The faUowing intelligence .organizations participated in the preporafr'on of this."ntelligence Agency and thef (homerits of State. Dofense, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, AEC,.
}
.DMornd Research. DeportmentDefense Intelligence Agency
Asshtam Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Deportment of theChief of Naval Operation!wstont Chief of Staff, Intelligence,
. Director for InteKlgence, Joint Staff
* lite to the USIB
jlte)^tomlc Energy'Commission'Representative lo the; USIB* ^Direfiar of t'e.No'c-ral Sectnty Agency
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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Advanced Weapons Programs of the UAR and Israel
THE ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS OF THE UAR AND ISRAEL
THE PROBLEM
To estimate likely developments in the advanced weaponsof the UAR and Israel over the next several years, and the probable consequences of such programs.
CONCLUSIONS
A. We have no positive evidence that the Israeli nuclearis aimed atuclear weapons capability.the size of the program, what we know of its nature, and the amount of uranium concentrate acquired all suggest that Israel intends at least to put itselfosition to be able toimited number of weapons relatively quickly after a
B. We believe that Israel is undertaking the developmentautical mileurface-to-surface missile (SSM)holly independent Israeli effort to developissileayloadounds would probably require three to four years and great expense.there is evidence that Israel expects to rely on France for substantial assistance. If Israel acquires full access to French technology, components and test facilities, it probably could
imited number of missilesange ofayload ofounds, and an elementary guidance system in about two/
United Arab Republiclone or inother Arab States, does not have the capability ofnuclear weapon in the foreseeable future. The UAR istoSMange ofany difficult problems the UAR faces in its missilemay be able tomall number of these weaponsassuming continued help by the Westontinuing supply of foreign components.the payload of this missile at onlyoundsCEP as large. The military value ofeaponsmall. However, the UARissile program goinggained experience in the production of missiles. Withoutside help and components, it probably couldewa more effective weapon. )
continuing accusations by both the UAR andthe other is developing chemical, biological, andof mass destruction, we have no evidence tocharges. Both countries could, however, produceof chemical or biological warfare devices designeduse. Neither country can produce radiologicalweapons.
purely military significance of any missile systemor the UAR could produce is likely to be modest forto come, although if Israeluclear bombcapability will be greatly increased. The politicalimpact of the advanced weapons programs isthan the purely military effect and is alreadyIf Nasser could notounter to an Israelion his own, he probably would turn to the USSR toensure his protection, and the Arabs would blame the West,the US, for the increased Israeli threat. Israel,become increasingly activist in its dealings with thefactors which haveew outbreak of Arab-Israeli
hostilities in recent years still apply. Nevertheless, as theweapons programs progress, tensions will probably rise on both sides. In an atmosphere of this kind, there would always be the possibility that one or the other side would initiate hostile action to safeguard its ultimate security. )
DISCUSSION
The Arabs and Israelis have remained bitterly antagonistic since the establls*iment of Israelears ago. While all the Arab States are hostile in some degree to Israel, the most important confrontation is that between Israel and the United Arab Republichey have engaged in an arms racehile scornful of past Arab military performances. Uie Israelis fear that some day the Arabs, under UAH leadership, will be able to use effectively the formidable weapons they have acquired, principally from tlie USSR. These tears have almost certainly grownesult of the recent coups In Iraq and Syria and the subsequent progress toward Arab unity. The Arabs, ln turn, are conscious of their military inferiority as proved by their defeatsnd in the Sinai campaign
The arms race has broadened with attempts by Israel and the UAK to acquire advanced weapons. (No other Arab State has ato develop advancedhe UAR is engaged ln anto develop surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) which it hopes will increase itsconsiderable ln view of its jet bomberstrike at targets inside Israel. There is also evidence that Israel is attempting to develop SSMs. The most important step which Israel might take, however, is the developmentuclear capability. Possession ofew nuclear weapons would vastly increase Israel's present military advantage. Both Israel and the UAR have charged the other with developing biological, chemical, and radiological
ISRAELI PROGRAM
Our evidence on the Israeli nuclear program Isthere are many aspects on which we cannot speak withIrom the5 megawatt) research reactor atwhich has no potential for production of weapon gradematerials, the only known reactor is that under construction
e have no positive evidence that the Israel nuclear energyis aimed atuclear weapons capability./-
f The size of the program,
what we know of Its nature, and the amount of uranium concentrate already acquired all suggest, however, that Israel at least intends to put itselfosition to be able to produce weapons relatively quicklyecision to do so, f-
issiles.believe that Israel decided by2 to undertake Ihr developmentystem. J
Israel has already acquired some experience in the missile fieldesult of Its efforts to develop soundingollowing at least one unsuccessful attempt, the Israelis successfully launched thewo-stage sounding rocket, ine believe the rocketolid propellant, weighedounds, and reached an altitude of about. where metallic sodium was exploded toloud. Although there have been frequent reports that additional firings in the Shavit program would occur, none has been confirmed. The Israelis have also acquired valuable information on the theoretical aspects of missile technology from research done by Israel underwith the US Department of Defense. An Israeli official staled1actical missileange of. had beenbut we have no information on the production or development ofeapon. Despite its research to date and the high level of scientific and technical skills available, any wholly Independent Israeli effort to develop andSMayloadounds would probably require three to fournd great expense.
In order to. missile as soon as possible, we believe that Israel has decided to rely on considerable foreign assistance, and our limited evidence indicates that Israel Is relying on France for such assistance. We do not know the extent of French support, nor do we know the scope or degree of success of the Israeli program for hiring foreign missile experts. Israel would have extremeinile test range in its limited territory and so might be forced to test at shorter ranges, and probably would look to Fiance toissile testing range.
The French program tor SSMs iselatively early stage and is designed toissile which coulduclear warhead. The solid propellant second stage ot this missile has been flight tested. Adaptedurface-to-surface role, this second stage couldound payload. We believe that the (liquid fueled) first stage will be flight tested by the end of this year. We further believe that the characteristics of the first stage are such that If adaptedurface-to-surface role. It couldayload ofoundsangem.
If Israel acquires full access to French technology, components and test facilities, we believe it couldimited number of missilesange ofayload of
rsraol lias made no cHorl lo developmissilesul ison acquisition of US Hawk missiles forcfcr.se.
pounds, with an elementary guidance system in about twony limitation on the availability of French resources wouldlengthen the time required for the Israeli capability.
Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Warfare. Israel iscompetent in the microbiological and biological sciences, and has sufficient personnel and facilities toodest biological warfare program. However, there is no evidence of an Israeli research and development program for offensive biological warfare (BW> weapons. Israel also has impressive research capabilities In the field of chemical warfareesearch has been done on chemical agent aerosol dissemination, the synthesis and reaction mechanisms of toxiccompounds and other poisons. Future efforts probably will include the synthesis of psychogenic agents thatW potential. Israeli defensive CW research apparently emphasises the development of CW agent detectors and antidotes. However, Israel is neithernor stockpiling CW defensive equipment, nor are toxic CW agents produced or stockpiled. Israel has no known BW or CW field testing facUities and the Israeli military apparently are skeptical of the efficacy of using CW weapons. However, Israel could produce small BW or CW devices designed for clandestine use hi the event of war, and may do so.
Israel does not have the reactor capacity to produce more than small amounts of radioactive isotopes, and we have detected noshipments of such material to Israel. These factors, combined with the difficult technical problems involved in the development of suitable radiological warfare weapons and the uncertainty of their potential, make it unlikely that Israel will even attempt to develop such weapons.
III. THE UAR PROGRAM
Nuclear- The UAR nuclear energy program is confined to basic research and the production and use of small quantities of radioactive isotopes; lt is limited by the severe shortage of personnel, materials and capital.6 agreement with the Soviet Union, the UARwo megawatt research reactor, which is located at the Atomic Energy Establishment at Inshas. It has virtually no capability of producing fissionable material.
Exploration for uranium, originally done with Soviet help, is now being carried out with Yugoslav assistance. Very small quantities of uranium have been produced by limited exploitation of black sand deposiLs in the Nile Delta. There are no known significant uranium deposits in the UAR or other Arab countries. There is no uranium plant in the UAR and none Is envisaged at present. Negotiations foreavy water plantapacity of aboutons an-
nually have been going on for several yearsest German firm, but it is not known if the plant will be built. UAR officials approached both West Germany and the US1 for assistance Inuclear power program, and West German scientists conductedstudies at that tune. Under present plans, invitations to bid for the constructionuclear power reactoresign capacityegawatts are to be issued aboutuclear power reactor would take at least four years to construct.
Even after the completion ofower reactor, diversion of the reacUir to the production of plutoniumuclear weapons program would require adequate fuel supplies without safeguards as to use and the construction of chemical separation facilities. InUie UAR would have great difficulty in designingrude device. In view of these limitations, as well as Egypt's generally limited scientific and technical resources, it is clear that the UAR will not have the capability ofuclear weapon in the foreseeable future. The addition of Syria and Iraq to the UAR would not increase the UAR's capability to any significant extent.
Missiles. The UAR has shown an intense interest in acquiring guided missiles In recent years and has approached most of the mlssUe-producing nations of the world at one time or another. The Egyptian approach has included outright purchase, licensed manufacture in Egypt, and the recruitment of Western European teclinlclans. For example, the UAR has purchased sounding rockets from the US, has acquired short-range tactical naval missiles, air-lo-air missiles, and SAMs from the USSR, and has acquired the servicesestscientists and engineers to develop SSMs capable of reaching Israel.*
During the2 celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, the UAR fired four liquid fueled single-stage rockets and paradedore of two sizes through the streets of Cairo. These were sounding rockets, developed in Egypt since0 by West German scientists utilizing material and components procured inStatic testing started earlynd1 there were apparently several unsuccessful as wellew partially successful firings. The UAR apparently is attempting to convert the largera SSM, The versions in the parade differ slightly from those fired and appear to represent the initialefforts.SM, the Conqueror probably couldoundistance of. We believe that this missile will have an unsophisUcated guidance system and that its CEP will be large. We have no informationilitary version oi tills rocket has been flight tested.
Oalar.c' of the Gentian scientists and technicians in the UAR are engaged in (lie nicducUon of jet oneirics and aircraft or in nonmilitary projects.
The UAR faces many difficult problems in its missile program. Work on the guidance system and the ground-support equipmentIs still in an early stage. The UARest range in northern Egypt but we believe that it is not instrumented; the Egyptians are currently attempting to purchase Instrumentation in the US. Theeffort is totally dependent on outside assistance, and withdrawal of the West Germans or inability to secure materials and components abroad would make it Impossible to carry out the program in thefuture. Even under present conditions the reluctance of many of the best qualified European Arms to supply components probably makes quality control difficult. Despite these obstacles, the UAR may be able lomall number of the military version of thesebyssuming continued help by the West Germansontinuing supply of foreign components and parts. However, with its relatively small payload and large CEP. Its military value would be small. Nevertheless, the UARissile program going and if it were to have access lo outside help and components, it could probably produceewore effective weapon.
The smaller rocket, the Victor,acsimile of the French sounding rocket Veronique. Both were designed by the same German scientist.urface-to-surface rocket, the Victor wouldange ofowever, itsnd the lackuidance system would make lt virtually uselesseapons system.
Biological, Chemical, and Radiological Warfare. The chemical industry of the UAR is small and while it Is" being expanded withscientific and industrial resources are severely limited. The UARilitary CW establishment and may have produced such items as napalm and flamethrower fuels. Further, the UAR may have some World War II toxic munitions left behind on the evacuation of the British bases. While the UAR also makes certain industrial toxics, such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide, we do not believe that the UAR is now capable of significant research andof more sophisticated CW agents. We have no evidence that the UAR is trying to produce CW weapons. Similarly, the UAR's ability to produce significant quantities of BW agents is extremely limited, and we have no evidence of any program to do so. In neither the case of CWs, or of BW do we know of any program or facilities fortests of military applications. It is possible, of course, that in either field, the UAR could produce small quantities of CW or BW agents which might be used for clandestine operations. The CAR has no capability of producing radiological warfare agents and we know of no attempt to procure isotopes in the quantities which would be needed for this purpose.
IV. IMPLICATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS PROGRAMS
UQUary. The armed forces of the Arab Slates have long been inferior in quality to those of Israel, though superior in total numbers and equipment.*when one or both sides come Into poascssionSal system Its purely military significance is likely to be modest for some time. The UAR'a missiles will be of little military value without nuclear warheads, and we see no prospect of ihe UAR's producing such warheads In the foreseeable future. I' Israeluclear bomb deliverable by aircraft Its military capability will be greatly Increased. Possession of missiles with nuclear warheads would further Increase Israel's military superiority, but the Israelis probably will not be able Ui achieve this for several years. During the next several years, both sides are likely to .see any advanced weapons primarily as deterrents against aggression.
Economic. Our Information regarding the economic costs of these weapons programs la scanty. /
cost will be substantial. While the Israeli Government is no doubt loath to ace such resources diverted from economic development, the burden appears to be within Israeli capacity.
he total costs of the UAR's missile program probably have been modest thus far,arge part has been payable In foreign exchange. Since the UAR's supplies of foreign exchange are relatively small, the drain of tho missile program, together with the costs of the much more expensive Jet aircraft program,ignificant burden on the
UAH.
sychological and Political. Although the UAR's missile program does not appear to have great military significance lt has had apsychological effect on the Israelis, who are acutely conscious of the compactness of the target which Israel providesotential enemy. Moreover, the Israelis sec these missiles as weapons against which they have been unable toefense. While the Israelis almostdo not fully believe the claims they have made regarding the progress of Ihr UAR missile program and the threat ol chemical,and radiological warheads, the steps they have taken to frighten the German technicians out of Egypt, the vigor of Israeli propaganda.
'Bt*he Anb-Iuarll Problem.'* datedanuary IMS. for deUUi ul Arab and Uracil military eapabiliiies.
and the apparent launchingigh priority missile program are evidenceeal fear of future developments.
We believe the motivation of the Israelis for acquiring nuclear weapons lo be primarily defensive. Ever conscious of the greatsuperiority of their Arab enemies and of the frequentlyArab threat to drive them out of the Near East, the Israelis would regard possession of nuclear weaponsowerful deterrent lo any Arab aggression. Possession of nuclear weapons would, however,them to be bolder in the use of their conventionalboth diplomatic andtheir confrontation with the Arabs. The Israelis might also see the possession of nuclear weapons asthe Arabs with such overwhelming force that the latter would give up hope of Imposing their will on Israel.
In seeking to develop SSMs. Nasser has been in part motivatedesire to acquire prestige for himself and tlie UAR. He views such weapons as supporting the UAR's claimlace of leadership among the Arabs and among the nonaltgned countries generally. It isthat Nasser and the UAR's military leaders arc not conscious of the military limitations of their missiles. However, they may be aware of such limitations but see the missiles as the best they can do at present andirst step toward the development of more effective missiles.
The factors which haveew outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities in recent years still apply. Nevertheless, as the advanced weapons programs progress, tensions will probably rise on both sides. If either country came to feel itself in iminent danger, lt might go to extreme lengths to maintain Its security. If Nasser could notounter to an Israeli nuclear threat on his own, he probably would turn to the USSR to try to ensure his protection. While the Soviet Union might increase its military aid to the UAR, including such advanced weapons as SSMs capable of reaching Israel, we do not believe the USSR would provide nuclear weapons. Israel, likewise, would grow more edgy, becoming increasingly activist In its dealing with the Arabs. In an atmosphere of this kind, there would always be the possibility that one or the other side would initiate hostile action to safeguardre-emptive UAR air strike against Dirnona.
Acquisition of nuclear weapons by Israel would add greatly to Arab hostility toward the West. The US as well as France would receive much of the blame in the eyes of the Arabs. Moreover, failure of the US to force Israel Lo give up its nuclear weapons would be regardedesult of deliberate US policy, and there wouldrowing tendency for the confrontation in the Middle East to take the form of the Bloc and the Arabs against Israel and the West.
Original document.
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