APPROVED ?OR RELEASE
P: MAP
OF THE DIRECTOR
Memorandum No.ay Ittl
Date
VIA :
EFERENCE:
Deputy Eix ae torsearch
Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence
Ait: Df. Chamberlain Deputy Dire<tor/XateUi*eace
MSAVi
C T. I
O N
la National Security Action Memorandumhicheporteach Geaaons DiUasiem Plant with the request that the Pre aide at woeld Uke taeport aad aa appraisal oi thia project by live DCI together with the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Comralsrton.
Alio attachedrief memaraadvm for the DDCI frerm the Director riving Mr views oa this. Will yea Jointlythe reepoarl-Wltty for peeper la treeoesteo report together with AiXatter of uTfon- r. ll la requested that tble report be la the DCX's office not later thaaeay.
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Executive Dlractor
LB K: .
Distribution: D/R
D/I *
ExDir
USPENSE DATE: *
D/SIyjyavia DD/I
ER 63
Ri Gonoral Cartar
Suggest wa pot In motion*
This laew atoryoat0 million toillion ta0 altar going ovor tbo Trench pilot plant at Saciay. b7 dato waa Included in tho rocont National Estimate and alto ta my tastimoay tooint Cocnmittoo era Atomic Snarly.
Thoanch raauaat for Carman old probably ioclodoa wohleh tha Germans have davolopod and whichC knowa all about.now of no competence aoiong tbo Italiana In thla liald.lso know at* bo work by Germans on tha gaaaoua dilXnaion procoas. Howavar, they eoold holp on matertala, mechanical ltamo,ate. oliovo wo ahould put ia motion bofora 3oaborg laavas foriR. Although thioeiiova Pete ScoviUa knows mora of tha background than any ono olaa.
It la Important to note
rotocol to tho Brussels troatyormany in tbo (laid oi nudaar arms and porhapoof this naturem not aara about tbia point J, and
(Z) Garmaay ajreed0 to elaaalfy their canirifaga work. AIC workod out this ajeat.
JOHN A. McCONE Director
(Typed from DCI notas)
Attachmeott1
ddreeaee
ER
CI cbrono
CIy atteh.
SAM
1. Attachedeport by the Office of Scientific Intelligence in response ton the French gaseous diffusion project, f
the exception of the final paragraph, this papercoordinated with the General Manager of tbe AEC. The reportJointly by OS I, ORE, OCX, and ONE, and was coordinated
final paragraph of the report consists of on estlotat*
by ONE of the probability of German participation in the French program. While AEC representatives have seen this paragraph, we have been unable to secure their formal concurrence In tine to meet the deadline on the paper.
SlifiUXXS
Acting Deputy Director (Intelligence)
Attachments
3
REPORT OJi FRENCH GASEOUSROJECT
The French announced8 their Intention toaseous diffusion plant at Plerrelatte, In the Rhone Valley in southern Prance. At that time, they proposed having this plant in operation, preducing low enriched material2 and fully enriched material Estimates at that time, baaed on opinions. scientists vho saw the pilot facilities at Sac lay and upon Information provided by the French, were that production of low enriched material could begin2 withg/day of fullynd capacityofg/day Technical difficulties in producing adequate compressor seals and unforeseen difficulties In barrier development and production have delayed this plant until it is now estimated that top-product will not become availableT- This date of availability has recently been confirmed by Pierre Me3seer, the French Minister of Araed Forces.
rench estimate of the total cost for Plerrelatte0 minion. However, by3 this estimate had risen toillion, not including the cost of the high enrichment section of Pierre la tte,which no weaponan be produced. If the cost of this portion of the plant bears the same relationship to the total as In previous estimates, the total cost of Plerrelatte would be2 billion aboutimes the original estimate. During budget debates in the fall, the situation was officially surroarised as follows:
"plerrelatte exists. Itarge undertaking, and It Is necessary toeans of rendering the costs bearable." This sentiment undoubtly is one of the causes of French exploration of possible German and/or Italian financial and technical assistance in completing Plerrelatte.
3. there have been numerous reports concerning possible Franco-German, and more recently Franco-Italian, technical and financial cooperation in areas associated vith nuclear weapons. Although monetary contributions would certainly be helpful, technical assistance coy be of more immediate benefit. The Vest Germans have considerable experience ln industrial seal research and development which could be used effectively to help solve the problem of adequate compressor seals for use in the Plerrelatte plant. German scientists have no major backlog of experience in gaseous diffusion separation* However, their generalcapabilities and ample numbers of technical personnel could, if so applied,ignificant factor ln the solution to other technical problems encountered at Plerrelatte, including development and fabrication of satisfactory barriers. The use of ultracentrlfuges at Plerrelatte is not anticipated, since the French are already ccexritted to the gaseous diffusion process. The Go mans areood position to provideIn the ultracentrlfuge field should the French seek lt. However, German ultracentrlfuge developments have lost impetus since their program was classified, and they would probably require two years or more of priority development effort to achieve an economically practical technology.
It. Protocol to tbe Brussels treaty Imposes no prohibition on Vest Germany other than that no atonic weapons or associated weapons materialsbe namifactured on German territory. This does not preclude tha possibility of German assistance, financial or technical, to non-Geman nuclear weapons programs nor of thair obtaining nuclear weapons from such sources.
5. In conclusion, from the evidence available ve believe tbat French officials have In fact broached the subject of aid for Pier-relatte vith the West Germans asd possible Italians. Ve do not know the precise tens of the French requests, the amounts of aid requested, or tha quid pro quo being offered by Prance. Paris at present will probably not offer Germany any meaningful degree of control orin the French nuclear program. The Germans, particularly If pressed by. to avoid entanglement ln the French program, will probably not provide aid unless they are given some control. In the longer run, however, despite the prospectost-Adenauer government less closely In tune vith the present French leadership, stronger pressures for French-Vest German cooperation on military applications of nuclear energy are likely to develop. As the costs of the French program continue to mount, the French may become more willing to giveodicum of control ln order to get aid. The Germans, for their part, may cometo regard participation in the French programay to get around the treaty restrictions mentioned above, anday for Geroan industry to improve Its position in tbe nuclear technological race.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: