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SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
communist reactions to us actions taken with regard to laos
NOTE This is the foaWcrtion of the estimate and additional twxt will not be cijtuTdecJT""^
Central Intelligence Agency
m
reparation of thb. and the intelligence
State/Defense, the Army,% the Air Force, and
nitep stated intellkjence board
on IH. Concurring were the Direcior or Intelligence mid Research. lk-pdrlment ol Slate; TheDefense Intelligence Agency: ihe Assistant Chief ofor Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operationsepartment of Ihe Nary; the Assistant'Chief pf Staff, intelligence:tV Director.
outside
nmii wwryy -w> seutative to the. USIH and theureau of Investigation, abstained,f'-hen'jUi'tsdui'-/a
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IS
SUBJECT: : CTI0HS TO US ACTJCflS TAKEK
WITH REGARD TO IAOG
I. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. General Comnvunlet policy In Laos has been confident, prudent and persistent.
a. The Cotsounists continue to display considerablethat theyood thing going in Laos. They apparently believe thot the situation there is so soft, Ccaaaunlst capabilities to support Pathet Lao (PL) subversion of the country so great, and the military and political inhibitions on effective US counterwasurea bo telling, that Comfflunlst absorption of Laos and the undercutting of the US position in the area oreatter of time. We believe that neither the USSR,China, North Vietnamor the PL is presently interested in any Battlement or partition scheme which would preclude ultimate realisation of these goals.
jRCUP 1
responding to US pressures in Laos over the pastthe Conrunlsts haveenerally keen sense of whatwould bear. They have not pressed their luck,ossibly imminent and sharp rise In the USin the area, have postponed military aotion untiland political jockeylngs haveew situation, andand attention have slackened. In this process, theshown no disposition to rlak major US military action.
each spurt of non-CoBounlst vigor In Laos,have resumed their persistent efforts to erode thethere. Tbe recent flare op of Comaamiat militarythe neutralists in Laos does not in our view signal ain this general pattern of behavior; it is,instead, aa lack of Communist progress in the politicalesponsedevelopments, an exploitation of opportunities presentedweakness, andto the Connunistsan apparent decline in
US attention to Laotian developments.
2. The Communists also probably estimate that the Western Powers, and their allies, continue to be reluctant to take positive action in Laos. Moreover, the Communists probably believe that the non-Communist Laotians, and particularly their arced forces, are so disorganized
and weak that the West could not, ewer. If it would, sake very effective use of then in countering Comtmintat actions.
3. CooBiunlst responses to US actions will be aade In four oentera: Moocow, Hanoi, Peiping, and on tho ground In Laos. Each of these sees the Laotian situationifferent perspective, and each is now Involved to varying degrees. Accordingly, each mightifferent degree of credence to US signals of ctxasltment, and each will be inclined to react somewhat differently.
e. Moscow is more renote and lees deeply involved than tha other CooEunlst elements. Its immediate concern isow major crisis in Laos could leadS-Soviet confrontation. The USSR appears to prefer the tactic of subverting Laos through low-risk, essentially political means, but is probably not wholly displeased with recent Ccemunist military gains there. In general, Moscow would alaost certainly attempt toestraining influence on its allies, and to prevent serious risk of war from developing in an area at the extrealties of Soviet Interests and influence.
t. Short of ultimate crisis, the DRV is the most important Communist entity, since the subversion of Laos is largely the product of Hanoi direction, under the probably conflicting guidance of Moscow and Peiping. The DRV's role in Laos remains high, while that of the
USSR has become somewhat less. Hanoi would almost certainlyore militant course than would the Soviets, hut at the same time seek not to provoke US military action.
arger stake in southeast Asia thanby Its current activity in Laos: some materiel supportDRV, the urgingorceful course in Laos, ond theoutargely through roadhullding activitiesof aof Influence in certain areas of those northern provinces ofborder on China. Peiping's Interest rises sharply with anya strong US presence in or near Laos, and China would becomeimportant actor in any situation where US militarythe DRV seemed inrninent.
PL appears to exercise at least bods degreemilitary activity, and by taking local initiative,Soviet or Chinese policies, at least in the short term.
k. Although the Sino-Soviet dispute has apparently not as yet crucially affected Communist, policies concerning Laos, It would complicate Cotaminist responses to forceful US or US-sponsored courses of action. The forthcoming Sino-Soviet confrontation this susaner will probably Intensify this problem and make it even more difficult for the Comm-nists to concert their responses.
estrangement could becomecute thatvould seek to dissociate itself froa Communist Chinaanddistant DRVo tho eventrisis showdown withsia. Evan Inituation, however, it isthe USSR would abandon the DRV or Communist China.
of such crisis, continuation of Sino-Sovietabout present levels will tend to keep Moscow involved and nightappear more militant concerning Laos than it might otherwise be.
II. COMJNIST REACTIONS
5. Generally speaking, we would expect the Communists to react in tbe future much as they have in tbe past: quiet down when the threat of US military Intervention seems markedly to increase, and advance again when tbe threat has abated. We think thereood chance, therefore, thet tho first or second phases of action described below would lead eithere-establishment of the Government of national Union or to de facto partition. We do not believe, however, that either of these developments vould go far to Insure lasting stabilisation in Laos, for the Internal situation in that country would remain highly vulnerable to the virtually certain continuance of determined Communist efforts at subversion.
A. PHASE Iactions not involving tho use of US
forces, and generally within theof the Geneva Agreements. These actions might include strengthening the Royal Laotian Artsyhe Kong Le neutralist forces, and the tribaland providing the PAR withfor strikes against Communist concentrations and lines of communication within Laos. The principal objectives of these actions vould be the conclusionease-fire ond reactivation of the national Union Government under Geneva Agreements. It vould be made clear to the CcraounlBte that if the US-aponsored actions did not cause them to honor their Geneva commitments concerning Laos, the US vould be ready and willing to raise the level of pressures.
6. Thereood chance that the first Communist reaction wouldL move toward talks at the local level. It is possible that their allies would suggestew international conference be held on Laos, dependingonsiderable extent upon how they Judged things were going for them in Loos. In any event, thewould probably embark on an international campaign denouncing the US actions.
7. Meanwhile, DRV on cod re merit of the PL might be increased to meet en increased FAR ground threat. Evidenceubstantial buildup of FAR or Kong Le units in local areas might be countered by limited PL/DRV attacks to disrupt FAR and Kong Le forces. This
might resultuick effort to eliminate completely Kong Le's position In the Plain of Jars.
G. If US-provided aircraft were used hy the EAR to attack the PL, the Coinriunlsts would increase their political attacks on the US ond would probably try first to counter with ground fire, including DRV (and, perhaps, Communist Chinese) antiaircraft units. If these efforts proved ineffective and the PAR aerial attacks were really hurting, the Communists might introduce "volunteer" fighter aircraft.
B. PHASE IInot involving combat use of US
forces, but in some cases exceeding the limits of the Geneva Agreements. These actions might include, in addition to those of Phase I, removing existingon FAR/kong Le offensive actions (ground andntroducing "volunteer" combat aircraft, significantly Increasing US air and naval forces In adjacent areas, and undertaking US aerial reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam and harassment of DRV shipping. The objectives of this phase would be same as those of Phase I.
9. Communist concern over escalation vould rise. We think that the Soviets at this stage would seek to persuade the US and the DKV/PL/ Chinese not to take such further actions as might escalate hostilities. The extent to which the PL, the DRV, the Chinese, and the Soviets would believe that the US was prepared to take major additional steps vould be influenced significantly by the nature and extent of US deployments
in the area. the absenceuildup of us ground forces in adjacentn thailand,vould detract from tbe credibility of us the chinese vould be harder to convince than the soviets regarding us determination, and would probably exert whatever pressure they could upon moscow to call the us "bluff."
phase u, we believe the communists would bethan duringo attempt to bring the situationthrough negotiations. if they bad not already done so,press demands for an international conference and wouldto consolidate their military gainsease-fireinitial offersease-fire would include provisionsgrant them further areas of control. if this was notwould probably resume local military pressures hoping for anbased on the then existing positions. communistany cease-fire vould probably be that the us vould find ittoigh pitch of preparedness in the area over
the long term, and the communists would await an opportunity to take renewed action whenever the situation appeared opportune.
the event the us were to harass drv shipping and moveunits into the gulf of tonkin, the chineee vould almostincreasingly threatening etatenente and ready themselvesdo not believe that chinese forces vould intervene directly in laos
or North Vietnam et this time, though ve do not rule out the possibility that the Chinese might commit themselves formally to the defense of the DRV, in an attempt both to deter US actions and to increase pressures on the Soviets to extend their commitment in the area.
C. PHASE HI Actions including combat use of US forces.
These might Include, in addition to those actions ofnd II, US forces' occupation of key Laotian centersin non-Communist hands, US naval blockade of North Vietnam, US bombing of selected targets in Laos and North Vietnam, and such additional commitment of US and SEATO force to the struggle as might be judged expedient. The objective of these actions would be achievementormal partition of Laos.
IS. As we have indicated undernd II, Communist reactions would vary depending on many imponderable factors. Without knowing what the precise reactions would be, or assessing their significance, we cannot estimate with any degree of confidence Communist reactions to Phase IH. Assuming that the first two phases had failed to achieve the results sought, we -would conclude either: (a) that the Soviets did not believe that the US would in fact take extreme action in southeast Asia; (b) tbat the Soviets were unable to control the situation; or (c) that they were prepared to assume the rather considerable risks of assisting theon the scene.
13- Wo estimate tbat initial reactions to Phase HI would be approximately as follows:
forces in Laos would probably attemptUS forces and movements of US personnel, but woulddirect confrontation with US forces. They might attemptareas defended by non-US forces.
DRV vould raise the level of its military activity
in Laos.
China vould increase its presence Inraise further Its level of warnings to the US, but at thisprobably not openly commit Chinese Communist armed units. vould probably not core to put their aging fighteropposition to US air forces over Loos, but might try toproviding the PL/DRV In Laos with some increased air defense
Ih. US air attacks on North Vietnam would pose the Immediate possibility of hostilities between the US and Communist China. We incline to the view that the Chinese would commit their forces to assist the DRV against these attacks, as needed, and we believe that Corsmunist forces in Laos and South Vietnam would exercise their maximum remaining military capabilities in those countries and in defense of DRV efforts.
Chinese Communist aircraft would be clearly unable to compete with US air power, and the Soviets would be under strong DRV ond Chinese pressure to provide advanced aircraft.
lt>. He are unable at this time to estimate Communist responses beyond the local military reactions we have just described. Whether the Communists at this stage would come to the conference table ready to arrive at some kind of settlement would depend largely upon their reasons for allowing the situation to reach this point. If their reason was that they did not believe the US would take extreme action, they now would havo strong indications to tho contrary and presumably would be willing to talk. If tbe Soviets had been unable to control tbe situation, perhaps the US actions would have convinced the Chinese and North Vietnamese that the situation had become dangerous and that It was unduly hazardous to remain udament in the face of Soviet disapproval. On the other hand we cannot exclude the possibility that tbe Chinese would feel so deeply committed In southeast Asia that they might be willing to accept the risks of large-scale engagement with US forces in the area. In any event, if tbe Soviets were prepared to assume rather considerable risks, the situation might become quite critical and involve the possibilityS-Chinese confrontation, with tho Chinese supported by the Soviets, andS-Soviet confrontation.
Original document.
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