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soviet bloc armed forces
the cuban crisis
A CHRONOLOGY:2
THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL
I
INDICATIONS CENTER
D.C.
INTRODUCTION
Recipients of this document are cautioned thot it contains some information from very sensitive and restricted sources and that it should be handledtrict need-to-know basis. It cannot be shown to foreign nationals or disseminated outside the Continental United States.
This chronology of Soviet and other Bloc activity during the period of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba and the period of me Cuban crisis of the summer and fall2 is designed to serve the following purposes: (a) to provide in reodily usable chronologicalummary of the known activity undertaken by the USSR in Cubo ond concurrently in other areas, and particularly Ihe activity of the Soviet Bloc armed forces during the period; (b) to highlight, by placing the known developments in lime sequence in relation with one another, those periods of Soviet military activity which appear lo have been most signiflcont in bringing Ihe Soviet military forceslate of readiness ond which may therefore be the most productive for further collection and reseorch for warning purposes; and (c) to serveetailed supplement for an accompanying document which will discuss the more significant aspects of Soviet military activities during this period from lhe standpoint of their possible indications ond warning significance.
This study is ofreliminary compilation of the material; it Is based largely, particularly with regard to Soviet military activity, on the information reported currently during the period. Such additional information os was roceived up to early3 has beenbut lo date relatively little additional information has been obtained and Ihere has been little further detailed study or rtanalysls of Soviet preparedness measures, particularly during the period prior toctober. II is hoped that this compilation will be useful in encouraging such collection ond research, since il appears almosi certain that furtherand analysis will provide additional insight into Soviet military planning, doctrine, alerting procedures and deception measures for possible hostilities.
All crises in which the USSR is or may potentially become involved are of value for the study af indications and warning Intelligence. There haveumber of these since World War II, all of which provldo some insight into the manner In which Ihe USSR alerts or prepares Its military forces. There hove been only two, however, which were so serious as to involve on actual or potential commitment of Soviet forces in hostilities (except for the Soviet air participation in the Korean War). The first was the Polish-Hungarian crisis ofhichudden and unplanned commitment of Soviet ground forces in Hungary (under lax security conditions) and preparations for such action against Poland; the second was the Cuban crisis. The latter was potentially the more serious, since itisk of direct hostilities between Soviet and US forces (at least In Cubo) andar greoter danger of escalation. It is also significantly different in that the USSR had ample lime to prepare Its forces for the crisis so that ll would not be caught by surprise, and to insure maximum secrecy and deception measures.
Even this preliminary compilation of ovoilable evidence strongly points to the month of September as of ot least equal ond possibly greater significance for warning analysis than the period of the "crisis" itself. In particular, the period of0 September, which coincided with the first deliveries of MRBMs to Cuba and fhe Soviet announcement that its forces were being brought to "highest combats believed the most likely (as further information becomes available) to provide understanding of the nature of Soviet preparedness measures.
This chronology covers the period2 tohe initial date was selected because it marked the start of the heavy Soviet military shipments to Cuba. However, Soviet preparations of course began considerably earlier, and the decision to undertake the Cubon venture almost certainly had been made by April. certain earlier activity is probably relevant to the buildup although it has not been included here.
Since this study is directed to Soviet and secondarily Satellite preparedness measures rather than to Cubo itself, the developments relating to Cuba have been relatively briefly noted, with the exception ofctober period when considerably more detail has been included.
Because all US and many other Western intelligence collection facilities were on an alert and every scrap of available information was promptly reported during the period beginningctober, the volume of material included for this period on the preparedness measures of the Bloc armed forces is almostisproportionately large in relation to
the earlier period. imilar intelligence alert been in effect earlier, it is possible that
more information would have been currently available.
Items dealing with the USSR and Satellites were selected generally to Include: significant training activity, unusual inactivity, or movements of military forces; reports or indications of possible alerts or other unusual readiness measures; unusual security measures
or travel restrictions; communications abnormalities, including those which are unexplained;
movements of key Soviet military personnel; Soviet diplomatic and political activity,in relation to Berlin and Germany; diplomatic and military activity in other areas possibly intended for diversionary or cover purposes; political deception measures; propaganda,
particularly that relating to Cuba and Berlin; Soviet press statements relating to readiness
measures and deterrent capabilities of the Soviet armed forces; civilian activity where it appeared to bear some possible relation to the problem, such as movements of key civilian leaders ond civil defense; and generally any other items which appeared unusual, possibly relevant or of unexplained significance. Where there is doubt, items have been included rather than omitted. Therefore, inclusion of an item does not necessarilyudgment lhat it bore any specific relation to the crisis or to Increased readiness of Bloc forces. Indeed, many military activities noted probably did constitute relatively "normal" training and would have occurred in any case.
All items are entered under the date on which the action occurred, rather than when it was reported. In most cases, the information was obtained relatively promptly after the event, but in some coses thereonsiderable delay.ew instances in which the information was obtained long after the event, this has been noted. In addition, the datingumber of items relating to the deliveries to Cuba has been based primarilyestudy of available material after the crisis rather than on current reporting. Thus, the information reported for any date or period in this study is actually more than was available at theew ,tems wh.ch cannot be specifically dated have been included at the end of the chronology.
This document has been compiled entirely by the National Indications Center andbeen coordinated with other agencies. Items have been checked for accuracyreporting and publications, but thereossibility that certain items hoveerroneous on the basis of further information which has not been available toIndications Center. I
_uunuieim tepmrsurs generally irom reliabeor eye-Witness sources; ine source is of uncertain or dubious reliability, fhe nature of the source has usually been indicated. ew items, particularly relating to some US actions, have been taken from press sources and are so indicated.
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Developments Relating to Cuba: Soviet Bloc Developments:
Developments Relating to Cuba: Soviet Bloc Developments:
2
Developments Relating to Cuba: Soviet Bloc Developments:
2
13
2
Developments Relating to Cuba: Soviet Bloc Developments:
2
Developments Relating to Cuba: Soviet Bloc Developments:
40
32
In this section, each day is treated separately and is subdivided into Cuban and General Developments and Bloc Military Developments. For the period1 October, Soviet ond Satellitedevelopments are further
AND UNDATED ITEMS
APPENDICES
Soviet and Warsaw Pact Military Orders and Announcements:
Red Slor on Combat
116
on Combat Readiness,
120
on War and the Cuban Crisis,
on page numbering: In addition to the serial numbering of pages at the bottom and the dates at the top, each page is also identified in the lower right-hond corner as to the date and the areaJul-ct:, etc.
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA
2 Jul: Raul Coilro arrived in Moscow and was met by Malinovskiy; composition of his group strongly suggested its purpose was fo negotiate for more Soviet military aid. He departeduly, after having seen Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders; the lackommunique suggested possible difficulties during the talks. There were rumors thot the purpose of the trip was toefense treaty with the Soviet Union.
2 Jul: Photography in the port of Leningrad showed extensive dockside storage of some of Ihe types of equipment subsequently observed on the decks of Soviet ships en route to Cuba.
Early Jul: The first of the Soviet cargo and passenger ships for the Cuban buildup were being loaded or prepared for loading.
6oviet-Yugoslav protocol was signed permitting Aeroflof landings in Belgrade on fulure West African runs (the Aeroflot rum subsequently inaugurated to Cuba Initially moved through West Africa).
cul: Soviet cargo ships began moving out of the Black Seo for Cuba with false dec an lions of their destinations and reported tonnages well below their capacitiesormal indication of military cargoes).
ul: ade the first trial flight on the Moscow-Havana run, followed onuly by on announcement that Cuba and the Soviet Union had signed an agreementegular Moscow-Havana civil air route.
ul: Five Soviel fishing vessels arrived in Havana.
ul: Tho arrival of Soviel passenger ships in Cuba began, with five arriving by
7 August. TASS had announced it was sending lechnicians and Cuban students who had boon training in Ihe Bloc. One of the ships was announced as carrying Soviet agricultural technicians and students. The other four were not publicly announced In any manner and disembarked atassengers at Mariel. If troop-loaded, those four ships could have carrieden.
Jul:
Jul:
total ofoviet dry cargo ships arrived in Cuba; several unloaded mililary equipment in late July.
The first shipment of cruise missiles and associated equipment probably arrived (lotor identified as the KENNELissile). The date is not firm and the first shipment may have arrived even earlier.
Cubans were evacuated and restricted from areas In ihe vicinity of Mariel, Bahlo Honda and Santa Lucia; the port area of Banes was evacuated.
(Jul: Cuba)
OVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS
H Jul: Khrushchev, Instotemenr carried by Pravda, attacked McNomoro's statements that the balance of forces favored the US; the military balance of power would be determined in the course of war and by its outcome; the US was not justified in trying toposition of strength" policy in dealing with the Soviet Union.
ul: ASS statement on Berlin said that the Western powers were "not displaying an understanding for the need to do away with the vestiges of World War II bya German peace treaty." Citing US rejection of Khrushchev's proposals for NATO-Warsaw Poet units in West Berlin, it declared that the Soviet Union, with other peace-loving states, "will hove to solve the question oferman peacewithout the participation of the Westernhrushchev,olk with US journalistsuly, set no time limit and Indicated Ihe USSR would continue the talks.
Jul: The Western Military Liaison Missions were restricted from almost all of East Germany (nine separateor an apparent fwo-phose
)
OVIET BLOC
ul: Izvestlyq stared that the talks on Berlin hadcrucial state."
ul; Khrushchev, Malinovskiy and Admiral Gorshkov visited the northern USSR,
where Khrushchev inspected the Northern Fleet, observed missile launches from submerged submarines and decorated the crewoviet atomic submarine, according to TASS. (Duringoviet Northern Fleet nuclear submarine returnedspecial government mission" Involving extended and involved accurate navigation, apparently under ice in northern waters, for which its crew received awards.)
Jul:
stated thot the "provocative activity" from West Berlin required thesigningeace treaty. The continuing intractability of the Soviet position, particularly the requirement for Western troop withdrawal from West Berlin, suggested that Moscow was increasingly pessimistic about achieving a
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)
OVIET BLOC
ul: negotiated Berlin settlement and might be considering other means of reach-(Cont'd) Ing its objectives.
The CINC, GSFG, protested to General Freeman on alleged US violations
of the air corridors and US helicopter flights over East Berlin, implying that such matters should be dealt with at the CINC rather thon the commandant level.
Red Star carried an article indicating that amphibious exercises were in
progress in the Odessa Military District or had been completed there.
Khrushchev left Moscow on on extended working vacation on the Block Sea,
returning to Moscow onugust, again departing for the Black Sea onugust, and returning finally to Moscow oneptember.
Izvestiya strongly reaffirmed Moscow's intention toeace treaty with
East Germany which would "notere formality" and would require the West to deal with the East Germans on the question of access; however, there wos no mentioneadline.
Turkish couriers were denied transit of Batumi and Lenlnakan on the grounds
5 Aug: that transport was sold out. Western attaches were denied visits to Sevastopol for Soviet Navyuly).
ul: The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that Rostov-on-Don wasto all visitorseptember for unexplained health reasons, and In-tourist indicated the restriction had already been in effect for two or three weeks. The closure at the time was believed related to the apparent serious riot in the Rostov-Novocherkassk areaune.
Late Jul: Observations indicated that there hadhange of the Soviet vehiclenumbering system In the USSR, Hungary and Poland, but not in GSFG.
Latearge communications complex was established connecting elements ofh TAA with the EGAF,h TAAhe Soviet naval air unit at Kaliningrad, and unidentified commands in Warsaw and Prague.
Thereeries of unusual air defense exercises in Eastern EuropeJul: an oir defense exercise over East Germany, Czechoslovakia and
Poland with Sovietn an aggressor role;ul- unprecedented UHF exercise communications involving Soviet,ug: German, Polish and possibly Czech air elements, in which Lelgnltz was prominently mentioned; apparent detached elements from Hq,
)
fOP SECRET
OVIET BLOC
ul: USAREUR reported that ECM equipment had been installed at Heinersdorf and Treptow towers in East Berlin (Mound Brick, Cheese Brick, Dome Brick) which could interfere with corridor traffic.
Ju,: In Indonesia, preparations continued for an attack on West New Guinea,
with indications that newly arrived Soviet equipment manned by Soviet crews
_ "ere were reports, mannea rjy soviet crews, would be used in the attack. Mikoyan arrived In Indonesia onuly and reportedly stated thot the Dutch would be eliminated from New Guinea only by force. An Indonesian general reportedly stated that an attack might require Ihe active participation of Soviet personnel. Both Mikoyan and Vershinin allegedly hod urged ilitary solution and had offered Soviet "volunteers."
(Jul: Bloc-4)
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA
/Various other security measures were imposed.id-AugusT, the construction of awall with sentry boxes around the docks at Mariel, the most secure of the Cuban ports.
personnel ond ground equipment were unloaded at Mariel and Bahla
the movement of Soviet troop convoys ond equipment was reported in
the area of Santiago de las Vegasumber of other points on the island.
Aug: oviet-Cuban technical assistance agreement for fisheries was signed.
Aug: Photographyumber of vehicles at Maranzas and Santa Lucia, later
identified as SAM site areas.
Early Missiles for the cruise missile units probably arrived, representing one ofportions of the buildup (some probably arrived in July).
Second The first Komor-class missile patrol boats were observed as deck cargo being week of delivered to Cuba; they were offloaded ot7 andugust. Aug:
ug: The new Soviet Ambassador (Aleksandr Alekseyev) arrived in Havano, two months after the announcement of his appointment and the departure of the previous Soviet Ambassador.
Mld-Aug: Equipment for the SAM system probably began arriving.
Mid to Equipment for the construction of the MRBM and IRBM sitos probably arrived, late Aug: Deployment probably began on the major elements of the Soviet military System.
ug: Che Guevara ond Emilio Aragones left for Moscow, allegedly to discuss the installationteel plant. They saw Khrushchev and Gromyko at Yalta onugust to discuss international issues "agitating both sides"trengthening of friendly fraternal relations, accordingress onnounce-ment. I
)
VfTPPFT
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO
avana radio broadcast warned that the US would hove lo answer to the USSR
for any aggression against Cuba which would mean another world war.
Photographyoviet ship approaching Cuba provided the first evidence of
the delivery ofecond ship carrying these aircraft waseptember.
ug: The first sightingomar ot sea was made in the vicinity of Mariel.
ug: The first firm photographic evidence of SAM deployment was collected, whenquipment was observed being emplaced at seven sites in western Cuba, including SAM radars and launchers (sites were Bahia Honda, Havana, La Coloma, Mariel, Matanzas, San Julian and Cienfuegos).
ug: Photographic evidence provided no indication of armored encampmentsiat
Artemiso, Santiago de las Vegas or Holguin (or at Remediosndicating the actual establishment of these campsater date.
ug: Photography of the San Cristobal area revealed no evidence that construction of MRBM sites had yet begun, placing the probable Initiation of this activity in early September. However, farmers were evicted from the area of one of the San Cristobal sites in late August and presumably from the locations of the other MRBM sites ot about the same time.
Late Aug: Reports suggest some form of construction activity wos under way in the Sagua la Grande area, although photographyeptember revealed no discernible activity at the location of the MRBM sites.
Photography revealed vehicles and building materials later determined fo be
connected with ihe construction support area for the Guanajay IRBMo other work on IRBM sites had apparently begun, since Guanajay '2 and Remedios showed no activity as ofugusteptember respectively.
Cuban patrol ships firedS Navy patrol plane over international waters.
(Aug:)
SECfifil
OVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS
1 Aug: Ulbricht ond Stoph deported for Moscow and remained in the USSR the entire month.
1 Aug: Soviet diplomats in Bonn were hinting broadly to the press that they should not take vacations in August or they would miss an "historicll Polish and Czech correspondents were reportedly ordered to stay in Bonn during August and September.
1 Aug: The Soviet commandant in Berlin went on two months' leave, designating his Chief of Staff as acting commandant.
1 Aug: op Bulgarian military delegation, headed by the Defense Minister, arrived in Moscow.
2 Aug: Kekkonen reportedly stated his visit to the USSR was scheduledctober, after Khrushchev's visit to the UN.
Early Thereumber of indications of increasing East German security prepa-Aug: rations in the Berlin area which suggested possible preparations for the East Germans toore active role in Allied access to Berlin.
6 Aug: The Moscow press announced that the Moscow-Leningrad highway would be closed to3 September between Torzhok and Leningradiles or two-thirds of thehe Soviets informed the Embassy the reason for closure was "some kind of tests."
8 Aug: The Czech Minister of Defense made an unannounced visit to Moscow ofduration.
)
OVIET BLOC
9 Aug: Izvestiyatatement of East German Flnr Deputy Premier Stopheace treaty could not be postponed "any" longer.
II Aug: Soviet Navy chief. Admiral Gorshkov, attended the Bulgarian Navy Dayaf Varna.
he Soviets orbited ond recovered their twin cosmonauts Popovich ond Nikolaev. Aug:
Soviet Chief of Staff, Marshal Zakharov,isit to Finland. Aug:
ug: The CINC, GSFG,ote to General Freeman regarding helicopter flights over East Berlin, stating that the CINCs are the proper channel for dealing with such problems and Indicating that the barring of the Soviet Commandant from the US sector of West Berlin was the reason for use of the CINC-level contact.
Mid-Aug: Several blackout ond alert exercises were reportedly held inumber of similar exercises reportedly had been held in preceding weeks. Camouflaged underground public shelters were used by the populace.
Mid-Aug: All sources clearly Indicated that the Indonesians were poised for an imminent attack on West New Guinea and that Soviet equipment, manned in port bycrews, might be employed in the attack. ast-minute agreement with the Dutch, largely negotiated under US auspices, forestalled the assault.
ug: Rumanian leaders were identified back home from vacation in the USSR.
Khrushchev returned briefly to Moscow from his extended stay on thedeparted ogain onugust and returned to Moscoweptember.
Aug:
speaking at the celebration in honor of the Soviet cosmonauts, claimed that the socialist countriesilitary Superiority over the capitalist world; his last statement on this subject the previous month had claimed only parity, not superiority, with the West.
)
OVIET BLOC
Khrushchev made no referenceime limit on negotiations on Berlin; in state-
ments at about the same time the Soviet Ambassador to Bonn explicitly staled that no date had been set foreace treaty,oviet diplomat In New York suggested the USSR might lake the Berlin problem to the UN.
Khrushchev told the West German Ambassador he probably would arrive in New
York the second half of September, but his plans were not definite.
ccordinganish report, increased activity by Soviet officers wos notedond night al the planned GSFG wartime headquarters at Ruedersdorf.
ug: The Soviets began transporting their personnel to the War Memorial in West Berlin In armored personnel carriersesult of indignation in West Berlin over the East German youth allowed to bleed to death at the Wall, The US and UK then began police escort of Ihe Soviet armored vehicles.
ug; Marshal Malinovskly departed Czechoslovakiaisit of unknown length, probably for an unonnounced visit to East Germany. Onugust, his plane left Berlin for Moscow
(Note: Except for the announcement that Malinovskly was Pn ^abuiumuvukiu, nis whereobouts during the entire month of August were apparently not divulged in the Soviet press. Grechko served as Acting Defense Minister in early August, indicating that Mallnovskiy was away.)
ug: The Soviets announced the abolition of the office of Berlin commandant, effectiveugust; tost German General Poppe was appointed commandant of thesector of the city.
)
TOP VRPftFT
OVIET BLOC
ug: Rumanian Liberation Day ceremonies were attended by Soviet Marshals Chuykov (CinC, Groundershinin (CinC, Air Forces) ond Bagramyan (Chief of Rearnd by East German Defense Minister Hoffmannall allegedly "vacationing" in Rumania.
ug: Gomulka reportedly returned from vacation in the USSR where he was said to have met with Khrushchev and Ulbricht.
ug: TASS announced that Khrushchev and Ulbricht hadong conversation at Yalta in which "important International questions were discussed."
ug: Khrushchevhant that he definitely wouldeace treaty with East Germany but mentioned no date. He claimed he had not yet given thought to attending the UN General Assembly, but said he would not hesitate to come or to meet with Presidont Kennedy If the climate Is favorable forenture.
ug: The East German Berlin commandant formally assumed command of allIn East Berlinove which subordinated them to the East German Army.
(Aug:)
SeSCREX
POP SECRET
OVIET BLOC
ug: The acting Chief of Staff, GSFG, threatened retaliatory action against Western milltory access to Berlin if lhe Western powers did not cease escorting Soviet vehicles to and from the Soviet Wor Memorial in West Berlin. However, the Soviets shortly later accepted the prohibition against the use of Friedrichstrasserossing point for their convoys to the memorial.
ug: estricted area was imposed in East Germany for the periodeptember (see September).
ug: Several reports during July and August indicated that the East Germans would take over old age homes, kindergartens, hospitals, etc. inilometer strip along fhe West German border effectiveugust; one report said there wouldconcentration of manpower" in the stripeptember, but there was noindication lhat the measure was more than continuing improvement of security measures.
Lole Aug: The Czech press announced thai fhe summer Spartacus games of fhe Bloc armies, which had been scheduled9 September to involve large groups of soldiers from other Socialist countries, had been cancelled.
Late Aug: Beginning in late August and continuing through late October, an unusual number of Soviet novol ships (ofransited the Turkish Straits en route to foreign navies for transfer.
Aug: There were rumors which could not be substantiated by attache observations that additional Soviet troops (allegedly upad moved Into Poland.
)
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA
ASS release from Havana charged the US with "preparing for aggression
againstnd claimedhite House statement confirmed that the warlike policy of the US threatens Cuba and the peace of fhe world.
oint Cuban-Soviet communique issued on the departure of Che Guevara from
Moscow strongly reaffirmed the Soviet "right" to provide Cuba with military equipment and technicians for the training of Cuban military personnel to assist it in withstanding "threats of imperialist aggressivet stated that an agreement had been reached for the provision of such aid to Cuba. There was no specific commitment to defend Cuba in all contingencies.
Provdahotographubans, dressed in mil!tary-type uniforms,
arriving in Odessa "for training in the USSR."
President Kennedytatement to the press announcing the arrival in Cubo
of Soviet surface-to-air missiles, radar equipment, guided missile boatsoastal defense missiles, andoviet military technicians. He stated that there was no evidence of any organized combat forces in Cuba from anyBloc country or of offensive ground-to-ground missiles but that, "were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues wouldhe Castro regimeot be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere."
5 Sep: econd group of SAM sites was detected (three) but they appeared to be in the initial stages of construction/
5 Sep: Photography showed no evidence of MRBM site construction at Sagua la Grande (where two MRBM sites were later identified).
5 Sep: rates were unloaded at Lahird ship carryingrates was identified nearing Cuba, and the first assembledas photographed at Sanfa Clara.
First Cubans were reported evicted from the areas of the San Cristobal MRBMand 2. The arrival of the troops of the four armored groups probably began
Sep: (the information is not precise) and continued Into the second week of October.
ep: The Soviet press carried additional articles charging the US with preparing to attack Cuba.
7 Sep: President Kennedy asked Congress for authority to calleservists.
7 Sep: Soviet Ambassador Dobrynln assured Ambassador Stevenson in New York that "only defensive weapons are being supplied" to Cuba.
7 Sep: Two unarmed US Navy patrol pi anes were buzzed over international waters by an aircraft tentatively identified
)
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO
B Sep: Provoo noted President Kennedy's message to Congress on the callupeservists to active duty because of the buildup of Communist forces in Cuba and international tensions.
8 Sep: The first of the large hatch ships docked at Casilda, probably carrying MRBM equipment for the Sagua la Grande sites; deliveries through this port probably continued for these sites throughctober, although no reports of unloading* were received.
TASS released an authorized Soviet Government statement which said with
respect to Cuba: The US is staging provocations which might plunge the world into the disasterherroonuclear war. The President's request to calleservists cannot be ossessed as othercreen for aggressive plans and intentions. The US wonts to repeat "against little heroic Cuba" what it did) against the Soviet Union. The USSR, like other socialist countries, has stretchedand of assistance to the Cuban people ond is supplying industrial equipment and goods; il Is sending agronomists, tractor drivers and rank-and-file state and collective farm workers. ertain amount of armaments" ond some military specialists and technicians to train the Cubans in handling up-lo-dote weapons are olso being sent at the request of the Cuban Government. "However, ihe number of Soviel mililary specialists sent to Cuba can in no way be compared fo the number of agricultural workers being sent there." Theand military equipment ore "designed exclusively for defensiveThere is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for fhe repulsion of aggression,etaliatory blow, to any otherCuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful In their explosive force, ond the Soviet Union has such powerful rockets fo carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search tor sites beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union." Further noting that the time has gone forever when the USonopoly of nuclear weapons, it notes the terrible consequences of war and stales lhat "one cannot attack Cuba ondthat the aggressor will be free from punishment. If this attack is mode, it will be fhe beginning of fhe unleashing ofSee also the Bloc section for portions of this statemonl dealing with the Soviet military forces and Berlin.)
The Cuban Foreign Minisleranadian official that the Cubans did noi
have on ironclad military guarantee from the Soviets. Another report of about the some lime indicated that Raul Castro had been turned down in Moscow In early July on his request thai Cubaember of the Warsaw Pact, and that the same request by Che Guevara was turned down in early September.
Thereeported sighting in Havana of trailers carrying missiles onswering
the description of theRBM (seeeptember).
President Kennedytatement that the US would take necessary measures
If the Soviet buildupuban use of force threatened the security of the US or Its allies.ave Indicated thai if Cuba shouldapacity lo carry out offensive actions againsl the United States, the United Slates would act."
ep: ravdo editorial expanded on theeptember statement and the threat of US intervention, again acknowledging thatertain quantity of armament
JOB SBOMBP*
top sfprkt
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO
ep: exclusively for defensive purposes is being sent Ioiting the capability (Cont'd) of the USSR to render help "from its own territory to any peace-lovingnd repeating that an attack would be tbe beginning of war and that orders had been issued to take all measures to bring the Soviet armed forces to highest combatull page of material carried comments on "aggressive US designs againsted Starommentary on theeptember statement, which said that the arms to Cuba were "exclusively for defensive purposes" and denied any Soviet need to install atomic missiles outside Soviet borders. It said that the USSR "will never permit American imperialists to extinguish the Cuban revolution either by blockade or by military intervention."
ep: Thearge hatch ship, docked at Mariel, probably carrying MRBM equipment for the San Cristobal sites; sources reported the probable unloading of MRBMs at that port during the three nights precedingeptember and the night movementonvoy of at least eight MRBMs through towns between Mariel and San Cristobal during the nighteptember. (Byctober, all missiles for the San Cristobal sites had probably arrived in Cuba through therea. Seeeptemberossible delivery of MRBMs through Havana slightly earlier.)
ep: The Soviet press carried fragments of President Kennedy's press conference of
eptember and further alleged evidence of "an impending US attack onnd additional statements supporting the Soviet Government position were cited.
Mid-Sep: An intensive Soviet propaganda campaign was under way charging the US with aggressive designs on Cuba and reiterating the theme of the TASS statement ofeptember that Soviet deterrent power Is available for use against anywhich threaten world peace. The Soviet press was also publishing charges that US military aircraft had buzzed Soviet merchant vessels en route to and from Cuba.
16Sep: ourth shipment of Komars was offloaded at Mariel.
ep: Khrushchev told the Austrian Vice Chancellor that Soviet ships were under orders to ignore any US blockade action against Cuba, adding that firing on such ships would be an act of war.
Work possibly began on the Guanajaynd Remedios IRBM sites (firstphotography onndhe date is estimated, So far as Is known,
no IRBMs were delivered to Cuba.
Pravda carried an article by an international low expert statingS blockade
of Cuba would be aggressioniolation of the UN charter. In case of attack, other countries would be justified in coming to the aid of the "victim of aggression" under terms of the UN charter.
The US Senateesolution on Cuba.
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO
Soviet Lt. Gen. Pavel Dankevich was first identified in Cuba; he wos formerly
ot Vinnitsa and possibly held the post of commander of the rocket forces in Cubo.
Gromyko, in his UN speech, charged ihe US wiih whipping up war hysteria
and said lhat President Kennedy had threatened invasion of Cuba in violation of tho UN charter. The USSR and socialist countries have "at least" the same means as the capitalist countries. Any US otlack on Cuba would have tho results mentioned in the Soviet statement ofeptember, that is "theof the unleashing of war."
ep: It was announcedoviet-Cuban agreement had boon concluded for the constructionarge fishing port in Cuba for the use of the Soviet Atlantic fishing fleet, under lease to the Soviets. (There was some indication that this was announced prematurely by Cuba without Soviet concurrence.)
TASS reported US Congressional approval of the resolution to
reservists and to extend the period of active duty.
Three more SAM sites were photographed.
ep- Four Soviet ships were observedotal ofruise missiles to Cubact: (this probably brought the total of Soviet cruise missiles in Cuba to at,
as later identified in photography). The cruise missile silo at Siguanoo was first
observed and was operational oneptember.
'
The firstdentified from photography of the crates at sea arrived in Cuba on the Kosimov (other ships carryingere photographed during October).
total ofoviet cargo ships arrived in Cuba, the peak for any month; however
it would hove been exceeded in October except for the US quarantine.
TOP SFf-PFT
OVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS
1 Sep: Western travelers were reportedly told in Moscow that Kharkov and Rostov-on-Don airports were to be wholly or partially used by the militaryeptember ond thot no foreigners would be allowed to land in these cities^ (Note: see entry ofulyeason given earlier by the Soviets for aof travel to Rostov.)
1 Sep: East German units were inspected by members of the Warsaw Pact high command and Ministry of Defense personnel as parteries of inspections, according to an East German regimental commander whoeptember; emphasis was placed on speeding up unit training, particularly in heavy equipment.
Italian travelers observed three westbound trains carrying medium tanks, ot
oviei soldierslosed van trucksrain trip from Warsaw to Brest.
SMLM vehicle was fired onoviet train guard near Frankfurt/Oder
while the MLM team wasrain apparently carrying missile-associated equipment.
TASS announced that Khrushchev had recently visited Krasnodar Krai (Kuban)
during his vacation.
The USSR protested to fhe USircraft had violated Soviet territory
onugust, spending nine minutes over Soviet territory near Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk; the diplomatic note was accompanied by propaganda charging that the flight was provocolive and might have serious consequences. Red Stareptember criticized the battle readiness of PVO units.
4 Sep: The Soviets discontinued movement of their War Memorial guards through the
US sector of West Berlin, switching to the checkpoint ot Invalidensfrasse in the British sector.
)
OVIET BLOC
ep: Thefeelative lull in Soviet nuclear testing, with only one test during the
periodt Is uncertain whether this is of any significance into the readiness status of Soviet forces. There were other periods oflulls in the tests betweeneptemberctober andndctober; no break in testing occurred during late October or early November, although there was another light periodovember.
Sep:
Czech reservists were reportedly "suddenly" recalled to active dutyis scant and if is not known whether this was an unusual recall of reservists or routine refresher training).
5 Sep: The Soviets delivered notes to the Western powers concerning Berlin, charging them with various provocations and again calling for the abolition of the occupation of Berlin and withdrawal of Western troops.
OVIET BLOC
6 Sep: Ambassador Dobrynin fold Stevenson in New York that Khrushchev would noT
aftend the UN before mid-November, leaving on impression that no decision had been reached but that Khrushchev might come thereafter.
Sep: The commander of the East Germanotorized Riflo Regiment defected to the West and reported: East German training was to be accelerated this fall and completed by the end of October (one month earlier thanis unit was to participateorsaw Pact maneuver some time between late September and November which he believed would be used tolockade of West Berlin; he believed there would be no discharge of personnel in November and that unit strength would be considerably increased by recruits.
OVIET BLOC
ep: There were rumor* from Rumania that Ihe conscript class due for release in October would be held in serviceanuary.
Ulbrichtelevision speech declared that an understanding on Berlin
was the most important task, worning against delays and statingeace treaty will come in any case.
The Soviet Government statement on Cuba, released by TASS, stated-that
the USSR would not follow the lead of the US in calling up reservists,in fact just ordered the release of servicemen who had completedof service. "This alonelear enough indication of our No government would takeeasure if itactionilitaryowever, in view of US threats,Union "must do everything to be prepared, to see to ithe strategic rocket forces and the ground forces, thedefense, the navy and particularly the submarinerecope with their tasks. If the aggressor unleashes war, our armedbe ready torushing retaliatory blow against theSoviet Government considers it its duty to be vigilant in thisto instruct the Minister of Defense of the USSR and the command ofArmy to take all measures lo bring our armed forces to thereadiness." These, however, "areoncluding section, Ihe statement indicated that "abeen reached in talkserman peace treaty, and that thewas prepared to reckon with the fact that it was difficultUS to negotiate on fhe German treaty now since elections are due(See Cuban section for portions of fhls statement dealing
I Sep: Khrushchev,onversation with Ambassador Kroll of West Germany,he would proceed with the German peace treaty shortly after the US elections; the terms would make continuation of Western occupation of Berlin quite impossible.
(Sep:)
top SrTPRFT
OVIET BLOC
Elements of ihe Soviet Seventh Guards Armyogether with border troops,emonstration for the benefit of the visiting Arab delegations.ock attack from Turkeyubsequent counterattack. (TheIsorder Guard defector; size of the exercise is not known.)
)
OVIET BLOC
OVIET BLOC
rip of the Canadian MA to Murmansk was postponed by the Sovietseptember and he was later informed no tickets were available untilep-
top SKPfn-t
tember. The closure of the Moscow-Leningrad highway between Torzhok and Leningrad was believed related to these exercises.
top SFTiTRE
OVIET BLOC
were some signs of increased vigilance related to lhe Berlin situation,appearanceoviet soldier on top of the Brandenburg gate, recon-
SFTfrTT
naissance of lhe sector/zonal border by four or five helicopters, an alleged direction of EGA soldiers to ossembly areas, ond an apparent "air of expectancy" on the part of Ihe Soviets as if they expected "something lohese were attributed to the controversy over Soviet use of ormored personnel carriers to trans-part War Memorial guards in West Berlin.
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ep: An Edit German defector reported that effectiveeptember leaves were reducw toercent and passes toercent because of the Cuban and Berlin situat.ons. However, this is believed to be normal during the fall maneuver period.
employees and workers of an East German rail station northwest of Berlin were
reportedly compelled tosecrecy oath" with regard to military transports during September; whether thisoutine security move or related to some special military movements during September Is not known.
ep: Red Star carried interviews with "indignant civilians" ond reports ofmeetings in the armed forces, said to have been held in GSFG, SGF, the Baltic Fleet and the Odessa Higher Combined-Arms Command School.
ep: The USSR announced that!elegation to the UN General Assembly, opening in New York oneptember, would be led by Foreign Minister Gromyko.
ep: ed Stor editorial staled the Soviet armed forces "now more than ever before must be equal to theirhe "highest combo! readiness" means the highest level of organization, precise execution of orders and instructions, and faultless
discipline. "The.mightyand awesome Soviet armedalways ready to
execute any command of the motherland and destroy anyhe article claimed Soviet possession of nuclear weapons "in adequate quantity ond quality" and first-class equipment of every type. The issue carried more protest meetings from the Soviet aimed forces and more material on alleged US "aggressive policy" toward Cuba.
ep: The Soviets changed back from armored personnel carriers to busses to transport their personnel to the War Memorial in West Berlin, in an apparent move to ease tensions.
OVIET BLOC)
Mid-Sep: Various reports and Soviet statements continued to point to Bloc plans tomoveserlin settlement in November.
ep: Khrushchev returned to Moscow from the Black Sea.
ast Germon troops were extensively engaged in harvest activity Sep:
ep: age one story In Red Star described preparationsVO rocket unit prior to going on combat duty, tying Ihese to "US provocations against Cuba" and the highest combatoint Soviet-Cuban meeting was held in Odessa, accordingravda item of the following day.
ep: Khrushchevelligerent line in talks with the Austrian Vice Chancellor, stating that the USSR would use submarines and rockets to enforce its right of passage to Cubo and hinting that US intervention in Cuba would spark Soviet reaction in Berlin. He indicated he was still thinking of going to New York in the second half of November and would hope to see the President. If there were no results from these contacts, the Soviets would proceed with the peace
rTCffffT
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OVIET BLOC)
ep: treaty. There would be no blockade of Berlin but also no access to malnla (Cont'd) Western troops there. He expressed confidence there would be no war unit it were triggered by craiy, hot-headed action.
SSR declaration reiterated the position that Western occupation of Wes Berlin hos no legal basis and thot recent developments show the "necessity for immediately abolishing the NATO military base in West Berlin."
Khrushchev held an interview with former Belgian Economics Minister Scheyven
(not published untilctober) In which Khrushchev said he would bring the German question up at the UN and made referenceeparate peace treaty under which Soviet forces would be introduced into Berlin.
ource trartsitting Laninokan en route to Moscow reportedly saw soldiers digging
trenches near the roil line. On the trip, Ihe source observed no apparentof rolling stock, increased guards on bridges or railroads or any other unusual military or civil defense activity.
ep: ed Star editorial In honor of the anniversary of the October revolution noted the efforts of the armed forces "to storm ihe heights of military skills" and stated that they must be brought to the highest slote of combat readiness in the light of the world situation and US plans for aggression against Cuba. "This compels Soviet military personnel to be on the alerl every second." The Soviet press also carried articles stating that the general course of US policy was directed toward the unleashingacket-nuclear war against the socialist countries and describing US aggression against Cubaiolation of international law which "can lead to catastrophic consequences."
ep: Ulbricht endorsed the Soviet declaration lhat.negotiations on Berlin could wait until after the US Congressional elections, expressing hope that the West would take steps during Ihe "pause" toavorable atmosphere for negotiations. The speech concluded Ulbricht's visit tooint communique waslargely to Berlin and Germany.
TOP SFr>RF'r
OVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS (U)
ep: Red Star, In on editorial criticizing the Bonn-Paris axil, colled for the highest combaTreadiness of the Soviet armed forces ond unremitting vigilance of Soviet servicemen, and carried an article praising the "efficiency and readiness" of rocket troops whose combat capobility "must be at the highest. '
ep: Accordingeported memorandum of conversations between Soviet officials and the Cuban Ambassador in Genevahe Soviets stated that "everything is prepared for the possibility of Soviet intervention if the UShereobilization of all Soviet forces (the Cuban Ambassador interpreted this toathering of strength In all areas ratherilitaryAll land, sea and air forces" were reported alerted. The USSR hadecision to defend Cuba at all costs and the Soviet people were ready.
ep: Radio Moscowroadcast In English to Southeast Asia concerning a
Red Star article which said again that an order had been issued to bring Soviet"highest combat reodiness" but in which the English version of this was given as "warhis variant of the Russian phrase "nalvysshuyu boyevuyu gotovnost" (highest combat readiness) was not reported In any other Moscow English-language broadcasts, but it couldeflection of what the Soviets actually mean by this phrase.
ep: Red Star carried on editorial titled "The Submarine Fleet is on Combathich praised the "power and combat capability" of the Soviet submarine fleet which is vigilantly watching the maritime frontiers, fulfilling the government order to be at the highest combat readiness, and ready, if the aggressor forces it, to put to sea Immediately and bring down the enemy with rocket strikes and torpedo fire.
ep: Red Star carried another article denouncing the so-calledeptember "anti-Cuban" resolution of the US Senate ond citing other facts as evidence that the situation In the Caribbean was exceedingly strained, reiterating the necessity for the highest state of vigilance ond alertness, and stating that Soviet soldiers are in the highest stale of combai readiness to destroy the aggressors. Another article dealt with increased combat readiness ond widespread meetings to explain thesituation to personnel of the Baltic Military District.
OVIET BLOC)
ep: LRA flight activity in the Western USSR returned to normal levels.
ep: Red Stareport on the state of readiness and trainingadartailation on "day and night" operation. Pravdo carried the text of Gromyko'september speech to the UN General Assembly which stated, inter alia, that "an attack on Cuba would lead to consequences of which the Soviet Government warned the entire world in its well-knowneptember 62
ep: The USSR announced the postponement for all but the lower income groups of
the scheduled exemption from income taxes because of "premeditated aggravation of internationaly Imperialisthreatening universal peace."
ep: Soviet-President Brezhnevisit to Yugoslavia.
ep:Two defectors reporteden from two units of the East German Army were sent to Zwickau for four weeks special training; they were toew regiment for special duty in Berlin.
(Sep:
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arsaw Pact exercise was conducted in western Czechoslovakia, andin the adjoining southern area of East Germany, involving Czech, East
German and Soviet troops. It culminatedarade in Karlovy Vary. The exercise was announced by the Czechs oneptember. The East German units were probably from fhe 7th Tank Division, the Sovief troops possibly from the Eighth Guards Army. Air activity was extensive .
ep: oviet lecturerublic forum In Moscow emphasized that the USSR was making every effort toeaceful solution of the Berlin problem, but Khrushchev cannot wait much longer.eace treaty is ready and can be signed within minutesegotiated settlement is preferable. He then frankly described the horrors of nuclear war, warning that events in Berlin could sparkonflict; the Soviets would win but onlyerrible cost.
ep: Red Stareport from the North Caucasus Military District concerning "intensive nightome of them of long-range. etters were said to have been received during one week testifying to fhe efforts of military personnel to bring their units to the highest state of combat readiness.
Soviet fightersn Air France Uiravelle, ondo Kan Sep: American clipper in the Berlin corridors with close passes; thiseriod of relatively few air incidents.
Khrushchev arrived in Ashkhabad, Turkestan, on the startour of Central
Asia.
Red Star carried an editorial on "training alert" which stressed the importance
of efficiently conducted training alerts "to every unihond ship of the Soviet armed forces"eans of developing their ability to mount instantaneous action. An article described the high state of training and vigilanceank unit of SGF.
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rOP SECRET
ep:
ep:
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A Red Star editorial described the gunnery of naval rocket carriers which staled thoTSovUt sailors must "be ready at the first signal to put to sea andrushing blow against an aggressor."
Pravdo carried another statement warning that the USSR and its allies would have nToption but toeace treaty with East Germony if the Western powers are not responsive to Soviet proposals.
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA
3 Oct: Pravda carried an article on US policy toward Cubo and the Monroe Ltoctrinethat, "if there are Soviet weapons in Cuba, then they have been sentaccordance with the will of the Cubanhe objectives of Sovietand military specialists as aid to Cuba are purelySoviet
has warned the American ruling circles through the TASSthat it would be now impossible lo ottack Cuba without punishment."
First Additional SAM sites were identified on photography ot Manati, Senado, Man-week zanillo, Chambasand Esmeralda, bringing the total identified under construction of Oct:
Jet: Two more SAM sites were identified in Oamaguey Province, bringing the total
ct: The first of the MRBM sites (Sonossibly hod an operational capability.
ct: US aircraft made the photoreconnaissonce flights which first detected the
Oct: Cubo)
2 Oct: Red Stor continued the publication of letters from its readers on the readiness of units and ships in light of the world situation, with an introduction claiming that tht US hadituotion in which some incident could "develop into Ihe catastrophe of world thermonuclear war." It reiterated thot everything was being done to fulfill the government's requirement thot the armed forces be brought to the highest state of combat readiness. An alleged letter said thot personnel of an interception unit were always on the alert and reody ond that "weapons must ol-woys be reody for bottle, and doubly so in these days."
ugoslav official reported he was "aboutercent sure" that Khrushchev would
attend the UN General Assembly in about three weeks.
4 TASS carried warnings concerning Soviet military retaliatory capabilities inUS should resort to warerman peace treaty. Two Soviet officials at
ihe UN indicatedctober that the Berlin problem would be solved one way oronother by the end of the year.
The newly arrived Soviet Ambassador in tho Congo reportedly offered military
assistance against Katanga ifN plan failed and the UN was removed from ihe Congo.
ct: The East German Pony Central Committeelenum and announced that fhe Party Congress would be held in January.
ct: The East German railways reportedlyommunications exercise or CPX involving mobilization procedures (West German report).
Soviet President Brezhneven-day visit fo Yugoslaviaommuni-
que was issued asserting an identity of views on international questions.
Octcl):
Warsaw Poet exercise was conducted in northwest Poland
Oct:)
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top sfcrffr
OVIET BLOC
Soviet newspaper in the Kirgiz Republic contained the first noted press reference
Oct: to civil defense drills being organized and implemented in that port of the Soviet Union.
5 Oct: Red Starengthy discussion by officers of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces concerning the combat readiness of troops under modern conditions and readiness doctrine in light of the Cuban situation. It stated, among other things, that the underestimation of the timely placement of armed forces in appropriate combat readiness in the faceilitary threat had ofteneason forof particular countries, thot the Soviet reverses at the start of the German invasion1 could have been substantially reduced hod the troops beenin time and prepared to repel the German attack, and that today all branches of the armed forces, and particularly the Strategic Rocket Troops, are required to maintain high combat readiness. It defined "highest combatas "that state in which troops are able at any moment to repelurprise nuclear attack of an aggressor and, at the first signal, to undertake resolute combat operations aimed at the complete destruction of theSee appendix)
5 Oct; Red Slot carried an editorial on the alert status for PVO rocket troops, referred to as "combat duty. "
reconnaissance aircraft showed great interest in the movements of the US
Kitty Hawk to Japan from Hawaii.
7 Oct: On the anniversary of the East German regime and ending of the SED plenum, both Khrushchev and Ulbricht reiterated their desire to settle the Berlin problem through negotiations and to resortnilateral solution only if agreement proves impossible. Another report was received that Khrushchev intended to be in New York, this time onovember.
Oct:)
TOP SECEfil
OVIET BLOC
An East German military delegation, headed by Defense Minister Hoffmann, arrived
in the USSRen-day visit ond was met by Malinovskly and later by Khrushchev. It was ihe first official German military visit to the USSR since World War II. Kozlov slated that its experience In tho Soviet Union would help in augmenting theafforded by the Berlin Wall.
igh-level Soviet Porty delegation, headed by Demichev, arrived in East Ger-
many, remaining untilctober.
ct: Khrushchev returned to Moscow from an extended tour of Central Asia.
ct: oviet truck convoy was reportedly observed east of Berlin carrying vehicle
registration numbers of the Carpathian Military District (the validity of thiswas never established).
ct: Red Starest of combat readiness of rocketeers; in accordance with the "well-known TASSvery soldier and officer was said to be morally prepared for the execution of anyis the highest combat readiness in action."
ct: Gromyko in New York reviewed the standard Soviet line on Berlin to Secretory
Rusk, stating that the USSR would deeply regret having to act without the US and its allies.
Oct: Soviet BISONs andonducted heavy reconnaissance of the US corrier Midway In the Far East.
Oct:)
uirf
etl Red Stor onnounced thot the doted oreo in the Barents ond Koro Seos foe jointId be extended untilovember.
A Warsow Pact exercise wai conducted in Rumania,
ctooeT,fiouunieu nie exercises 'ot^rcenlo, the defense ministers of Rumania, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary and military delegations of other Warsaw Treaty members.
i2 Oct- Red Star reported that "Intense combat training" was in progress in the Army and Navy and that military personnel were increasing their combat readiness which "now has to be maintained on fhe highost level."
33
ct:)
PQB ST PR FT
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OVIET BLOC
ct: There wai on extensive reorganization of the Moscow domestic services radio facilities, involving particularly an expansion of services to the Ear East ond Central Asia.
Oct: Bloc-5)
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EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO CUBA
ct: Analysis of photos takenctober confirmed the presenceoviet medium range missile site near San Cristobal.
ct; All remaining of theAM sites in Cubo, except Maldonado, had been identified.
Oct: Photos of San Julian airfield showed thatere being uncrated.
Oct: The President wos informed of the MRBM evidence, and the first of the series of
meetings of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council was held to chart the US course of action.
ct; ere identified af Santa Claraotal ofas subsequently estimated).
More photographic evidence was obtained of MRBM sites in Cuba at San Cristobal
and at Sagua la Grande. The IRBM sites near Guanajay were detected, but they, like the IRBM site subsequently fou nd ot Remedios, were probably not to bebefore December.
Four of the Komor missile boats had been deployed to Banes from Mariel.
ct; The President saw Gromyko who stated that Soviet assistance to Cuba was only for defensive purposes.
The US authorized onderies of military moves,einforce-
ment of air defenses In Florida and preliminary preparations for navalofreviously scheduled amphibious exercise in Puerto Rico served as cover for the movement of elements of the Atlantic Fleet to sea.
Rodio Moscow stated that the US naval maneuvers in the Caribbean area were being
carried out to prepare for an invasion of Cuba. The maneuver was described as "ridiculous" when rockets exist which are capable of carrying hydrogen bombs around the earth to designated targets.
ct: The latest version of FAN SONG rodar (SAM guidance) was identified at one of the Cuban SAM sites.
Rumors were beginning to circulate in Washington that some major action was impend-
ing; the movement of aircraft into Florida continued. President Kennedy leftampaign trip to preserve on appearance of "normalcy."
The President suddenly returned from his campaign trip becauseslightOct: Work ot the MRBM sites was continuing.
Oct:)
TOP ^rpFT
EVELOPMENTS RELATING TO
US military preparations were intensified, with various Marine units prepared for Oct: movement, preparations underway for the reinforcement of Guantanamo, further reinforcement of southern Florida, stationing of four destroyers between Cuba and southern Florida, and other preparatory alerts and preparations for further
There wosrop in Soviet press comment on Cubo, Pravdo onct: October carryingoundup concerning US public opinion on policy toward Cuba,ull awaiting US actions. Byctober, sufficient evidence of US preparations must certainly have been available to Moscow, if not sooner, to indicate that some strong US reaction was likely. Onndctober, the US press carried articles statingajor US policy decision was pending.
Oct;)
OVIET BLOC DEVELOPMENTS
ct: Khrushchev told Kekkonen thot, while he hod expected the US to attack Cuba in late August or early September, he now believed that the US would not take direct action. He soid he was bound to no timetable on Berlin and did not believe that the West woulduclear war over Berlin.
ct: The USSR announced that there would be extended rocket firings Into the Pacific during the periodctober toovember. The first extended test was made onctober.
i
igh-level Polish political delegation, headed by Gomulka, arrived in East
Germanyour-day visit which concludedommunique stressing the urgent neederman peace treaty.
Khrushchev, in an interview with Ambassador Kohler, reaffirmed the Soviet Intent
to take no action on Berlin prior to the US elections; he mentioned the possibility of visiting the UN in late November or early December but did not commit himself.
ch An All-Army Conference on Ideological Questions opened in Moscow and wos addressed some time during the session (which apparently concludedctober) by Marshal Malinovskly.
ct: Red Star again charged the US with undertaking dangerous provocations directed
athermonuclear world war and staled, "Our answer to theseis obvious and clear: the highest combai readinessI" An article warned that "people who rely on force usually respect and understand the fact that other people may respond to force by force."
Oct:)
TOP SFruiVT
OVIET BLOC
cl: Izvestiyo angrilyumor reported In the New York Times that the USSR was prepared toore mcderote course in Cuba if the US eased Its stand on Berlin.
ct: oviet military medical delegation arrived in Yugoslavia.
Och)
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IB Oci: II was noted again (by EUCOM) lhat there hod been on extended period ofinactivity in GSFG since conclusion of the maneuver in the temporarytricted areaeptember, with training largely confined to low-level activity near home stations. GSFG-conirol led "shadow- nets believed associated with exercise facilities had appeared.
IB Oct: An unconfirmed SHAPE report stated that shuttle trains arriving in Easi Germany beginningctober were filled and those returning were empty. ater report as ofovember said thai three-fourths of the returning trains were empty resulting in an apparent troop increase in GSFG.)
Bucharest announced the termination of Warsaw Pact exercises in Rumania ond
the attendance of Marshal Grechlco and others (see previous items).
cct: Polish professors and students reportedly received orders to return home from Sweden.
oviet naval detachment visited the East German port of Rostok; it wasthe Commander of the Baltic Reel ond received by Ulbrichtctober.
Izvestiyoew section called "Militaryo be written by
leading Soviet military commanders and specialists. Marshal of Armored Troops Rotmistrov led off with an article stating that the tank units were in "the slate of high combat readiness." Red Stor carried an article entitled "Washington in the Fog of Warhich said that Washington is acting as though It Istate of war against Cuba and lhat the limes are gone "when imperialist sharks may go unpunished after seizing and swallowing other countries."
cl: Gomulko told the East German parliamenteace treaty with East Germany would be concluded in the very near future. There were hints in the Soviet press that Moscow might be preparing to demand the seating of both Germany* In the UN; Provda omitted Ulbricht's reference to continuing US-Soviet discussions after the US elections.
cl: Khrushchev conferred with the East German military delegation visiting Moscow; Molinovskiy was also present.
Och)
TOP SFfPFT
OVIET BLOC
(Monday)ct
CUBAN ANO GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The US press (AM) further statedajor policy decision wos impending.
A Pravda article carried in advance by TASS warned that "alarming news" hod come in that Washington is "hatching another adventure."
Rapid construction was continuing at the Cuban missile sites; the possible nuclear woiheod building at San Cristobal was completely assembledctober.
A submarine was sighted alongside the Soviet naval tanker Terek in the North Atlantic (It waslass submarine which had boon on patrol In the western Atlantic sinceeptember and was then on its way home).
Guantanamo was reinforced by three Marine battalions and the dependents were evacuated.
The dispersal of bombers of the Strategic Air Command began, and preparations were mode to implement an increased airborne alert of SAC oircraft.
US allies ond the Soviet Ambassador were informed of US plans in the afternoon, prior to the President's speech; the US colled for on urgent UN meeting.
DT: President Kennedy made his quarantine speech, announcing US plans to cut off the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba, describing the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba, and warning of US retaliation If the missiles in Cuba were used against the Western Hemisphere.
US forces worldwide went onoincident with the President's speech.
The US continued other military preparations,uildup of forces for possible action against Cuba. The US press onovember stoted that five US Army divisions had been earmarkedossible invasion of Cubast Airborne, the 1st andnfantry, and the 1stnly the latter actually moved, beginningctober from Texas.
Havana radio stated thot Cuban forces had been ordered on an alert. Soviet media failed to reoct to the President's speech for six hours.
Oct: Cuba)
Sri'fiVI-T
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ct
BLOC MILITARYSSR
Moscow requested assurance of beacons for several Arctic airfields-
USAREUR reported the recent completionecond GSFG tactical pipeline to Allsredt (southwestern East Germany).
The West German press reported that Soviet soldiers had been sighted at four locations along the Berlin Wall.
Oct: )
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BLOC MILITARYATELLITES
(Tuesday) IN OctUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Various US preparatory moves wereworld-wide military alert, deployment of air defense units to the east coast, an extension of Navy and Marine tours by one yoar, etc. The President signed the order authorizing the callupen.
PM: The Presidentroclamation malting the blockade effective4 October (EDT).
The OAS unanimously endorsed US octlon.
Fourteen hours after the President's speech, Moscow radio carried the Soviet Government statement charging the US with piracy, calling all arms to Cuba defensive, warning that the US was courting thermonuclear war and referring to the Soviet nuclear capability ai on effective deterrent. It ignored the question of missile sites ond was noncommittal obout specific Soviet counteraction or Intention to support Cuba against any US action, but said that the USSR wouldetaliatory blow "if the aggressors toucht distorted the President's warningissile strike from Cuba against any Western Hemisphere country would be metull retaliatory response on the USSR, claiming that he hod said that the US wouldetaliatory blowingle nuclear bomb fell on US territory. It stated that Ihe Soviet Union was requesting Security Council consideration of US violations of the UN charter.
Fifteen minutes before this release, Moscow radiotatement denouncing the President's speech and stating that he had said that Cuba was being turned into an "important strategic base" of the USSR but without mentioning missiles. Foreign audionces but not the Soviet people were informed that the President had alleged that offensive rocket weapons were being sot up In Cuba, which was described by Moscow as "mythical."
Moscoweries of announcements (which continued throughout the week)ave of workers' protest meetings throughout the USSR expressing solidarity with the Soviet stand.
Of total Moscow radio commentary, 4B% wos devoted to Cuba, with the total risingnh and maintaining close to this percentage throughh (an extent unmatched in any previous international crisis).
The President of TASS reportedly stated In Hiroshima that the Soviets would sink US ships if Soviet ships wereimilar stotement was reportedly made by lhe Soviet MA in Washington.
Of the nine Soviet surface-to-surface missile sites in Cuba, four MRBM siles were considered fully operational, and two others had some operational capability. The three IRBM sltos were under rapid construction with an estimated operational capability as of the first weak of December. There was no firm evidence ol the presence of nuclear warheads ot any of the sites, but some construction was under way which was suspected to be nuclear storage bunkers.
Oct: )
ct
CUBAN AND GENERAL
Castro announced "rnobNIzation" ond Cuban armed forces were puttate of alert. Cuban messages reflected an alert status and intensified patrol of the coasts.
Castro,minute speech, denied the presence of offensive weapons in Cuba and categorically refused to allow any inspection of Cuban territory.
Soviet leaderselegation of Rumanian leaders returning from Central Asio, and most of the Presidiuminner for the Rumanians and the theater.
Moscow announced that the ambassadors of the socialist countries had been asked to call on Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov.
Gromyko arrived in East Berlin from his trip to the UN.
Oct: Cuba-2)
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BLOC MILITARYSSR
The USSR announced deferment of release of troop* In the Strategic Rocket Forces, PVO ond submarine fleet, cancellation of all leovei, and orders to "raise the bottle readiness and vigilance of all troops."
Marshal Grechko ordered representatives of the ormies of the Warsaw Pact to "carry out several measures in increasing the military preparedness" of Pact forces.
The USSR cancelled travel by foreign diplomats and recalled most foreigners already travelling to Moscow immediately.
Observations in Moscow indicated normal activity; this continued through fhe crisis.
Oct: )
BLOC MILITARYJS'iii
5
BLOC MILITARY
Accordingort German report,ctober, oloments of four GSFG division* were observed out of garrison with oil movements westward; according to NORTHAG, small groups of Soviet troops were stationed in compsumber of points along the zonal border {dates of actual movement not given).
Oct;)
TOP SECPFT
cr oz
bloc militaryzechoslovakia
a collateral report statedan was placed on the use of vehicles from factory motor pools for long-distance official travel; Communist Party functionaries in factories were alerted to tighten security on industrial installations, arms depots at factories wore readied
ct:)
TOP SFPfffiT
ct
BLOC MILITARY
for immediate use and guards increased on installations; management staffs were put on extra shifts. These measures were rescinded at small industrial establishmentsovember but were still in effect asovember at large plants.
BLOC MILITARYATELLITES (Other than Czechoslovakia)
Traveler observations in the Erfurt/Eisenach area suggested possible implementation of an alert plan in the East German 4th Motorized Rifle Division with troops reported in the field and an EGA unit from Sonderhausen reported to have departed for field duty. The East German border command Erfurt/Eisenach area was possibly on an alert. (Note: most reports of East German alert measures are for
Oct:)
CWedrsesdoy) ctUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Khiushchevenage to Bertrond Russell staled that the USSR would make no "recklessop-level meeting would be useful; he warned that if the US carried out its program of "pirate action" the USSR would have no alternative but to "make use of the means of defense ogainst thehe Soviet press gave heavy play to the exchange of messages between Russell and Khrushchev.
Mr. William Knox, US businessman,hreeuarter hour interview with Khrushchev at the letter's request. Khrushchev said that it was now too late for the US to take over Cuba, that eventually he would give orders toS blockader if Soviet ships were stooped. He several times brought up the question of US missiles in Turkey, indicating that the US would have to learn to live with Soviet missiles in Cuba. He said Ihe Soviets hod AA and ballistic missiles with both nuclear and high-ex plosive warheads In Cuba, that these% under Soviet control and would never be given to the Cubans. The missiles would not be fired except in defense of Cuba or the Soviet Union; if the US attacked Cuba, Guantanamo would disappear with the first action. He would not be the first touclear weapon, but "if the US insists on war, we'll all meet together in hell." He wouldummit meeting; he hod been planning and might still go to fhe UN this fall. He maintained the standard Soviet line on Berlin, but without threats.
Soviet propaganda carried numerous commentaries supporting the Soviet Gavii'rnmeiit statement. The press emphasized the readiness of Soviet forces, featuring pictures of strategic rockets taking off, and there were repealed references fo Ihe warningoviet retaliatory blow if war was unleashed. There were no explicit denials of the President's specific statements obout the construction of missile sites, but the commentaries impugned the veracity of the President's allegations without denying them unequivocally. The statements claimed thot the Soviel Union's powerful rockets obviated fhe need for missile sites outside the USSR and maintained that all weapons sent to Cuba were purely defensive in nature. The allegation of Soviet offensive rockets in Cuba was described as "false from beginning to end." Generally, the crisis was pictured more in termsS-Cuban disputeS-Soviet dispute, ond It was maintained that it was absurd that Cuba could threaten the US. Propaganda remained equivocal as to the Soviet response to tho quarantine measures and did not carry fhe statement of the President of TASS In Japan thai, if the US attacked Soviet ships, the USSR would sink US ships.
A KGB officer stated thot he did not expect wor but that the Soviet Union wouldtrong response to US action on Cuba (nature unspecified).
The first of several small demonstrations against fhe US Embassy in Moscow occurred.
Oct: )
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U Oct
CUBAN AND GENERAL
It become apparent thot the diversion of Soviet shipping from the quarantine zone hod begun (this was apparently actually ordered and begun onctober).
The US Strategic Air Command went onith one-eighth ot its aircraft on airborne alert.
US Poloris submarines put out from Holy Loch on secret courses (press).
Gromyko departed Berlin for Moscow; the Rumanian delegation left Moscow.
Hungarian and Bulgarian authorities possibly deliberately interfered with communications of the US legations in Budapest and Sofia.
Oct;)
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Red Star carried an article from the Baku PVO District ofctober stating thot all ^iTsomwl were at their combat posts and the rocketeers were -in the highest state of combatn editorial said that the Soviet Government was "taking all necessary measures to ensure that it will not be taken by surprise" ond that Soviet soldiers would double their vigilance and combat readiness.
The initial indications of preparations to activate alternate or dispersal airfields were noted in East Germany with the movement of Soviet trucks to Schlotheim airfield on the nightctober (this was followed by similar activity at several other fields in East Germany).
Oct: )
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BLOC MILITARYAST GERMANY
An East German Border Command defector stated his unit wos placed on pre-alert0 October, followed by higher combat readiness (Erhoehte KampfbereitschattJ. Under this, all personnel were restricted, interior guard was ordered to return to home stations, line companies resumed patrolling, men were recalled from leave, discharges were suspended until further notice, border obstacle construction was suspended. No additional men, weapons or equipment were received, and no combat gas mask filters were issued.
A covert report states that the EGA and People's Police were placed on the highest state of alert readiness (Hoechsteut this is notrench report of unknown reliability stated the EGA went on state of Alert4 October.
Oct: Bloc-3)
top ^ruBT
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS US source* slated the blockade would be continued as long as the missiles stayore US troops moved into Key West.
A private letter from Kennedy lo Khrushchev was said to haveery stern warning (press).
The US let Ihe Soviet tanker Bukhorest through the quarantine. Zorin, al the UN, called the US photos forgeries (press).
The Soviet Union accepted, and the US agreed tohan! proposal of
ctober for simultaneous suspension of Soviet military shipments and the US blockade,
but the US reaffirmed that the issue was Ihe removal of the missiles (press).
Marshal Malinovskiy told the French MA that Cubaogger pointed at the heart of the US, that if the Soviets can put up with Turkey and Iran the US should be oble to put up with Cuba.
Red Star sold the Soviet people would offer Cuba all aid and support.
In two commentaries for foreign audiences, Radio Moscow claimed that there were no long-range rockets in Cuba, but generally the denials continued to be carefully hedged and to take the line that all weapons In Cuba were defensive in nature; the Soviet press and radio portrayed the UN Security Council session ofctober as offering no proof that Cubahreat to the Western hemisphere. The Soviet press remained silent on the turnback of Soviet ships to Cuba, emphasizing "peaceful cargoes" to Cuba.
Pravdaispatch from Washington warning ogoinst the possibility of further US action against Cuba andS press item citing Congressional circles as believing that if Cubo did not submit to US demands, "ihe invasion order could be given in the course of several days."
The Soviet Ambassador in Ankara attempted to induce the Turks lo acquiesce in the mini In exchange deal proposed in Khrushchev'sctober letter.
Kharlomov told Kohler that control of the situation in the US hod passed into the hands of the military, that the Soviet Union could not be talked to like Belgium or Luxembourg, but heenuine desire for conciliation and talks.
The Soviet Ambassador in Djakarto told the Indian Ambassador that If tho US sank ships, the Soviets would sink ships, but that the Soviets are willing to negotiate and would hold off their ships during talks; removal of the rockets should be negotiated.
At leastoviet dry cargo ships en route Cuba wero known to havo reversed course (begun onith tankers continuing toward Cuba and one dry cargo ship withelicopters aboard also continuing on course.
Oct:)
CUBAN AND GENERAL
Threelass submarine, were sightedndctober near the quarantine tone and four were believed In the area (indicating departure from home bases at least by early October).
Photographic intelligence identified possible nuclear warheadese of the launch sites in Cuba ond provided the first identification of Soviet ground troops, at RemediosROG launcher andndther armored vehicles wereank park oflso found near Havana; rapid construction was continuing at the four MRBM sites with camouflage employed.
Photography of San Julian airfield showed two assembledndn crates.
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Red Stor carried portions of Malinovskiy's speech to the Army ideological conference; it emphasized the power of Soviet missiles and the effectiveness of Soviet defenses against enemy nuclear attack but contained no direct referencereventive strike. It defined "highest combat readiness" as the ability to bring the might of the armed forces, ot the first signal, "into immediate action ogainst the enemy, his strategic mililary, economic and political centers and main concentrations ofn this, the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces "is extraordinarilySeo appendix)
No public appearances of Soviet leaders were reported in the press,arge array of Soviet marshals (including the commanders of all types of forces except Chuykov) and other leading officers atlended the Rumanian Armed Forces Day reception in Moscow.
Oct:)
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The Western Military Liaison Mission* wero denied travelovember from two areas near the East-West German border in proximity to the adtobohns and air corr.dors; no significant military activity was detected in the area during the restriction.
BLOC MILITARYATELLITES
Heavy tracked vehicle movement was reported through Eisenoch in the early morning, possibly indicating some local border alert exercise.
Elements of the East Germanotorized Rifle Regiment were observed preparing to leave home stations ot Stahnsdorf; approximately one-half to two-thirds of the vehicles were apparently absent from the installation ofotorized Rifle Regiment at Sondershausen.
Observations in Czechoslovakia showed the (Colin tank and vehicle park which was lull onctober to be empty onctober while additional equipment was seen at Stribro (and continuinguggesting some shift in dispositions for alert purposes. Czech garrisons throughout the alert showed most troops at home stationsinimum of activity on roads ond some evidence that vehicles were loaded forraveler, who reportedzech officer stated that the Czech Army was on an alert, also reported heavy military traffic between Prague andctober (the latter point Is on the West German border).
Attache observations in Bulgariactober and continuing through the crisis showed generally lhat troops were in barracks areas, road traffic was very light, but more than lhe usual number of ambulances were on Ihe roods; there were few additional security measures, and aircraft apparently were not dispersed. Some Bulgarian troops recently released from duty and some specialists from the reserves were reportedly colled up during the week ofctober.
Oct:)
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CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The UShite House statement warning thot further US action may be necessary because work on the missile sites was continuingapid pace."
The US was continuing its militaryarine HAWK battery further reinforced Guantanamo.
The UN announced that Khrushchev hademporary suspension of shipments lo Cuba,
The USebanese ship en route to Cuba (the only ship actually boarded during the quarantine).
The Presidentrivate letter from Khrushchev (not published) offering to withdraw the missiles under UN supervision in return for US agreement to lift the quarantine and give assurances against an invasion of Cuba; the letter was answered favorably by the President onctober (press).
The Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Washington (known to be head of the KGB) asked the diplomatic correspondent for ABC in Washington to inquire of the State Deportment whether the US would pledge not to invade Cuba if Castro agreed to dismantle fhe missile sites under international supervision.
A Provdo article for fhe first time made mention that fhe US was "said to hove received information on the delivery of Soviet offensive rockets" to Cuba; Red Stareavy US military buildup in the Caribbean ond Florida in advance offFe President'sctober speech; articles throughout the Soviel press repeatedly asserted that thewasrelude to imminent US Invoslon of Cuba; the Red Star focus on Cuba remained Intense with special attention to the readiness of Soviet rocket forces and large pictures of rockets on first twoed Star article entitled "Cuba Is Not Alone" slated thot the peaceloving peoples have enougKlorces to5 invasion of Cuba, but no specific Soviet countermeasuresS invasion were pledged.
ear""ed oncalled "Reason Must Triumph" colling on the US to realize that "fhe situation, aggravated to the extreme, can push the world into the abyss ofrovdo dispatch stated thai ihe US hod been tokenine "beyondingle step would take it fo the calamity of war." Soviet propaganda generally emphasized the judgment displayed by the Soviet Union in seeking to avoid war, in contrast to the war hysteria in the US; there wos one reference to the possibilityummit meeting fo counteract fhe fhreaf of thermonuclear war.
The Moscow radio went out of Its way to reassure the West on Berlin, stating that "no danger" threatens West Berlin.
Soviet leaders resumed their public appearancos.
The British War Office reported it hod received numerous requests from Sovieton which USAF units are based; the requests were
Oct: )
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CUBAN AND GENERAL
Hovono radio carried information on civil defense and air bombing ondampaign for blood donations (the call for blood donors was repeated during the following days).
Oct:)
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Red Stor gave very heavy coverage to combat readiness generally ond to the capabilities crihTrocker forces in particular,ull page of articles concerning training in vorioui rocket units. It noted that the government order to increase combat reodiness was directed first to the Strategic Rocket Forces which were "increasing their combat readiness ond vigilance tenfold." Malinovskiy's definition of highest combat readiness, carried the provious day, wos reiterated,eminder thot measures were being taken by the Soviet Government "to prevent beingighest combat readiness and "trebled vlgllanco" were demanded of all forces.
A Red Star article, datelmed "unidentified base,ndicated that most of the submarines from that base were at sea; "the submariners' piers are now sparsely populated; the majority of boats have gone to sea." (Note: This may be the first Soviet press reference to an apparent dispersal of submarines as part of the readiness measures; that such action was taken is further indicated in theovember order cancelling the alert and in Khrushchev's speech ofecember.)
Another Red Star article described the increased vigilance of radarmen ond signalmenVO rodor unit of the GSFG; reference was mode to standing combat watch and duty shifts.
US attaches, testing the Soviet travel ban, worerip to the Belorussian, Carpathian and Kiev MDs For thectober.
A large number of Northern Float surface ships wite reported operating off tho Kola Inlet (see entry ofctober).
Oct: )
top .secret
Observations generally indicated alert status of both GSFG and EGA units at or near homeruck driver reported the Soviet caserne ot Dallgow-Doeberitz hod streets lined with trucks combat-loaded in march order and garages empty.
BLOC MILITARYATELLITES
Observations showed no aircraft at certain normally occupied Czech airfields.
Oct: Bloc-2)
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(Saturday)ct
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Khrushchevtatement, carried by Moscow radio, stating that the Soviet Union would pull missiles from Cubo if the US did the some from Turkey; the missiles in Cuba are under Soviet control. The proposal was rejected by the UStatement saying that the Cuban situation must be settled.
US officials stoted that the US mult actew days unless the Soviet build-up in Cuba stops (press). Stevenson was said to hove told US allies the US would bomb the missile sites if dismantling was not begun soon (press).
peech delivered to the Supreme Soviet onecomber, Khrushchev stated: "In the morning ofctober we received information from our Cuban comrades and from other sources which directly stated lhat this attack (on Cuba) would be carried out within the next two or threeince immediate action to preserve the peace wasessage was therefore sent to the US President proposing thot the US agree not to invade and call off the blockade ond that the Soviet Union would then be ready to remove weapons described by Ihe US asNote that despite this statement, lhe Khrushchev letter ofctober did not coll for Ihis and that il was not untilctober that the letter described above was sent; Khrushchev had, however, proposed this privately onctober.)
Soviet media tailed to make any reference to Khrushchev's private letter to Kennedy ofctober, but did carry his proposalrade of missile bases. Between the release of thectober letter and thectober letter, Soviet propaganda wos generallyime-marking character. There was no mention of lhe US rejection of the missile trade proposal, but propaganda put declining emphasis on Ihe risks which the US was running, and there was no concerted campaign to push the missile exchange proposal. Thereew references, in Ihectober particularly, suggesting that the US should remove its missile bases from Turkey and other bases abroad, but this question was not stressed.
The Soviet press, continuing to maintain there were no Soviet offensive sites In Cuba, laid increased stress on efforts to discredit alleged US "faked" photographs of missile pads under construction for the launching of offensive rockets.
The Soviet press ceased editorial comment on Cuba which was not resumed untilctober although heavy news commentaries continued.
Red Stor carried the US warning lhat further actions would be justified if aggressive military preparations continued in Cuba.
Moscow published Khrushchev's messagehanl accepting his proposal to keep Soviet ships out of the interception rone temporarily, but no more Soviet ships turned back.
The US0 Air Force reservists to active duty.
Soviet leaders made no public appearances.
Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki postponed his scheduled visit to Yugoslavia because of the "strained International situation over Cuba."
Oct: )
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CUBAN AND GENERAL
would be taken against any interference with air
The US warned that "counteraction" Surveillance of Cuba (press).
Aos downed in eastern Cuba,
Castroublic announcement mar everywhich invades Cuban diTHSpace can only do so at the risk of facing defensiveradio claimed that AA batteries drove off unidentified planes In eastern
PI showed thai the construction of MRBM and IRBM sites was continuing and provided additional evidence that each was touclear storage bunker. The assembly ofas also continuing.
Oct:)
3
BLOC MILITARYSSR
Red Star continued articles emphasizing combat readiness, stating that the Soviet"was forced to bring its armed forces to the highest state of combat readiness because of the tense international situation brought about by thehe first deputy commander of the Ground Forces stated that "the dangerew war has never been sonother articleubmarine base said there had been no outward signs of changes in the life of sailors since the Soviet statement on "USas before, ships go out to sea and return, take on torpedoes, refuel andut the sailors are "living in the highest state of combatNote the implicit contrast with the item on submarines of the preceding day.)
A West European railroad group which had been in Moscow and Leningrad had observed no changes in the railroad administrationctober.
A night practice in Moscow forovember parade was possibly used to cover the movement of missile and associated equipment through Moscow to points north andof the city. (The purpose of this activity was not clear sinceamore effectiveof missile movements could be achieved by use of peripheral roads outside the city.)
eport received subsequentlyormer resident of Batumi stated that no unusual military activity was observed thereatrol of the area by three MJGs; no naval vessels moved, no troop movements, no new security measures at transportation facilities or military installations; leaves not cancelled and no recruiting observed.
Oct:)
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(Sunday)clUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
A Khrushchev message, broadcastST, stated that an order had been issued to dismantle weapons described as'bffensive" and that instructions had previously been issued to cease further construction on the sites. He indicated his willingness to have the Soviel dismantling of missiles in Cuba subjected to verification by the UN but the precise method of verification was not clear and subject to further agreement. No mention was made of the Turkish base question. In return, he said he trusted Kennedy's "assurances" that there would be no invasion of Cuba. The message suggested that at some point in the negotiations he intended to press for an end of US overflights of Cuba and the USSR and also an end to peripheral reconnaissance of the USSR. The message statedS reconnaissance aircraft had intruded over Chukotsk onctober which could be takenomber and "push usataliolation of Cuban air space could have "dangerous consequences. Kuznetsov is going to the UN (he arrived that night).
Kennedy replied to the foregoing message stating that firm undertakings on the part of both governments should be promptly carried out. The US violation of Chukotsk wos describedavigational erroruclear sampling aircraft.
A lack of advonce notice to Soviet propagandists on the Khrushchev statement was indicated by the fact that an hour after the message was released the text of thectober message was still being broadcast byeveral foreign languages.
Soviet propaganda on the crisiseak ofercent of total commentary time to all radio audiences, mostly given to broadcasting the Khrushchev statement.
Castro issued his fiveend of economic sanctions against Cuba, cessation of all subversive activities against Cuba, cessation of "pirateessation of violations of Cuban space by US ships ond planes, and US withdrawal from Guantanamo.
Saboteurs destroyed four power stations at the Maracaibo oil wells following the Cuban radio call for terrorism against US installations.
in* oiocropaganda campaign that unilateral US action had been averted byoves and hailing the action as averting thermonuclear war and opening the way For solving many other questions by peaceful means,
A mass rally In Peiping was held in support of Cubaessage was sent ro Ihe Cubans siat.ng that any US imperialist provocation against Cubarovocation against the tn.nesee.ping broadcast Castro's demand for US withdrawal from Guantanamo.
uba)
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Several reports from Sofia indicated that during the week ofovember city-wide meetings were held to discuss evacuation procedures in case of war; ambulance traffic in Sofia appeared unusually high. (Note: These were virtually the only reports of Increased civil defense activity In the Bloc during the crisis.)
Observations in Czechoslovakia again showed several airfields void of aircraft; coverage of westernctober also showed all troops apparently confined to barracks areas, vehicles loaded and in ready roll position, few reservists seen, and no evidence early callup reserves or younger classes. Military rood traffic was virtually nil.
ct: Bloc)
(Monday) ct
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Kennedy named McCloy, Ball ond Gilpatricpecial team to coordinate diplomatic activity at the UN; the quarantine ond air reconnaissance were to continue (press).
The US announced the quarantine would be lifted for two dayshant's visit to Cubo (beginningir reconnaissance was also temporarily lifted.
A "high military source" in Moscow was quoted by the press as saying that Costro would probably have to go alongoviet-US settlement; the Turkey arms withdrawal was dropped by Ihe Soviet Union because of the USS invasion of Cuba would haveoviet military response inevitable in his opinion. (Note: This wos not reported officially and the source is not known.)
Kuznetsovhant that the missiles were now being dismantled and shipped out ond that when dismantling wos completed the USSR would report to the Security CouncilN team be sent to verify the dismantling. However, the USSR would not permit the UN to inspect incoming Soviet ships to verify that they were not corrying offensive arms but would accept such inspection by Red Cross representatives from neutral countries.
Low-level reconnaissance ofissile launch positions showed nine hod the erectors moved out of sight, but construction was continuing at two of the probable nuclear weapons storage sites ond at least two of the MRBM sites. The arched roof structures, believed for the housing of nuclear weapons, had been completed at three of the MRBM sites ond were underat oil others except one. Camouflage and concealment of the sites was continuing.
The Soviet Charge in Budapest asked the US Legation Counselor at the Turkish National Day reception when the US Government would reply to the Soviet proposal that the US dismantle missile bases in Turkey.
Czech leader Novotny arrived in Moscow (the first of the Satellite leaders to make the |unket to see Khrushchev except for fhe Rumanians who wero there when the crisisovotny left onctober.
Oct; Cuba)
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Abnormal travel restrictions on Western attaches and diplomats were lifted in the USSR.
The pressigh Soviet military source as stating that the ban on leaves in the armed forces would remain in effect until the US lifted the Cuban blockade; he also said that hod the US attacked Cuba world war would have been inevitable. (Note: Presumably, this is the same source reported on the preceding page.)
Moscow announced the appointment of Army General Pavel Batov as Chief of Staff ofWarsaw Pact forcesoutine move unrelated to the crisis).
Collateral reports stated that transport aircraft landed at ten secondary airfields in tost Germony In the vicinity of the corridors, while other sources indicated that such fields (Cochstedt, Allstedf, Hassleben and Erfurt/Bindersleben) were in full readiness to receive deployments (Soviet tents ond various ground equipment items were present) but that no aircraft bad been noted at the fields.
GSFG Commander Yokubovskiy stated that Soviet forces in the GDRspecialIn view of the aggressive policy of the West, and that his forces havenecessary torushing blow against the aggressor and his rocket troops can hit any target.
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(Tuesday)ct
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Gfomyko informed Kohler thot the USSR desired to reach an agreement as quickly as possible on the basis of the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of letters; the Soviet Government "expects the US" will lake steps promptly loettlement and an agreement should "codify" obligations on both sidesS obligations to refrain from an attack on Cuba and to rescind the blockade and Soviet obligations to remove the weapons called "offensive" and Cuban obligations).
Kuznetsov told Stevenson the weapons would be dismantled and we could count on it, and then have whatever verification at the end of the process we wanted; Khrushchev had told him it would probably take two or three weeks. He was pleased Ihe US would accept Red Cross inspection of incoming ships. He was clearly worried about Cuban objections to He averted several times lo the removal of US bases which threaten the USSR as they hod removed their base In Cubo.
U Than! arrived Havana where heost unsatisfactory talk with Castro who refused any inspection of Cuban territory.
The US temporarily lifted the quarantinehant's visit.
Soviet delegates at the UN hintedeappraisal in the Soviet Unionossiblestruggle.
At least four Soviet submarines were still operating in the Cuban quarantine area, with all sighted on the surface at least once.
Ulbricht arrived In Moscow
included some unannounced military personnel.
EasTTJerrran delegation may
Oct: Cuba)
ct
BLOC MILITARYSSR
The Turks further claimed lhat ihe Swede* said that many Soviet submarines onassed through the Baltic to the Atlantic. This is not confirmed and unlikely. Oi submarine did leave the Baltic onctober.
BLOC MILITARYATELLITES
East German Border Guard units In the Berlin area werectober and tanks were observed at Gross Glienicke; Border Guard defectors stated they had been told thewas made in view of the Cuban crisis and the alert of troops in West Berlin.
Oct: Bloc)
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(Wednesday) cT o,
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
was also clear the ie sites. The Cubans stated they would resist ony viola-
Inhant's talks with Castro went very badly, with Caslro in an impossible andmood ond extremely bitter ot the Soviets for not consulting him; He declaredthat there could be no inspection of any kind of Cuban soil. Cubans were excluded from the miss!
tlon of their air space,N observer was sure that AA weapons under Cuban would fire on US aircraft. Cuban-Soviet relations were described as "unbelievably bod.
A Soviet general Igor Stazenko, who claimed to be commonder of Soviet forces in Cuba, told the UN delegation that instructions on the dismantling had been received fromSundayctober) and that dismantling had startedM and would be completedovember at the latest, when the sites would be bulldozed. Castro cla.med all AA was manned by Cubans and that they shot down. N delegate expressed the view fhe Soviet military were fed up and wanted to get out as soon as possible; fhebolleved both all offensive weapons and all Soviet military would depart. Stazenko said that none of the IRBMs had become operational, but that six or eight of the MRBMs had been operational, that all missiles hod not yet arrived in Cuba but he was not specific as to how many were still to come. He said there wereoviet military personnel in Cuba, plus civilian laborers bringing the total0 and that allCuba were under his control. (Note; The press reported the main points on Soviet pledge to get the missiles out by Friday ond Castro's adamonce but not the details.)
It wos learned that Mikoyan was leaving Moscow for Havana via New York.
US sources stated that the US pledge not to Invade Cuba does not rule out force if Castroew threat to the Western Hemisphere (press).
The USesumption of the quarantine ond air reconnaissance.
The Soviet press carried articles emphasizing that US pledges to respect the integrity of uban territory must be honored and stating that the application of Castro's five points would contribute to normalizing the situation in the Caribbean area ond that thesehave brood support.
Kuznetsov twice stated to McCloy that all AA weapons were in Cuban hands ond said the dismantling of missile facilities would be completedovember; verification must be worked out with Castro, but the USSR was prepared to fulfill its obligations. McCloy warned that US reconnaissance wos resumingost dangerous situation would arise if our planes were fo be shot at or downed.
Och)
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CUBAN AND GENERAL
The Soviet Ambassadorestern European country was reportedly personally briefed by Khrushchev who said that all available information had indicated the US was prepared to invade Cuba soon after the blockade was instituted, and that he made the decision tothe missiles on this basis and in the beliefoviet-controlled Cuba without missiles was of more advantage to the USSRS-occupied Cuba.
Oct- Cuba-2)
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Red Stor corried an article stating thot Soviet forces were intate of immediate combat preparedness."
Red Star devoted an editorial and full page of articles to the submarine fleet; it gaveunusual emphasis to its defensive os well as offensive role. The difficul ties involved for submarine crews in maintaining the highest combat readinessong period were noted. The editorial said there should be more flexible political training with submariners because the submarines now are often at sea completing the last missions of the training year.
BLOC MILITARYATELLITES
A report that Polish reservists hod been recalled ond thot university students were being notified at night to report for dutyossible fairly extensive covert augmentation of Polish forces.
No significant developments on this particular date were reported otherontinuation of activities previously noted.
ct: Bloc)
-TOP VKf'HL'i-
Nov 2
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Mikoyan arrived in New York en route Havana; he conferred with McCloy who concluded he wai going to Havana to placate Castro.
The press reported the US military buildup in Florida was continuing.
Castropeech in which he reaffirmed his refusal to permit on inspection learn on Cuban territory, reiterated his demands (including evacuation of Guantanamo) and said the Soviet Union hod proposed Red Crow inspection of Soviet ships bound for Cuba In lieu of the US blockode.
The US renewed Ihe quarantine.
Photography reveoled that all known MRBM sites In Cubo were being or had been dismantled, the lounch pads were destroyed, apparently by bulldozing, and missiles and launch equipment had been removed. Construction at the IRBM sites hod stopped, ond the installations were partially destroyed. Work on the probable nuclear warhead bunkers had also apparently ceased. Work was continuing ont San Julian but evidence was inconclusive as to whether the bombers were being assembled or dismantled.
The Chinese Communists continued their vigorous support of Castro ond his five pointsole from Chen YI to the Cuban Charge in Peiping; "the US imperialist provocation against you is tantamountrovocation against us."
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
USAREUR noted slight indications that GSFG was beginning to return to more normal training activity, but indications of an alert status continued. "
ov)
ULRbT
TOP SECRET
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Mikoyon in New York announced support for Castro's five demands and departed for Havana.
The US announced that the dismantling of missile sites was proceeding and KennedyV statement that sea and air surveillance would be maintained.
Work was reported under way to arrange International Red Cross inspection of the dismantled sites.
The uncrating ond assembly ofos continuing ot San Julion.
A second sabotage effort was mode against the Venezuelan oil installations.
Bulgarian Party leader Zhivkov arrived in Moscow and was received the following day by Khrushchev.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Nov)
rNov-^2
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS Mikoyan, in Havana, reaffirmed support of Castro.
The US agreed to IRC inspection of Cuba-bound Soviet ships but wos reported still insistinground check of the missile sites.
Abandonment of the missile sites was continuing.
Voroshilov was resurrected to write on article in Provda supporting Khrushchev. Polish party leader Gomulka arrived in Moscow to confer with Soviet leaders.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
ov)
41
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
A Soviet commentary to Cuba mora firmly committed the USSR to support of Costro'i five points, and increasing Soviet press charges thot the US was foiling to keep its part of the Cuban bargain suggested an effort to draw out negotiations an inspection; the Moscow radio called for an end to the blockade.
Kuznetsov,alk with McCloy, expressed doubt that the Soviets could obtain Castro's agreement to UN verification, stated the Sovietsotal ofissile sites in Cuba (of whichncompleted) and thatissiles had been Introduced; all sites were dismantledovember. The USSR would give thechedule of removal of tho missiles, allow us to bring ships alongside ond count the missiles; the entire removal job could be effected byovember. In return, the Soviets wanted the quarantine liftedrotocol of US guarantees including guarantees that the US would not invade Cuba and would Induce other Latin American states to do the some. He alsouarantee of no subversive action against Castro and UN observation In the US as well as in Cubo.
Photography revealed that missile equipment was orrlving af Cuban ports and that some was being loaded aboard ships; foreign observers in Cubo reported the movement of Soviet troops toward tho port of Mariel as well. Assembly ofas continuing at San Julian, and additionalrates identified at Holguin brought the total of known, assembled or In crates,
An additional cruise missile site was identified at La Sierra, near Cienfuegos (the equipment was probably moved from Campo Florido and returned to the latter siteovember).
Ulbricht and Gomulka left Moscow.
Nov: Cuba)
In" VFrffFT.
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BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
5 Nov
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The US press reported thai the Soviet Union wos (aid to hove told the US it would permit US inipection of mint lei at they leave Cuba (apparently Kuznetsov's statements tocCloy was also said to have warned Kuznetsovurnover ofo Cuba would bring the crisis to an acute stage.
The Havana press stated thead been shot down by Cuban AA batteries.
Three Soviet ships which had been loading misslle-associoted equipment at Mariel haddeparted,ourth loading.
The Aleksandrovsk, among the ships departing Cuba, carried six probable missile nose cone
vans to Gubo Okolnoya in the Northern Fleet area, where it arrived>
The International Red Cross announced the Cuban government had agreed to its inspecting ships bound for Cuba.
Chinese Communist support for Castro continuedigh level, with hundreds of thousands demonstrating In Peiplngovember. The People's Doily compared appeasement of the Cuban people to Munich. Similar statements come from Tirana.
Tne Bulgarian Communist Porty Congress opened with the removal of Premier Yugov and others from their government and party posts In on anti-Stalinist move.
Nov: Cuba)
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
ov: Bloc)
AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Nov 62
US press reported onother unpublicized letter woi sent by Khrushchev to Kennedy (probably In regard to inspection of Soviet ships).
Kuznetsovand Zorin, in talks with Stevenson ond McCloy, provided the planned shipping schedule for departures of several Soviet ships carrying missiles from Cubon portsovember. Kuznetsoy described the question of the removal of warheadsdetail"; no doubt the warheads would bef worheads are indeed Inhe Soviet Union is removing everything related to "so-called offensive missiles" and cannot soy more than that. The Soviets expressed surprise that the US should regards offensive since they are obsolete ond good only for coastal defense; they are not offensive and Kuznetsov indicated they would not be removed.
Soviet FROGs were identified by photography at the military camp at Artemisa, the second sighting of these in Cuba (the other at Remedios onctober). Four well-equipped Soviet armored encampments were now identified in Cuba with tanks,elf-propelled guns and armored personnel carriers.
There were references in Soviet operator chatter (ond ogain onovember) to theof winter quarters and fo replacing the tents.
A "fifth" Soviet submarine was sighted in the quarantine area (surfacediles south ofhree of the other four submarines in Ihe quarantine area were believed continuing on course oway from the Caribbean. (Despite Ihis sightingossible fifth submarine, only four are believed to hove operated in fhe area.)
Cubon exile Garcia Chabon claimed thai missiles were hidden in underground sites in seven locations (one of severol reports and claims to this effect).
Kosygin, making the keynote address on the eve of the revolutionary holiday, described the Cuban outcomeompromise from both sides, defended the pullouf of the missiles ond promised continued support to Cuba.
Kadar of Hungary departed on the trek to Moscow, rounding out the visits of Eastern European Satellite leaders except for Albania.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
A traveller reported Ihe apparent activationreviously abandoned garrison in the town
of Dzhulfa (on the Iranian border). No unusual rail or other activity was noted during the trip.
Nov)
TOP SrVPRKT
7 Nov
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The holiday celebrations in Moscow were markedoutine military paradepeech by Marshal Mallnovskiy stressing peaceful coexistence; he praised Khrushchev personally for having saved the peace in the Cuban situation.
Khrushchev at the Kremlin reception implied he had abandoned his earlier plan to come to the UN, statingeeting with President Kennedy was not necessary now and that he would favor heads-of-government talks only "if ituestion of peace and war." He did not press the Berlin question, ridiculing Western press speculationoviet timetableeparate peacee displayed sensitivity to Western views that he had backed down in the Cuban crisis, defended the necessity of flexibility in foreign policy ond said it was futile to ask "who won and who lost." He acknowledged that Castro had opposed his decision tothe missiles but said that he had told the Cubans not to do so would have meant war. ormal US guorantee on Cuba is not forthcoming, he said, this would "put us bock to aof catastrophe." He downplayed the significanceockets" in Cuba, saying thatouldn't beo newsmen, he reportedly further soldeek ago "we were on the edge of the precipice of nuclear war. Both sides were ready for it."
Ambassador Kohler reported that from the remarks of almost every Soviet official it seemed clear that events of fhe past ten days had really shaken the Soviet leadership. There were no signs that the leadership was divided. The most striking element was an extension of the definition of "peaceful coexistence" to include the concept of the necessity of mutualtoonflict. Khrushchev stated that he now thought the previously-discussed meeting with Kennedy should not be rushed into and that there should be advance preparation for one or more questions, so that agreement would be in view.
The US press disclosed fhe agreement with the Soviets to contact and "Inspect" shipsfrom Cuba and thot the Soviets were hedging on withdrawal of the bombers. Responsible US sources were quoted os discounting the "cove" reports.
Assembly oft Son Julian was continuing, but there was no evidence that thet Holguin were being unpacked.
Nov: Cubo)
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bloc military developments
the commander of rhe soviet far eosl military district, speaking at the holiday celebration, said that his forces like all soviet armed forces "have been puttate of highest combat
readiness."
two leading soviet officers (marshal chuykov, cinc of ground forces, arid marshal vers cinc of air forces) were missihg fromovember parade inost unusual occurrence. chuykov also wos missing from the rumanian reception onctoberhereabouts throughout the crisis wos unreported untilovember when he wos identify
in moscow. venn inn wos at thectober reception.
a traveler reported the presence of additional kniferest rodors at yerevan.
nov: bloc)
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The US announced that all known MRBM and IRBM sites had been dismantled and somewas outbound on Soviet ships. The US was said by the press to be still insisting on on-site verification.
Thirty ond possiblyissile transporters had been identified as being removed fromandere under way on Soviet ships on deck.
Photography continued fo show no change in the status ofn Cuba.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
An East German border command defector subsequently reported that some men hadovember but lhat the East German alert wos to remain effective untilecember.
Nov)
r-irT
9
The US began "alongside" inspection of several outgoing Soviet ships carrying missiles (first inspection wasovember).
The last of the Soviet ships identified as missile corners left Cuba, and observationsotal ofissiles had left on seven of the nine ships.
A US helicopter detected possible nuclear material aboard the outgoing Soviet vessel Bratsk, but subsequent inspection with nuclear-detection instruments onovember produced" negative results. (Note: This wos one of two ships possibly detected carrying radioactive material from Cuba, both very tenuous; see entry on the Aleksondrovsk.)
The press reported that the Soviets were still balking on the removal of bombers and on-site inspection, and the press quoted the Cubon UN delegate as declaring thot Cuba regarded thes its property and had no intention of giving them up.
Photography continued to show no further uncrating ofalthough work was apparently continuing on the engines of three of them at San Julian.
The Soviet military camp at Holguin was shown by photography to contain ninessault guns, fouranks, nine possible SNAPPER anti-tank missiles ondanks. At Remedios, there were six probable FROG transporters. Tho four Soviet camps (Holguin, Remedios, Ar-temisa ond Son Antonio de los Vegas) were judged to be composite armored groupments of near regimental strength.
Kadar left Moscow.
Nov: Cuba)
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iLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
ov 62
CUBAN ANO GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
All Soviet ships said by the USSR to be carrying missile components from Cuba, except one, had been inspected by US ships without incidents, and photography hadotal ofutgoing missiles.
U Thant said he hoped to announce arrangements for IRC inspection of inbound Soviet ships. Communist propaganda calling for withdrawal of US bases from Cuba was increasing.
Photography indicated oir-to-air missiles were apparently being readied for mounting ont Santa Clara airfield, the first observation of these missiles in Cuba.
Photography provided fairly conclusive evidence that assembly ofas continuing at San Julian airfield, but there was no evidence of unpacking at Holguin.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
The East Germans conducted the normal fallovember.
A Danish ship was denied entrance to Stralsund, East Germany, for unknown reasons; the restriction on commercial shipments into Stralsund was apparently still in effect onovember. There were rumors missiles from Cuba might be unloaded at non-Soviet Baltic ports, but no evidence of this was obtained.
ov)
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Nov)
TOP SECK&T,
ov 62
CUBAN ANO GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The US was reported still determined in negotiations with the Soviets to secure the removal ofombers; Kuznetsov told the Indonesian Ambassador at the UN that the US wasettlement of long-term problems and charged that the US demand for withdrawal of theos nonsense since they were obsolete and can only be used as short-range defensive weapons.
Khrushchev informed the British Ambassodor that then Cubo had been about to be scrapped when his marshals suggested sending some of them to Cuba in response to President Kennedy's callupeservists. He maintained this waserious issue and that the USSR hod already fulfilled its obligations in removing the missiles.
A Moscow government official, urging local committees to submit immediately material needed for theovember plenum, sold "everything has beentandstill, but is now being resumed again."
More US troops were reported moving into South Florida (press).
Photography of Sonta Clara airfield showed continuing arming of thewith air-to-air missiles.
A Polish general was reported to have briefed senior officials and to have said that Mikoyan wosifficult time dealing with Castro over the presence of Chinese Communist "technicians" manning AA weapons In Cuba. The Chinese were said to have been in Cubo at leostays and to have shot down, hoping to provoke war thereby. The general attempted to plocote fears over Soviet military strengthis the US. (Note: The story itself is, on the basis of all other information, false; however, sources in Poland believed that if was the story given high-level Polish officials, reflectingeed fo placate Polish fears and the Sino-Sovlet struggle over Cuba.)
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Nov)
7 HitI, J
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Nov 62
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet Union and Cubo were allegedaveormulo for the easing of the crisis which would include US withdrawal from Guontanomoolt in the US economic squeeze on Cuba (press).
The press reported some slight progress in Soviet-US negotiations at the UN bul Kuznetsov told the Braziliantalemate hadbeen reached.
The press reported thot Mikoyan again pledged backing to Castro's five demands in Cuba. Plans for IRC inspection of incoming ships were dropped. The Cubans claimed smashingIA sabotage group.
Cuban navol leaves were terminated after some relaxation3 November.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Red Star stated Soviet soldiers were not relaxing their vigilance "which is at the highest Battle readiness" for one minute.
Nov) '
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Khrushchev woi reported by the press to hoveroposal Tor the removal of the bomber* hedged with such conditions as US withdrawal from Guantanamo.
Photographs of San Julian showed camouflage netting over most of theut apparently no more hod been uncrated; there was no evidence of uncrating at Holguin.
U Thant informed US negotiators that Castro was insistent on reciprocity In any measures for verification or inspection.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Nov)
rnp seceex
Pirr
CUBAN ANO GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Castro,etterhanf, again refused any inspection of Cuban territory and stated that any aircraft which violates Cuban territory can do so only at the risk of being
The press alleged that Cuba wos possibly willing to accept inspection of missile bases in return for inspection of Guontanomo.
Accumulating evidence showed that Soviet ground force units were present in Cuba tn greater strength than previously estimated, with analysis suggesting thot the four camps at Artemisa, Santiago de las Vegas, Remedios and Holguin contained well in excessroops.
There continued to be no indication of the uncrating ofuselages ot MOiguin wnilf camouflage netting had been erected at San Julian to conceal the progress of thessembly.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
According to East Germane alert measures, such as reinforced border patrols, were lifted onovember in the Border Command.
Nov)
id general developments
c military developments
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTSgotiations were reported near deadlockubon sabotage group was seized in New York.
The Havana radio broadcast orders from Cuban military authorities to clear the skies over Cuba of all domestic aircraft by early morning ofovember,otice to airmen prohibited all flights until otherwise notified. Havana also announced that Castro'slhat aircraft would be shot down came into operation a! 1IO0Z.
The Cuban Government sought permission from Belgium, West Germany and Canoda for overflight clearances for threeo be ferried from Moscow to Havana betweenndovember.
Marshal Chuykov, writing in Red Star, stressed the role Of the Party in the iovi forces ond intimated that some mililary personnel were criticizing the political leadership for "spoiling" Soviet military successes.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Nov)
XQB SfiCRKC
a rvuv
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The US Government wos reported (press) to be concerned about evidence of Soviet troop units in Cuba and would call for their removal.
The pressive-hour conference between McCloy and Kuznetsov.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
The Soviet Ministry of Defense otder on Soviet Artillery Day stated that the Potty and Government were doing everything to see that the Soviet Army ond Navy are at the lei of their missions and canrushing retaliatory strike against on aggressor if hear, and calledigh degree of combat readiness.
A traveler reported the presence ofighters at Tlkhoretsk airfieldew occupation of the field.
Nov)
l'ftl;T
ov 62
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Costrotterhont (corried by Hovono Rodio,ovember) stating that theircraft belonged to the Sovier Government ond, if the Soviet* considerdvisable to withdraw them, Cuba will "not obstruct thathe letter warned again that to the limit of tho range of Cuban AA weapons, any "warplane invading Cuban airspace can do so only at the risk of beingnd again rejected any unilateral inspection of Cuban territory.
The press revealed the content of the Soviet-Cuban packoge proposals as Including; on-site inspection in Cubo only in return for similor inspection of Guontanomo, Puerto Rico and the CanalS pledge not to invade Cuba nor permit exiles to attack; ond agreement to lift Ihe blockade and talk about but not necessarily evacuate Guantanamo.
The CPSU Central Committee plenum convened andariety of administrative and organization changes, particularly in the economic field.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Nov)
TOP SEPftFT
Nov 62
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
President Kennedyress conference announced that tht US was lifting the Cuban quarantine. He further stated that he hod received assurances from Khrushchev that theombers would go withinays and could be counted as they go, that all nuclear weapons were also withdrawn, andumber of Soviet ground units which werewith protection of the offensive weapons systems in Cubo "will also be withdrawn in duee indicated that ports of his agreement with Khrushchev remained to be carried out (inspection and lasting safeguards ogoinst future introduction of offensivemplied thot reconnaissance of Cuba would continue, and avoided any specific commitment against invasion.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Nov)
1
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
SAC reverted fromo.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
The USSR announced Ihe cancellation of Its emergency measures, stating that, in connection wiih President Kennedy's instructions on lifting the quarantine and on the basis of thereached between Khrushchev and Kennedy, the Soviet Government had Instructed Its Defense Minister, effectiveovember, to: return the components of the armed forces from their various states of higher or full combat readiness (these are specified in the order) to normal combat readiness; to rescind the retention of overage senior servicemen in the Strategic Rocket Troops, the PVO and the submarine fleet; and to rescind the withholding of normal leaves. (See appendix for full text of this order.)
The USSR announced that, in connection with the easing of tension in Ihe Caribbean and in Europe, the CinC of the Unified Armed Forces of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Grechko, gave instructions onovember for the abrogation of measures established onctober for increased combo! readiness of troops and fleets forming the Unified Armed Forces.
A non-US source (reliability unknown) reported that Vitebskd Guards Airborne Division) was lightly occupied with no troops observed. (Note: This couldindicate that the troops hod been confined to barracks or had moved out of the installations in connection with alert measures; there is, however, no indication from any olher source that any airborne troops were redeployed in connection with the alert.)
)
ILITARY DEVELOPMENTS (conlTmnd}
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)
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The US press onnounced thot the US militory hod token the following measures: SAC bombers from unusual alert (nine out of ten reported on groundce0 Air Force reservists effectiveovember, unfrozen Navy discharges. The Navy disclosedhips0 men had been Involved in the Cuba quarant.ne
buildup, including eight aircraft carriers.
Cuban commercial flights to Progue were to be resumed, morking the first air operations since Iheovember order clearing the skies of domestic aircraft; MIG flights were also resumed.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
Nov)
ov 62
CUBAN AND GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS
The last of the sotface-to-surface missile related equipment (trailers, erectors,os apparently being withdrawn from Cubo.
BLOC MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
There were no indications of any significant degree of alert continuing in any elements of the Bloc armedeport received subsequently indicated that Bulgarianheld in service in connection with the October alert were released at sometime after the termination of the preparedness measures.
Nov)
top secret
Mikoyan finally left Havana onovember, with promises of continued Soviet friendship but no indlcotion of new Soviet economic or military aid to Cuba orilitary guarantee.
Mikoyon visited Washingtonecember, taking the line with the President that Soviet missiles had been only defensive and erected because of invasion threats. He hod no new instructions and it was agreed thot negotiations would continue in New York.
Theere withdrawn from Cuba on three Sovietecember.
In early December US reinforcements were withdrawn from Guontonomo and the dependents returned.
Onecember, Khrushchevpeech to the Supreme Soviet dealing primarily with the question of war and the Cuban crisis (see appendix).
anuary, the US and the USSRetter to the UN Secretory General stating in effect that agreement had not been reached between them on any further action with respect to Cuba and that it would not be necessary for the item to occupy the further attention of the Security Council. The statement thus closed this phase of negotiations and indicated that, in the absence of agreement on inspection, the US had made no assurance against invasion ond would continue air surveillance.
UNDATED ITEMS
Accordingeported statementuban Communist (Emilioode some time after the crisis, Fidel Castro had told him that Cuba had been an "atomic power"ew weeks bul it was no longer; there were no more nuclear weapons in Cuba.
Accordingeported statement of the son of the Cuban Foreign Minister, Soviet-Cuban plans had been to install the missiles ond then screen Cuban ports with maior Soviet fleet units; the plan from the beginning called for the ultimate withdrawal of the missiles but at the price of US concessions to Cuba. The Cubans, who were not consulted on the decision to remove Ihe missiles, reportedly felt that had the Soviet fleet units proceeded to Cuba the US would not have undertaken military action or endorced the blockade.
Accordingeport as ofhe Soviet intention not to go to wor over Cubo in the eventS invasion was formalizedigned top secret decision of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This decision was made during the
October crisis. The only reason for Mikoyan's prolonged stay in Cuba was to restrain Costro from attempting to shoot down another US reconnaissance plane. Khrushchev was terrified
that such an act would spur the US to invade and did not permit Mikoyan to leave Cubo
until he felt this danger hod passed.
A reportrom on unwitting crew memberoviet merchant vessel states that, In connection with the Cuban situation, some of tht Soviet shjps which were In home waters were kept ready under orders as reserve lonnoge for the Navy. However, that was only foreek, and it was mostly tonnage which had token port in maneuvers with tht Navy
at Novaya Zemlya and in the fiords. (There is no indication os to the precise period involved.)
1 14
-top vrrrcri^
There ore several reports dealing with the attitude of the Soviet military on the Introduction ond removal of the missiles from Cuba. They include:
An implication by the YugoslavS officer that it was the military who were responsible for the deployment of strategic missiles to Cuba. When Khrushchev realized the danger, heold stand and agreed to their withdrawal.
A Brazilian report, said to have originatedoviet source inthat the decision to install missile bases was due to the suggestion of Ihe military who fell the Island was indefensible by conventionaland intended to make any invasion as costly as possible, especially in economic terms, since one of the preferential largcfs for the missiles would hove been the oilfields and petroleum industries in Texas.
A statement by an Izvesfiyo correspondentritish official that the Cuban venture was urged on Khrushchev by ihe Soviet military who were alarmed at the US Minuteman program.
A reported statement by Khrushchevroup of non-Bloc Communists that Mallnovskiy had questioned the wisdom of removing the missiles from Cubathat Khrushchev hod told him the settlement of the Cuban problem wasefense question and not in Malinovskiy's province.
A reported statementuban official lhat Soviet officers in Cuba were bitter about the removal of long-range missiles, felt that Khrushchev had backed down in the faco of US threats and resented his failure to demand equal reciprocal commitments from the US.
A report that someoigh-ranking military officers who ore also members of the Supreme Soviet failed lo appear for the Supreme Soviet session during December, allegedly because of displeasure over Khrushchev's handling of the Cuban crisis, and that there wos considerable criticism by both military and civilian officials over the way Khrushchev acted during the crisis.
A reported statement by Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin in March that the withdrawal of Soviel troops from Cubaelicate matter ond that there was opposition from "certain quarters" in the USSR.
At the time of tho crisis during October, Mao Tse-tung is alleged to have sent an envoy to see Castro. Tho emissary is said to hoveformal secret promise" that Communist China would Invade Taiwan If the US Invaded Cuba.
115
SOVIET AND WARSAW PACT MILITARY ORDERS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS
Excerpt from the Soviet Government Statement ofThe Soviet Government calls the attention of the world public and all government* which stand for peaceful coexistence to the fact that even now, when the United States is preparing an act of aggression and is increasing its armed forces for this purpose by callingeservists into the army, when the US President is asking Congress for permission to do this, USSR Minister of Defense Marshal Malinovskly has ordered that those servicemen who have completed their term be discharged and then transferred to the reserves.
"Trained soldiers are being released from the Soviet armed forces and recruits are being called up to replenish the units. This alonelear enough indication of our peaceful intentions. No government would tokeeasure if it contemplated any actionilitary nature. One must realize what it means when trained soldiers are being released from the army and recruits called up who must yet bethis is not so easy to do considering the complex military equipment of today, whichreat amount of knowledge not only from commanders but from every private. In taking this step we are realizing measures in our daily life which confirm that the Soviet Union isolicy of insuring peace and friendship with all peoples.
"The Soviet Union will not take any similar retaliatory action to the callupeservists in the United States, the more so since this cannot be of any serious military importance, given up-to-date means of nuclear rocket warfare. If in the past the yardstick for armies of the belligerents wos mainly the number of soldiers, sabers, ond bayonets, in our time the might of these armies is determinedifferentnuclear rocket
"The Government of the Soviet Union will do its utmost to safeguard peace and peaceful coexistence with all countries. But this does not always depend on us. The Soviet Union did not want World War II, but Hitler imposed it on us ond we were forced to wage war. That is why we must do everything to be prepared, to see to it that our armedstrategic rocket forces and the ground forces, the antiaircraft defense, the navy, and especially the submarine fleet of the Sovietable to cope with their tasks. If the aggressors unleash war, our armed forces must be ready torushing retaliatory blow against the aggressor.
Soviet Government will not follow the way of the United Slates, which Is collingeservists. If we imitated this US action, we would do what apparently Is wanted by certain American circles: wo would help them inflame the situation. But neither can we disregard the aggressive preparations of the United States. The Soviet Government considers if its duty In this situation to display vigilance and to instruct the Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union and fhe command of fhe Soviet Army to fake all measures to raise our armed forces to highest combat readiness. But these are exclusively precautionary measures. We shall do evorylhing on our part so thai peace is not disturbed."
116
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JOB SWH
Soviet Government Order ot "The Soviet Government today ordered the USSR Minister of Detente to hold up the release of senior oge groups in the strategic rocket troops, troops of antiaircraft defense and personnel of the submarine fleet until further notice, to cancel the leave of all personnel ond to raise the battle readiness and vigilance of all troops.
"The Soviet Government today, in connection with the provocative octions of the US Government and the aggressive intentions of the American armed forces,eport by Marshal Malinovskiy, USSR Minister of Defense, on the measures earned out to raise the battle readiness of the armed forces."
Warsaw Roct Order of "The Commander in Chief of the united armed forces of the countries of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Grechko, has today summoned officers and representatives of the armies of the countiies of the Warsaw Pact and gave an order to cany out several measures in increasing the military preparedness of troops and navies which are members of the united armed forces.
"This was done in connection with the provocative octions of the Americon Government ond the aggressive intentions of the American militarists."
Soviet Government Order of "In connection with instructions by the President of the US, J. Kennedy, on lifting thethe Republic of Cubo and in connection with the recognition of the possibility foreliminating the consequences of the dangerous crisis which has arisen in the Caribbean area, and on the basis of the understanding reached between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers USSR, N. S. Khrushchev, and the President of the US, J. Kennedy, the Soviet Government has given instructions to the Minister of Defense USSR, Marshal SU, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, to carry out tho following measures, effective
"I. Intercontinental and strategic rocket troops ore to shift from full (or total) combat readiness to normal combat training and activity;
"2. The antiaircraft rocket defense of the country and fighter aviation of the PVO ore to shift from full combai readiness to normal activity and combat training;
"3. The combat readiness status (or state of constant combat preparedness) of strategic aviation is rescinded;
"4. The naval forces are to shift to normal combat training, and the submarine fleet is to return to Ihe places of usual deployment (or permanent disposition);
"5. The state of increased (or higher) combat readiness in the ground forces is rescinded;
"6. The retention of overage senior servicemen of the Soviet Army due forfrom the strategic rockel troops, the AA defense of the country (PVOnd the submarine fleet is rescinded;
*7. The withholding of normal leaves in the armed forces is rescinded."
Warsaw^ Pact Order of "In connection with the easing ofin the Caribbean and the related easing of tension In Europe, Ihe Commander in Chief of Ihe united ormod forces of the countries of the Warsow Pact, Morshol SU A. A. Grechko, on2 gave instructions for abrogation of measures established on2 for increased combat readiness of troops ond fleets forming the united armed forces."
117
EQE SFPRFT
RED STAR ON COMBAT2
Tho followingummary of an article in Red Star2 entitled "Combat Readiness of Troops Under Modern Conditions,"irprepared by two members of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces:
After noting that the "policy of provocation pursued by the US ruling circles has again seriously aggravated the international situation" and that the Soviet Government had therefore Instructed the MiniHer of Defense and the Soviet Army to take oil measures to place the Soviet armed forces on highest combat readiness, the article states:
"Tho experience of history teaches that aggressive countries havo oftenstrategic successes and oven victories in war, owing to their having beensecretly deploy and to put the army and navy in combat readinessurprisethe other hand, the underestimation of the timoly placement of armed forces incombat readiness in the faceilitary threat has often been one of thedefeat of particular countries
"Tho failures of our Army in the initial phase of the Great Patriotic War are also largely explained by the underestimation of the timely placement of troops in increased combat Even the substantial shortcomings then existing in the organization, armament, and combat training of the Red Army might not have had decisive influence on the state of defense if the troops had been deployed In time and prepared to repel thefascist attack. But owing to Stalin and certain other former military leaders, thetroops did not receive orders on Ihe advance deployment of forces and the occupation of defensive positions along the western border of tho USSR.
"Thus, history teaches that the aggressor always counts on surprise in on attack, the effectiveness of which Is all the higher, the lower the combat readiness of the armies of the states subjected to attack .
"Ourin the faceof military danger, cannot allow tho country to be less prepared forictorious war in defense of its freedom ond independence than the imperialist aggressors are prepored for an aggressive war."
The article then notes that the USSR has all Ihe necessary economic ond military capabilities to defend the country against aggression ond in fact surpasses those who threaten the USSR with war. Soviet troop* are required "to be always In high combat readiness and to observe the greatest vigilance." Tho development of now rocket and nuclear weapons and the threat of an imperialist surprise nuclear-rocket strike against the Soviet Union "places very high and responsible requirements for combat readiness on units ond ships and on all our armed forces. Evaluating objectively tho power of modern weapons, one must not ignore the groat danger which Surprise, massive nuclear ttfjkes of an aggressor may represent if the forces ond means Intended for Iheir prevention or frustration are not kept in constant high combat readiness."
The article notes that in conventional warfare, high combat readiness was required first of all of the forces in the border military districts and Ihe PVO, but lhat today it Is required of all branches of the armed forces, wherever located. "Naturally, the training of the Strategic Rocket Troops for the immediate deliveryossive, nuclear rocket strike against theploys the primary role."
118
ECRET,
"The highei! combat readiness is that state in which troops are able at anyto repelurprise nuclear attack of an aggressor and, at the first signal, to undertake resolute combat operations aimed at the complete destruction of the enemy."
The article then cites the following ingredients of high combat readiness: he modern combat equipment and weapons of theigh level of combat training In all units, including the ability of the troops to carry out operations under conditions of high mobility and maneuverability and the development of an aggressive fightingfficient and constant supervision of troops under one-manerfectof all materiel, particularly In the Rocket Troops and the PVO whose troops must always be indegree of combat readiness that they can begin to execute combat missionsatter of minutes or even seconds after signals and commands arerreproachable combat discipline on the part of all personnel. (CONFIDENTIAL)
More extensive excerpts of this article are carried in CIA, Foreign Documents Division,on Soviet Strategic,CONFIDENTIAL)
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The following, ii from fhe address of Marshal Mallnovskiy, Sovier Minister of Defense, to the Armed Forces Ideological Conference,s published In Red Star of
After noting the military hysteria of the imperialists over Soviet military aid to Cuba and the advances in Soviet weaponry and doctrine, he states thot "these factors In themselves ore worthless without men who have mastered and ore able to put them into action in the interests of gaining victory over thehereas previously to attain victory it was necessary to expend efforts, in production and training of cadres,and during the processrolonged war, now "decisive results con be achieved even In the initial phase of war. Most of the effort which the country and the Army expended previously to conquer the enemy,ourseumber of years, now must be Incorporated in the first nuclear rocket strike and the subsequent combinedof all branches of the armed forces."
The Soviet armed forces are called upon to be In constant high combata situation can develop In the world which requires special vigilance andthe part of our troops. We now areeriod of sharp deterioration insituation, when fhe danger of aggressive operations on the part of USand their bloc allies is increasing
"Under these conditions, the party Central Committee and the Soviet Government require us to betate of fhe highest combat readiness. To solve this central problem, all our means, including Ideological and educational work and our oral and printedmust be used.
"What does It mean to betate of the highest combat readiness? ord, this means that all the might of our armed forces, ot the first signal, must be put intoaction against the enemy, his strategic military, economic and political centers and main concentrations of forces.
"Maintenance of the highest combat read inessong time is not on easye must well understand the lessons of the initial phase of the lost wor and educate our servicemen in the spirit of high vigilance, comportment, solidarity and organization. This is particularly important under conditions when fhe highest combat readiness isof us.
"In maintaining high combat readiness to the maximum degree, the role ofofficers and generals of the main branch of the armed forces, the Strategic Rockets extraordinarily great. They ore required to maintain their powerful equipment, as they say, on alert, and to be readyhort time to deliver crushing retaliatory blows againsl the most Important enemy targets located ot any point onCONFIDENTIAL)
More extensive excerpts of this speech are carried in CIA, Foreign Documents Division, Statements on Soviet Strategic, (CONFIDENTIAL)
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KHRUSHCHEV ON WAR AND THE CUBAN CRISIS,2
Khrushchev devoted the major portion of his speech to the Supreme Soviet on2iscussion of the necessity of avoiding nuclear war andefense of Soviet policy in the Cuban situation. "The main result of the foreign politi col activity of the Sovietconsists in the Fact that the attack on Cuba prepared by the aggressive Imperialist circles of the United States has beene repeatedly stated that peaceful coexistence rather than war must be fhe course for humanity and emphasized the catastrophic consequences of war. Specifically, with regard to the Cuban crisis he stated:
Cuba had been in danger of another invasion this autumn; "everything showed that the US was preparing to carry out an attack on the Cuban Republic using its own ormed forces."
Because of Ihese threats, Cuba "last summer" asked the Soviet Government for additional assistance and "an agreement was reachedumber of new measures, including the stationing in Cuboew dozen Soviet ballistic rockets of medium range. These weapons were to be in the hands of the Soviet military."
This small number of rockers was not intended for on attack on the US but only for the defense of Cuba. Rockets were ploced there so thot the American imperialists, if they decided on invasion, would feel that war was on fhelr own frontier and wouldore realistic idea of the danger of thermonuclear war. If there had been no threat of invasion in the first place, there would have been no need to put rockets in Cuba. Not only were the rockets not for attack on the US, the Soviet Union hasno need for military bases on others' territory. Cuba "has no strategic significance for the defense of the Soviet Union. We stationed rockers on Cuba only for the defense of the Cuban Revol ution and not for attack on the United States. "
"If we wanted toar against the United Stafes, .we would not have agreed to dismantle the rockets installed in Cuba, which were ready for launching, for battle; we would have put them In motion."
The course of events in the Caribbean confirmed lhat fhe threat of US aggression was al hand. Khrushchev here reviewed the buildup of US troops In Guantanamo and the southeastern United States, using press figuresen detailed for thehips, etc. He stated that Ihe US brought into full military preparedness oil Ifs armed forces, including those In Europe and the Far East, ond that "aboutercent" of theof SAC were in the air round the clock, carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs aboard. NATO forces were also brought to full battle preparedness. "The world came under the threathermonuclear war. "
In the face of these preparations, the Soviet Government "Instructed tho Minister of Defense to bring the whole army, and first of oil the Soviet rocket forces ofand stratoglc type, the country's antiaircraft rocket defense andtate of full battle readiness. Strategic aircraft, fhe navy and our submarine fleet, including atomic submarines, took up'prescribedtate of increased military alert was declared in land forces, and demobilization of the senior age groups of the army was suspended in the strategic rocket forces, in the AA defense units and in the submarine fleet. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, loo, were brought up to full battle readiness." If either side had not shown restraint in these circumstances, there would have followed an explosion of irreparable consequences."
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KHRUSHCHEV ON WAR AND THE CUBAN CRISIS,2
Khrushchev devoted the molor portion of his speech to the Supreme Soviet on2iscussion of the necessity of avoiding nuclear wor andefense of Soviet policy in the Cuban situation. "The main result of the foreignactivity of the Sovietconsists in the fact that the attack on Cuba prepared by the aggressive imperialist circles of the United States has beene repeatedly stated that peaceful coexistence rather than war must be the course for humanity and emphasized the catastrophic consequences of war. Specifically, with regard to the Cuban crisis he stated:
Cuba had been in danger of another invasion this autumn; "everything showed that the US was preparing to carry out an attack on the Cuban Republic using its own armed forces."
Because of these threats, Cuba "last summer" asked the Soviet Government for odditlonal assistance and "on agreement was reachedumber of new measures, Including fhe stationing in Cubaew dozen Soviet ballistic rockets of medium range. These weapons were to be in fhe hands of the Soviet military."
This small number of rockets was not intended for an attack on the US but only for the defense of Cuba. Rockets were placed there so that the American imperialists, if they decided on invasion, would feel that war was on their own frontier and wouldore realistic idea of the danger of thermonuclear war. If there had been no threat of invasion in the first place, there would hove been no need to put rockets in Cuba. Not only were the rockets not for attack on fhe US, the 5oviet Union hasno need for military bases on others' territory. Cuba "has no strategic significance for the defense of the Soviet Union. We stationed rockets on Cuba only for the defense of the Cuban Revolution and not for attack on Ihe United States."
"If we wanted toar against the United States, we would not have agreed to dismantle fhe rockers installed in Cuba, which were ready for launching, for battle; we would have put fhem In motion."
The course of events in the Caribbean confirmed that the threat of US aggression was ot hand. Khrushchev here reviewed the buildup of US troops in Guantonamo and the southeastern United States, using press figuresen detailed for thehips, etc. He stated that the US brought into full military preparedness all its armed forces. Including those in Europe and the Far East, and that "aboutercent" of theof SAC were in the air round the clock, carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs aboard. NATO forces were also brought to full battle preparedness. "The world came under the threathermonuclear war. "
In the face of these preparations, the Soviet Government "instructed the Minister of Defense to bring the whole army, ond first of all the Soviet rocket forces ofand strategic type, the country's antiaircraft rocket defense andtate of full battle readiness. Strategic aircraft, the navy and our submarine fleet, including atomic submarines, took up prescribedtate of increased military alert was declared in land forces, and demobilization of the senior age groups of the army wos suspended in the strategic rocket forces, in the AA defense units ond in the submarine fleet. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact member states, too, were brought up to full bottle readiness." If either side hod not shown restraint in these circumstances, "there would have followed an explosion of irreparable consequences."
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KHRUSHCHEV ON WAR AND IHE CUBAN CRISIS,2 (Cont'd)
Khrushchev then described the measures taken beginningctober by the Soviel Union to bringeaceful settlement. However, the US continued preparations to carry out on attack on Cuba. "In the rnorning ofctober we received Information from our Cuban comrades and from other sources which directly stated that this attack would be carried out within the next two or three days." Immediate action was needed lo preserve peace,essage was therefore sent lo the US President suggesting mutually acceptable solutions--that the US agree not to invade and call off the blockade and lhal the Soviet Union would then be ready lo remove weapons described by the US as "offensive."
Khrushchev further stated that the Soviet personnel which served the rocketalso left Cuba, thats were obsolete and had been sent to Cuba only for useind "of flying artillery" for coastal defense, that the Soviet military measures were revoked In response to the US lifting of the blockade and recall of warships and troops from the area. Favorable preliminary conditions have thus now been created for theof the crisis, though Ihe negotiations must be completed. "Who has won? It con be sold that it is reason that won; the cause of peace and people's security hasuba exists and grows stronger. If the Soviet Union was forced, os some say, to give in onthe US was also forced to give in.
He stated thot the Soviet Union fully supported Castro's five points, would never leave Cuba in trouble and that Cuba would not be left defenseless.resh invasion of Cuba remains possible; war was prevented in this caseensible compromise "but the world was literally on the very brinkwar, and if the imperialists again tighten the knot, will it be possible even lo slacken it? One cannot swear to it."
Khrushchev maintained lhat Soviet men in Cuba had received orders lo defend Cuba against invasion, lo fight together with the Cubans. The US "understood that if Its forces had sparked off fhe fire of war in Cuba and both Cuban ond Soviet people in Cuba were burned In that fire, then no force could have restrained the Soviet Union fromrushing retaliatory blow."
For Adenauer's benefit he stated that the rockets withdrawn from Cuba had been added to fhe "defense equipment which covers our westernOFFICIAL USE ONLY)
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