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the soviet bloc armed forces and the cuban crisis
a discussion of readiness measures
national indications center washington, d. c.
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CONTENTS
Introduction
Timing of the Soviet
Soviet Moves In Indonesia July-August
The September Readiness Measures
The Apparent Relaxation of the Soviet Readiness
Measures, Late September to EarlyWeek Before the
The Soviet Response to the Quarantine and to US
Militaryctober-21
How Ready Were the Soviet
What Is Highest Combat
The Strategic Rocket
Long Range Aviation
The Air Defense Forces (PVO) and Tactical
The Navy and the Merchant
The Ground
Mobilization
Logistics and
Nuclear Weapons
Activation of Alternate Headquarters Defense Deception and DiversionaryMilitary
TK* Coll torVolunteers^ from Ihe Armed Forces
The Role of the Military in the Cuban
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INTRODUCTION
The movemont info Cuba of Soviet strategic missiles and their accompanying Soviet combat forces was probably the most risky vonture undertaken by the USSR in tho period since World War li. It is commonly believed to have brought the US ond the USSR close to nuclear war; there are some Soviet statements which suggest that Soviet leaders, at least, believed this to be so.
Regardless of how the Soviets estimated that the US might react to their actions (and there are of course many indications that they did not expect tohey must have consideredossibility that the risks of hostilities between the two great powers would be substantially increased. In sheer prudence, any military high command would in these circumstances have taken measures to bring Its military forcestate of readiness for the possibility, however remote,ilitary confrontation. Further, since the hoped-for successful positioning of strategic missiles in Cuba undoubtedly wqs also designed tohreshold for further aggressive pressures elsewhere against tho West (and the evidence indicates that the Berlin question wos clearly on the Soviet immediate post-Cubahen again, achievementigh state of military readiness would be sought to support Ihe anticipated continuing risks.
The USSR in fact had months to prepare for the crisis and to bring its forces to the desired state of military readiness. While it could not anticipate precisely the date when the US would discover the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba,
it could determine precisely and well in advance when the danger of such detection would begin. It wos thusosition gradually to undertake such measures as it deemed nocessary ond to prepare against the date when maximum readiness of its
forces might be required. The USSR was not in the position that it was In the
Polish-Hungarian crisis6 whon It wos caught by surprise and had to react
suddenly and without adequate prior planning.
Tho purpose of this paper is to exomine, from the standpoint of our future warning problems and capabilities, some of the military measures which the USSR undertook, particularly fromuly onward when the movement of military equipment ond troops to Cuba began, and to compare the timing of these actions with the course of the buildup of Soviet forces and equipment In Cuba. Particular aHontion Is given lo the month of September, when the movemont of the strategic missiles into Cuba began ond the USSR announced that its forces were being brought to "highest combat readiness."
Although this project has involved on extensive review of availableit is not intendedefinitive project on Ihe subject. It isinal treatise,rimer. It is intended not to answer questions but to raise
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them, not to clow research into the subject but to open up tome of tha avenues of future inquiry which tiay shed more light on the cr^elo1 question from the warning standpoint ot how ready tne Soviet forces oct-jglly were for Hostilities and on the capabilities of Western Intelligence to determine rhar level of readiness.
It Is clear In even this initial approach that the gaps in our knowledge are lor greater than Ihe extent of our information and that we have at bestimited understanding of the steps which the USSR took during the summer and fallf this be doubted, it need only be pointed out thai the USSRinimum0 combat troops (and quite possibly more) from unknown points in the USSR to Cuba, together with the equipment for entire SAM battalions ond MRBM regiments, as well, short-range tactical missiles and antitank missiles, and quantities of air, naval and electronico discernible ripple in the USSR Itself. The movement of the ships was promptly detected, and there were dozens of reports frompoor, some foir, and somethe unloading and nature of the equipment. Its precise nature was finally established from aerial photography. But there Is even now no Information relating to theof this small expeditionary force ond its equipment Into Soviet ports.of troops staged through the Baltic port of Kaliningrad, less thaniles from Ihe Polish border,umor of the movement ever reaching the West. In view of this accomplishment in security, it may be asked what other and even moremilitary measures or movements might have been undertaken in total secrecy.
This poper is entirely the work of the National Indications Center, and the interpretations have not been coordinated with other agencies. An effort has been made to check the accuracy of all facts and reports cited. In addition to material drawn from current reporting and publications during the period, assistance in the preparation of this paper has been providedompilation of Soviet press comment on military readiness in the Cuban crisis, prepared by the Foreign Documents Division, Central Intelligence Agency; and studies on Soviet ond^otellirc military activity and readiness measures during the period
Comments on this paper and particularly information which mayon the preparedness statu* of Soviet forces will be welcomed. They shouldto the National Indications Center, Room, Pentagon, |
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DISCUSSION
2. April-June: This paper does not attempt so review In any detail Soviet military or political preparations prior to July. The April to June period, however, generally does not appear to hove involved exceptional military activity which might hove provided much hint that the USSR was already embarkingourse of action which would involve an extraordinary degree of risk. ew developments are noteworthy.
1. Timing of the Soviei Decision: There is no clear evidence as to when tho Soviet decision to undertake Ihe Cuban venture was mode or when discussions wore held with the Cubans on the subject. No high-level exchange of visits is known to hove occurred during the period when the decisions must have been taken. II appears reasonably certain that the USSR decided on the Cuban buildup some time between the endollowing the failure of Its efforts toerlin settlement that autumn, and the early soring In view of the magnitude of the logistic effort and me extensive planning involved In the coordination of the various shipments. It appears that the probable latest doteinal decision was April. Thus all Soviet moves at least from then on, particularly military measures, must be examined as possibly related to preporednessrisis some time in the autumn. It Is olso possible that certain earlier Soviet moves, notably the delivery of large numben of additional fighter aircraft to the East German ond Bulgarian Air Forces in December and January, were In part contingency preparations for an anticipated greater air defenseseveral months later, but no firm conclusion can be drown.
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Politically, during thii period, tv. ussr wai ogam iteppmg upto proceed with unilateral actionerman peace treaty and its demands for on end to Ihe occupation status in West Berlin. There were hintsossible new Berlin crisis about August.
3. Soviet Moves in Indonesia: Meanwhile, in April and May, the ussr rapidly began the delivery of additional mililary equipment to Indonesia, includingombers ond submarines manned by Soviet crews, in order to meet "thethreat from the Dutch in Newoviet air commander Marshalrrived in Djakarta in late. Juneiand reportedly encouraged an attack on West New Gulnoa using Soviet weapons.imilar line was said to have been taken by Mikoyonater visit In July, by which time there were Increasing sign* that Soviet "volunteers" might actually be used in the attack. The Indonesian attack was planned for August and forestalled only ot tho lost minute by successful negotiations largely conducted under US auspices. Whatever other reasons the ussr may hove hod toilitary solution to the West New Guinea problem, hostilities In August ond September clearly would haveubstantial diversion of world attention from other areasotential cover for the Cuban buildup. The deliveries^of equipment also served to place si* Soviet-manned submarinesumber ot iovtal medium-range bomberstrategic loco Hon in the South Pacific.
Tho movements of the first Soviet ships carrying equip-
ment and troops for the military buildup in Cuba began in early to mid-July andsubstantially during August. While the pattern and areas of certainilitary activity suggested possible Installation of surface-to-air missile information became available os to Ihe nature of the shipments untilugust when tho Komar missile patrol boats wore first identified en route. Onugust, prK.togropn7iaentified the first of tho SAM sites and the cruise missile sites andth. first evidence of tho probabl. delivery af MIG-2U. There was as yet no activity which would hove indicated preparations for the esfabl.shment of MKBM or IRBM sites.
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Onuly, me USSRignificant statement on Berlin, which said that the Western. not deploying en understanding of the neederman peace treoty and declared that th. Soviet Union, with* s" -VIM have to solve the question oferman peacewithout the participation of the Western powers."
Onuly, the USSR onnounced thai it hod given the order to tailing, and an extended series of tests beganugust.
During August, no motor Soviet military exercises were noted.
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the principol focus of both soviet military and political interest waieast germany where, onugust, the abolition of the office of the sovietwas announced ond on the following day east germany announcedof on east german berlin commandant. east german leader. ulbrichtspent the entire month of august in the ussr. thereumber ofof increasing east german security measures and of possible eos* germantoore active role in allied acceis to berlin j
t
to the conclusion ormm emnUvonyno time limit wo.there were several suggestions that khrushchev might attend the unthe fall in connection with the berlin question.
a number of leading soviet officers pold visits to eastern europe, possibly in connection with planning for future warsaw pact exercises or other coordinated sav.et-satellite military activity.
septembereasures: whatever state of readiness the
soviet armed forces haa1 achieved by the end of august, it was probably onlyto the extraordinary series of measures undertaken during theeptember. the timing of theseonjunction with the actual schedule of deliver es to cuba and soviet political actions and statements, strongly indicate thatrthat maximum dangerost critical period in its buildup in cuba would occur during september. in fact, the most striking feature of the octiv.ty during september is the remarkable coincidenceumber of widespread soviet military measures with the delivery to cuba of the first of the medium range missiles and what might be called the official public opening of the soviet political deception effort and massive propaganda campaign designed to forestall any us military action against cuba. the coincidence of all these measures, largelyndeptember, provides very strong evidence of the most core ful advance planning and preparations and suggest* that the soviet military steps were probably notesponse to us announcements but wens portredetermined schedule of preparedness measures.
the following are the highlights, but by no moons all, of the most significant known developments during september, arranged in chronological order andvery briefly:
2 sep: tho soviet* announced theywere sending some military equipment and technicians to cuba in viow of imperialist throat*.
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Sep:
4 Sep:
Kennedy announced the arrival in Cuba of SAM* ond other equipment and Sovietarning that thessues would arise if offensive equipment were to be sent.
A buildup was beginning In the Soviet Far East for what was to bo the largest exercise ever held In tho orea, Involving components of all forcesumber of unusually realistic features.
Sep: The President asked for authority to calleservists.
7 Sep: The USSR issued Its annual collup and release order, which was entirely normal and Indicoted that foil releases from the armed forces would not bo deferred.
first movement* of MRBMs into the Cuban ports of Cos!Ida
8 September) and Moriol (c.eptember) probably began,
destined for the sites at Soguo la Grande and San Cristobal.
USSR closed tho major portion of the Moscow-Leningrad
(having announced an intention to do sougust)
for reasons which remain unknown but probably for military exercises or deployments. There were concurrent indications of possible large-scale exercises in tho western military districts but little is known of their nature.
ep: TASS carried the Soviet Government statement on Cuba which said that oil weapons being sent to OAa were "designedfor defensivehat there was no need for the USSR to deploy it* missile* to any other country, ond that on attack on Cuba would "be the beginning of the unleo*hlng of war. It also said thot tho Minister of Defense had been instructed to bring Soviet forces to tho "highest combatnd that the Berlin issue would bo deferred until after the US election* In Novembor.
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Sep:
ep:
ep:
ery low level of flight activity fay Long Range Aviation aircraft in the western USSR, which was not attributable to weather.
The Northern Fleet engaged in annvolving the putting to seaurfoce force and other activity which suggested anti-nuclear dispersal and defense measures ratherormal Northern Fleet Air Force activity increased sharply,very heavy schedules for flights over the Norwegiory'Greenland Seos. The activity lessened aftereptember.
A major portion of the Baltic Fleet put to sea, dispersed to somebut apparently largely in the general area of home ports. An orea in the Gulf of Finland was closed to all shipseptember. There was increased surveillance of the entrance to the Baltic by Soviet, East German and probably Polisheptember.
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Mid- The USSR was engaged in an intensive propaganda campaignmat the US was preparing for an attack on Cuba and stressing
Soviet deterrent capabilities against such aggression. The Soviet press, particularly the military press, repeatedly reiterated that Soviet forces were being brought to "highest combat readiness" which would enable them to respond Instantly to aggression. One English language broadcast defined their readiness status as "war footing."
Thereumber of Indications of increased Eastand security measures in the Berlin area. An Eastcommander who defected in early Septemberunit* had been inspected by the Warsaw Pact hightraining wos to bo accelerated and that helockade of Berlin. Soviet statements Indicatedwith respect to Berlin would follow shortly after thewhen Khrushchev might visit the UN.
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c. 27 Fourloss submarines deported Northern Fleetwere the four subsequently detected in the quarantine zone.
As will be readily apparent, the foregoing measures cannot be describedingle category suchimpler even widespread simultaneous exercises, since rhoy involved on apparent varioty of activities,
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extent of which are not yet apparent. In particular,
exercises from
the naval activity, dthoyoh there Is strong reason to suspect that the unusual security
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be undertaken insofor at possible- jndcr the guise oTexotcise
the activity points up the extreme difficulty of distinguishing realistic uc'ual combat aep-oymenn andjajsjrg_of co-nbat readiness of Soviet forces and lends suppoTHolhe likelihood, which hos been noted in Soviet military; literature, thoT preparations for war w
The coincidence of oil this activity, which is apparently unprecedented in the post-World War II history of Soviet military forces, ond particularly when considered In con June Hon with the USSR's own statements as to the nature of its readiness measures, strongly suggests that this period may be the most significant for indications ond warning purposes of any period of Soviet military activity. Although the full extent of these measures can only be surmised at present from the probably fragmentary information thus far available, they may well be the closestlive" readying of Soviel forces, at least for defensive purposes, since the advent ol nuclear and rocket weapons.
6. The Apparent Relaxation of the Soviet Readiness Measures, Late September
to Early October: After Ihe exceptional '
^0 SeDtember. there were slam of a
abatement in the activity, f
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The foregoing apparent lull in Soviet activity (except In Cubo)some very interesting: quest Ions, which con not be onswered satisfactorily, although various hypotheses, not all mutually contradictory, may be offered;
o. Thereoviet miscalculation as to US reaction, or the timing of US reaction. The USSR expected, or af least believed there wos grove danger, thol the US would detect the arrival of the missiles in mid-September, ond believed that If it survived this period successfully without strong reaction, the danger would be materially lessened. It therefore timed Ih militarymeasures for the period of moximum danger, os It saw if, ond when nothing happened, felt free fo relax its preparedness somowhat. While it seems difficult to believe that the USSR would have felt that the US would react more strongly to the arrivalew missiles, not yet operational, than it would to the discoveryot of missiles alreody emplaced, this may actually have been the Soviet estimate. In fact, the whole Cuban venture seems to have boon basediscalculation that the misiilos once deployed would not result in US military reaction but would serveeterrent to such action and would bring the US to the bargaining table on other issues aserlin.
b. The Soviei preparedness steps in mid-September wererill or rehearsaleriod of future crisis; the exercises ond deployments were viewedest of readiness measures ratherreal" alert.
USSR had wanted merelyCC crisis, il could havo better done it in June or July before there was any real danger of US reaction. However, it is true that some, although by no means oil, of the measures lhat the USSR took in September wore repeated or resumed during the period of the October-November alert.
he USSR encountered some difficulty In maintaining the readiness levels of Its forcesrolonged period. This has been hinted In Soviet' statements, notobly Mallnovskiy's ofctober: "Moinlenonco of the
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d. The September activity waihow for the benefit of the US and designed to demonstrate that Soviet forces were Indeed at fhe maximum state of readiness alleged tn their propaganda. The Soviet Union not only never Intended to go to war, but it also did not believe that the US would consider any milifory octlon ogalnst the USSR. It actually took no real steps to raise the combat readiness of Ils forces. This point will be discussed ot
some length later in this paper, |
peak of the Soviet readiness measures, or at least fheof them, may have been timed also to precede the NATO fallwere conductedeptember. The USSR, traditionallyof such exercisesossible cover for artaek, may hove feltthey hod been completed the danger of surprise US action would
Septemberonly servedemporary period ot some iu to tz cays but theyore permanent redeployment or other readinesswere In fact not relaxed but sustained through November. Havingaccomplished, tbe overt manifestations of the activity were no
7. The Week Before the Crisis: The week from the discovery of the first of the MRBM sites (IS October) until the President's announcement of them ondof thectober) was morkedumber of unusual US activities which scarcely can hove failed to com* to Soviet attention. Among them were the intensified reconnaissance oferies of high-level meetings ineinforcement of air defenses in Florida and other preparatory military measures. There is no firm basis for determining the precise date when the USSR would probably have recognized that the US hod defected the sites ond was preparing to roke some octlon; however, it wos probably earlier In the week rather than later j"
Betweenndctober the USSR:
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The Sovier measure* seem lo have been selective and precautionary, but Ihey were probably sufficient, together with the combat readiness token previously, to preclude the possibility that Ihe Soviet military forces were token by surprise. It appears doubtful, however, that the Soviets anticipated the precise nature or full extent of the US reaction, particularly the extensive combat-ready deployment of the Strategic Air Command. There are, forumber of signs that their propaganda machinery had not been prepared to respond to the President's speech.
8. The Soviet Response to the Quoronllne ond lo US Militaryovembor): This period has been extensively covered In currentand other publications, and the reactions of the various components of tho Soviet forces and of other Soviet and Satellite elements ore covered in later sections of this paper. Only the highlights of this period are therefore noted here.
Tho USSR, after several hours delay, responded to President Kennedy's quarantine speech ofctoberovernment statement which charged tho US with piracy andetaliatory blow ifggressors touchut which was noncommittal about any specific Soviet counteraction or intention to support Cuba against USecall of Soviet merchant ships on route to Cuba; an announcement deferring the release of troops from the Strategic Rocket Forces, the Air Defense Forces and the submarine fleet, cancelling oil leaves and ordering the raising of bottle readiness ond vigilance of all troops;!
There were concurrently and continuing during the following days aan alert status
was imposed throughout the iovlet WcflS, OTmUUBn in* inoicurrons of thisond In some coses would probably not have boon consideredfrom trainingeneral
alert of Soviet forces boon anticipated unaer me cm.uiri3iuni.vi1. In general, this period might be described, based on the evidence thus far available,elatively static alert of Soviet troopsf
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_ :robV roodmess measure* oppeor mora nearly to coorooriy regarded as an "alert" status of troops, thateadying of troops ot homo stations for posslblo rapid redeployment If required. This wasapparent In Eastom Europe whore, In contrast to the September period, there wos clear evidenceeneral alorr of Soviet forces In Germany and of Satellite troops, particularly In East Germany and Czechoslovakia.
acuta, were rjm?
On the some doy,injoay nioniyver Cubaoviet
surface-to-oir missilo, an action which probably wos not ordered by Moscow.
Thi*ctober) marks the probable peak of the Cuban crisis and should presumably have also boon tho date of maximumf Soviet troops, although
is no door sign of this. Khrushchev, speaking to the
1 auuiemoh December, singled outctober as the date on which tho USSR received InformationS attack on Cuba would be carried out within the next two or three days; he indicated that this information prompted the dispatch of his proposal (made publicly Ihe following day) that, in return for US agreement not to Invade Cuba, the USSR would remove the weapons described ashis proposal had actually been conveyed privately to'the President on tho evoning ofctober, while onctober tho USSR, in what oppears to haveast desperate effort toubstantia! US concession, publicly proposed that the USSR would pull its missiles out of Cuba if the US did tho same from Turkey.
Although redeployments during this period appoor to hove beenumber of measures taken wore remarkably similar to those duringepetition or reimpositlon of virtually identical alert or combat readiness measures was undertaken In some Instances. Such activity was probably most opporent in the Navy, whore both tho Northern and Baltic Roots apparently carried out aof unknown extent of Surface and submarine units within homo waters which was similar although possibly loss extensive than during September. Surveillance of the Balticombined Soviot-Pollsh-East Gorman novel force was resumed, apparentlyore extensive scale than daring September.
There appears no doubt thot. In additionoliefS attack on Cuba was imminent, the action which hod most convinced the USSR of the seriousness of US intentions wos the dispersal and augmented airborne olert of the bombers of the US Strategic Air Command. There Is some reason to suspect that the USSR regarded this step as so serious that It may deliberately hove limitod its own readiness moves and avoided any actions which might have been considered potentially offensive In nature in order to provide no possible pretextS attack. As will be noted below,there is very Utile available Information on which toonclusion as to the actual readiness levels of the Soviet long-range retaliatory forces, However, Into repeated claims throughout tho crisis thot Soviet forces hod been placed in the highest state of combat readiness. Red Stor on bothndctober stated that the USSR was "taking oil necessary measures to ensure thot it will not be taken by surprise."
9. How Ready Were the Soviet Forces? Any attempt to answer this most crucial of all questions from the warning standpoint can be only preliminary at this stage and must toko account of the likelihood that our information Is fragmentary at best and that, on some of the most important of all readiness measures, we hove no information whatever. Moreover, there Is sufficient Information to soonest thot, at least during the September period, the USSR adopted some extraordinary security precautions to conceal certain preparedness measures, If not an active deception program. The following sections of this study will bo devoted primarily to oof some of the foe tors Involved in the Soviet readiness measures and the as yet unanswered questions concerning the nature of Soviet military activityduring both the' September period ond Ihe October-November crisis.
There has been some tendency to dismiss the Soviet activity, particularly fromctober onward, as exclusively defensive in nature and therefore of little
With the confirmationovemberismantling of the MRBM ond IRBM sites in Cuba wos actually under way and the subsequent removal of the missiles ond related equipment beginningovember, the most ocute phase of the Cuban crisis had passed. Soviet readiness measures remained in effect, however, with littlerelaxation until after President Kennedy's announcement onovember thot the US was lifting the quarantine In return for Khrushchev's assurances that thtombers would also be withdrawn ondumber of Soviet ground units would "also be withdrawn in duen the following day, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact command announced the termination of their emergency measureseturn of forces lo normal levels of combatelaxation of the olett measures wos almost Immediately evident in the termination of the Baltic Sea surveillance.
significance inlue to any future pattorn of Soviet preparation for possible hostilities. While the measures talcen by the USSR almost certainly were primarilyand precautionary against possible US octlon, it may be noted that thebetween defensive ond offensive preparations in some spheres of activity is aone. US preparations also were defensive, Insofar os the Soviet Union wasyet the US force brought to highest readiness wos the Strategic Air Command.
10. What is Highest Combai Readiness? One of me anomalies In Soviet activity before and during lhe Cuban crisis is the apparent limited nature of Soviet readiness measures, particularly during October ond November, as contrasted with the USSR's repeated claims thot Soviet troops wero brought to "highest combat Thisaivysshuyu boyevuyuhas also been"peak militaryfull battler "total combatto hove been rarely used prior lo2 in Soviet public statements, although there had been numerous references to tho importance of high combat readiness for Soviet military forces. Beginning with the II Septemberstatement, however, the phrase appears again and again in Soviet publications. Day after day, the Sovietthe militarythat Soviet troops hod been or were being brought ta this state of preparedness because of the alleged threat to International peace os the result of US "oggxealve Intentioni" against Cubo. One Radio Moscow tnglish-languoge broadcast oneptemberthe phrase os "war footing." Although many Soviet statements left thethat all Soviet forces were brought to "highest combatumber of them specified thot Ihis applied above all to the Strategic Rocket Forces. Theeptember statement also singled out the submarine fleet os of special importance In the readying of Soviet forces. It was not until theovember order cancelling the readiness measures mat the USSR announced specifically that there had been varying degrees of readiness in Ihe several components of the armed forces, of which only the Intercontinental ond strategic rocket troops and the PVO wero then said to hove been brought to -full combat reodinesj." (Seeiscussion of the readiness levels of the vorious components of the ormed forces.)
At might be expected, Soviet statements are in genoral quite vague as to precisely what Is involved In bringing troops to highest combat readiness, although they are explicit that the result of the measures taken Is ta place troops Infor Instant retaliatory action ogoinst any aggressor. To cite three examples:
"What does it mean ta belate of the highest combatord, this means that all tho might of our armed forces, at the first signal, must be put into immediate action ogoinst the enemy,
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strategic military, economic ond political centers ond main concentrations of forces."'
highest combat readiness Is that state in which troops are able at any moment ta repelurprise nuclear attack of an aggressor ond, ot the first signal, to undertake resolute combat operations oimed ot thedestruction of the enemy."2
"The possibility that the enemy will attack by surprise and with massive use of nuclear weapons immeasurably increases the need for the Armed Forces to be in constant combat readiness. In some instances, fhe^ time required to bring troops to combat readiness should bo moosured not in days, andumber of cases, not even in hours. For many units and formations it is nowatter of minutes. This applies above all to the Missilend it also applies to the Nationalvery unit, every formation must be readyignal or upon command to execute Its combat mission Immediately. Only with such anigh degree of readiness can on aggressor's attack bo successfully foiled and his surprise blows repellod."
In various other Red Star items, -highest combat readiness" was said ta Involve -intense combat trolnlng^t'rnilltary units; the highest level of organization, precise execution of orders and Instructions and faultless discipline; efficiently conducted training alerts In all units;onstant state of vigilance and alertness In all forces. The Red Star articlectober outlined various elements of high combat readiness osigh level of combat training in all units; perfect condition of materiel, particularly in the racket troops ond PVO whose troops must bo ready to execute combat missionsatter of minutes or even seconds; and Irreprochable combat discipline. MallnovsMy further noted that "highest combat readiness" also included Ideological and educational work.
'Marshal Malinovskiy as quoted inar,Red
Wore those statements more propaganda intended primarily for US consijnp-tlon and without moaning In terms of any actual preparedness steps taken by Soviet forces? Before this is assumed to be the cose, certain related Information must be examined.
Firtt, the bulk of the Soviet statement* were carried In Red Star, the organ of the armed forces, and only secondarily by Provda, Izvcitiyo anTTASX They were thus intended primarily to reach members of the armed forces. The full extent of these statements can be found only in an analysis of the Soviet military press and not from Soviet propaganda broadcasts.
o takeoff.
ocumentary evidence confirms that there are at leoit three stage* of combat readiness in the Soviet armed forces, from "combat readiness numberthe lowest stage) to 'combat readiness numberthe highest stage). Althoughot entirely clear from available material, these conditions may be called for only In times of unusual preparedness for actual combat or for training purposes, definednd there mayourth or lower stage of normal readiness. Imposition of any one of the reodlness levelspparently collseries of actions designed to bring troops and equipmentrescribed degree of readiness for military action. "Combat readiness number I- or "conditionn the Navy, for example, equates to general quarters, accordingoviet book on this subject. There Iseries of alarm or alert signals which establish the various conditions of combat readiness. Although the precise steps taken by any given type of unit will naturally vary, the sequence from lowest combot readiness (numbero highest (numberpptors to be uniform throughout the Soviet armed forces,
End pilots on strip alert duty are-ptaceoith those In conditionready for Immedl
Whether tho same progression of numbered readiness conditions olso applies uniformly to the European Satellite forces is by no means clear, ond the available Information is highly conflicting.
Tho foregoing would thus tend to Indicate that the Soviet pubhc statements, although intentionally vague, did actuallyaising of combat readiness In the armed forces, which in some cases al least was the "highest combait defined in Soviet military literature.
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A few words may be in order os to the possible relationship of varying degrees of combat readiness to an "alert" status. It appears clear that the imposition of higher than normal degrees of combat readiness does involve actions commonly described os ann some cases, the Soviets themselves seem to use the terms synonomously. Thus, Malinov-sldy In his address to the Armed Forces Ideological Conference In October stated: "In maintaining high combat readiness to the maximum degree, the role of soldiers, officers and generals of the main branch of the armed forces, the Strategic Rocket Troops, is extraordinarily great. They ace required to maintain their powerful equipment, os they say, on alert, and to be readyhort time to deliver crushing retaliatorygainst the most important enemy torgots located ot any point on-
It appears, however, that the varying degrees of combat readiness in the Soviet armed forces mayore precise and extensive series of steps than those usually associated with what might beimple "troop alert" or alert drill. The latter are conducted with great frequency in the Soviet forces, apparently ot the discretion of the unit commander, and normallyodden alerting of the troops, frequently at night, for assembly at prescribed stationsesignated concentration orea, possibly followedood march In the ground forcesakeoff of aircraft in the oir forces, ofter which the troops return to barracks and the alert is terminated. The raising of combot readiness, on the other hand, would seem to Involve more extensive measures andore permanent condition of enhanced readiness and toore meaningful Indication of preparedness for possible hostilitiesimple troop alert. Although tho analogy may not be: entirely accurate, Soviet combat readiness sieges may more nearly approximate the US "DEFCON" stoges.
The timing of the Soviet announcement that troops wore being brought to "highest combat readiness- (II September)!
mol the raising ot combot redBIMis ffloy llrVCMVB, at IMI in swimide variety of training activities, alert measures, readying of equipment, redeployment of forces, and other preparations which go beyond those usually associated with on
'Red Star,
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"alert." Thli view it further supported by statements in the recently published Soviet book on strategy which states among other things that the strategic deployment of forces will be undertaken prior to tbe outbreok of wor ondhigh state of combatin the armed forces Is an Important part of this process."1 II appears noteworthy
thai no official Soviet order or statement on the readinesi measures referred to themere "olert" and that theovember order cancelling the readiness measures in effect revoked both the order ofeptember and thot ofctober, thus furtherthat the readiness measures were more or less continuously In effect from about
eptember on. The Warsaw Pact order ofovember, on the other hand, is quite explicit in revoking only thectober order, thus Implying that increased readiness measures in the Satellite forces did noi take effect until after the President's speech ofctobor.
So far os con be determined from available information, Soviet combatstages, including the imposition of "combat readinesshatever steps may be involved, opply only to the Soviet armed forces in being. Although further research to establish the validity of this conclusion is clearly In order, it would appear that such other measures as may have been taken by the USSR prior lo ond during the Cuban crisis would involve the issuance of additional orders beyond those involved in bringing the armed forces to "highest combat readiness."
11. The Strategic Rockei Forces; Ai notedumber of Soviet statements clearly specified that, in the raising of the combat readiness of Soviet forces, the role of the Strategic Rocket Forces wos of primary importance orgreat. In general, Soviet statements convey an impression that the readying of these forcesatter of greatest concern. In tbeovember order cancelling the readinesi measures. It was stared that "Intercontinental and Strategic Rocket Troops are to shift from full (or total) combat readiness to normal combat training onden due for release from the rocket troops, together with those in the Air Defense Forces and the submarine fleet, were specifically retained In service under the Soviet order ofctober.
There Is virtually no available evidence as to whether the rocket troops were or
were not brought to the level of readiness claimed by the USSR. [
Soviet Mililary Strategy,
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1 If con only be cocci jded thot theie lorces -nay hovet reoainess ond thot Weifem copobMItfet tor determiningre very poor.
12. Long Range Aviation: In theovember order, it wot ttated that "the combai reodines* status /or state of constant combat preparedness^ of strategic eviction Is rescinded." Khrushchev, speaking to the Supreme Soviet onecember, said that in connection with the state of full combat readiness, "itrategicook up prescribed positions." (It ii interesting to note that these two statementsore ond perhaps unique referenco to "strategic aviation" rather than Long Range Aviation, which suggests thot medium bombers of the naval air forces may be Included in the term.) Other Soviet statements appear to have given conilderably less emphaiii lo the readiness of long-range bombers than to thot of the rocket forces, and the general impression is that their readiness was of somewhat less importance to the USSR than that of the rocket troopi ond the Air Defense Forces.
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13. The Air Defense Forces (PVO) ond Tactical Aviation: There are clear indications that the USSRumber of measures to augment the readiness of fighter oircraft of the Air Defense Forces (the IAPVO) and_ tactical air units,in the border military
H. The Navy and the Merchant Fleet: The Sovieteptember statement taid that "particularly" the subroorirw fleet must be able to cope with Its tasks, the only element of the armed forces thus singled out in the Initial readiness order. The Importance of the submariners In the readiness measures was again suggested in thectober order which deferred the demobilization of men oue for release from the submarine fleet (along with those in the Strategic Rocket Forces and the PVO). he order cancelling the readiness measures, the Novy was the only component ot the armed forces for which the previous readiness level wos not In some way defined, the order stating morely lhat "the naval forces are to shift to normal combat training. However, the order also stated that "the submarine fleet Is to return to the places of usualnd Khrushchev onecember stated that "the Navy and our submarine fleet, including atomic submarines, took up prescribed positions. Red Mar
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ctober carried an article datellned "unidentified bote,ctober' which indicated that mott of the submarine! from that bate had redeployed: "thepiers are now sparsely populated; the majority of boatt have gone tonctober Red Star carried an editorial and full page of artlclei devoted to the submarine fleet,"wh"ich gave somewhat unusual emphasis to its defensive as well at offensive role. The difficulties involved for submarine crews in maintaining highest combat readinessong period were noted, ond it wos stated that the submarines were men often at sea completing the lost missions of Iht training year.
During September ond again beginningctober, thereumber of indications, particularly in tht Northern and Poclfic Fleets,edeployment or dispersal of naval units, including both surface ships ondwhich wos apparently largely confined to movements within local waters and did not involve out-of-area deployments. Tht September activity in tht Poclfic Fleet was extensive and prolonged'
DeploymenrrorsurTaee-uriii* weietxlcniiv. wiiwiWly, MB'nmngond continuing until abouteptember elements of all threewere also redeployed ond engaged in unusual activity, although thelo have been relatively limited in the Black Sea Fleet. |
[ and aclMfy ol auxiliary Torres suggested ane ueueiui
logistic-support required by fhe fleet.air proportion of the Baltic Fleet was also at sea during Ihis period, apparently dispersed to some extent, and there was increased survtllloncc of the entrance to the Baltic by Soviei, East Germon ond probably Polish Fleet unlh.
tsttr extent, much the same pattern of activity wos repeated during tht October-November period, Tht Northern Flett In particularonildtroble numbtr of surface and an unknown number of submarine units in tht Kola Inlet area. In activity which possiblyltptrtal In local waters; the level of auxiliary activity sjggeited that Flttt units were replenished either under way or in coastal Inlets. Tht Baltic Fleet, although possiblyesserthan during the September period, apparently also had on unusual number of surface units and submarines at sea. ombined Soviet-East German-Polish naval surveillance of Iht Baltic wos maintained from aboutctobtr untilovember, with the activity apparently supported by theh Radio Direction Finding Battalion whichestward deployment aboutctobtr. In the Pacific
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pecial submarine brigade put to seo In the Sea ol Okhotsk, there were some indicationsubmarine interior barrier patrol, apparently relatively small-scale, ond the number of out-of-area submarine patrols in the Pacific increased to four by the end of October.
Ihe Fleet activity in general provides considerable Indication to support tho Soviet statements that elements of tho Reel, including submarines, took up prescribed positions outside their normal deployment aroos. It appear* probable, although the full extent of the activity cannot bo determined, that substantial elements of the Navy did deploy to alternate or wartime dispersal bases, particularly In the Northern and Pacificnd that unusually large numbers of ships may also have boon kept at sea, although generally within local waters,urther defensive measure. There is, however, no apparent evidence of offensive deployments such os have been noted In major Floot exercises, particularly in tho North Atlantic.
Aport from these activities, unusual no vol ond merchant fleet activity wos largely confined to submarines and merchant vessels Involved in tho Cuban buildup. Thel ass submarines deployed Into the Atlantic abouteptember
nod all returned to home waren Dy aor uT I
Uecemt>er.
There was no reportod reduction in soviet
merchant lhippmg to lorein^-portr qui
ng the period of tho Cuban crisis ond no other apparent indication that the USSR wos unduly concerned about the safety of its ships outside Communist woters.
15. The Ground Forces:
stated thai fho ground WotC BOB DMruiv ifincreased" (orcombat readiness rather than tho 'highest" combat readiness of the rocket force* ond tho PVO; Khrushchev onecember defined the readlnoss of the ground forces ostale of Increased military olert."
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In Eastern Europe, and particularly East Germany, where coveroge of the Soviet around forcei ii vastly superior to that in the Soviet Union itself, thtmeasures of tht ground forces appear generally to have been limited to whot might be called precautionary alert measures designed to place the troops in rtadiness for rapid tedeployment if necessary. There Is no evidence for either the September or Octobtr-November period thot any significant redlspositlomng of Soviet troops was undertaken, with the possible exception of fhe Southern Group of Forces In Hungary,
ooservanons uur were made.
period confirmed lhat some soviet
troop movenBi
In the Group of Soviet Forces, Germanyn the other hand, the great bulk of evidence for both September and October-November indicates that troops were htld in readiness near their home stations or In barracks areas. During September and early October, the clearest sign of this was the marked absence of significant field trainingeriod when division and nigher level extrcises art normally held. In addition,
oneptember at least some Soviet personnel at the GSFG hecaquarrers were placed on an alert and combat readiness status which Involved the full readying and loading of equipment for possible deployment and other increased alert measures, which Soviet personnel reportedly believed wos not on exercise. |
Ihere isepairf the West Germanin Troops was Increasedeptember.
Similar alert and readiness measures were clearly discernible in GSFG frorctober onward.
activity ana appurenny
stations, although Ihere are unconfirmed reports that sma _ o camps along the West German border, probobly for reconnaissance and security purposes.
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If the pattern of Soviet ground activity in Eastern Europe thus appean relatively clear, the same cannot be said for the Soviet Union, where the nature of troop activity during both the September and October-November periods is obscure.
Reports during the first three weeks of September Indicateumber of exercises were apparently held in the western military districts of the USSR, the nature of which is not clear. Wither these constituted relatively"normal" field training activity or served as covertrategic redeployment of some forces cannot befrom available evidence. However, the closing of the major portion of the Moscow-Leningrad highway3 Septembertep believed lo be unprecedented in peacetime) strongly suggests that certain very unusual military activity, most probably
involving me grumiudenied travel to Murmansk fromoeptember.
5 October, Red Star carried an article on combat readiness in relation to the Cuban situation by two oifTcers of the Main Staff of the Ground Forces whichtrong hint that some redeployment of ground forces in the western military districts hod probably been undertaken. Its pertinent passages ore:
"The experience of history teaches that aggressive countries havesignificant strategic successes and even victories in war,their hoving been able to secretly deploy and to put the army andcombat readinessurprise arrack. On tho other hand, theof tho timely placement of armed forces In appropriateIn the faceilitary threat has often been one of thedefeat of particularThe failures of our Army in theof tho Great Patriotic War are also lorgoly explained by theof tho timely placement of troops In Increasedven the substantial shortcomings thenmight notdecisive influence on the state of defense If the troops hod beenin time ond preoared to repel the Ger-nan fascist
Soviet froopso'ld not receive orders on tho odvonco deployment of farces and the occupation of defensive positions along the western border of the
In the face of military danger, cannot allow the
country to bo loss prepared forictorious war In defense of its freedom and Independence than the imperialist aggressors ore prepared for an aggressiveItalics added)
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ctober, the USSR cancelled all travel by foreign diplomats, so thot no first-hand observations are available of activities in the western border districts.
16. Mobilizotion: The Soviet Union took special precautions in itseptember statement to reassure the West that it was not retaining men due for release from the armed forces or colling up reservists, contrasting this with President Kennedy's request to calleservists. The release of trained soldiers was citedclear enough Indication of our peaceful Intentions. No government would takeeasure if it contemplated any actionilitary nature." This claim of peaceful intentions wos somewhat qualified, however,urther statement thot the callup of reservists "cannot be of any serious military Importance, given up-to-date means of nuclearince theeptember statement in most other particulars wos, toell-worn TASS phrase, "false from beginning tohis claim, clearly cannot be accepted on its face value alone.
There is thus far, however, no available evidence that the USSR undertook ony
unusual mobilization of reservists prior to or during the Cuban crisis.
possibilityartial secret mobilization may hove been takenarticularly during the Septemberannot be discounted, however,in light of certain statements made in Military Strategy which suggest that such mobilization would be conducted under precisely the type of conditions which then "Partial mobilization In fhe past was carried out simultaneously or In succession only In certain military districts closest to the probable theater .of operations. Partial mobilization was sometimes effectedoncealed fashion by mobilizing only certain unit* under fhe guise of various types of tests, assembly for traininganeuvers and so on.
"Concealed mobilization is also possible under present-day conditions, but it will be carried out somewhat differently from before. As relations between thestates become increasingly strained, they will gradually bring up to full combot
reodlness part of the force* earmarked for tasks in fhe Initial period of theystem of territorial build-up of troops during mobilization Is considered the most acceptable. Under the conditions of nuclear war this system considerably speeds up the process of putting one's troopsor footing." This discussion then goes on to point out that under territorial or dispersed mobilization eoch unit will bemobilized locally, rather than under the centralized method employed In previous wars, and that It will be unnecessary to transport mobilized troops or materiel to mobilization centers.' It Is clear thatethod of mobilization, If conducted In the border militaryould greatly reduce the chances of detection ond wouldinimum of disruption of transportation. Moreover, It Is of interest that the reason given by the USSR for tho cloture of the Moscow-Leningrad highwayoeptember wos "some kind of tests."
The USSR in tho fall2 did delay to on unknown extent theof men from the armed forces. Although the annual collup andordereptember Indicated that releases would be entirely normal, thereleast one report as early aseptember that some men In East Germanythat their demobilization would be deferred. Also, olthoughpecified that releases would be held up only In the Strategic RocketPVO and the submarine fleet, there ore somere-
leases from the armed forces wore temporarily deferred In oil Droncnei of tho armed forces. Unfortunately, information on troop rotation In East Germany for tho fall2 appears too meager to reach any firm conclusion as to the extent to which demobilization was deferred or slowed down, although fhe evidence on balancethat there was atlowing down of departures andemporary total cessation of demobilization.
In the Satellites, there is good evidence that In several countries the norma! fall releases were held up, which concurrent with the normal foil callups resultedemporary increase in fhe strength of the armed forces. In at least two countries (Bulgaria and Poland) there were reports that reservists wore called up os well.
17. Logistics and Transportation: Virtually no evidence has becomefor the period of the Cubon crisis which would Indicate that the USSR took any
unusual logistic
am to which this apparent lack of
Soviet Military Strategy,.
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activity reflects the actual situation and the extent to which It may be attributableack of information is uncertain]
However, noon Tvai cofm to UgrlT WTllcri would sUggelt that thei*ilitary requisitioning of rolling stock, civil aviation or other means of transportation either in the USSR or Eastern Europe.
'8. Nuclear Weaponi: Of all preparedness measures, the mostin bringing Soviet forcestate of reodiness for Immediote retalration or preemptive attack is probably the arming of strategic missile nosecones, long-range bombers and other nuclear-capable components of the armed forces with nuclear weapons ond the Issuance of orders permitting the employment of such wee pom under certain contingencies.
t iovier puo^cttOtt
m inur inerroMipeu tot on, ana punicuiuriy cket Forces, were at highest combat readineu carry any meaning, however, it would appear that some steps should have been token to make nuclear weapons available for immediate use. Rigid controls on the storage and release of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union insure that their employment will not be Initiatedecision of the highest political authority, and special units have probably been established throughout tha chain of command {perhaps under the KGB) to hold custody of nuclear weapons.
LIm'IUPQMlGH PltKM
Is known to hove been in the Moscow oreo at least onctober when most of Ihemumanian reception, and the civilian leadershipumber ofpublic appearances during this period. Thus, on balance. It oppears unlikely that any molor components of the Ministry of Defense were relocated, although the possibility thot secure or ur^erground facilities may exist fairly close to Moscow cannot be discounted.
ivil Defense: Information which has only recently become available, months afler the event, indicates that approximately concurrent with the militarymeasures during September civil defense alert* ond exercises were altoot leost In the Baku and possibly the Nebit-Dog areas In the Tronicoucasus ond Turkestan, respectively.
Apart from this, there have been only very limited indications thus far that unusual civil defense precautions were taken In the USSR either prior to or during the Cubanew other civil defense drills were reported late In the summer, but evidence is lacking that these were stepped up In comparison with previous years.
Virtually the only other available reports of unusual civil defense activity during me period were from Bulgorlo, where city-wide meetings were held In Sofia during the week ofctoberovember to dlicuw evacuation procedure*and courses were begun in poison go* defense. |
only olltH IliUIUJllon* ui puklbU medico! or civil defense preporeq-
nesswer.rev. sightings of poMibly larger than normal numbers of ambulances in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. There were no publicized advisory warning* to the populace and. In general, it appear* that fhe Bloc leader* sought to avoid taking measures which would have caused undue public alarm.
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21, Security, Deception ond Diversionary Measures: Tho Sovier political deception measure* In connection with the Cuban buildup are well-known ond need no elaboration. They involved Khrushchev personally as well as all other spokesmen for the USSR, both publicly and through private diplomatic channels, in direct ondfalsehoods to tho President of tho United Stares ond the worldrg*. Every effort was taken to mislead tho US os to Soviet intentions and, on occasion, to divert attention to other areas as the ostensible primary subjects of Soviet concern. Not only the Indonesian venture but to some extent the Berlin issue were played up forpurposes. It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that all Soviet threats with respect to conclusioneace treaty with East Germany ofter the US elections wore Intended entirely to mislead and to concentrate attention on the German issue, sinco one major outcome which the USSR foresaw from the Cuban venture wasa more favorable climate to pursue Its objectives with respect to Berlin.
As Is also well known, elaborate security precautions were token with respect to the delivery of military equipment to Cuba, both ot sea and in Cuba. The only notable lapse in Soviet security in this field was the failure to camouflage tho construction of the MRBM and IRBM sites.
Less attention has been paid to security ond deception measures within the USSR itself with respect both to tho nature of the shipments to Cuba ond tho military pro potations of Soviel forces. It is noteworthy, oven for the USSR, lhat there wosingle known look through Soviet or Satellite channels of the true nature of Soviet shipments to Cuba, that security restrictions on the movemont of equipment and troops into and through Soviel ports were so rigid that no information hos ever. been obtained on thomj and that, although thousonds of Soviet troops were deployed lo Cuba, there
was no discernible reflection of this]
restrictions which were placed on travel into tho Black Sea ond Caucasus oreas from July onward quite probably were related to the movement of equipment into Black Sea ports. Various pretexts were offered for these restrictions, particularly to Rostov.eported serious riot in tho Rostov areaune was gene roily believed as late as September to be tho reason for the restrictions,In retrospect it appear* that this area may haveey point for certain military movements. Otherwise, tho USSR appears lo have accomplished the military deliveries without imposing any abnormal restrictions on Western travellers. The port of Kaliningrad, through which many of the troops were moved, is normally closed to Western travellers. The only highly unusual travel restrictions known to hove been imposed throughout tho period wore tho closure of the Moscow-Leningrad highway3 September and the denial of all Western diplomatic travel fromoctober.
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22. o Military Reactions: Although there It no proof, it if probable that the top Satellite political and military leaden wore Informed some time during the iummer, probably during August when several of the leoders made visits to the USSR, of the nature of Soviet shipments to Cuba ond of probable Soviet plans to exploit the advantages to be derived from the hoped-forpositioning of strategic missiles In Cuba. Inumber of combined Soviet-SatelIIte exercises were conducted during the summer and foil in Eastern Europe, which suggest that Soviet military planning, particularly in air defense preparedness measures, wos coordinated in some degree with the Sotellitei, An East German regimental commander who defectedeptember, although he had no knowledge of any Soviet activity in Cuba, reported that on inspection of East German units by the Warsaw Pact high command hod empeedup of unit training, thot East German training was to bo accelerated andonth earlier than usual, and that hearsaw Pact exercise would be used tolockade of West Berlin that fall.
There Is, howover, no discernible indication that Satellite forces were alerted In connection with the Soviet readiness measures during September, and the readying of Soviet troops In Eastern Europe at that time appoars to hove been
35
IIMITFD niSTRIHUTION/MCi FQgfilftM QISSFftil
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quite limited In comparison with the activity In the USSR. There were, however, continuingarticularly during August and September, thot Eait German forcei were being preparedotiibly greater role around Berlin ond along the western zonal border, probably in expectation of planned Sovier moves with respect to Berlin hod the Cuban venture succeeded.
Beginning onctober with the issuance of the order to raise the readiness of the Wortaw Pact forces, there were numerous Indications of an alert of Eost German ond Czechoslovak forces, several signs of on increased readiness of Polish troops'
[and some but considerably fewerof an alert status In the southern soreniht forces. In general, the readiness measures of East German ond Czechoslovak forces appear to have been very similar to Ihose of Soviet troops in Eastern Europe. |
i^erman detectors and oDMrvationi 'inmany connr placed on alert aboutctober whichestriction of allancellation ofeturn of units to home stations,uspension of training ond border obstacle construction. There were some indications as well of tightened security on industrial installations ondimited alert of East German party No major troop movements were mode, although there may haveimited reinforcement of the borders with West Germany, and thereassible alert of Czechoslovak railroad facilities. No Information Is available on any unusuol measures taken by the East German railroads. Observations Indicated that an undetermined number of Czechoslovak aircraft were probably moved to alternate bases
Throughout the Satellites, there were no unusual restrictions placed onof Western diplomatic and attacherobable further indication that no offensive measures or significant deployments were token and that It was desired that Western observers know this. The alerts, as far as can be ascertained, appear to have consistedrecautionary readying of forces at homeuspension of normal autumn releases from the armed forces in several countries, ond on apparently relatively limited callup of reservists in some Instances (see previous section on
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top secret UMITFn DlUltlDUTIOI/HO rOfiriCM'
24. The Coll tor"volunteers" fromthe Armed Forces: During theIn me autumnhe USSR publicly oneed thot members offorces hod applied as "volunteers" to assist Egypt, although me threatsuch personnel to Egypt was stressed only ofter the peak of the crisisNo evidence was obtained that the USSR hod seriously intended tosuch "volunteers." In contrast, prior to and during the Cuban crisis,to have been no public reference In the USSRecruitment of There wos, however, on unpubllclzed campaign within the encourage personnel to "volun-
teer" for service in Cuba; Tl wos apparently initiated about the time of the Soviet Government statement oneptember). It should be noted lhat by this lime the bulk of Soviet forces dispatched to Cuba were either already en route or most certainly had already been selected ond initial preparations begun for their movement to Cuba. It Is doubtful, therefore, both from the timing standpoint and from the unlikelihood that the troop units and personnel for Cuba would have been selectedvolunteer" basis, that the campaign for "volunteers" In tho armed
3?
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i imitfi. itKToiBi iTinM/Mnis
forces bore any direct relation to the actual selection or movement of troops to Cuba. It didsychological purpose within the armed forces, however, coinciding with the preparedness measures initiated at the same time, of emphasizing the USSR's seriousness of purpose and of conditioning the troops for the future revelation that Soviet combat forces had actually been sent to Cuba. In an article published ineneral Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Directorate, claimed that: "During the events in the Caribbean, entire large units and units (soyedineniya anded by their commanders, applied to the Minister of Defense for permission to be sent to Cuba; thousands of soldiers wrote applications expressing their desire to go there as
25. The Role of the Military In the Cuban Decisions: There Is virtually no available evidence, nor even good hints, as to what Individuals or groups within the Soviet Union originally propounded the suggestioneployment of strategicto Cuba, or what individuals or groups may have opposed the venture. It may be argued on the one hand that Khrushchev personally originated the projecteans toapid alteration In the balance of power which might permit him to pursue other aspects of his foreign program,erlin peace treaty, or, on the other hand, that the military, acutely conscious of their actual strategic inferiority,the venturererequisite to any new moves with respect to Berlin or In other areas which mightisk of commitment of Soviet forces. In any event, it appears almost certain that Ihe advantages and disadvantages of the venture must have been discussed at length and that the final decisionollective one. It is also clearly evident that Khrushchev, whether or not he first proposed the idea, was deeply committed to it and that he personally led the political deceptiondesigned to assure tho US and the world that the Soviet Union hod no Intention of placing any offensive weapons In Cuba.
Inhereumber of changes In tho Soviel high command which are notable primarily because of the extraordinary secrecy which surrounded thorn. It wos not until the publication of the Soviet Encyclopedia In October that the USSR made it known either publicly or privately that there hadumber of shifts of commanders, Including the appointment of Marshal Biryuzov as commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces. It may bo surmised that the unusual secrecy concerning these changes was In some way connected with the Cuban decision and may havesome opposition within the military establishment. There is no evidence,that Marshal Moskalenko, who wos replaced as commander of the missile forces and appointed to the post of chief inspector, was opposed to deployment of histo Cuba or that he has actually fallen from favor.
If the circumstances surrounding the original decision to deploy tbe missiles to Cuba are thus obscure, the circumstances surrounding their withdrawal point fairly
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lo the likelihood that Khrushchev personally made the decision or ot least led the argument in favor of the retreat. There are,umber of reports which suggest that the decision was opposed by elements within the militaryot least without some quid pro quo such as thectober offer to trade Soviet missiles In Cuba for US missiles In Turkey. The extent to which the Soviet highitself may have opposed the withdrawal orarder bargaining position is, however, totally unknown. That there was some opposition to the Soviet course of action within the military was strongly suggested by Marshal Chuykov'sovember article in Red Star which Implied thot some military personnel were criticizing the political leadership for "spoiling" Soviet military successes ond In effect reminding the military of its subordination to the Party and to the decisions of the political An unusual number of ensuing references in the Soviet press to the supremacy of the Party over the military in matters of policy may also be related, of least in part, to military dissatisfaction over the outcome of the Cuban affair.
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