OCIopy No.
3
KHRUSHCHEV'S ROLE
INTHE CURRENT
1DEFENSE POLICY
ReferenceXVIII
TAFF STUDY CIA/RSS
CAESARNo.
Off. Ser. No.No.
KHRUSHCHEV'S ROLE IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY
Thisorking paper, an interim report on recent developments in Soviet strategic thought and military ore comprehensive treatment of the subject is planned, but must await the acquisition of more substantial evidence.
This report focuses on the relationship between the controversy over resource allocations and the dialogue on military doctrineeriod in which the military and economic choices facing the USSR have been acute. In the process of tracing developments in the Soviet economic-defense sphere since the Cuban crisis, we have sought to discover Khrushchev's objectives and scheme of political maneuver, and to gauge his progress in putting his program across. On this basis wo have tried to determine the main direction of Soviet defense-economic policy.
Although the writer has benefited from theresearch findings of colleagues, he is solelythe paperhole.
SUMMARY
Since the Cuban crisis, which nurtured the cause of the advocates of greater defense spending, Khrushchev's basic plan has been to keep up the present pace of growth of Soviet armed strength without further impairing the country's economic growth. To his way of thinking, further serious retreats in tbe economic process of "building Communism" could be as disastrous for Soviet foreign policy and prestige as faltering ln the arms race. method of dealing with the military-economic dilemma has been to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" in the resource allocations equation. Since last November, he has arguedadical redistribution of resources is not needed to vitalize the economy and meet the country's military objectives; great resources could be found, he has said repeatedly. If "bidden reserves" were exploited, inefficiency ln production reduced, and economicstreamlined.
In addition, Khrushchev appears to be campaigning behind the scenes for another substantial reduction ln conventionaldo not figure importantly in his conception of the requirements for deterrence and waging nuclear war. While he has not yet explicitly called for new cuts, his scheme has been reflected in his recent deprecations of conventional forces; ln his likely success lnroop cut in the Bulgarian army (reportedly made possible by Its acquisition of "newer weapons"); ln his depiction of future war as lasting one day; in the transformation of his "one-day war" formula into military doctrine in some military forums; ln the new emphasis given the doctrinal importance of his0 (troop cut) speech; and in the studied assertion of the prerogatives of tho party leadership In the sphere of defense policy and military doctrine, as well as the propaganda effort to build up tho image of Khrushchev personally as aauthority.
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In short, we have found Khrushchev to be successful in resisting the efforts of others to shift more of the country's strained resources from the consumer to the defense sector. That his position in the inner sanctum policy disputes has been appreciably strengthened since his gloomy economic forecast of last February is seen in the sustained propaganda emphasis since March on improving consumer welfare. (In this regard, the most notable developments have been an increase ln March in the planned capital investment in light industry and the publication ln June of Khrushchev's guidelines forconomic plan that give priority to the chemical industry explicitly in support of agriculture and consumer goods.) On tho other hand, Khrushchev thus far has been thwarted in his own efforts to cut back Soviet conventional forces,omewhat weakened but still unyielding and articulatemilitary element (which, in turn, evidently has important backing in higher party circles.).
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KHRUSHCHEV'S ROLE IN THE CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER SOVIET DEFENSE POLICY
Tho collapse last fall of the Soviet strategy to putIn Cuba seems in retrospect to havotrong current of opinion in favor of increasing the defense establishment's share of the country's limited Both the deployment in and the withdrawal offrom Cuba were tacit admissions of Soviet strategic inferiority. As Soviet prestige dipped low in the wake of the crisis, tbe remaining dynamism went out of Soviet foreign policy in much the same way that air escapesire and with the same resultant immobility. The Chinese and their cohorts used the occasion to discredit the Soviet leaders with charges of "adventurism and capitulation." Soviet military morale seemed to slip to its lowest level since the announcement in0rastic unilateral troop-cut. Indirect evidence suggests that there wasamong the military over Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban operation.* Under such circumstances, the neod to improve tho relative strategic position of the USSR with genuine increments to the militaryolitically irrefutable argument, and the position of the advocates of greater defense spending was consequently strengthened.
That the Soviet leadership would give greater impetus to defense was further suggested by the declaration of
ounter, tbe regimeropaganda campaign asserting the wisdom of the party leaders and theirin the planning of the country's defenses. For example, in RED STARovember, Marshal Chuikovitherto unpublished exchange of messages between Stalin and Lenin0 to refute the notion that our diplomacy sometimes very effectively spoils the results achieved by our military victories." Stressing the dominant rolo of the party in military affairs, Chuikov criticized unnamed officers for falling to "maintain proper attitudes and opinions."
military superiorityoal of Soviet policy soon after the curtain fell on Cuba. In an important pamphlet on Soviet military policy and doctrine published in November, the Soviet Defense Minister wrote: "The most characteristic feature of the present state of the development of Soviet military doctrine is the fact that it bases itself on the superiority of the armed forces of the USSR over the armies of the most powerful countries of capitalism, with respect to military-technological means and moral-combatlong the same lines, thearch CPSU letter to the Chicom Partyew slogan: "As long as there is nothe socialist commonwealth must always havein armed forces over the imperialists."* Since Cuba, Soviet propagandists have also proclaimed current militarytimes qualified and at timesthe West. Boasts of military superiority had dropped out of the propaganda innd until last fall the Soviets were content to assert military parity with the West. Among the reasons for reintroducing boasts of current superiority, evidently, were the Soviet need to salvage some of the prestige lost in the wreckage of the Cuban operation, and, in the case of some Soviet leaders, to play down the strategic deficiencies Of the USSR in order to draw off some of the urgency that other Soviet leaders attached to the problem of Improving the Soviet strategic posture.
Despite the strong motivation to improve the country's strategic position in the aftermath of the Cuban debacle, the USSR has apparently not radically stepped up its military program. It does not appear on the basis of available evidence
" *This slogan was subsequently reiterated by Marshal Grechko in IZVESTIYAay and by RED STAR in an article on the Warsaw Pact anniversary onay. It has been made clear in these and other Soviet materials, however, that the effective military organization protecting the socialist commonwealth is the Soviet controlled Warsaw Pact, in which China isember nor an observer.
that there hasubstantial shift in resources from the consumer to the defense sector. On the contrary, from all Indications measures taken have tended to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" ln economic priorities. (In fact, there have been indications in recent monthsecision to increase the rate of expansion of consumer programs beyond previous plan figures. Thus an article ln tbe March KOMMUNIST, claiming that the "correct proportions" between heavy and light Industry are being maintained, changed the figure for thein investment in light industry3oercent. However, the possibility that there hashift in some consumer residuals to the defense sector cannot be ruled out.)
That the resource allocations equation has not been changed, it seoms, is largoly the result of Khrushchev's determination (backed by hard campaigning ln ruling circles) not to lose more ground in the economic competition with tho West. For in the taut economic situation in which tho USSR found Itself, that would be the penalty of further sizeable shifts ln allocations to defense. Khrushchev has consistently regarded the growth rate of the Soviet economy, theof the living standards of the Soviet people, asan index of the growing power of the Soviet cause as Soviet military might. He has been willing to live with long periods of strategic inferiority so as to promote tbe country's economic growth. For example,e hadecline of two billion rubles ln military spending, with the savings diverted into investment and consumption, and thereby enabled the Soviet GNP to Increase annually by seven percent. This Is not to say thathas neglected tbe defense sector; he has ln fact led the pack of reformers in remolding the Soviet armed forces for nuclear warfare. But modernization was only one side of his military program; cutting back the conventional arms of service to offset tbe great cost of advanced weapons and to nourish tho economy was the other part of his scheme.
At the height of Khrushchev's powerhetrend in production and investment was reversed as the pace of military procurement, RIO and space costs rapidly increased. These trends were the main reason for theln Soviet economic growth (tbe rate of GNP Increase
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droppedercent) in recent years. Facediminishing economic growth rate and rising costs of new weapons, Khrushchev ln0 took steps to moderate the high total defense spending by drastically cutting back (by one-third) the older arms of service and diverting the savings in rubles, materiel and manpower resources to the exotic weapons program and tbe economy. Once again he was willing to live with real strategic inferiority while basing the Soviet strategic posturearge extent on deceptive propaganda claims about Soviet ICBM strength. After Initial success in getting his troop cut program adopted, Khrushchev saw his program founderesultombination of Internal and external And ho himselfit the coup de grace in announcing the "temporary"of tbe troop cut in Again lnn making the decision to place strategic weapons in Cuba, Khrushchev and his colleagues seem to have boon partially motivated by economic considerations. The venture offered tbo opportunityelatively inexpensive way to moot the felt needrans-oceanic strategic attack capability. The fact that the risks Involved in the operation werehigb, as Soviet foreign policy initiatives go,the desperation felt in Moscow toolution to tho dllomma of mooting military and economic requirements,
as well as to reverse the falling momentum in their foreign policy.
Khrushchev began to unfold his strategy for dealing with the great dilemma of meeting the demands of the economy and tho military, at the Central Committee Plenum lnhere he acknowledged the continued primacy ofheavy industry ln the organization of the country's resources. But he also made lt clear that be would not accept an "elther-or" proposition: he wanted the USSR to stay ln both the arms race (to bolster the country's strategic position) and the economic competition (to score important political points).
For to bis way of thinking, to drop back seriously in either competition would have disastrous results for Soviet foreign policy and prestige. Khrushchev's strategy, hence, was toolding action on tbe allocation of resources. heavy Industry has priority, flexible proportions should behrushchev said; "consumer goods areecond-rate matter." That Khrushchev won the first round of the controversy is seen in the fact thatword plenum report contained only one reference to defense. Stating the need to "maintain" national defenses at the "due and properhe phrase was auch weaker than thein the budget2 that called upon the country to "increase in every possible way" its defenses.
Khrushchev again plainly declared for both the arms race and economic competition in hisebruary speech at Kalinin. When assessing available resources, he said, "we must soberly take into account the needs of peace-time economy and tbe requirements of defense. We must balance both sides so as to prevento from beirig overempHo-slzed." In thehrushchevloomy picture of the future, lamenting that the high cost of defensewould noterious Improvement ln the consumers' lot In the foreseeable future. Thus he forth-rlghtly confirmed what ho had indicated in the previous November at the Central Committeehe had shelved for an Indefinite time his long-standing proposals forIncreasing allocations to agriculture and light industry. This alone could have been sufficient reason for the pessimistic tone of the speech: Khrushchev was apologizing to the Soviet people for not being able toearlier promiseshange ln favor of the consumer by, say, lifting the policies of restraint brought to bear on the consumer earlier ln the yearesult of over-committed resources. eat prices were raised byercent, private housing construction was cut back further,romised reduction ln the personal Income tax was "postponed.") On the other hand, Khrushchev'spessimistic tone may also have reflected the period of greatest weakness in his struggle to resist furtherby the insatiablo military machine into oconomlc
investment.* There have probably been starts and stopsumber of directions in the dofense-ecbnomlc sphere over the past half year, as various elements in the military and civilian bureaucracies competed for the country's strained resources. But as subsequent ovonts have shown, Khrushchev succeeded in beating down all attempts to divert morefrom the consumer sector. (This was made clear by the end of March when KOMMUNIST, as mentioned earlier, raised the planned figure for the increase in right33 percent toercent.)
We are also inclined to view the appointment in March of the former defense industry boss Ustinov to theof the Supreme Economic Council not as an indicationhift ln the allocation of resources toward defense, but as an effort to apply the more efficient methods used in the defense Industry to other industries. (At the November plenum, Khrushchev bad singled out the defense industryodel of efficiency. Even ln hispril speech, ln which he voiced dissatisfaction with the high cost ofln the past, he said that the former defense chief was selected for the new post because "he deserves it." Also, Rudnev, the Chairman of the State Committee for theof Scientific Research privately gave that explanation of Ustinov's appointment to Ambassador Kohler lnuch an interpretation is fully in keeping with the march of other developments in Soviet economic policy.
Still more recently, in late May, Khrushchev again
made plain his scheme for dealing with the economic- '
defense dilemma. With high confident he told[
that the USSR would benoo'jj op rco ainiBuseriouswith other investment programs." About the same time,
the same time Khrushchev was talking to the electorate in Kalinin, Kozlov wasuch more optimisticwhich he called for new "huge" invest, ment in heavy machine building enterprisesefenseLeningrad.
onay, he told the Soviet peopleally for Castro that while the USSR ranks second ln the world in volume of production, this is only for "the tinend tbat "ln five or seven years we shall say: move over and give us first place! And we will unfailingly be first."
This fresh injection of optimism, in contrast to the gloomy speech of last February, undoubtedly reflectedconsiderable success in getting Castro, during his stay in the USSR, to declare strong sympathy for the Soviet cause ln the Sino-Soviet polemics. But the new optimise) may klso have mirrored Khrushchev's improved situation in the inner sanctum policy disputes. Perhaps tho best testimonial of his success was the announcementune, of the"guidelines" forconomic plan. Following the general lines of Khrushchev's program set forth at last November's Central Committee plenum, the guidelines reflect his personnel concern over the lack of progress in agriculture and his awareness of tbe need for furtherin consumer incentives to spark the overallprogram. Significantly theplanningpriority to tho chemical industry explicitly in support of agriculture, consumer goods, and chemical substitutes for certain metals. But there was no mention of military priorities ln the announcement.
Thus far, we have discussed Khrushchev's program ln terms of hishave become officialof keeping the USSR in both the armed and peaceful We have also discussed his method of dealing with the military- economic dilemma ln terms of his efforts to maintain the "status quo ante Cuba" in the resourceequation (ln which defense already had primacy). Let us next consider how Khrushchev has been trying to meet his principal objectivesery tight economic situation without making bold changes in the allocation of resources.
Khrushchev, it seems to us, intends to find theto accomplish the difficult tasks facing the country in two ways;
(a) save by streamlining oconomlc management,inefficiency and exploiting untappod reserves; and
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<b) cut back thehis viewof service.
He has voiced confidence that the savings to be had from reducing Inefficiency In all sectors of the economy will be considerable. That economic productivity can be raised without new major shifts ln resources has been his battle hymn since the termination of the Cuban crisis. But he evidently does not calculate that those savings will be sufficient to meet the rising costs of advanced, production and deployment. Although he has not yet made explicitublic forum his intention to make further savings by cutting back conventional forces, be has done much short of that to prepare the ground forbringing the issueead.
At the November plenum, Khrushchev revealedajor ingredient in his remedy for the chronic ailments of the Soviet economy was another sweeping administrative In his November speech, he called for the bifurcation of the party into two separate organizations, ono to control Industry and the other to control agriculture; the establishment of five new Central Committee bureaus; the creationingle agency to be responsible for management of the economy;arty-state committee to oversee the fulfillment of directives at all levels. By raidheseamountedeln-stltution of stringent, centralizedadopted with some modifications. However, the effect of theon productivity remains asuestion.
A second ingredient ln Khrushchev's remedy, it was made clear,adical Increase in the efficiency of Thus, Khrushchev'spril speech was entirely devoted to the problem of utilizing "hidden reserves'* in all programs, from military to consumer. Repudiating (made earlier by Kozlov inter alia) for huge increases in Investment in machine-building, Khrushchev calledampaign to reduce tho "waste" in that industry, which amounted to almost one-fifth of the metal it consumed orillion tons. He insisted that there were "greatin light and food industry" as well as ln tho machine building. But most significant was his assault on the defonse
Industry. Ho complained about the high cost of weapons production in theUstinov'sargued that with better organization military costs can be lowered. "Tbo defense Industry has many reserves fpr increasedhe said, that are "not being usedhe new defense chief, Smirnov, Is younger, Khrushchev said, and "we shall be able to shake him Just as we used to shake Ustinov." And before leaving the subject,areful study of how production capacities are being used in the defense industry will be made by Ustinov's Supreme Sovnarkhoz.
As suggested earlier, it does not appear thatis counting on increased productivity alono to satisfy tho financial, resource and manpower Increments demanded by the Sovietffort. It is becoming Increasingly clear that he Is also campaigning behind tho scenes to win acceptance for another troop cut. Khrushchev, lt seems in rotrospect, never gave up the idea of drastically cutting back the older arms of service which do not figure importantly in his concept of deterrence and war. Even before0 troop cut was much underway, he spoke of further reductions as well as tho possible eventual conversion of the standing armyerritorialisarmament agreement is not reached"). ombination ofnotably opposition from thehim to announce the suspension of the troop cuto made it clear that he regarded tbo aeasuro as "temporary." Even after the scuttling of his troop cut program, Khrushchev occasionally indicated that he did not endorse tbe military's deeply-entrenched position on the needarge standing army irrespective
of the international political atmosphere.* And once again, after the Cuban debacle, Khrushchev could betrong vested interest to cut back the size of the large conventional forces. His urging the military to absorb as much of the higher costs of weapons as possible is one Indication of his intent. But there are also other, less ambiguous manifestations of his scheming.
One lever that Khrushchev may be using in his campaign to effect new cuts in conventional forces in the Soviet armyoyal There is strong, but as yet inconclus ive, evidence that the Bu 1garian armed forces are being reduced. I
a reduction may already be underwaylso sugt the publication onprilecree of the Bulgarian presidium amending previous legislation and establishing civillan equivalents for some military specialities.)
did not state the size of the reduction or givir-iiuy inuxcati'onut might be distributed among the armed forces components, other less authoritative sources have said that the cut might amount to as much asercent of the present estimated strength.
'Thusessage to President Kennedy on disarmament problems, evidently timed to coincide with the celebration of Soviet Army-Navy Day inhrushchev said:
In the nuclear rocket weaponswe have entered thisnumerical strength of the forces does notong way have the importance it had in Worldnd II. War now would at once become total, worldwide; and its outcome would depend not on the actions of troops stationed along the line dividing the combatants but on the use of nuclear rocket weapons, with which the decisive blow can be struck even before vast armies can be mobilized and thrown into battle.
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The reported justification given for the cut is the receipt of newerhe same rationale used byfor the Soviet troop cut Tight budgetary problems in Bulgaria also bear comparison with the USSR. Moreover, any major change In the Bulgarian forces would have to be engineered in Moscow. The Bulgarian armed forces are regulated in large part by the Sovietesult of their inclusion in the Warsaw Pact. And that organization0 has assumed growingin Soviet military planning. Also, the Bulgarian Party chief Zhivkov owes his political life to Khrushchev. In early February, according
Zhivkov sent his Defense Minus icr wuuraxtosort of public relations job for Comrade Zhivkov with the top echelon of the Soviet In April and May, reports reached here on the Bulgarian troop cut decision. In short, it would seemecision to reduce the size of the Bulgarian army would'mean that theofficers in the Soviet high command had ceded ground in the controversy over whether massive land armies are essential for the bloc's defenses. (On the other hand, the ground-oriented officers could probably be expected to spring back with the argument that the cuts in the Bulgarian forces make it imperative that no new reductions be made in Soviet conventional forces.)
Khrushchev gave further evidence of his interest in earlyhen he told
that the USSR would not increase its ground forces irrespecrlve of Western increases in their ground forces. (Khrushchev made similar statements0 in defense of his troop cut program.) To meetestern move,said, the USSR would increase its rockets. (He also said that the USSR, at the urging of Soviet scientists, is settingew nuclear rocket system despite thee went on to belittle. calls for building up NATO
has recently received new-generation Soviet fighters and surface-to-air missiles and may have received short range surface-to-surface missiles.
conventional forces, saying that the McNamara thesis of conventional warairytale since nuclear weapons would be used from tbe outset.* (Later, on ,lD_Juna^_ba would again belittle conventional weapons. /
Wo interpret as further evidence of Khrushchev's effort to cut back conventional forces the two unprecedented references ln hisebruary speechone-dayirst he said, ew war is unleashed, it will end with tho full collapse of those who launch it on the very first day of the war." Later in the speech he said: "The Imperialists must know that if theyar our armed forces willrushing blow to the enemy ln order to topple him and crush him on the very first day of the war."
Khrushchev may have taken his cuetatement, in the formarning to the West, made only four days earlier by Marshal MalinovskyED STAB articlearmed forces day: "The power of our counterstrike is more than sufficient to burn the aggressors ln the first hours of war." Both Khrushchev and Malinovsky thusar in which the main enemy is consumeduclear holocaust with tbe first missile salvoes. But Malinovsky is more ambiguous than Khrushchev on the finality of the nuclear exchange for the war. While all three statements are obviously Intended for the West, they also figure in tho internal dialogue on military doctrine and policy. In the latter context, they lay the basisorcefulagainst tho need to maintain large conventional forces for general nuclear war. Moreover, the statements of the two Soviet leaders have since turned up in the military literature. Thus far, only one senior military figure has
we shall see how the traditionalist spokesman Marshal Rotmlstrovontrary statement on the subject of conventional war in order to justify the maintenance of largo conventional forces.
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alluded to the one-day wax predict looublicthat, surprisingly, is Marshal Konev, who apparently had left his number two post ln tbe defense establishment in0 because of his opposition to Khrushchev's troop cut plan. (The ways of Soviet military leaders are unpredictable: Marshal Rotmistrov, who led the reformers of Soviet military doctrine, has ln recent yearseader of tbe conservative group in thehe fact that more of the top military leaders have not mouthed the one-day war slogan seems to us to point up its polemical nature.
More remarkable still is the transformation ofpassing referencos to one-day war in hisebruary speech into "military doctrinal positions" ln recent Issues of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES, organ of the MainAdministration. Thus, in an article in thessue of the Journal (signed tolight paraphrase of one of Khrushchev's statements on one-day warthe conspicuous addition of the Russian word forIncludedist of the "most important positions of Soviet military doctrine." Tho articlehole, in terms of the dialogue on military doctrino, Is strongly "modernist" or pro-Khrushchev. The authors, two colonels, tressed the party's excluslvo capability to decide the complex questions connected with the "complicated tasks ln the sphere of military construction"; ook potshots atymbol of military professionalism and autonomy, thereby helping to scotch recent rumors of an impending rehabilitation of the officer whoa Khrushchev fired lnmphasized the contribution of Khrushchev's0 speech to the militaryut made no reference tod CPSU Congress speech ln which ho set forth the "tonets of military doctrino" that departed in some important respects from Khrushchev's0laimed SovietIn tbe "means of armed struggle" over the armies of the West, showing the adequacy of the party's policy toward the army and deflating the urgencyapidbuild-up; ade no mention of the "traditionalist" catchword "multi-million man armies";id however, acknowledge the weaker "traditionalist" tenet on the need for combined forces to conclude victory; tressed the
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dependence of military strategy on politics;entioned the importance of civil defense.
In addition to eclipsing the military's contribution to military doctrine, the article gave greater directto Khrushchev's0 speech than has been the case since the suspension of the troop cut. Whereas previous articles acknowledged that Khrushchev's speech had "laid the foundations" of Soviet military doctrine, the present article states flatly that Khrushchev's speechthe "most important positions of Soviet military doctrine worked out by the Central Committee." Among theseimplied to have been stated byIn Januaryincluded the references to tho blitz one-day war and the need to be able to pre-empt an enemy surprise attack. Khrushchev inar from stressing the Importanceurprise attack against the Soviet Onion, denied that such an attack could be decisive. It was Malinovsky, ln his speech atd Party Congress ln who first presented the problem of preparod-noss for an onomy surprise attack as the most important task before tbe Soviet armed forces. In doing so, however. Malinovsky Invoked the authority of the CPSU Presidium.
An ancillary development is the renewed effort being mado in some quarters to portray Khrushcheveasoned military leader. Of late, he has once again been Identified In the press as the "Supreme High Comaander of the Soviet Armed Forces." 3 RED STAR, in an unsigned account of the May Day Parade.) The last previous public references to him as military chieftain, to our knowledge, appeared ln the fall* Also,ecent IZVESTIYAay)2 picture of Khrushchev in uniform with members of an anti-aircraft crew at the front. And last Maroh, some
2 Defense Ministry book "Soviet Strategy" noted that in time of war, the functions of Supreme High Commander will be vested in the "First Secretary of the Centraland Head ofut did not say thatholds the supreme military post in peacetime as well.
commemorative articles on the Battle of Stalingrad played up Khrushchev's wartime roleilitary leader, while others subtly detracted from lt. (More will be said on the detractors later.) There have also been occasionalin the military literature in recent months toother wartime experiences, such as the Kursk battle, in various military publications.*
recent visitor to the USSR, Fidel Castro, also sang praises of Khrushchev's World War II experience andprowessarathon television interview ln Havanaune. Mote how he characterized Khrushchev's role in the defense policyseem to boar on his present as well as past activities--in the following passago:
We must keep in mind one thing: The fact that the Soviet Government, the Soviet leadership, and Comrade Khrushchev have shownpecialto see it ln my talks with the Soviet officers on strategicthe decision to build rockets. Thisecision In which Khrushchev contributed with his leadership. Be defended this policy consistently, that is, theofweapon that has made it possible for the USSR to face,ilitary point of view, the danger of an imperialist aggression. Part of the technical equipment of the Soviet armed forces has Included rockets in the past few years, and the number of rockets is increasing. This is the Aside from Khrushchev's preoccupation with peace, as constantly aware of histo beosition to resist and of his determination toirm policy. We must realize that Khrushchev has participated ln wars: in the civil war and ln the most decisive battles of war. He has participated ln war; he has taken part ln the most difficult battles, and ho showed groat audacity in those difficult moments. He was also bold in politics and lt is admitted that heold politician. This is therew.
PRAVDA carried this passage in its coverage of the Castro intorvlew.
Also, since the Cuban crisis, there haspato of articles in the military press asserting the prerogatives of the party leadership in the military sphere and rebuking the military for their presumptions in national defense The KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES article discussed aboveood example of the party leadership's.claim to exclusive authority in deciding basic defense questions. Another notable example is the widely circulated pamphlet released last November under the signature of Marshal Malinovsky. Entitled "Vigilantly They Stand in Defense of Peace" and Issued by the Ministry of Defense, the pamphlet went to some length to ascribe the credit for Sovietdoctrine to the political leadership and to inflate the role of Khrushchev personally in the development of the doctrine. But the pamphlet ignored the contributions of military thinkers to the doctrine, omitting any reference to Malinovsky's own speech atd CPSU Congress in which he set forth the "tenets" of military doctrine.
In part, the reassertion of party prerogatives is no doubt intended as an answer to military critics ofhandling of the Cuban affair. But lt also seems to answer those who may question the authority and wisdom of the party leaders in deciding on other Issues pertaining to the nation's defense. By the same token, the recent tendency to put fresh paint on Khrushchev's portraitilitary theorist and to present his0 speech (In which he announced the troop cut) as the principalof Soviet military doctrino may be designed to strengthen Khrushchev's authority in arguing for changes in military policy.
What we have presented thus far is only one sideontinuing dialogue between Khrushchev and his supporters on the one hand, and those who oppose his military-economic policy views, on the other. Let us next consider theside of the dialogue. Khrushchev's "opposition" ln the sphere of national defense-economic questions, from our perch, hanging, amorphous body of military and political leaders, of whoa we can identifymall number by name. We bave been able to deduce the existence of elements ln the Soviot civilian and military bureaucracios thatesire to maintain or even strengthen tho conventional
forces of the Soviet Union while moving ahead in the advanced weapons field;onsequentlyhift in resources from the consumer to the defense sector. We can also gauge the relative strength of these elements in terms of thetrends ln Soviet defense-economic policy. Thus far, as maintained earlier in this paper, Khrushchev has, since last October, been able to thwart the efforts ofhift in resources to defense. In doing so, he has had to make concessions ln theirhas shelved his own long-standing proposalsajor change inln favor of tbe consumer; he has given ln on some political-ideological questions such as the "economics over politics" issue, after deflating them of much of their policy significance. Moreover, he has not as yet been able to put across his programeduction in tbe conventional arms of service. And until he does, the USSR will be at anpolicy impasse--with an evidently generally accepted policy of forging ahead with the expensive development of advanced weapons, but evidently without sufficientto support lt.
The entrenched ground-oriented opposition among the military elite haveariety of vorbal weapons to resist further cuts into the conventional forces. Last fall, two defenso ministry books were published that stressed the need for'multi-million man armies, tbe likelihood that the war would be long and drawn out, and that the economy wouldital role throughout the war. Onanuary, RED STAR ran three articles defending the retentionarge standing army. One of the items stressed the need to be ready for protracted war with "mass, multi-million man armies." Another emphasized thategular cadre army can meet the country's defense requirements. And the third article concluded tbat military science "has profoundlythe doctrine that under present conditions the waging of war requires mass armies."
Inarshaloutspoken leador of the traditionalista strong case forforces ln his article ln thessue of KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMED FORCES. In that article, he attacked the notion, which he ascribed to the imperialists,uclear war willpush-button war." While acknowledging thedoctrine that strategic missile troops willdecisive role"uture war, he went on to assert the continuing importance of other types and branches of the armed forces. To show the compatability of these ideas, he portrayed
another Journal in February, PROBLEMS OF HISTORY OF THE CPSUeneralKhrushchev last year appointed to head the Main Politicalentral Committeea statement that appeared to be at odds with Khrushchev's way of thinking about the size of the armed forces. Yepishev wrote that the "views of some theoreticians about the need to stop developing mass armies, but instead replacing manpower by technology, have provednd that, in fact, "the role of mass armies has grown with tbe increased Importance of technology in modern war." (Yepishev made these points after stressing the leadership of the party ln developing military doctrine and policy.) Wc aremystified by these remarks by Khrushchev's political watchdog for the military. They may haveow point in Khrushchev's fight in party circles to cut back the size of tbo army; it will be recalled that he was very pessimistic ln his February election speech about the burden of defense costs. On the other hand, Yeplshev's remarks may have boon Intended to strengthen Khrushchev's position by dissociating him from the most radical proposals such as the complete scrapping of the standing army (Khrushchev had hinted at this0 inerritorial militia system) or the paring down of the ground forces toombat divisions (which Gen. Gastllovlcb bad proposed
; the not effectnnr.. Riiiusncnovmore moderately disposed
toward tbe force-size issue. Yepishev, it should be noted, spoke ofot of "multi-million man armies."
>iawV
nuclear war in terms of two wars to be fought in bascially different ways. "If all the weight of war with aenemy Is placed on the strategic missilee said "nevertheless on tho continent tho missile troops will operate in close coordination with land troops, the main striking force of which will bo composed of tank units and formations." Rotmistov was thus willing to concede that the ground forces will notombat role ln the war against territorial United States. Tbe standard formula on the need for combined forces to secure final victory makes no such distinction, but implies universal applicability of tbe formula.*
More recently, in tho English language MOSCOW HEWS ofotmistrovighly unorthodox statement which, irrespective of its foreign propaganda purpose, provided strong justification for tho maintenance of large, versatile armed forces:
The Soviet Army has at its command annew arsenal of weapons, with well trained men able to wage both atomic and conventional warfare,arge scale or small scale, in any climate and on any territory.
USSR, or course, has no serious capability forlanding ofa Soviet militaryBogolepov,
- was very pessimistic about attaining such-!
capantiity within the next decade or two. Yet, military spokesmen occasionally talk as ifapability exists.aval journal (MORSKTY SBORNIK, No. 1,eview of the Soviet book Milltary Strategy notes agreement with the book's statement on the heed to occupy strategically important areas on the enemy's territory, but takes the book to task for ignoring the role of the navy ln carrying out an "offensive on the territory of an enemyea barrier." The naval journal, in making this point, may be lobbying for the acquisition by the navy ofapability.
The standard doctrinal-propaganda position, rarely departed from In the Soviet press, virtually precludes theof the Soviet armed forcesarge or smallwar. forces. Any direct clash between Soviet. troopsocal war, according to thedoctrine, will inevitably developeneral nuclear war.
_ JmoroOvor, previous explicit argumonts Tor maintanmrg-'mrrong conventional forces have been In terms of nuclear battlefield requirements. Now Rotmlstrov has for the first time in open or available classified Soviet literaturetho grounds for justifying tbe maintenance of large conventional forces to the realm of non-nuclear warfare. (The irregularity of this position may explain why it was presentedery obscure propaganda organ, MOSCOW NEWS, that is not Intendedomestic audience and not even available in the Russian language. MOSCOW NEWS, it might be said, oor excuse for "equal time" for theviewpoint.)
Khrushchev's military "opposition" also tends to question the Party's claim to exclusive authority in the determination of military doctrine and policy. Tbey gently protest the tendency of Khrushchev's supporters to eclipse the military's role ln the sphere of doctrine and defense policy. Thus, Marshal Rotmlstrov in his KOMMUNIST OP THE ARMED FORCES last February acknowledged that Khrushchev's0 speechmajor contribution to Marxlst-LeninlBt science on war and thewent on to assert as few military spokesmen do nowadays the contribution of
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theleaders themselves: "Weetailedand exposition of the essence of Soviet military doctrine in reports and speoches by the Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky and other military figures."
Another possible man ifestat ion of the "opposition's" effort to press the military's prerogatives in the defense .sphere is the attempt of some to detract from Khrushchev's prestigeilitary savant. Thus,he occasion of the last Stalingrad battlo anniversary earlier In tho year, one group ofChulkov andthe main credit for tho victory with the local command meaning Khrushchev among others. econd group oforonov, Rotmistrov, andout officers of the high command in Moscow as the main architects of the Stalingrad war plan. Of the latter group, Voronov Is on the retired list and is eager to uphold his own World War II record as Supreme Command Headquarters officer. That Rdtmistrov was among Khrushchev's implicit detractors is consistent with his steadfast support oftraditionalist position. But it is difficult to say Just where Malinovsky stands on basic military questions. In debates among the military, he usually straddles the fence,entrist position which more often than not turns out to be anof the current stage of official military doctrine. At the same time, in his relationship with Khrushchev, he has alternated between the roles of grovelling sycophant and stalwart spokesman for the prevailing military viewpoint, even when that conflicts with Khrushchev's expressed views. Tho fact that Malinovsky in his PRAVDA articleebruary named Marshal Zhukov as ono of the Supreme Headquarters officers whoey role in planning the Stalingrad operation tends to support the political imputations of the article.
wflt SOMepeople were trying toZhukov, who hasymbol of military profession-
aiism, was made evident
Yet.ev days earllOrT
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General Yepishev's journal KOMMUKIST OF THE ARMED FORCES lambasted Zhukovead editorial and in an Inside article for his responsibility for early defeats in World War II. This difference over Zhukov's status, it seems to us, is another expression of the clash of views among the Soviet leaders over such fundamental policy questions as Khrushchev's efforts to economize on conventional forcos. As lt turned out, Zhukov has not been rehabilitated; and neither he nor any other Marshal attended. reception.
Whether orubstantial reduction lnforcos will be forthcoming will mostly dependability to dislodge the strongfaction that still holds sway ln the militaryas well as to overcome the importantof that group In the higher party bodies. Hecarried his fight to the military academiespropagandizing his preferred conception ofof future war and the country's requirementspreventing it and fighting it. But he has notexplicitly called for another force reduction; soto place his prostige at stake, ho may not dohe has actually won the policy fight. He maymade his first major movo since Cuba to replaceofficers in the military high command withsympathetic to his own philosophy of deterrence In this respect, in late February or early MarchMarshal Zakharov with Marshal Biryuzov asthe General Staff. Zakharov, who served in World Warchief of staff of Malinovsky's Second and Thirdand Trans-Baikal, authored aarticle ln the March issue of MASTER SERGEANTtrong argument for maintaining large groundsome 20
Soviet Marshals ana^innish Armed Forces Day Reception in Moscowune greeted Marshal Zakharov with "unusual warmth"latant show of sympathy over Zakharov's demotion.) Biryuzov, who headed up the anti-air defense of the country before his appointmont2 to succeed Moskalenko, comes to the General Stafftrong background in strategic warfare. The appointment may haveew effort to reorganize the Generalhe "laboratory" of Soviet militaryleaders of which up until now have been disinclined to break with tho tested, traditional concepts of war which accord tbearms ofery important role.
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Original document.
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