SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM REFERENCE TITLE CAESAR XVII

Created: 4/26/1963

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soviet military strategy and the chinese problem

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reference title caesar xvii

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Off. Ser. No. 8

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SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM

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SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE CHINESE PROBLEM j

SUMMARY

Is the thesis of this paper that/the Soviets have

/ not neglected the military implications of the rift with

Communist China. -Having failed ino integrate- hinese military poweroscow-controlled bloc-wide military entity, the Soviets have tended since to exclude China and her followers from major Soviet military planning and bloc military and economic organizations. 0 the close Sino-Soviet military alliance, as originally conceived, wasictim of the changed political relationship between the two Communist giants.

The new Soviet course has been to strengthen the Warsaw Pactilitary organization, to present it as thebloc military force (to the exclusion ofooctrine on the primacy of strategic weaponsChina's comparative military weakness), and to make it clear that the deterrent shield protecting China depends on Soviet good will. (The Soviets have implicitly threatened to withdraw the deterrent, which evidently never entailed an automatic Soviet commitment to fight on China's behalf, as late as) Peiping recognizes the uncertainty of Soviet military help ln time of crisis, and there is now very little military cooperation of any type between the two regimes.

The new Soviet scheme for dealing with China, moreover, appears intended to block avenues for tbe expansion of Chinese power and influence, and for acting militarily against China if necessary. With these objectives in view, the Soviets have denied China advanced weapons; have sought to delay Chinese development of nuclear/delivery weapons; have reduced economic and military aid to China to the minimum, short of risking the loss of Communist control of China; have formalized theand economic Isolation of the Chinese camp from the rest of the bloc; have sought to check the expansion of Chinesein underdeveloped areas in Asia; in supporting the growth of large neutralist countriesave been building up long-term counterweights to China in the Far East; and have taken measures to strengthen the security of Soviet borders with ChinaJ^including the training of troops deployed ln the Far East for combat against Chinese forces.

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SOVIET MILITARY STRATEGY AMD THE CHINESE PROBLEM

National Interests at Stake

Among the factors undorlylng the Sino-Sovietclash of national interests looms large and clearlyno easy resolution. Both Chinese and Sovietaddressed themselves to the national issue, though mainlyprivate

In their long-winded polemical articles, the Chinese hove been careful to avoid stating explicitly that theirwith Khrushchev stems largely from considerations of China's national interosts (which the Soviet leaderecondary position ofut they have consistently criticized the Soviet leader for binding the entire strategy of the bloc to Soviet foreign policy There Is evidence that the Chinese would prefer to have this situation reversed, tying the entire strategy of the bloc to Mao's idea of foreign policy requirements for

China, while hiding creen of "internationalist" phrases.

As for the Soviets, there is strong evidenceariety of sources to Indicate that the Soviet leaders find themselves at serious odds with the Chinese in the roalm of state as well as party relations. Soviet propaganda, as early as intimated that the Chinese are guilty ofnationalism." And recently, in thearch CPSU letter to the Chinese Communist Party, the Soviets warned against organizing the Communist movement along geographical, national, or racial 1ines.

Soviet Image of the Chinese Throat

Out of the contest of national interestshreat to each other's national security. The Sovietof the Chinese Communist national threat to the USSR are in some respects apparent to us. Thus, the Soviets have manifested concern over:

security of their country's extensiveChina;

aspirations touclear power;

pretensions to hegemony in the FarAsia and South Asia;

(racial and national) chauvinism ln

general;

magnitude of the Chinese population;

Chinese interference in the USSR's pursuit of "normal" relations with the Western powers;

Chinese efforts to displace Moscow as leader of the world Communist movement;

efforts to undormlne Sovietunderdeveloped countries; and

(1) Chinese influence and interference In the internal affairs of the USSR.

At the bottom of Soviet worries evidently is the prospect of China's omcrgonce ln timeowerful military neighbor, independent of control or strong influence from Moscow, and in possession'of nuclear weapons. It Is In this light that the composite Chinese threat appears particularly sinister to the Soviets.

Elements of Soviet Strategy Against China

The measuresilitary-rolatod nature which tho Soviets havo soon fit to take against the Chinese

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as well as shortto the existence of an overall strategic scheme. By this we do notigid plan or blueprintontinually evolving strategy that is basedhanging relationship with China. (We also allow for the possibility of differences among Soviet leaders on the Chinese question.) At this juncture, Soviet strategy as we perceive it is generally bont on restricting the growth of Chinese military power, whereas prior0 Soviet strategy sought to promote it within predetermined bounds. The currently operative elements of Soviet strategy for dealing with the Chinese problem, we think, are the following:

China technologically advancedand non-nuclear);

delay for as long as possible, by whateverfeasible means are available, Chinese developmentuclear weapon/delivery capability;

give various types of advanced weapons to countries such as Indonesia and India, which may employ them politically or militarily against China as well as against members of Western alliances;

foster, inolicy of containing the spread of Chinese influence ln the underdeveloped areas of the world;

take measures to strengthen the security ofwith China, particularly critical areas like Vladivostok that might be vulnerable to Chinese attack and that may be targets of Chinese long-range irredentism; with the same end in view, encourage anti-Chinese feeling among border peoples in Soviet Central Asia and, ower key, subvert border opulations in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and

isolate China and her followers militarily and economically from the rest of the bloc, changing insubstance if not in form the Sino-Soviet military alliance;

expand Soviet influence in countries on the periphery of China, using politically feasible if divorso and seemingly contradictory methods, in order to deny them to China;

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(h) In this regard, build up Mongolia militarily and economically, through Integration ln the CEMA community and close ties with the Warsaw Pact;

(1) reduce all forms of economic and military aid to China to the minimum (steps beyond which would giveto tho "enemies of Communism"); in other words, do not seek the collapse of the Communist regime in China, forovolopment might croato an even greater threat to the USSR

in the formeutral or even pro-Western Chinese regime; and

(J) retain sole and comploto control over the Soviet strategic deterrent, so as to offer China some protectionled attack against the mainland while minimizing the risk of being draggedar with. or its alliesesult of Independent Chinese foreign policy or military Initiatives.

The Military Alliance in the Fifties

In the first decade of tho Chinese Communist regime, China featured Importantly in Soviet strategic military It seems to have been tho view of Soviet officialdomthe Stalin and Khrushchev regimesthe national security interests of the USSR would best bo servedtrong modernized conventional force in China; that Chinese power wouldiable role in East-West relations, and would help to swing the strategic balance of power in tho world decisively in favor of tho Soviet-led "socialistoviet planners must also have calculated that the USSR, through political influence in Peiplng, could exorcise adequateover Chinese military forces and assure their close coordination with the Soviet high command in times of political crisis as well as in military combat situations.

A closo military alliance between the two states was crooted in a yoar after Peiping fell to the Communists, withsigninghirty-year treaty ofand mutual defense. The treaty committed the USSR to support China If attacked by Japan or "any state allied withut, at least ln the published version, did not underwrite possible Chinese military initiatives. The treaty alsofor the return to China,ixed period of time,

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of Port Arthur, Dairen, and the Manchurlan railways, and grantedreditillion dollars. ories of economic and trade agreements were drawn up ln ensuing months; China was to supply the USSR with raw materials in exchange for arms, machinery, and tbo sorivces of Soviet technicians and advisers. Joint Slno-Sovlot companies, modelled on those in Eastern Europo, were set up to exploit China's mineral wealth and othor natural resources. Four months after the creation of the Slno-Soviot military alliance, the Korean War was unleashed by direction from Moscow. The wareriod of very close military-political collaboration between Moscow and Peiping. It intensified Chinese military and economic dependence on the USSR, which gave generously of its resources. Throughout tbe conflict Moscow retained overall control of Chinese and Worth Korean operations, of the protracted and acrimonious(which constituted an important tactic ln the management of the militarynd of tbe decision (made only after Stalin's death) to sign an armistice.

The lessons of the Koreanthe willingness of China to perform loyallyunior partnerarmonious relationship with thostrengthened Soviet confidence in the military alliance. Even before the USSR fully emerged from the political successionwhich andivisive issue among the contenders for power was the quostion of national defense and resourcerenewed Soviet effort was made to strengthen the military alliance with the Chinese. Inhrushchev and some of bis supporters went to Peiping to sign the second majoraid treaty with China, usheringeriod of massive Soviet industrial and military assistance to that country. The Soviets, to bo sure, demanded repayment forIn exchange for the loan of skilled technicians and shipments of machinery and equipment vital to China's industrialization program and armaments vital to her defense, the USSR received raw materials, foodstuffs and textiles that had no directon Soviet industrial production. The priorityto China's industrialization program as the Russians have said, were probably of considerable cost to the Soviet economy and hindered to some extent the equipment of the

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programrand Soviet industrial expansion.* They underscore the importance which the USSR attached to tho military alliance at that time.

In keeping with the policy ol strengthening thealliance, Soviet assistance to tbe Chinese industrial-military machine continuedarge scale5e know very little about the military hardware transferred to China. We do know that in this period the Chinese gottreatment among the Soviet satellites and non-blocof Soviet military aid and assistance. To be sure, the Chinese did not receive much of the first-line equipment that wa being Issued to Soviet troops, but neither did any otheruntil the switch ln Soviet strategic policy that accompanied

"According to the original agreement the Soviet Union was to provide the Chinese in the socond half of the fifties withillion (new) rubles of machinery foractories which the Soviets were to assist the Chinese in constructing. In addition, there was an agreement for anamount of military hardware to bo supplied to the Chinese Communists, possibly of the same order of magnitude as the investment machinery. The machinery and equipment to be supplied amounted to onlyercont of Sovlotdurables production duringeriod. the burden on the Soviet Union was quite out ofto the arithmetical expression, particularly9 on. During thehe Soviets were able toabout two-thirds of the Increment to machinery andoutput to investment but the rising cost of militaryreversed this relationship In theoarly two-thirds of the Increment to machinery andoutput has been allocated to the military, with an atten-dent slowdown ln Soviet economic growth and the continued poor prospects for tho growth of consumption which the Soviethave lately communicated to their people. Thus tbe burden of Soviet shipments of machinery, producers durables andhardware to the Chinese0 had become an economic burden of considerable significance for the overstrained Soviet economy.

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the rapid deterioration in Slno-Soviet relationsUntil then, all advanced weapons in East Germany were in the hands of Soviet troops stationed there. And the armies of the East European satellites, despite their inclusion in the Warsaw Pact organization which was set upere not assigned an Important role In Soviet military planning.) in short, priorhe Soviets supplied tho Chinese with the most advanced equipment made available anywhere outside the USSR, including later models of MIG's andew BadgersS) and SAM'S. The. Soviets also elped to construct and equip aircraft plants in China. But the amount and types of aid that the Soviets gave the Chinese in their atomic energy and rocket programs is stillystery.

One of the most perplexing and critical questions. the Soviet scheme in thebuild upmight in the "socialist commonwealth"an intention to help Chinaucleara military sense. There are three distinct aspectsnuclear, quostion. First, it is clear that Soviotthe start had no Intention of giving the Chineseweapons. Second, there is good evidence thatwere willing to promote ateacefulprogram in China. peaceful atoms"with the Chinesehe Soviets furnisheda research reactor along with other relatedbegan to train the Chinese in nuclear energythird and crucialwe cannot as yetwhether the Soviets

ilitary nuclear program in China.

arguments can be e it

ui luu quuuiiin. There is simply no indisputable evidence of direct Soviet assistance to the Chinese project.

Wo are inclined to think, on the basis of theevidence, that the Soviet leaders were never more than very reluctant partners to any agreement touclear weapons program in China. We think it probable that in the year or two after the Korean War, tho experience of which enhanced Soviet confidence in the loyalty and tractability of the Chinese Communists, the Soviet leaders acquiesced to Chinese requests for assistance ineaceful and military nuclear

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energy program.* We think, further, that the Soviets nay have helped to get the Chinese military program off the ground by giving Chinese scientists basic training in nuclear technology. Andaseous diffusion plant does exist ln China, vethat the Soviets helped construct it.** (The fact that all work at the suspected plant ceased for at least two years after Soviet scientists and technicians were withdrawn from China points to Soviet participation at that site.) But we think lt highly unlikely that the Soviets at any timegave the Chinese the most crucial, sensitive information on nuclear weapons design. In other words, we are inclined to think that the Soviets never deliberately gave the Chinese much of the kind of technical information (which was not already general knowledge) or equipment needed for the development of an atomic bomb. And we attribute this presumed state ofprimarilyrowing Soviet awareness in the middle andhat the Chinese would not bo constant in their tractablllty and loyalty to Moscow.

If our thesis is correct that the USSR withheldcritical to the development and, specifically, tho design of the nuclear weapon, how did tho Chinese come by the essential information (assuming that they have it)?/

. national estimates say it is "probable" that the jjlaut in question (at Lanchow) aseous diffusion plant.

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All the while that tho Soviets sought to strengthen the military alliance with China on Soviet terms in the, forces wore at work in China to reduce Chinesedependence on the USSR and to improve their juniorin the alliance. As early the Chinesehad evidently decided to strive for self-sufficiency in armaments production. (Thus,ational People's Congress in Peiplng lnenior official, Teh Chlen-ylng implicitly deplored China's dependent status, declaring that "our industry must be speeded up in order to remedy China's inability to provide the armed forces with tho most modern equipment."} On an either/or basis the Chinese would prefer to purchase the means of production rather than the finished weapons, so as to reduce rollance of Soviet good fellowship.

In the, the Soviets saw still more reasons to question their earlier assumptions about the loyalof the Chinese. Following the announced Soviet ICBM test in7 the Chinese began to view the world strategic situation differently than the Soviets. In their public discourse, the Chineseore optimistic view of the Soviet strategic position than the Soviets themselves did, and regardod the USSR as capable of taking greater risks than Soviet leaders were Inclined to take.

It has been persuasively arguedumber of places that the7 Conference of Communist parties in Moscow was of critical Importance in the Sino-Soviet dispute over strategy and the question of nuclear weapons sharing. It was at that time that Khrushchev probably balked atthe Chinese serious assistance In the development of their own nuclear weapons as well as finished nuclear weapons. This would help to explain why in the following year, the Chinese publicly reasserted the validity of the traditionalist military doctrine expounded by Mao and vigorously disparaged nuclear weapons; rebuked professionalism in tho PLA; rejected the implicit pleading of professionalsrash nuclear program in China; and generally made it clear that Chinese nuclear weapons would have to await the time when Chinesescience and technology were sufficiently developed to produce thorn. If they had been granted substantial Soviet aid for the development of an Indigenous nuclear weapons program, the Chinese would not have had to assert the need to develop an industrial acientific base first. Indicative of thein Poiping on this matter was the statement made by

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by Marshal Ho Lung8 that China could not rely on "outside aid" in trying to solve its military problems. (The day beforearning, Khrushchev, alarmedharp upsurge in Chinese propaganda calling for the "liberation" of Taiwan, arrived in Peiping for an unannounced three-day vis lt.)

The Taiwan crisis ofresult ofritical effectattitudes toward the military alliance witheagerness of the Chinese in the Taiwan affair topower and prestige. power in thoobering effect on Khrushchev. Tho crisishim tho danger that China could drag the USSR intonuclear war with the United States. over the possible consequences of thealliance in the Taiwan crisis is seen in theway that he raised the Soviet deterrent shieldChina from. threat. Only after theit clear that there was no plan to attack CommunistChou En-lai made an offer to negotiate did the

leader recall the USSR's commitment to defend China.

Also during this period the Sovietscloser cooperation between the Soviet and themilitary commands. In this respect, theseveral proposals for military cooperation thatby the Chinese for unspecified reasons. is reported to have rejected Soviet proposals forof Soviet submarine, missile bases, airradar installations in China.* Peiping reportedlySoviet-proposed arrangements for joint airwartime, that is. mutual use of the other's bases,

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A proposal had also reportedly been made to sotoint naval command in the Far East; although it could not befrom the reports what the terms of the proposal were or which party initiated it, it seems likely that the Soviets preferred it and the Chinese rejected it on the grounds of being alioecondary role.

There is yet another discordant element ln themilitary relationship during the decade (thegenerally close political and military association. to the historic anxiety that the Soviets haveover their borders with China. Since World Warmilitary contingents have been constantly deployedpoints along the Sino-Soviot border, in additionregular border troops performing routine security Tho Soviet forces wero kept there with somein their complement after the withdrawal ofthreat from the area,friendly"was sot up in China, and after the Korean War

terminated; and they have been deployedanner that would permit quickest penetration into China. (In European ussia, the bulk of Soviet combat-ready forces has also been concentrated in border areas toapid thrust into Western Europe as well as to deal with emergencies in the satellites.) Soviet forces deployed near Chinese territory moreover, have never to our knowledge participated in joint military exercises with the Chinese. (In contrast, the Soviets ineld combined exorcises with neighboring East -European armies.) As will be shown shortly, Soviet forces in the Far East have been trained to actossible Chinese enemy.

The Hew Soviet Concept of Bloc Military Power

Taking stock toward the end of the first decade of Chinese Communist rule, the Soviet loaders saw plainly that they had failed to achieve their main strategic objectives regarding China and that there were vory dim prospects for attaining them. The USSR had not managed to integrate Chinese military poweroscow-controlled military entity; had not strengthened Chinese loyalty and subservience to the USSR (of the sort in evidence in the Koreannd had notChinese military dependence on the USSR but lost much

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ground in this respect. The Soviet leaders may also have been concerned that the substantial contributions that the USSR hadno smallthe Chinese industrial-military machine not only were not paying dividends, but had helped toignificant potential threat to themselves.

Byhen political tensions between the two allies flared up, the Sino-Soviet military alliance as originally conceived was all but dead. From the Sovietthe nature of the alliance had to change once the USSR could no longer sufficiently influence Chinese foreign and military policy from thePelping. Thisine qua non for the alliance, as conceived by the Soviets. Without confidence in political Influence over Peiping, Moscow could not assignlace of Importance in Sovietplanning, for there would be no assurance that the Chinese would execute the military-political tasks assigned it in time of crisis. Perhaps more important, the USSR would beto extreme military risks from any commitment to China's defenserisis involving the United States. As Soviet behavior in8 Taiwan crisis seems to suggest, at no time was the Soviet commitment to act on China's behalfbut was to be determined at any juncture on the basisareful Soviet evaluation of the actual situation. The treaty insofar as it extends the deterrent shield to China was notit still served Soviet purposes: As long as the USSR can manipulate its nuclear deterrent on China's behalf, it isosition to limit and perhaps define the nature of overt Chinese military moves. For, as8 Taiwan crisis has again shown, China cannot achieve even local objectives in the face. opposition without overt Soviet backing.

The changed political relationship between Moscow and Peiping resultedoviet decision that the nationalof the USSR would best be served not by the builduploc-wide, loose military organization, but by thebuildup of Soviet military power and that of satellites militarily Controlled by Moscow through the instrument of the Warsaw Pact. Thus, the new Soviet course introduced in0 was to strengthen the Warsaw Pact as an operationalorganization, while de-emphasizing Soviet reliance on Chinese military strength. By late summerhe whole complement of Soviet scientists, engineers and technicians, with few exceptions, was withdrawn from China. In doing this

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tho Soviets virtually sabotaged the entire Chinese Industrial effort. Also Soviet-Chinese cooperation ln nuclear energy was henceforth restricted to the innocuous non-military research conducted at tbe Soviet-controlled Dubna Institute, where most bloc countries have been represented.

It is also noteworthy that inhe Soviets (at Khrushchev's initiative) came forthew military doctrine of primary reliance on nuclear/missile weapons that further widened the gap between Soviet and Chinese military thought, policy, and force structure. The import of the new Soviet military doctrine (which in time underwent important modifications) dramatized China's continuing militarycompared with the military postures and strategies open to the USSR and the United States. Incensed over thisthe Chinese leadershipeek after Khrushchev announced the new doctrine made it clearesolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress) that China had great power pretensions, aspired touclear power, would not permit Its interests to be disregarded by the great powers (the USSR and United States), and would not be bound by Soviet commitments to the West (as ln disarmament agreements).

It has only been ln the past three years that the5olitical counter to NATO andeans for exerting control over tbesignificantly In Soviet war planning. fter tho fallout with the Chinese, tbe Soviets have been pressing the development of the military capabilities of tbe Warsaw Pact alliance. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states have boon strengthened and re-equipped with up-to-date Soviet weapons; and increased emphasis has boen placed on Integrating Warsaw Pact forces in exorcises. Of late,ilitary spokesmen have given prominence to the Warsaw Pact, portraying it as the effective military organization of tho socialist camp. TETs was strongly intimated by Marshal Malinovsky in his Army-Navy Day speech of last February. In an obvious rebuff to China, Malinovsky stated that the Soviet armed forces aro "developing and strengthening their combat comradeship with the fraternal armies of the socialistunited by the Warsawe observed that thethe impl iod exclusion of China and its"merged their economic and militaryhrough the CEMA and Warsaw Pact; and ho equated the

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Soviet-allied governments vith the Warsaw Pact membor states, noting that their armed forces were, along with Soviet forces, broughttate of "complete military readiness" during the Cuban crisis. It is also noteworthy that while China wasember of the Warsaw Pact, that country was represented at meetings of tbe organization by "observers." But no Chineseby their choice or by Soviethave attended Warsaw Pact meetings since (China's follower Albania, according to Soviet statements has "excluded itself" from the organization.) Also significant and related to this development was the effective exclusion of China from the future economic life of the bloc with the reorganization lnf CEMA. now portrayed as the viable economic organization of the socialist camp.

Those developments do not necessarily affect theof DSSB to pose as protector of the entire socialist camp and of Cuba as woll. Soviet spokesmen continue to do this; witness Khrushchev'sebruary election spoech. But what the Soviets are saying now, it seems, is that the bulwark of defense of the socialist camp is the Warsaw Pact and first of all the USSR, not the armed forces of the camphole. Bence, though tbey "cordially" extend the protective umbrella of the strategic deterrent over other countries building socialism, the Warsaw Pact countries headed by the USSR may withdraw that protection. An implicit threat to this effect was maderavda editorial as latehreatened withdrawal of the Soviet shield against attacks on China was also implied in Soviet statements ln the past, as In Marshal Halinovsky's remarks onhen he spoke of the Soviet ability to defend socialist countries "friendly to us." That ominous distinction between friendly and unfriendly socialist countries was repeated by the Soviet Ambassador in Peiping in the following month and used again2 issue of the Soviet Defense Ministry Journal,

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KOMMUNIST OP THE AHMED FORCES.* In other words, the Soviets have threatened abrogation of the Sino-Soviet treaty in the event that the Chinese do not heel to.

The Chinese, for their part, ery conservative view of the possibility of Soviet Military assistance in the event of Chinese Involvementilitary crisis.

share the scepticism or the Chinese-anouT

SovieT willingness to fight on China's behalf, especially in the event. Involvementilitary crisis with China. We think that it is almost certain that the Soviets would not enter the conflictredetermined basis or becomeInvolvedreaty commitment. The Soviet

first threat of this typo was made in an article by S. Tltarenko in the0 issue of SOVIETSKAYA LATVIA:

Can oneuccessful construction of socialism in contemporary conditions oven inroat country as, lot us say, China, if this country was ln ansituation, not supported by tho co-oporation and mutual help of othorcountries? It would havo been subjected to an economic blockade from capitalist countries;ountry at the same time would be subjected to military blows from outside. It would have boon tried by greatest difficulties even in the event lt could withstand the mad onslaught of the enemy.

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decision to intervene, and the method of intervention, will most probably dependoviet evaluation of the general situation at the time of the crisis.)

In the current stage of military relations, there is very little military cooperation of any type between China and the Soviet Union.

I And the Soviets, significantly have done nothing (apart from taking note, in Soviet propaganda, of Chinese complaints) toalteconnaissance flights over China. In addition, evidence of the lack of liaison between China and the USSR on matters of military policy was provided by Ulbricht last January at the Sixth SED Congress. The East Gorman party chief complainedno other bloc source had previouslyChina failed to give advance notice to the bloc of its intention to attack India. (By the same token the Soviets probably did not inform any bloc member of their intention to move strategic weapons into Cuba.)

The subject is pected to be

The question of dealing militarily with the Chinese threat has not been raised in Soviet military

obviously

aired publicly. The absence of any reference'to thein thearticles may be

explained by the penchant of the security-conscious regime to discuss delicateas the Chinese problem, the role and capabilities of the Soviet ICBM force, contingency planning for local militaryamong thosethoseneed to know." It is also possibleoctrine has not been worked out, arid will not be, that is explicitly addressed to the Chinese It may be felt that this isoliticalthat doctrine governing the use of forces against the Western allies may also apply (minus nuclear weapons) to the possible Chinese enemy. (in this respect, it Is noteworthy

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that problems of conducting operations in desert regions and in the Far East, in general, have been discussed in the doctrinal materials.)

The USSR, it is clear, has sought to prevent the Chinese fromuclear power for as long as possible With this objective, the Soviets have not given the Chinese

nuclear weapons (or modern delivery vehicles) and,

""have denied aid

Strategy JjO_Pre venitNucloar/Missile Diffusion

to une

uuxuusc- uuuxear energy program since re-evaluating the strategic consequences of that aid several years ago. The Soviets have also explored, but for the time being evidently shelved, the idea of concluding an agreement with. with the object of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not now possess them. Tho Chinese, for their part havo publiclyy implication thea test ban and nuclearon the grounds that it is designed to deprive China of the possibility ofuclear power while preserving. (and Soviet) military might. The <fo inn-am [

have

ipiy uuu uiructiy attacked the Soviets for this attempt. Tho apparent Soviet decision not to press for agreementuclear non-diffusion pact may have been the resultecision thatact would probably not have any effect on China after all; that the established policy of denying any Soviet assistance is about all the USSR can hope to do to slow down the pace-of China's work in the nuclear field.

The Soviets have, of course, also denied theany finished missile delivery systems of strategic range. It appears in retrospect, however, that the Soviets did help the Chinese to get some kinduided missile program off the ground. supposition that the Soviets gave thosubstantial assistance in their guided missile program is based mainly on the similarities of certain Chinese launch facilities to those in the USSR. he Chinese missile program has progressed very slowly, evidently having been sot back drastically when the Soviets withdrew. What is more, tho Soviets have in tho past yearesire to prevent the Chinese from acquiring strategic missiles in the

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future through international agreement. In this respect, Gromyko's proposal, first made at the UN in2 and reintroduced only last month at Geneva, that. and USSR agreed to the maintenance between themimited number of missilesimited period of time, has strong anti-Chinese overtones. By singling out. and USSR as the only two countries to be excepted from the provisions for total destruction of delivery vehicles inf general disarmament, the proposal implied that other countries will not have their own defensesime when, presumably the danger of possible strategic attack remains.

-eports the view of

_iot even discuss what will have to be done with the Chinese Communists or Chinese resistance in this field, if the accomodation point should be reached."

The Soviets, in short, seem to have concluded that they cannot prevent the Chinese from acquiring acapability; all they can hope to do, it seems, is to defer the time when the Chinese will realize this goal. Various Soviet statements foresee an early Chinese nuclear explosion; even outside Soviet estimates place it within three years time.* But the Soviets evidently have not yet made adequate preparations for the arrival of that moment of truth. Some kind of detente with thein the formisarmamenthave appeared to the Soviets toromising way to put curbs on China once ituclear power. But as recent reports have pointed out, the Soviets at the disarmament table are still essimisticreakthrough in disarmament in the near future; they point out that the politicians and the military in the USSR must firstommon ground before technical plans for an accomodation withan even be considered. And, most important, Soviet colleagues th

opinion military

There are conflicting reports about how the Soviets think the Chinese will act Pace thevimited nuclear

capability, the Chinese

of tnis sort may reflect tactical Sovietin disarmament discussions with the West.

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adventures; that Chinese leaders really believeuclear war would destroy capitalism and thereby leave the field clmmr for Chinese survivorsew world.

China's apparent

ud

a uaru-iine ana warlike attitude toward the West isthey characterize the Chinese as "barking dogs without teeth" since they speak of nuclear war without themselves possessing nuclear weapons; and they predict that once the Chineseuclear capability of their own, they will

speak ure responsible fashion.

i eg idlciencct S

Soviet public opinion, OT Tne regime's propaganda effort to discredit the Chinese, tends toearful view of Chinese possession of nuclear weapons. Some Soviet citizens commenting on the subject to foreigners reportedly seem to feel that nuclear weapons ln the hands of the Chinese would be directed primarily against tbe Soviet Union. When told that lt seemed likely that Communist China woulduclear device within the next year or two, one Russian, for example, observed, uppose they will still havo to build bombers before they start dropping them on us."

Trade and Aid Developments

The Soviet policy of slowing down China's progress towardilitary-industrial power has been ln force for three years now. Soviet military aid and assistance to China is now very small, although not cut

(An example assistance

extremely selective and low-level military

soviet trade With China has con-

Soviet trade figures, amounted to0 million This figurehird less than it was1 andwo-thirds drop from the peak of $2

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billion The Soviets still sell China some petroleum productsew basic heavy Industrial items. But even this may go by the board.*

The Border Problem

Soviet concern over the Sino-Soviet borders longthe Ideological polemic between Peiping and Moscow. The Soviets since World War II have kept sizeable ground forces in several areas near the Chinesehave strengthened those forces in recent years. The Soviets have evidently long been aware that the Chinese night babor expansionist ambitions, and have of late been given strong reason by tbe Chinese to fear and take precautionary measures againstChinese incursion in Soviet frontier areas. umber of border incidents have probably served to heighten Soviet suspicision of Pelping's intentions. 0

reported an incursion by armed Chinese lrum ornxj.ang' iuiu tne Kirgiz SSR.

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More border incidents occurred in sorinc and summer

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Then" InerpiHR* oponry raise a

" Doraer-quest ion rn-g'People's Daily editorial. The editorial used Khrushchev's sarcastic jibes about Chinese caution in dealing with Bong Kong, Macao, and Taiwaneg for bitter discussion of the "unequal treaties" by which the Chinese Empire was shorn of its rights and territory. Tsarist Russia was named as one of the offending colonial powers, the author of three of the nine agreements specifically mentioned. This discussion was followedestatement of Pelplng's declared intention to examine in good time all treaties concluded by provious Cbinese governments and to accept, revise, or abrogate them ai- it soos fit.

Tbe Soviets now maintain Just under ten percent of combat-ready forces in tbe Par East.* Major concentrations of ground forces in Slno-Sovlet border areas include three rifle divisions and one airborne division ipaflh'*lma Ata area; three tank and two rifle divisions in the Irkutsk-uoitrcchnaya area; one rifle and one airborne division in the Blagoveshchensk-Belogorsk area; and six rifle divisions in the southern Primorskly Kray. At least some of these units seem to have trained for the possibility that they would have to protect Soviet territory from an attack by the Chinese. It is also noteworthy that the Soviets have in

The paragraphs on the" deployment and exercises of Soviet forces in the Par East wore prepared with tho help of the Uilltary Division of OCI.

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Tor nrrrii x

recent months deployed new air defense radar units near the Manchurian border and along the Soviet-Mongolian border. This pattern of deploymentelt need in the USSR to increase coverage of aircraft approaching from the direction

Inoviet field training exercisean attack from across the Manchurian borderthe Lake Khanka area of the Primorskiy Kray. Thisarea which Russia acquired by the Treaty of Peking inthe Chinese have threatened to abrogate. Becauseground force exercises almost invariably arethe terrain and along the area anticipated underand under as realistic conditions as possible, that the exercisehinese Communistthe north toward Vladivostok.

/Whl.l- thi.:;

indication mat training of this scope and nature takes place,

there are suggestionsariness on the part of Soviet

military planners as to China's intentions has existed for several years.

does not appear that Peiping wishes to becomein frontier clashes with the Soviet Union. owever, there haveumber ofsuggest Peiping has started to strengthen borderthe key Manchurian area by introducing troops wherepreviously been only nol ice and frnpfipr

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While economic and military relations between the USSR and China have deteriorated to the extent of virtual isolation of China fron Soviet-controlled lntra-bloc military andorganizations, Soviet relations with Mongolia haveharp positive turn. Inoviet presidiun member Suslov was sent to attend the Mongolian Party Congress, at which hoeference to the "firm security" of the Outor Mongolia borders on both the Chinese and Soviet sides. In this he may have been reassuring the Outer Mongolian Party tbat Moscow would not tolerate Chinese attempts at border (Chinese Communist maps, unlike Soviet ones, have persistently shown the Sino-Mongolian border asnongolia wasull member of CEHA, and there is some evidence of closer military ties between Mongolia and the WarsawMongolia has apparently not been admitted to full membership, evidently for reasons of its very delicate geographical position. Inrotracted visit to Mongolia thst may have had important consequences for Soviet-Mongolian military relations. While there is no evidenceecent re-equipment program for the Mongolian armed forces (intelligence on this subject ist seems likely that tbe Soviets have taken steps to strengthen Mongolia's defenses. Hints of such action were heard oviet broadcast ofarch recalling the history of USSR-Mongolian military ties. Tbe broadcast claimed that in recent years the Mongolian army haB received modern aircraft and tanks. Reflecting Soviet concern over Chinese Communist intentions toward Mongolia, the broadcast also pointed out that tbe Soviet-Mongolian mutual defense treaty concluded6 has been an important factor in safeguarding peace ln the Far East.

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The Soviet Strategy of Containment

It is now clear that the USSR wishes to check the increase of Chinese Influence not only across tho frontiers of the USSR but in South Asia and Southeast Asia as well Itell-established fact that the Soviets have for some time been tryingariety of means to wean Communist North Korea and North Vietnam away from China, and to Isolate the

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Chinese militarily and economically within the blocQ In this connection, it also appears toong-range Sovloi objective to support the growth ol large neutralist countries in Asia that could be used as counterweights, eopolitical sense, to Chinese power ln the area. Soviet support to the military establishments of such countries as Indonesia and India, while varying greatly and serving different objectives, seems to be designed to serve this objective as well. Recent Indications of Soviet eagerness to render military assistance to Burma andin which Chinese political Influence alreadyalso suggestiveoviet interest in improving the position of the USSR ln tbe area, at tho expense of the Chinese. Similarly, Soviet behavior in the very complex Laotian situation may also be said to have anti-Chinese overtones: to the extont that they have cooperated inthe present arrangement for govorning tbe country, the Soviets have helped to forestall what would amounthinese Communist takeover of tho country.

Tho antl-Chinoso nature of tho Soviet decision toIndia with some moderns which had been denied touse against Chinese forces in tbe Indian border dispute is self-evident. To be sure, ln supplying India vith military aid, the Soviets are seeking to recoup bloc prestige whicheneralIn Indiaesult of the military clashes along the Slno-Indlan border last fall. Tbe Soviets are stronglyfurther,elt need torastic swing on India's part from non-alignment to closer relations with.. But the fact remains that the Soviet transfer of woapons to Indiaime of conflict with Chinaadditionally tho Soviet deslro that tbe weapons be used politically or militarily against the Chinese,ebuff to apparent Chinese pretensions to political hegemony ln tbe area. The fact that the amount of Soviet military aid to India is small is not important, it seems to us: the Chinese throat to India was itself small, for the Chinoso had no Intention

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of overrunlng India last October. What does seem Important Is that tho Soviets demonstrated an earnest to check theof Chinese political influence in Sooth Asia,Peiping that Moscow vould not tolerato Chinese hegemony in that area.

Like India, Indonesiaowerful force ln its area of the world. The military strength of Indonesia, tho fifth largest country In the world, is already unequalod inAsia. And as in India, the Soviets find inseful counterweight to Chinese influenco and possibletendencies in Southeast Asia. The Soviot decision to support the Sukarno regime and to build up the militarythere, at the expense of the Communist-radicalln that country, was takenumber of objectives in mind. As is known, the Soviets have provided Indonesiaast amount of military aid and assistance. Beginning in oarlythe Soviet fall-out with theUSSR began to pour first-line military equipment into Indonesia, much the same kind of equipment simultaneously being issued Soviet troops. Included in the military shipments were SAM's, Komar boats and. Moreover, the Soviets have been urging theappear to have reached apoint, probably because of the great cost of theaccept still greater amounts of military aid. By the time of the West Irian affair, the Soviets had already provided Indonesiauch greater military capability than needed to deal with any of her neighbors or oven withDutch.

ajor objective of the massive Soviet MAAG program in Indonesia is the denial of that country to tho West, and lt is probably hoped that Indonosla will atpoint or another use its forces politically or militarilyestern alliance member. But lt also seems likely that Soviet strategists are counting on Indonesian military power being directed politically and even militarily against China as woll. It has no doubt been apparent to Sovietthat Chinese ambitions for political hegemony throughout Southeast Asia are potentiallyollision course with Indonosian expansionist designs. Indeed, the Soviets have boon publicly supporting Indonesian opposition to the proposed Maylayslan Federation and have apparently been privately egging the Indonesians to take over Borneo and Sarawak. The Chinese, on the othor hand, have given only very weak propaganda support

for the Indonesian position, harboring as they most likely do grave misgivings about increments ln the power and prestige of the third largest country in Asia.* (Moreover, theof the Indonesians to purchase vast amounts of up-to-date Soviet military equipment may have sprung not onlyesire to possess and flaunt the status symbols of big power, but also from the fear that Indonesia will ultimately have to defend itself against Chinese Communist influence or attack.)

There is yet another important anti-Chinese aspect of Soviet military aid to Indonesia. undamental Sovietrequirement is of course to prevent China from gaining political control over Indonesia. We surmise thatreater threat to Soviet interests inthan does the United States, and that this threat will increase should. military presence in Southeast Asia bo reduced or withdrawn in the future. Within Indonesia, the Soviet MA AG program is bolstering the government and the military establishment, the leaders of which are strongly anti-Communist. While the Soviets almost certainly hope to promote pro-Soviet feelings among the military through close association with Soviet military officers and training in the

strongest statement of Chinese sympathy with Indonesian opposition to the Maylasian Federation was made by Liu Shao-chi during his recent visit to Indonesia and incorporatedoint Indonesian-Chinese communique marking the conclusion of his talks with Sukarno. But this expression of common views only papers over basic differences in the national interests of the two countries.

USSR, the policy of strengthening the military establishment is bound to have the effect of postponingore distant future tho possibilityommunist party takeover. Indeed, the arms given Indonesia can be used at some point in the future against the Communists in that country. But that is desirable, from the standpoint of Soviot national interests, for the Communist-radical movement in Indonesia is underChinese influence. Thus, ln the contest forin Indonesia, the Soviets have chosen to combat tbe Chinese by backing the neutralist regime and the anti-Communist army against the Indonesian Communist party. This situation could develop into one of the most turbulent pockets of tho Sino-Soviet dispute.

Original document.

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