities forattack by Long Range Aviation has been the limited rangeaircraft which make up the bulk of the force. Consequentlyhave given considerable emphasis to aerial refueling andtraining. The USSR has not developed an aircraftuseanker. Instead. BISONs and BADGERs are convertedas tankers with their bomber counterparts. BLINDERS couldalso refuel from these tankers. There is evidence that allregiments and some aircraft from about half of thehave trained in aerial refueling. The recent sighting of a
-The Assistant Chief of StaC. Intelligence.issents to the estimates on havcy bombers ln this paragraph. See his footnote to Conclusion M.nd S.
"Fur estimated characteristics and performance Of Soviet air-to-surface missile systems, sec Annex B, Table 5.
BEAR equippedose probe indicates the possible development of an in-night refueling capability for this aircraft, but we have no evidence as to how many BEARs have been so modified.
ven with aerial refueling, the range capabilities of Long Range Aviation for intercontinental attack remain Urnited. Refueled BADGERS on two-way missions from Arctic bases could cover many targets in Alaska, Canada and Greenland, but could reach only the northwestern portion of the continental US. The BUNDER is even more limited as to range. The BISON would require both Arctic staging and In-flight refueling for extensive coverage of US targets on two-way missions, and many of these targets would be at extreme ranges. BEARs could cover virtually all US targets on two-way missions from Arctic bases. They could teach targets in northeastern US directly from their homeut would have to stage through the Arctic for extensive coverage of US targets when carryingissiles or tomb-loadsbs. The recently observed BEARose probe was also configured to carry air-to-surface rnissiles: modification of BEAR for in-flight refueling would obviate the necessity for Arctic staging.
e believe that the Soviets would plan to commit their entire heavy bomber forceortion of their medium bomber force to initial attacks on North America. In the past two years, the numbers of heavy bombers engaged in Arctic training have Increased, while participation by medium bomber units has declined. Analysis of this trainingsuggests that the Soviets might plan to commit as manyircraft through relatively few Arctic bases in initial attacks on North America.ariety of operational factors but excluding combat attrition, we estimate that the Soviets could putombers over North America on two-way missions; of these, about half would be heavy bombers.'*
he Sovietsarger potential for bomber attacks against the US, but to exercise it they would need to employ BADGERs onmissions and to use crews which bad not participated In Arctic training. As Soviet ICBM forces grow, such use of the medium bomber force becomes increasingly unlikely.*'
-The Assistant Chief o( Staff. Intelligence. USAF, disagrees with judgments expressed in this paragraph- See his footnote to Co Delusion M.nd 8
Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. USAF. agrees that the need for the medium bomber force wUl diminish at sometime in the future because of the Increasing sue or the ICBM force. Further. In the immediate future, he considers Chat the need for these bombers In attacks against Eurasia Is decreasing because of the growing MRBM/tRBM strength. He also notes that the Soviets arelarge numbers of medium bombers and training them exterjtvcly. Hetherefore, that medium bombers will be used on one-way missions In any attack- on the US but that the number so utilised will diminish In time
ff. Space Systems
n Che basis of evidence presently available, we arc unable tothe existence of Soviet plans or programs for the military use of space. The limitations of this evidence, however, arc such that our chances of identifying military programs are poor. We believe that the USSR almost certainly is investigating the feasibility of space systems for military support and offensive and defensive weapons. Sovietto develop military space systems will depend on their expected cost and effectiveness as compared with alternative systems, the political and military advantages which could be gained, and the Soviet estimate of US intentions and capabilities in comparable fields. We believe that the USSR will produce and deploy those military space systems which it finds to be feasible and advantageous in comparison with other types of weapons and military equipment.
ithin this decade, the basic factors of reaction time, targeting flexibility, accuracy, vulnerability, average life, and positive control for an orbital bombardment system almost certainly will not comparewith ICBMs. We believeoviet decision to develop and deploy an orbital bombardment system would depend in large part upon the extent to which these drawbacks can beemonstration of an orbital bombardment satellite could occur at any time, but we believe that in the near term its military effectiveness would be minimal. If the Soviets decide to develop an orbital bombardment force, it would be precededevelopmental system ot limited military effectiveness which couid appear as early
I. Implications of Capabilities
The capabilities of Soviet long-range striking forces will be only inunction of the numbers of weapons available, their performance, and the adequacy of supporting elements. Equally critical will be the way In which the Soviets employ their striking forces, their ability to maximize the effects of these forces under the various circumstances ln which war could begin, and their assessment of Western capabilities and plans.
Should the Soviets conclude that the West was Irrevocablyto an Imminent nuclear attack on the USSR, they would launch their available ready forcesre-emptive attack designed to blunt the expected Western blow. The mixed forces which they have available for such operations would permit flexibility" of tactics and complicate Western defensive problems, but would pose severe difficulties ofInitial missile and bomber attacks against the US wouldextenderiod of many hours, and those against Eurasia over atew hours.
The Soviets would almost certainly wish to assign US targets to attack by submarine-launched missiles in the event ot general war. Considering the absence to date ol patrols in US waters and the long time of transit from Soviet base areas, we believe that at present thewould plan to employ few if any missile submarines in initial attacks against the US. Initiation of routine submarine patrols within missile range of the US could change this situation, and we believe that some such patrolling activity will have been instituted by thes.
By the, the USSR will haveubstantially increased ICBM and submarine-launched missile capability to deliver nuclear weapons against the US. In addition to its already formidable forces for strikes Ln Eurasia. Significant portions ot these forces will be relatively invulnerable to attack. Reaction times will probably have been further reduced, and techniques for control and coordinationThe Soviets will beosition to strike pre-emptively at the Axed bases ol an important segment of the US nuclear delivery force, and they will have some prospectortion of their own force could survive an initial US attack and retaliate with high-yield nuclearWith the long-range striking forces we estimate that they will have in thes. however, the Soviets could still not expect to destroy the growing numbers of US hardened, airborne, seaborne, and fast reaction nuclear delivery vehicles.
VI. AIR AND MISSILE DEFENSE FORCES
USSR has continued to devote large-scale efforts toand modernizing Its air defense system.'4 Defenses againstespecially against medium and high altitude bombers,be strengthened by the widespread deployment of surface-to-airsystems, improved interceptors with air-to-air missiles, andtor air defense warning and control. Antiaircraftwill be further improved and extended, but the major futurewhich we foresee is the adventapability againstmissiles.
more than five years, the Soviets have been conducting aand extensive program to develop defenses against ballisticWe believe that they are developing several different ABMto defend against missiles of various ranges, but our evidenceto support an estimate of the characteristics orany of these systems. Despite the intensity olnda fuller treatment of this subject, see. "Soviet Air arid Missile
Defense Capabilities througholedctobeiOP SECRET.
Far estimated strength and deployment of Soviet air defense equipment, sec Annex A. Table i.
pealed official claims, we arc not aware of any Sonet breakthrough in ABM technology.
Against Long-Range Missiles. Wc believe that theare deploying an ABM system around Leningrad which will achieve
some operational capabilitye have no basis for determining its effectiveness, but we think It unlikelyystem deployed at the
current stage ofould be effective against missiles employ-
ing decoys or other countermeasures.
counter the more complex long-range ballistic missilethes, the Soviets may seek to improve the Leningrador mayifferent and more advanced system, orthey follow the first course, deployment of the Leningradat additional locations would probably begin In the near futurehas not already begun. If sites are under construction now,capabilities could be achieved at one or morein about two years, and subsequent Improvements wouldincrease the capabilities. We regard it as more likely,that the USSR will defer deployment at locations otherew and better antimissile system is available. Inthe requirement forould probably delay theof deployment for another year or so. Initial operationalwould probably be achieved at one or more locations.
I technical achievements enable the Soviets to develop an ABM system which they regard as reasonably effective against long-rangeigorous deployment program will probably be undertaken. Considering the vast effort requiredarge program and the relative importance of the various urban-industrial areas In the USSR,igorous Soviet deployment program would contemplate the defense ofrincipal Sovietrogram of this scope almost certainly would require some five or six. years from its initiation to its completion. We have no basis for Judging whether or when the Soviets would consider their ABM system effective enough to warrant the initiation ofrogram.
efense Against Short-Rangehere are Indications that the Soviets have beenodification of their standard antiaircraftissile system for use against short-range ballistic missiles such as the Honest John, Corporal, and Sergeant. We have no evidence of Soviet progress, but we estimate that an improved SA-2having some effectiveness against tactical ballistic missiles could now be available. It is also possible that the Soviets have chosen toompletely new system, if so, it could also be available this year. We believe that whatever system is developed will be intended primarily for the protection of field forces and for this use will be mobile. It will probably also be deployed at fixed sites In border areas vulnerable to short-range missile attack.
Systems. We believe lhat ihe Sovmi leadersintend to acquire an antisateliite capability. Although wewe think it probableevelopment program exists,Soviets are utilizing components from existing systems, theyable to intercept current models of US satellites now, and theycertainly be able to do so within the next year or so; In thisthe intercept problem could be solved by determining thethe target satellitesew passes.
defense against aircraft, the Soviets now rely primarilyempiaced near fixed targets, and upon fighters deployed toroutes as well as gaps between missile defended locations.now have operational three types of SAM systems. Two ofandre designed primarily for defense against mediumaltitude attacks; the third,robably designed tocapabilities at low altitudes. Theystem isaround Moscow, while SA-2's have been extensivelythe USSR. The newest system.s in the early *
ofhe basic Soviet missile defenseassive scale Moreites have beenthe USSR; each site has six launchers, together with additionaltoefire capability. Most of these have been deployedof population centers. Industrial complexes, andcenters. They also defend long-range missile sites, airfieldsRange Aviation, nuclear production and weapon storagemissile test ranges, and industrial facilities. Several sitesareas suggest that the Soviets are also deploying peripheralwhich may eventually extend from the Kola Peninsula alongand southern borders of the USSR into central Asia.the pattern of deployment, the length of time the program hasway and the extent of our intelligence coverage, weites are operational In defense of more
^ * USSR tJ!d* total of some
ites. Thiseployment program will probably be largely completed within the next two years
heystem is also being deployed to defend principal cities and major installations of theater field forces in the European Satellites.ites have been observed to date, and we estimate thatites will be deployed in the European Satellites during the ne-xtorincluding sites manned by Soviet field forces.
char*clcn"icj lna performance of these systems, sec Annex 8.
ow Altitude Defense. The USSR1 begin deployment of theystem. However, we have ^sufficient evidence to estimate characteristics for this system. ypicalite consists of four launch pads. Wc have identified more thanuch sites, located in the Moscow and Leningrad areas and in certain coastal regions,the Baltic and Black Sea areas. Wc believe that the Soviets will continue to deploy SA-3's to supplement existing SAM defenses, giving priority to those coastal areas which they regard as particularly vulnerable to low level attack. obile version of theystem will probably also be provided to field forces. The present limitedhowever, does not provide sufficient basis for estimating the extent or pattern of futureeployment.
C. fighter Aircraft
lthough the Soviets are clearly placing heavy reliance on surface-to-air missiles, they continue to maintain large numbers of fighterin service. As ofe estimate that there were0 fighters in operational units throughout the Bloc, withf these in Soviet units." f the Soviet fighters are in Fighter Aviation of Air Defense (IA-PVO) with air defense as their primary mission. The remainder, which are in Tactical Aviation, are trained In air defense as well as ground support operations. The Soviet fighter force has been reduced by about one-third over the past few years, and weurther reduction on the order ofercent over the next five years.*1 The more advanced performance characteristics of new model fighters and Improvements in theirand control systems should mote than offset reductions In numbers.
aythe subsonic FRESCOup over three-quarters of the Soviet force. However, sincehe Soviets have been working to Improve the all-weather capability of the force, bringing into servicell-weather interceptors anday fighters (FRESCOs and FARMERS) modified by the addition of airborne intercept (Al) radar. Under nonvisual conditions, the effectiveness of most of these aircraft is limited by the relatively short range of the Al ra'dar, by the continued reliance on gun armament, and by the restrictionead pursuit attack.
n the past fewew generation of supersonic, missile-equipped Soviet fighter has appeared in peripheral areas of the USSR and Eastern Europe. The delta-wing FISHPOT, probably the bestetailed estimate of Soviet Bctitcr st/engtA. we Annex A,imilar est.male on the European Satellites and Asian Communist nations, see Annex A, Table 6
Assistant Chief of StaB. Intelligence. USAF. notes that Soviet fighter strength has remained nearly the tame since mtd-lMi, and considers it may well belateau has been reached.
operational AW fighter, has been phased into PVO units; the swept wing FITTER and the delta-wing FISHBED C. whichlear-air-rnass capability, have gone largely to units of Tactical Aviation; thell-weather fighter has been identified in EastIn armament, flrc control, and speed, these aircraft represent significant advances over the bulk of Soviet interceptors now in service.
hree new Interceptor prototypes, all equipped with improved AI radar and AAM's. were displayed in1 Aviation Day show: FIREBAR B, FLIPPER, and FIDDLERs an interceptor version of the tactical strike/reconnaissance aircraft. FIREBAR A.elta-wing typeelatively short combat radius, is capable of speeds In excess ofO feet. FIDDLER has sufficient range and endurance tooiter. or more from base. It may be intended for use against air-to-surface missile (ASM) carriers, but its potential for such missions is currently limited by the shorter ranges of Soviet early warning radars.
believe that all three of these new fighters could startunits; we have limited evidence that FIDDLERFLIPPER may be In production now. Soviet productionaircraft has dropped sharply in recent years,n theohe annualtheas on the order.
e have firm evidence on theAAMs In the Soviet fighter force and in several of the Satellitewell. We believe that three types arc nown infrared homing missilend amay be either an Infrared homing missile or an all-weatherradar homing missilewo prototype AAM's1 (then FIDDLER and thenwe estimate that one or both could become operationalIt is probable that these missiles have improvedhoming systems and lhat they carry substantially heaviersome of which could be nuclear. -Soviet development ofover the next few years will depend primarily upon theof interceptors equipped with suitable AI radar and fire
D. Antiaircroll Cum
he Soviets continue to employ large numbers of antiaircraft guns for defense of field forces and fixed targets, primarily for defense at low*altitudes where fighter and missile effectiveness is poor. The number of antiaircraft guns deployed with the Soviet forces, now about
Tor characteristics sna performance of Soviet alr-to-alr missile srsicmi. see Annex B. Table 6.
as declined over the past few years and this trend is continuing. Because of the widespread deployment of SAMs, we believe that most of the remaining medium and heavy guns used in the defense of fixed targets in the USSR will be phased out over the next fewarge number of these probably will be held in reserve status near major target areas, and some will be retained to defend field forces. Continued transfer of some of this equipment to other Bloc countries is probable.
E. Supporting Equipment
e believe thateavy prime radars anduxiliary radars are deployed in various combinations atites in the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Radar coverage now extends over the entire USSR and virtually all the remainder of the Bloc. Underconditions the Soviet system of early warning (EW) radars can detect and track aircraft at high and medium altitudes more. from Bloc territory; under virtually all conditions the system can detect and track such aircraft withinm. Maximum effective range of Soviet ground controlled interceptadars is. Future Soviet radar development will seek topresent limited capabilities against low altitude targets and air-to-surface missiles. With the wider deployment of improved radars and automated control systems, the total number of radar sites will probably decline.
most important advance In Soviet air defenseand control over the last few years has been thedeployment of semiautomatic systems with data-handlingfor rapid processing of air defense information and datafor vectoringystem similar inthe US SAGE system, but less complex, is widely deployed inWe believe that its original ground element has beena second generation system, and that an improvedcontrol system is being introduced. These new systemsalso be widely deployed in the USSR and possibly Inwithin the next few years.
radar could now give Moscow and many other targetsinterior more than one hour's warning of medium and highmade with Western bombers of2 type. Sovietsuch detection would be reduced by low level penetrations.and ASMs.now being added to Westernreduce this warning time by as much asercent.more limited EW time available in Bloc border areas wouldeflectivencss of the defenses of even heavily defended targets in
such areas. As the speeds of Western aerodynamic vehicles increase, and as Western ballistic missilesreater part of the threat, the problem of providing warning time will become more critical.
G. Currenf Capabilitms and Future Trendt
he extensive deployment of SAMs over the past four years has significantly improved Soviet air defense capabilities. Theseare greatest against penetrations by subsonic bombers in daylight and clear weather at altitudes betweennd0 feet. Under such conditions, virtually all types of Bloc air defense weapons could be brought to bear against attacking aircraft. Most Soviet fighters can operate at altitudes up to0 feet; the FLIPPER will probably be able to execute attacks at0 feet" The capabilities of the fighter force, composed largely of day fighters, would be reduced considerably during periods of darkness or poor In the increasingly widespread areas defended by SAMs. air defense capabilities are virtually unimpaired by weather conditions and extend to altitudes of0 feet.
espite its recent and considerable Improvements, however, the Soviet air defense system would still have great difficulty in copingarge-scale air attack employing varied and sophisticated tactics, even in daylight and within the foregoing altitudes. In addition, the Soviet defense problem would be complicated by the variety of delivery systems which might be employed, including air and surface-launched cruise missiles and fighter-bombers. At altitudes beloweet, the capabilities of the system would be progressively reduced; beloweet, the system would lose most of its effectiveness. The Soviets will attempt to correct these deficiencies during the next few years by improving the capabilities of surface-to-air missile and fighter defenses for low altitude operations. Total system effectiveness will be increased by further application of automated command and control.
he significant Improvements in the Soviet air defense system during recent years will be extended during the next few years, and successful penetration by manned bombers will therefore requiresophisticated forms of attack. The Soviet air defensecan be degraded by the increasingly complex forms of attack which the West will be able to employ, including air-launched missiles of present and more advanced types, penetration tactics, and electronic countermeasurcs. Even In such circumstances, the Soviets wouid prob-
Current operationalnterceptors (FtSHBED. FITTER, FISUFOTJ axe capable orynamic cUcib and reaching altitudes otOO feet. Inlimb, the aircraft would be at these alUtudCihort period of Ume (perhaps one lo threeunng which it would have Utile maneuverability. The precision with which the elimb must be planned and executed limit* IU effectiveness as an Intercept tactic.
ably expect loumber ot the attackers. We doubt, however, that they would be confident that they could reduce the weight of attackoint where the resulting damage to the USSR would be acceptable. Unless and until the USSR is able toubstantial number of advanced ABM defenses, the USSR's air and missile defense deficiencies and uncertainties will sharply Increase as ballistic missilesarger proportion of the West's total nuclear delivery'
VII. THEATER FIELD FORCESn
A. Ground* Forces
he Soviet ground forces, which represent the largest part of the military establishment, are well-trained and equipped with excellent materiel. Combat troops are distributed among IS military districts in the USSR and three groups ot forces ln the European Satellites. The strongest concentrations are in East Germany and the western and southern border regions of theesser concentration is In the maritime area of the Soviet Far East. Most Soviet ground forces are organized Into field armies with combat and service support for the line motorized rifle and tank divisions. Combat and service support is generally stretched thin, and thereow ratio of nondivisionalto the present divisional force. However, there are large numbers of artillery, missile, and antiaircraft artillery brigades and regiments which are either allocated to field armies or retained under higher command headquarters. Combat air support is provided by units of Tactical Aviation, organized into tactical air armies under thecontrol of the military district or group-of-forces commander.
f the nearly two million men in the Soviet theater ground forces, about half are In line divisions and the remainder are In combat and service support elements. We estimate that there areine divisions, of which approximatelyrc considered to be combat ready (atercent of authorized personnel strength ornd the remainingre a', low and cadre strength (estimated to range betweenndercent of authorized strength and hence requiring substantial augmentation before commitment to combat) At present,
ore detailed treatment of this subject seeCapablllUes of Sovlot Theaterncludes sections on theSatellites, forces facing NATO, gross capabilities for theater campaigns, and capabilities for distant military action.
""The number of divisions confirmed since January IKt; most of the additional divisions included In our estimate are undersuetigth units located in areas from whicheceived only sporadically. Talcing account of this and other factors,conclude that the current total of divisions couldangeo iso. with the most probable ftgure being about us.etailed estimate of ground divisions by location and type, and their estimated strength, see Annex a,,
there are an estimatedankirborne divisions,otorized rifle divisions. The present lorce levelut of aboutombat ready line divisionsow strength divisions since Khrushchev's announcement of force reductions inhe large number of cadre and undcrstrcngth divisions retainedontinuing Soviet preference forery large and partly skeletal ground force capable of being rapidly fleshed out with
Weapons and equipment. The program of modernization and reorganization has involved the introduction over the last several years of more advanced designs of practically all types of equipment, including surface-to-surface ballistic missiles. range, tanks, armored personnel carriers, nuclear-capable free rockets with ranges up tontiaircraft guided missiles, artillery and antiaircraft guns, recoilless antitank weapons,ide variety of transport vehicles. In some instances, there have been two successive generations of equipment since World War n. The increasing number of tracked and wheeledand amphibious tanks has greatly improved Sovietcapabilities, and we expect extensive equipping with the newarmored personnel carrier.
Present trends in the ground weapons development program pointontinuing emphasis on firepower and mobility. Specific areas of concentration probably will include light gun aad missile weapons to defend against low flyingield antimissile system,weapons and equipment, weight reduction of existingand improved reconnaissance and communications. Surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) arc replacing medium and heavy antiaircraft guns; guided antitank missiles are being introduced and will probably replace some antitank guns.
oc'icof missile and alt support
ho. In their doctrine for theater operations in general nuclear war, the Soviets continue to employ the combined arms concept, but they have come to consider nuclear and missile weapons as the basic element of firepower. Soviet development of tactical guided missiles has greatly improved the fire support available to fieldlthough nuclear warheads axe probably the primary armament of these missiles,considerations might prescribe the use of chemical (CW) and high explosive (HE) warheads. Road mobile surface-to-surface ballisticwith maximum ranges.nd SS-1A).ave been available for several years. Thend SS-2are intended primarilyround support role, and missile units are assigned to direct operational control of field commanders.
Although there is little direct evidence on the deployment ot these missiles, we estimate that aboutrigades (with Geach) andattalionsaunchers each) are now operational. These missile units are believed to be in the artillerystructure of major Soviet theater force commands, although none have been firmly Identified. We believe that the numbers orndnits will remain fairly stable. However, the Soviets probably will soon begin replacing theith an improved follow-on system of similar range, as they have done with the SS-1.
The number of aircraft in Tactical Aviation was reduced by half0ince that time, it has been generally stabilized in overall strength, with phasing in of new model aircraft andreductions in older models.esult of reductions andSoviet Tactical Aviation is now mainly located in the areasmajor potential land theaters of combat. About half its total strength Is with Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and most of theis in western and southern USSR. Tactical Aviation willto receive new models and to decline In numbers ofprobably fromoyhe estimated current and future numbers of Soviet tactical aircraft appear low into estimated total ground forces and their likely missions in the event of general war.
A prime current deficiency or Soviet Tactical Aviation is the lack of modern aircraft, particularly fighter bombers. For offensive tactical air support, the Soviets still rely heavily on the obsolescent BEAGLE subsonic light bomber, but it is now being replaced by the FIREBARupersonic tactical fighter bomber. In addition, the FITTER and FISHBED C, while primarily Interceptors, could also be employed for tactical support missions. The older types or Soviet tactical fighters, FAGOTs, FRESCOs, and FARMERS, were designed primarily asand have limited load-carrying and range capabilities when used In the ground support role. They canariety of missions in support ol ground forces and can be equipped to deliver nuclear weapons, but the newer types of tactical aircraft mentioned above appear better suited to these purposes. At present, about three-fourths of the fighters in Tactical Aviation are older types, mainly obsolescent, but the introduction or modern supersonic fighters has been accelerated, and these types now comprise about one-fourth or total estimated strength.
-The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence. USAF, notes that combat elements of Soviet Tactical Aviation have not declined In total numbers sincend he does not agree there will necessarily be the future decline forecast here. If the Soviet Union markedly reduces the ground clement of Theater Field Forces over the next lew years, Tactical AidaUor. mayomparable reducUon, but probably not otherwise.
ome ol the Soviet tactical lighter units have been equipped and trained only fox the interceptor mission. Despite the limitations of the older aircraft, however, most units observed have also been trained anil equipped to perform ground attack missions and could therefore be used for any one of several purposes depending on operationaldefending against air attack, providing close supportround forces, or assisting ground operations by striking targets in the enemy's rear. The Soviets have conducted some training in fighter delivery of nuclear weapons. In addition. Tactical Aviation now hasra. surface-to-surface cruise missiles (SHADDOCK.
C. Military Air
ight transports of the CAB, COACH, and CHATS types, aboutonverted BUI.I. piston medium bombers, andedium turboprop transports of the CAT, CAMP, and CUB types, are assigned by Military Transport Aviation to support ottroops. The assigned transports of the airborne troops areto airliftingle airborne division or the assault echelons of two airborne divisions. Each divisional assault echelon would be limited toroops, including headquarters elements, nine rifle battalions, and light regimental support elements. Divisional combat and service support as well as transport vehicles of the Infantry would not be Included. The mobility of these echelons, once landed, would therefore be restricted,econd sortie of the entire fleet could deliver the balance of the two divisions. Radii of the transport aircraft would permit operations of this type to be conducted to aofun.
he probable addition in the near future of more transports wilt enhance Soviet capabilities to lift laree numbers of troops or cargo to peripheral areas; in several years, the present lift capacity may be doubled. Soviet airlift capabilities also could be augmented byet and turboprop transports now In civil aviation; these aircraft have an airlift capability of nearly two additional divisional assault echelons.
D. Ampnibiowi Copobifi'iei
oviet amphibious capabilities remain quite limited. They vary from one battalion in the Northern or Pacific Fleet area, to one regimenthe Black Sea, and two regiments in the Baltic. The USSRotal merchant ship lift in all seas which Is theoretically sufficient to transport approximately*otorized" rifle divisions; however,ift would require port or other extensive off-loading facilities in the landing area The Soviets may seek to further develop their amphibiousapability, but significant Improvement will depend upon their
quisition ol additional amphibious cralt, extensive training,eliable logistic support system. There are no indications of such an improvement in the near future.
ocficof Nuclear Weapons;
Tactical nuclear capabilities are still limited, but they have been improved markedly over the past fen years. Soviet military planners are nowosition to think in terms of committing upew hundred nuclear weapons, virtually all with yields in the kiloton range,ypical front operation. Limitations on the quantity and variety of nuclear weapons available to theater forces will have cased by thes. The Soviets are probably developing subkiloton weapons, but we have no present evidence of work on delivery systems designedfor such weapons.
The Soviets evidently consider CW munitionstandard and integral part of the Soviet arsenal for general war, to be used extensively in conjunction with nuclear and conventional weapons In support of front operations. Military forces of the USSR and Satellites regularly conduct training exercises involving the offensive use of toxic chemical agents as well as defense against them. We believe, however, thatfrom Moscow would be required before operationalcould initiate the use of chemical weapons.
Although tactical nuclear delivery systems arc integral to Soviet theater forces, the nuclear weapons themselves do not appear to be in their custody. In peacetime, such weapons are stored In depots operated by the Ministry of Defense and located within the USSR. Soviet procedures for controlling these weapons ensure the national leadership that they will not be used without authorization. Existing procedures, together with deficiencies in logistical support, appear to penalize the Soviets in terms of operational readiness and rapid response for tactical nuclear weapons employment. There is evidence that the Soviets arc considering steps to overcome these deficiencies; such steps could include preparations to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to theater forces during periods of heightened tension.
f. Copabi'ifits for Theater Operation!
he longstanding Soviet concern with concepts and forces for campaigns in adjoining theaters, especially in Europe, has resultedormidable theater force strong in armor, battlefield mobility, and units in being. The-tactical-nuclear delivery capabilities of-these forces, al- -though improving, are still limited. In offensive operations, rapidlytheater forces are in constant danger of out-running their logistical tall, which is heavily dependent on railroads. Finally, the Soviets have traditionally exercised very strict supervision over the ac-
tions of their subordinates, but existing command and control systems do not permit the strict supervision over the widely extended deploymen* required on the nuclear battlefield or under the threat of use of nuclear weapons.
he statements or Soviet leaders, as well as the deployment and training of Soviet theater forces, make it clear that the principalof these forces in general war would be directed against NATO in Europe. The Soviets plan in tho Initial dayseneral war to move massive theater forces rapidly toward the Channel coast, and to secure the exit of the Baltic. This campaign would probably be augmented by operations in the Scandinavian area to acquire advance bases for the Northern Fleet. The Seme's evidently also contemplate operationsthe Mediterranean, and to secure the exit ot the Black Sea. Other peripheral areas, such as the Middle and Far East, are apparentlyas having lesser priority for theater force operations. Soviet capabilities to conduct theater operations against North America are limited to minor airborne and amphibious attacks against Alaska and Arctic bases elsewhere.
he adjustments In Soviet theater forces in the past few years have not materially impaired their capabilities to conduct nonnuclear operations. The USSR's highly mechanized forces have favorablefor the dispersed operations required because of the constant possibility of escalation to nuclear warfare. Over the past two years, the nonnuclear firepower of ground units has not been significantly altered, but the supporting nonnuclear firepower which can be delivered by tactical aircraft has decreased. There are indications that thehave recently given recognition to the possibility of nonnuclear war with NATO forces In Europe. They probably intend to retainfor conventional warfare against NATO, but they do not appear to have revised their expectation that any major conflict with NATO would be nuclear from the start or would probably escalate."
he Soviets have evidently not elaborated any doctrine for limited nuclear warfare by theater forces. Involving the use of tactical weapons only. We think they would be severely handicapped Ln any attempts to conduct such warfare at present. Moreover, thus far the Sovietsto think that limited nuclear conflict in the NATO area wouldcertainly escalate to general war.
"Th* Assistant Chief of StaS. intelligence. USAF. beliefs that the material*ATjaUon in 1W0 and1 mmcdly rcduccC Soviet capablUUcs for nonnuclear air support for groans operations Since then rr.occrrJiatlon of lacUcal air equipment for oucicar warfare has not Impaired the residual quality or totality of nonnuclear capabilities for theater air support. Fur-ncr. he notes the possibility ot limited warfare Involving Soviet forces has been no more Uian mentioned In Soviet writing. There is no evidence that any limited war doctrine, whether nuclear or nonnuclear.irectof Soviet and US or NATO forces, haa been discussed.
VIII. NAVAL FORCES
ntil recent years, the Soviet Navy has been equipped and trainedrimarily defensive role. An intensive postwar shipbuildingconcludedurface fleet, including cruisers, destroyers, and escort ships, which was Limited for effective operations to the range of shore-based aircraft. Even the Soviet submarine force, largest ever assembledation in peacetime, was composed for tbe most part of types capable of Infesting the North Atlantic and the sea approaches to the USSR, but lacking the range for such extendedas patrols off the US coasts. However, in the past few years, the Soviets have developed an increasingly diversified naval forceew emphasis on weapons and equipment of greater range and effectiveness.
uch of the impetus for technological change in the Soviet Navy has come from the USSR's concern over the threat posed by US missile submarines and carrier task forces. To counter these forces at sea, the Soviets have introduced medium bombers equipped with air-to-surface missiles, submarines equipped with cruise missiles, and new classes of antisubmarine warfare (ASW) ships. They have also introducedmissile submarines which can carry the attack to the homelands of opposing naval forces; and improved types of attack submarines, both nuclear and diescl. for interdiction of sea communications and enemy naval forces. Soviet surface forces have also been greatly strengthened by the addition of missile armament to cruisers, destroyers, and patrol craft, and by the introduction of new minewarfare ships.
A. Submarine Force
oviet capabilities for conducting operations at long distances from the Soviet coast rest primarily upon the submarine force. The numerical strength of this force has changed little in the past few years, and we believe that for the period of this estimate it will remain stableirst line snips. However, with the continued Introduction of missile armament and nuclear propulsion, the capabilities of this force are changing significantly. For example,he USSR had only aboutubmarines capable of conducting extended patrols off US coasts all of them diesel-powered, torpedo-attack types. Trie USSR now has moreubmarines with this endurance, includingships, about half of them armed with missiles.
12S. Nuclear Submarines. We estimate that the Soviet Navy now has aboutuclear-powered submarines operational. To date, we have identified three classes of Soviet nuclear-powered slups: tbe "II" class ballistic missile submarine; the "N" class torpedo attack submarine, and the "E" class which is equipped with cruise-type missiles. Wc believe that within the next few years other classes of Soviet nuclear-powered submarines will be In service, including both torpedo attack andn*s
Soviet shipyards are currently engaged ln nuclearproduction: Severodvinsk in the northern USSR, andthe Soviet Far East Considering the construction ofto date, our estimate of the USSR's capacity to producenuclear propulsion systems, and our estimate ol the existingeffort, we believe that the USSR is likely to buildubmarines of all types per year, it is primarily on thisweuildup in the Sovietotal ofnonsidering Soviet requirements,possible that they will seek to Increase their production ofsystems andarger force. On the other hand,difficulties which they have apparently encountered withpower plants may retard the program somewhat.
Attack. Submarines. The Soviet force of attackis capable ofarge-scale torpedo attack andagainst Allied naval targets and sea communications LnNorth Atlantic and northwestern Pacific. Its capabilitiesnear the continental US are more limited, but arebulk of the Soviet submarine force consists of diesel-powered.submarines, built for tbe roost part in the early andincludeW" class.Z" class.R" class,ubmarines. Of these older ships, only the "Z" class submarinescapable of conducting patrols off of US coasts from basesUSSR. However,8 the Soviets have produced about"F" class submarines andN" classboth of which have sufficient endurance to perform
Soviet construction of diesel-powered, torpedo attack submarines may continue for another year or so, but future emphasis probably will be placed on nuclear-powered types. In view of the expressed Soviet concern with US missile submarines, we believe that the USSRtrong requirement for attack submarines designed primarily forwarfare. The "N" class, with its nuclear propulsion andsonar equipment, appears better suited to this role than any other class. If the "N" class is not intended for such use, we believeew class of Soviet nuclear-powered attack submarines, specificallyfor ASW. will appear within the next few years
Missile Submarines. Soviet leaders have repeatedly stated that nuclear-powered submarines armed with various types of missilesthe main power of their navy. We estimate lhat the USSR now has operationalbalustic mlssile_submarines, .including both nuclear and diesel-powered types. These ships, their characteristics, and capabilities have been considered above) in terms of their contribution lo Soviet long-range striking forces. In addition, it has become apparent within the past year that the Soviets are giving
considerable emphasis to the development and deployment ot submarines equipped with cruise-type missiles. We have nownits ot the nuclear-powered "E" class, each equipped with. cruise missiles designed for low altitude flight at supersonic speed. Inthe Soviets have convertedW" class submarines to carry two or four such missiles each,esire to achieve an earlycapability. The Soviets are nowubmarine-launched cruise missile ofor the possibleof submarine-launched cruise missiles see
Naval surface forces, which are heavily dependent upon land-based logistic and air support, appear suited primarily for defensive operations in waters adjacent to the USSR Conventionally armed major surface units now compriseruisers,estroyers, andscort ships. In recent years, however, the Soviet Navy has considerably increased the firepower of its surface forces by the addition of missile armament, including surface-to-air missiles, which has extended the potential scope of effective operations. The only known major surface combatant ships now being built in the USSR are guided missile destroyers. The "Kynda" class, armed with both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, is being built at Leningrad,ew destroyer class, believed to be equipped with missiles of an unidentified type. Is probably in production at Nlkolaev on the Black Sea. The Soviets have alsoew older sliips to missile armament.
The Soviets now have operationalestroyers, armed with cruise-type missiles for use against surface targets. Thesehips of the new "Kynda"f the "Krupnyy" class,f the earlier "Kiltuh" class. The "Kildin" and "Krupnyy" classes employurface-to-surface missiles, whichpeed nearnd an effective range. With the use of forward observers, maximum range can be extended. We believe that the "Kynda" class employs.n addition to theirarmament, ships of these three classes also carry ASW gear. They are probably intended primarily for operations against both surface ships and submarines in coastal areas, either in defense of the sea approaches to the USSR or In support of theater field forces.
Other new construction during the past few years has involved small specialized craft for use in antisubmarine warfare, amphibious operations, rninewarfarc, coastal defense, and logistic support. Two classes of patrol boats equipped with surface-to-surface cruise-typeare now operational.'
We believe that the numerical strength ol Soviet surface naval forces will remain fairly stable over the next five years. Sovietof guided missile destroyers and of smaller specialized craft wUl prob-
ably continue at about present levels. Modernization o( destroyer types will also continue, and additional surface ships will be retrofitted with missile armament. We estimate that byoviet first linestrength will consist ofissile destroyers.ruisersith3 conventionally-armed destroyers, andescort ships as well as moreissile patrol craft.
Soviet auxiliary fleet, composed primarily of older ships,augmented by newer tanker and cargo ships, and submarineis being reinforced by the addition of submarine tenders,and repair ships. Additional logistic support could betbe growing Soviet merchant marine. In terms of net tonnage,to the Soviet merchant fleet1 fellhe0 increase, but were still well aboveprevious year. The decline1 was apparently aphenomenon,hift in production to moresnips and to super tankers (Lc,apacity0 tonsOur evidence indicates that the increase1 increment. The widespread Soviet fishing fleetslimited logistic support to submarines, and they haveutility for training, minewarfare, and collection of
C. Naval Avlollon
Naval Aviationrastic reduction0 with tbe deactivation or transfer of all navalNaval Aviation is composed largely of Jet medium bombers;includes Jet light bombers, patrol aircraft, and helicopters.are focused primarily on reconnaissance and strikemaritime targets and on antisubmarine warfare. Air coveroperations would have to be provided either by shipbomeby fighters not subordinate to Naval Aviation.
f NavalADGER Jet mediumequipped to deliver antiship air-tc-surfacc missiles. Theseof two types; the subsonichichange of.oth are estimated toEPfeet against ships, and some of these missiles probably carryBADGERs can carry either two AS-l's or onef the missile-equipped BADGERS arc configured forand we believe that eventually allew of thesebe so equipped.
medium bomber strength will probably increasethe next five years We believe that Naval Aviation hasfew BLINDER supersonic medium bombers, and they will probably
appear in greater strength within the next few years. Some oi these may be equippedew air-to-surface missile, thef it isfor antishipping use; this system could become operational
of the naval BADGERS which are not equipped withassigned to reconnaissance units. Recent evidence indicatesand heavy bombers of Long Range Aviation have alsonaval reconnaissance missions, recent overflights of US carrieralso suggest an attack training mission for these aircraft.that the naval requirement for long-range aerialgrowing, and that it will be met either by Increased numbers ofin Naval Aviation, or by selective use of Long Range Aviationin this role.
apabilities lot Naval Warfare
In recent years, the missions of the Soviet Navy have beento encompass strategic missile attack against foreign territory and operations against Western naval farces, while retaining the more traditional roles of interdicting Western sealines of communication, defending the littoral of the Soviet Bloc, and providing support for the seaward flanks of ground field forces. In waters adjacent to the USSR, all types of Soviet naval weapons could be brought to bear againstnaval forces. In the next few years, the Soviets almost certainly will give the greatest emphasis to strengthening naval capabilities for long-range attack) and for defense against Western carrier task forces and missile submarines.
Against Carrier Task Forces. The Soviets evidently regard the carrier task forceajor strategic threat. Their capabilities against such forces have been improved by continued conversion of Jet medium bombers to carry antiship missiles and by the introduction ofequipped with cruise-type missiles. In the European area, BADGERs with antiship missiles could operate against surface ships in the eastern North Atlantic, the Norwegian and Barents Seas, and much of the Mediterranean. These capabilities are. of course, subject toof detection and Identification. In the past year or so. reconnals sancQ of open ocean areas by Long Range and Naval Aviationreased. Submarine operations against carrier task forces could tend to US coastal waters
Sealines of Communications. The threat of thefleet to the vital sealines of communication of theis greatest in the northeast Atlantic and northwest Pacific.of Soviet submarines to interdict these supplyumber of factors: endurance of the submarines,to station, repair and overhaul requirements, logistic support,extent of opposition. Interdiction operations against North At-
lantic supply routes would be undertaken largely by submarines of the Northern Fleet; this force includes aboutubmarines withendurance to operate in US coastal areas but which could operate in the Norwegian Sea and eastern Atlantic. Included In these arc sixonverslon" class SSG whichun. antishipping cruise missiles. Not considering combat attrition, aboutorthern Fleet submarines could be maintained on station continuously in the eastern Atlantic approaches to the UK and Europe. This force might be augmented by submarines deployed from the Baltic prior toSome coverage ol the approaches to the Mediterranean could also be achieved. The Soviets could also maintain0 nuclear-powered and long-range dicscl-powcred, torpedo-attack submarines on more distant stations for operations against sliipping in the western Atlantic. This number could be more than doubled if the Soviets were able to provide logistic support during the patrolorward base such as Cuba.
In the Pacific, the Soviets have someubmarines which they could use in an effort to sever the US sealines of communications. While only one-third of this force has sufficient endurance to operate off the US west coast, the remainder can operate in those areas through which US sealines of communications must pass to support our Pacific island bases and Asiatic allies. Included in theseubmarines in the Pacific, the Soviets now have six nuclear and three diesel-powered cniise-rnissUe-launching submarines. We believe the Soviets intend to employ these submarines in an antishipping role but they could be employed against land targets. Considering the Limitations oftransit time to station, repair and overhaul requirements and logistic support, the Soviets could now maintainubmarines in the ocean area between Hawaii and Japan and about five off the US Pacific Coast.
ASW Capabilities. Since thes the Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on the Improvement of ASW forces. They haveajor effort in the construction of ASW ships, particularly small coastal types, and are testing new ASW seaplanes andew ASW aircraft may be introduced within the next few years. An ASW role may have been assigned to Soviet "F" and "R" classwhich feature Improved sonar gear, as well as to the nuclear-powered "N" class. Detection equipment and weapons now in service include air-launched passive sonobuoys. airborne magnetic anomaly detection (MAD) equipment, multiple tube ASW rocket launchers, and passive homing torpedoes. ASW exercises have expanded in scope, and training doctrine has become morec believe thatoviet Navy is capable of carrying out fairly effective ASW operations in coastal areas.
oviet military writings reflect great concern with the threat posed by US missile submarines, and we believe that in recent years the Soviets have emphasized improvement of their ASW capabilities in the open seas. Much of the new and improved ASW* equipment which is in service or under development Is probably designed for such employment. However, several years of intensive trainingcoordinated operations by submarines, surface ships, and aircraft will be required before the Soviets can effectively employ any new ASW systems they may develop. Moreover, although the Soviets may beong-range hydroacousUc detection system, the USSR'ssituation would make it most difficult to maintain continuous surveillance by this means over large ocean areas except in thePacific and in the Arctic We believe that at present the Soviet Navyegligible ASW capability in the open seas. Despite the effort which they almost certainly are devoting to this problem, we believe that over the next five years, the Soviets will be able to achieveimited capability to detect, identify, localize, and maintainon submarines operating in the open seas."
IX. SPECIAL WEAPONS
A. Chemical and Biological Warfare
The Soviets have developed spray devices for disseminatingagenLs from aircraft; they are estimated to have CW-filled artillery shells, short range rockets, and warheads for tactical cruise andmissiles. Chemical munitions might be used in areas ol enemy contact in ground combat, and against enemy troop concentrations, command posts, missile launch sites, and other key targets. Using air and missile delivery systems, CW agents might also be used against naval concentrations.
Based largely on the capacity of CW storage sites, we estimate that the USSR possesses an inventory of atons of toxic agents in bulk and in filled munitions. At least half of this stockpile probably consists of nerve agents, principally tabunnd the remaining half of various older standard agents. We believe thatdevelopment could produce only small increases in the toxicity of known agents and that some research is being directed towardof new, lethal agents. The Soviets may develop nonlethal,agents, and at least one could be available for use
We believe that the Soviet Union has an active BW research effort which is suitable toomplete BW program, but there Is lnsufflcient evidence on which torm assessment of Soviet BW offensive activities. However, the USSRomprehensive biological
"The Assistant Chief of Sun, Intelligence, USAF, disagrees with judgment! expressed in this sentence. See his footnote lo Conclusion T. page II.
warfnre defensive program which could load to an offensive capability. The Soviets have conducted research on antipersonnel. antlUvestock and possibly antlcrop BW agents. Although wc have identified no mass production Iflcility for BW agents and have no evidence of Sovietof such agents, research laboratories and existing plants for the production of vaccines could provide these agents in quantity.
The Soviets haveide range of active and passive ECM equipment, mcluding Improved chaff, radar, and communications jammers, and various deception devices to counter Western electronic systems. Soviet military ECM capabilities are complemented by the unique Soviet experience in extensive, centrally controlled, selective Jamming of Western broadcasts. At present,.the USSR has ancapability for Jamming at thane frequencies normally used by Western radars and long range radio communications systems. Within the period of this estimate, we believe that the various types of Soviet equipment, taken together will be able to produce signals for jarnmlng all frequencies likely to be employed by Western communications, radar and navigation equipment.
Thus Soviet capabilities to interfere with Western strategic and tactical communications appear formidable. The Soviet ground-based jamming capability is roost effective withiniles of Soviet tern lory. In addition, the cutting of trans-Atlantic cables by Soviet trawlers has demonstrated the vulnerability of this Westernsystem. The Soviets are aware of at least some of the effects of high altitude nuclear bursts on radar and communications, and have continued their program for investigation of these effects
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table 1 Estimated Personnel Strength of the Soviet Armed Forces,2
Table 2 Estimated Strength of European Satellite and AsianArmed Forces,2
Tablestimated Soviet Aircraft Strength by Role Within Major
Table 4 Estimated Strength and Deployment of Sino-Soviet Bloc Air Defense3
Table 5 Estimated Tactical and PVO Fighter Strengths
Table 6 Estimated Strength and Deployment of Soviet Groundand Tactical Aircraft.2
Table 7 Estimated Strength of Soviet Ground Force Line Divisions.3
Table 8 Estimated Soviet Naval Strength and
Table 9 Estimated Strength of Ground and Air Forces of European Satellites and Asian Communist Nations,2
Tablestimated Strength of European Satellite and AsianNaval Forces,2
Table 11 Estimated Characteristics and Performance of Soviet Postwar Submarines
Table 12 Estimated Performance of Light Bombers. Strike-ReconnaLs-sance Aircraft, and Seaplanes
Table 13 Estimated Performance of Soviet Transport Aircraft
Table 14 Estimated Performance of Soviet Helicopters
ESTIMATED PERSONNEL STRENGTH OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
Theater Field Poieea
Ground Forces, Field
Air Defease Forcea
Surf ace-to-Air Missiles
'Flghler Aviation of Air Defense
Warning aad Control
Loog-Rnogc Attack Forcea
. S.nd T) Naval Forces (excluding personnel tousled rhftxrt)
Uclti*on. aad UUity Ai/erafl
PttopersHoonl Aviation Training
Steuiity Fotena (Not includedots;)
utimalci piesQoled Id lob (able are generalhe Ggum arefrom animate* on order of bat tic and manning which vary markedly in adequacy. The evidence is normally belt (or combat uoiU aodlcmanta immediately iupportio( them, it tend* lo become much poorer for logistical and arta.ni dative elements'ir.cSotU margin of error to each Individual ngvie. bat in eocve rasas tailU likely totaiu.-clfW, UUotsluaatcO loUlkaly toa few percent of tb* tola] number of uaiioimtl personnel actually in the SowatMUblishrncot at present lo addition, there bio atoitaoljal but unknown cumber of civilians working for too Soviet military ettabUabmaot.
Military scientific research and devrJopoeotIn the USSRargely conducted by civilian ageaeiM, In particular the Academy of Sciences, the State Committees lor DcleuioAviation Technology, Salonechnicaladio-Electro uia. andand by Ihe Ministry of Medium Macruna Building (nuclearhoOf active duty military personnel estimated here are those piiatanly subordinate lo the Ministry of Defense and at aarsnia teal ranges, ia eiectronica. owclear development, and avis-Ua* tacnnoteary. Othera Research and Dcvdoptoent aad aUMd fune-Lioas are tousled in other categories.
This figure is based on the aw-impuon lhat all aofl MRDM launching pooltions arc munned. If a* many as bill of thesealternates (see paragraphbis Gguro would be.
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE AND ASIAN COMMUNIST ARMED FORCES2
Secuffi* Fo iters}
Satellite* (Rounded Totals).
Communist Aiia (Rounded
AaaUlaol Chief of Stafl, Inwuigeaee, USAF, bebcvwoUowoo heavy bomber -ill probabtr be Introduced la4 aad would tbartfoc* tatircalc thai beair bomber atrangtli will regain it about 2C0 throughout the period of this estimate St* oil footnote lo pagearagraph M. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS Further, the MUM Chief of Staff, lotelLgcaee, USAF. believes thai fighter ttraagUu are UVeJj to reaaia at or near praaaat levcii; sec his foceaote toinally, be doea oot cocaider lhat the Soviet reqcucasaal for rnoaualataaee aircraft will dJBuciih as ladtealed la Uii tabic If theomber motnumcu aireeaA phase oul. he believe* this would be compensated by asiigacwct of additiooo! fighters to reeoeoaAiaaaoo roles.
traotport aad helicopter figures io paiestheaes air sol :od jdrs ia the total) of th* compoaenl under which the? are baled; Ibe/ ate, however, included io Ihe miliary transport avialioo figure*
' Include* ISO light transports assigned touoctiou; not ihowa eliewhere In Iheac table*.
ESTIMATED STRENCTH AND DEPLOYMENT OFT BLOC AIR DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
Kail Casual USSR
Fa/ Last ussr
Easieia Europe Sovietastern Europe Satellite Forces..
Moscow Air Defense'
Transbsitalu Far East).
Id operational units excluding trainers. FIREBAR A, aad FLASHISBPOT. FISOBED D.
FRESCO D.ad E,ISHBED C. FITTER.
FAGOT. FRESCO. FARMER.
i Fighters aad EW sod CCI radarsa. o(AM lites withinire included above in tbe figures lor woicra, northwestern, and wesi^calralFigure* are fornd SA-3,
. aad AA guns withinSSR.
ESTIMATED STRIKE/RECCE AIRCRAFT STRENGTHSMID-IM7
at imstes in these table* take account of current trends In orderof-batde, evidence on ru/crsft production and research aod development, estimates of Soviet leebnieal capabilities id design and development, and consideration! regarding future Soviet requirements for numben and type* of air defense aad tactical aircraft in general. The loul estimated number* of aircraft arc higher throughout tbe period than ia previous estimates because our curreat evidaaee shoirs that the USSR is not retiring older fighters and light bombers as rapidly aa we had anticipated We do ooi exclude thethat in the neat fear yean the Soviets mil returnolicy ofreductions in older models; these tables, however, are based oa the assumption that during the period under coosideratioa there -ill be no draati*in la* trends sow obscrvablc.*
Most tactical fighter uaiU have been trained acd equipped In perform both aa interceptorround attack mrsoioo.
Wa believe tfcstnd FLIPPER were designed tooughly (ompnrsbl* mission, that or poinl intercept. Tbe spread figure* lu this category reflect our uncertainty as to Ihe curreDt status of FLIPPER. The higher figures reflect iho possibility that FLIPPER is lo production now snd will enter unit* In IMS; the lower figures are based oo the assumption that FLIPPER production does nnt bepo before3 aod that the aircraft doe* not enter unitsowever, il FLIPPER is not produced, we would espect the number of FISHBEDlo fall within the range of ihi* estimate.
' Follow-on aircraft which eould appear toward the cad of th* period nf this estimate include an advaoced all-weather interceptorultipurpose flghlar. Both of these eiretalt types sre withic Soviet cspab.lilies. but there is as yet
oo evidence ot their develop nun;
Assistant Cruel of Staff. latcltigence. USAF, believe*ncLcuntioe of Soviettrength at about preseot levels il some-hat note Ukely. at least in tbe sear term, than the downward trend presentedthis table With substitution of new models foe eider aircraft, the total number of Soviet operational Tactics! and PVO fighters has held quite level, snd may even be up slightly, over the pastonths
SOVIET NAVAL STRENGTH AND
Tri'b or Sin
LINE SUBMARINES Nuctiar
Cruise missile <E)
Torpcdn attack (N)
BaHiatie fnissiknd Z-
t.R. torpedo (Z. F)
L.R. torpedo (W. R)
M.S. torpedo (Cfl
S.R. tcipedo (Ml
SECOND LINE SUBMARINES
SR. torpedo (M)
FIRST LINE SURFACE SHIPS
SECOND LINE SURFACE snips
IS S6 02
Use submarines are Uiose ol modern coos true tioo. Tbe aecood line category lists units ftooioears old which, by virtue ot sgc and design are eooMdercd useful only for training orij: defense. Scene of the second Una ships will probably be retired freea service earner than oa sa age criterion.
Surface ships which or* at leastears old are carriedecond line status uaul there is evidence of theirfrom the Beet or until they are finally considered removed (in tbe absence of enntrary evidence) -benears old.
Designations of classes of nuclear submarines) identified to date appear in parenthesis. Totals for future years include submarines of fnllon'-on classes which may be built during tbe period.
We have previously etUrosted that construction of "C" clan eubmarines would terminate by tbe endecent evidence has Indicated, however, that Ibis codstruction has continued- Whileare unable to predict the future numbers of this class with certainty, our estimate reflects both the recent evidence and the possibility thatontinue for about another year. The sue of the "C" class constructionwill be ialwnced by Sovietregarding construction of nuclear-powered niissJc submarines
"It" class are iu the Northern Fleel aod live in the Black Sea.
thsuropean Ssicllitc ground divisions.re combat read* and Die remainder could be brought lo rc-.dir.cts
' Generally high manning levels ar* maintained lo Asian Communtil ground fortes, but combat effectiveness is reduced by Ihe tow standard* of material and logistic support.
Aircraft totals for Poland include Naval Airhich contiit ofet hghtcra, and IS reconaaissanc* aircraft.
Aircraft totals for Coenrnur.lst China Include Naval Alt Forrei which consist of 2'0 Jetot lightrop llfhtS prop light transports, androp ASW reconnaissance aireralt- Htllcoplcrs hava not been observed In Communlil China, but II I* posslbl* thai soma lisva been Ai-lgncd lo mllllnry force*. In addition, Communlil China IsI maud to have ns many a* IS plslon medium bombers.
Under civil auspices to satisfy Otnsva Convention itmltatlom.
ESTIMATED STRENGTH OF EUROPEAN SATELLITE AND ASIAN COMMUNIST NAVAL FORCES.3
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF SOVIET
on wo ilon'
Lrxotn/ Beam (retT)
(Tom) SuntACtc/ Suauitioto
5 Cruise 10
0 Cruise 13
ESTIMATED ANCE OF LIGHT BOMBERS. STRIKE- ECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT. AND SEAPLANES
. '7 _
' i h " , , t t p t f
level ics le.*l
la The BEACLE tanb. boablasdrar.je/.ed.u* ofmsll pan of the Soviet BEACLE force is equippedUp lacks. Raoce/radius o(quipped aircraft woulda.educed bombloadbs.
Reconnaissance missioc carrying lip isoka throughoutround attack rauatoa.
MlMlariac raiealoa sritbines
i There is sorsi evidence thai lakc-oB weight mar be lea-
O M f* _
1 0 0 o n _ r
;-. *v vw
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Glossary of Missile Terms
Table 1 a unehed Surface-lo-Surfacp MissileEstimated Characteristics and Performance
hort-Range Ground-Launched Surface-to-surface MissileEstimated Characteristics and Performance
Table 3 Naval-Launched Surface-to-Surface Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics and Performance
Table 4 Surracc-to-Air Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics and Performance
ir-to-Surface Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics and Performance
Table 6 Air-to-Air Missile Systems Estimated Characteristics and
GLOSSARY OF MISSILE TERMS
Initial Operational Capability (IOC)Date the first operational unit is trained and equippedew missiles and launchers.
Maximum Operational Range
Surface-to-SurJace SystemsMaximum range under operationalwith warhead weight indicated. For long-range ballisticthe maximum range figures disregard the effect of the earth'sLn general, ballistic missiles can be fixed to ranges as short as approximately one-third the maximum operational range without serious Increase in CEP and to even shorter ranges with degraded accuracy.
Surface-to-Air SystemsSlant ranges are indicated in the tables. For practical purposes, the slant range can be used as the horizontal radius of the defended area. Range will vary with the direction ofthe altitude, and the size of the attacking aircraft. Maximum altitude is not necessarily achieved at maximum range.
Air-to-Surface SystemsSlant range between launching aircraft and target at the instant of missile launch.
Air-to-Air SystemsSlant range between launching aircraft andat the instant of missile launch.
Circular Error Probable (CEP)radiusircle in which,one-half of the impacts will occur. Inherent missile accuracies are somewhat better than the accuracies specified in the tables, which take into consideration average operational factors. For naval systems firing on coastal targets, an accurate determination of the launching ship's position is necessary to achieve CEP's of the order indicated In the tables.
Warhead WeightThe weight of the explosive device and its associated fuzing and firing mechanism.
Ready Missile RateA ready missile is an In-comraission missile with warhead mated, mounted on an in-commission launcherrained unit which is considered ready to be committed to launch. Readyrate is the percentage of missiles on launcher which are "ready
Kcliabiiiti: on LauncherThe percentage ol ready missiles which will successfully complete countdowns and leave their launchers attimes orinutes thereafter.
Reliability, in FlightThe percentage of missiles launched whichas planned in the target area. within three CEP's of the aLrninir point).
Readiness Conditionsfollowing conditions of readiness apply to all ground launched ballistic missiles having ranges greater.
aunch crews not on alert. Noseeone and missile checked but not mated. Missile guidance system not adjusted for particularand missile not erected or fueled.
aunch crews in launch area and on alert. Missile and noseeone mated and checked but in prelaunch storage building.
aunch crews on station- Missile with noseeone erected on launch pad Propellant facilities in position, attached, and ready to start propellent loading. Guidance system set.
aunch crew on station, missile propellent loading Guidance rechecked.
Reaction TimeTune required to proceedeadiness condition to firing.
Retire TimeTime required Co reflre from the same pad or launcher.
umcvrakgk CUOUNIi-LAUXCKUU SURFACK-Ttl-SUUFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED
CHARACTERISTICS AMI) PERFORMANCE
in haa re
Miv. liner-(ioiul m.>
Accuracy (cki'i mm. Warhead Weight (lb.)
Reaction Timerom 3.
Kohl Time, comikmmTime
8hn.S mmm. My hra.
many hrr.. - 1
SHORT-KANCE GROUND-LAUNCHED SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SVSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
atSB) (CW. rlA^ nuclear)
IleL ability On launcher
rt. mller .
sile, can be held at
foe liaaiied period.
stor. liquid sll-inertiai.O.
2 bra after arrival at preiur-oyed site, can be heldini, forpertods.
) (CW. HE. nuclear)
f ler arrival at pre*ur*eycd lite, can beheldr. fortendednd for5 rains.
estimate thai the USSR hasehicle-mounted, tactical cruise missil*sagi oro. for delivery of HE or nuclesr payloeds. Other characteristic, are unknown, but thev may be siailsr to those of Hi*arried by Sovietiile pauot craft
uclear0ill probably be increasedesult of1 uuclear leaU.
SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMSESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AJt'D PERFORMANCE
Initial Op Capobility
Max. Opciatio&al Range
. about 25
ltitude (ft.)Mio. Eff. Altitude (ft)
(CEP ia It.)
Warhead Weight (lbs.)
ship-borne surface-tc-air missile system, designated. has been observed on the KYNDA/KOTLIN conversion class destroyers. We have inumcicnt evidence tn os-litriste eosiacterisUea-
Characteristics are based oa originalissile. For thoseites modified for the SA-2'a GUIDELINE missile, ccaraeteristlto wfll approach those of tbeystem.
Marimurn altitude Is not necessarily achieved at marUnuni range. Range will vary with the eiie. direction of approach, and altitude of the attacking aircraft.
4havevidence to estimate chaisetcrtsUea. This system is probably being deployed for low-altitude defense.
- Would have some effectiveness up0 feet especially if equippeduclear warhead.
1 This system probablyigh degree of cfiectlveacss up to altitudes0 feet, with limited eflectireness up0 feet. Its capabilities would decrease rapidly at higher altitudes, but there is some cvideoce that it might be able to engage coamaocuveriog targets at altitude* as higheet.
ia such factors as citing conditions aad target cpeeds will influence low-altitude capabilities. Soviet doctrine suggests allocation of targetseel to AAA Hit.
' Although the original srstem was equippedand FAN SONG (formerly FRUITSET)and FAN SONG radars appearedhese new radar* have improved somewhat tbe accuracy and low-attitude capability of the system.
' Nuclear warheads ore possible, although specific evidence of their use is lacking
AlR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
Maximum Rangeutdaoc* Against
Action weU-deSued target* oa
beam-riding wllhaemi-aetlve homing
rnidcotiree inertia! with active radar termioal homing
Against land targets. Warhead WcgBl (lbs.).
ReLaCJ.lj on Laueebei. Reliability In
(BE or nuclear)
Oi to I.
primarily an tittup; could be used against land targets.
A new alr-to-surface missilearriedLINDER "B" medium.bomber, van displayed In1 Soviet air show. We believe that thisrototypeiaaila which could become operational
launch AS-I. BADGER must be at an altitude uoder JO.COO feet, acdpeednot*.
AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE SYSTEMS ESTIMATED CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE
sendee tm radar horning or infrared.
probable aero;radar horning
probable aeraiac-tivo radar homing
Q FARMER E
Limited to dear ait man coridi lions. -Range ia lca> at loo altitude andtrllh the target dctirmiaa-uoo capability o/ tighter. All-weather