RICCARDO LOMBARDI'S COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION WITHIN THE ITALIAN SOCIAL

Created: 7/19/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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on the current situation within the italian socialist party /ps i/

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SECRETARY OF THE CHRISTIAN OEMOCRATIC /DC/ PARTY.AS CONFIDENT THATECONCILIATION WOULD BE FORMALLY ANNOUNCEDEETING OF AUTONOMISTS SCHEDULED. FOR FRIDAY, HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT THE RECONCILIATION WOULD ALSO INCLUDE THOSETALIAN GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF LABOR /CGIL/ SECRETARY FERNANDO SANTI ANO PSI DEPUTY TRISTANOHO WERE THE MOST OUTSPOKEN CRITICS OF THEREACHED BY PSI SECRETARY PIETRO NENNI WITH LEAOERS OF THE DC, THE ITALIAN DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY /PSDI/ AND THE ITALIANPARTY /PRI/. AS BEEN WORKING TO PERSUADE SANTI AND CODIGNOLA TO ACCEPT THE RECONCILIATION, "BECAUSE EVEN THE ISOLATED REFUSALEW AUTONOMISTS TO DO SO WOULD HAVE VERY UNFAVORABLE REPERCUSSIONS WITHIN SOME OF OUR PROVINCIAL FEDERATIONS ANO MIGHT JEOPARDIZE THE VICTORY OF THE AUTONOMISTS AT THE FORTHCOMING PARTY

CONGRESS." DDED THAT, ON THE BASISOMPLETE RECON-

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ASSURED OF WINNING THE CONGRESS BUT SHOULDOODOF

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STRENGTHENING "SOMEWHAT" THEIR MAJORITY AT THE EXPENSE OF THE

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LEFT WING. S LONG AS OUR MARGIN OF MAJORITY iS SO- SMALL, HOWEVER,

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WE CANNOT AFFORD TO HAVE EVEN SMALL DEFECTIONS AND MIJ*OR* SPL ITSRANKS

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2. ACCORDING TO LOMBARD I, THE MOST IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD TH^^CONC IL IA-

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WAS TAKEN WHEN IT WAS RECOGNIZED BY ALL THE INTERESTEO PARTIES THAT THE EVENTSONTH AGO DID NOT STEMUODEN DECISION BASED ON "PERSONAL" AIMS AND MANEUVERS BUT THAT IT REFLECTED HONEST DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OR OF INTERPRETATION ON POLITICAL MATTERS. AS FOR HIMSELF,ONTINUED, HE HAD MAOE IT REPEATEDLY CLEAR OURING THE WEEKS FOLLOWING THE APRILLECTION THAT IN HIS OPINION THE CIRCUMSTANCES MADE IT INADVISABLE FOR THE PSI TO LEND ITS SUPPORT TO "THE KIND OF CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT AND PROGRAM WHICH WAS LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DC." LOMBARDI EXPLAINEO THAT WHEN THE FIRST CENTER-LEFTWAS FORMED BY FANFANI INHE NATURE OF THAT GOVERNMENT AND THE SITUATION AT THE TIME WITHIN THE DC AND IN THE COUNTRY IN GENERAL, MADE IT POSSIBLE AND AOVISASLE FOR US SOCIALISTS TO GIVE OUR OUTSIOE SUPPORT. THIS WAS POSSIBLE EVEN THOUGH NO SPECIFIC GUARANTEES WERE GIVEN ABOUT THE SCHEDULE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL PLANKS OF THE PROGRAM AND EVEN THOUGH SOME OF THE FEATURES OF THE PROGRAM ITSELF WERE NOT FULLY SPELLED. CONDITIONS HAO CHANGEO, SAID LOMBARD I, WHEN THE NEGOTIATIONS GOT

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UNDER WAY FOR THE FORMATION OF THE NEW CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT TO BE HEADED BY MORO. "FIRST OF ALL, WE SOCIALISTS WERE ASKED TO GIVE SUPPORT TO /AND EVENTUALLY TO PARTICIPATE DIRECTLYOVERNMENT INTENDED TO REMAIN IN OFFICE FOR SEVERAL YEARS, RATHER THAN TO A

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like that of amintore fanfani which hao still an 'experimental' nature and which was basedrogram which was supposed to cover only one year until the general elections in the spring in the second place, the economic changes that had taken place in the meantime made it even more evident that the program of the projected moro government could and would beonlyeriod of years. last but not least, the growing influence gained in the meantime by the 'moderate' groups within the dc made it even more necessary for the psi to secure definite guarantees about the program of the new government as well as about the schedule for the implementation of its various planks."

k. lombaroi stressed that "we socialists do not aim at splitting the dc. we also recognize that we cannot eliminate the presenceoderate' group within that party. we're convinced, however,asting and fruitful collaboration between us and the dc requires that the influence of the oc 'moderates' be contained and neutralized by the pressure and initiative of the progress ive-minded forces within that party. this was the condition of affairs which existed during the first six or eight months of the fanfan ibut which began to change in the fall of last year. during the negotiations for the formation of the moro government it

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party which has pledged tohange in the existing social and economic affairs ONLY through democratic means but which IS STILL committed to pursuinghange. we would haveurther, tremendous impetus to the turmoil alreaoy existing among our rank-and-FiLE and WE would have ALSO given up ALL chances of appealing to some sectors of the communist electorate."

strongly and heatedly said that his opposition toamong the dc, the psdi and the pri ano the failuresocialist majority to accept the agreement itself oid notthose parts of the agreement which referred to foreignto the proposed "delimitation of the majority" intendedthe projected moro governmenthe exclusion offrom that majority. he said that those whosuch had been the reasons for his opposition "are inor were not LISTENIN6nd thexperts' the four party secretaries on the points ON which anNot beenmong those who "did not listen oroeignisten" lombard! singled out psdi leader

the issue of the relations with the communists, lombardihe was the forerunner of the position, which was laterthe majority of the socialists, that "the PSI can no longer ally

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WERE WRONG. MOREOVER, TO ASK US TO ADMIT IT IS TANTAMOUNT TO ASKING US TO SPIT IN OUR OWN FACES." FOR ALL THOSEONTINUED, OULD HAVE PREFERRED THAT THE PROPOSED FOREIGN POLICY DECLARATION OF THE PROJECTED MORO GOVERNMENT, RATHER THANENERIC AND OOGMATIC REAFFIRMATION OF LOYALTY TO THE ATLANTIC AL.IANCE, SHOULD HAVE SAID THAT ITALY WOULD REMAINTO HER INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS ANO ALLIANCES ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ATLANTIC PACT WOULD EVIDENCE MORE AND MOREEFENSIVE NATURE ANO AIMS. IN OTHER WORDS, MY IOEA IS THAT WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ITALY SHOULD HAVE THE SAME DEGREE OF AUTONOMY THAT OTHER PARTNERS OF THE ALLIANCE HAVE ENJOYED OR HAVE INOICATEO THEIR DETERMINATION TO ENJOY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE ITSELF, THE KIND OF AUTONOMY WHICH PAST ITALIAN GOVERNMENTS HAVEEO TO PRACTICE OR EVEN TO ASSERT ITALY'S RIGHT TO PRACTICE. NEVERTHELESS, IT WAS NOT IN THIS FIELD, EITHER,AISED MY REAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT BECAUSE, ASAID BEFORE, I'M NOT OPPOSED TO ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY OPERATING ON THE BASIS OF THE ATLANTICONCLUDED ON THIS POINT BY SAYING THAT HE HAO PUBLISHED HIS WHITE BOOK IN ORDER "TO DOCUMENT THE FACT THAT MY OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT DID NOT REST ON ITS ASPECTS RELATING TO FOREIGN POLICY OR TO THE RELATIONS WITH THE COMMUNISTS, BUT RATHER ON THE /HEADQUARTERS COMMENT- PORTION GARBLED WHEN RECEIVED AND

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CORRECTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THE REPORT/, GUARANTEES FOR IMPLEMENTATION ACCORDINGEFINITEPECIFICATIONS AND GUARANTEES WHICH WERE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE COUNTRY AND WITHIN THE DC"

9. LOMBAROI EXPLICITLY STATED THAT HE AND THE MAJORITY OF THEIN GENERAL REMAIN CONVINCED THAT THE CENTER-LEFT APPROACH MUST BE RESUMED AS SOON AS CIRCUMSTANCES PERMIT ON THE BASISONG RANGE PROGRAM WHICH LOOKS FORWARDIRECT SOCIALIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENT. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF RESUMING THAT APPROACH DOES NOT DEPEND ONLY UPON THE OUTCOME OF THE SOCIALISTUESTION ON WHICH HE REPEATED HE IS RATHER OPTIMISTIC. IT DEPENDS UPON THE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DC. LOMBARDI ADMITTED THAT THE FANFANIRE NOT STRONG ENOUGH BY THEMSELVES TO INSURE THAT THE SITUATION WITHIN THE DC WILL DEVELOP INAY AS TO PROVIDE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR AN AGREEMENT WITH SOCIALISTS ALONG THE LINES WHICH HE /LOMBARDI/ ENVISAGES. HE FURTHER ADMITTED THAT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS CANNOTNSURED, EITHER, BY AN ALLIANCE BETWEEN THEND THE OTHER CENTER-LEFT DC GROUPS SUCH ASBASE ANO THE LABOR REPRESENTATIVES EVEN IF THE LATTER GROUPS SHOULC AGREE TO SUCH AN ALLIANCE, WHICH APPEARS MORE THAN DOUBTFUL. LOMBARDI CONCLUDED, "MUCH IF NOT ALL WILL DEPEND ON MORO."

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IN PARAGRAPH THREE, LOMBARDI APPEARS TO BE USING

N REFERENCE TO THE DOROTEI FACTION OF THE OC.

THE WORDSOURCE COMMENT- LOMBARDI'S WHITE BOOK, /PARAGRAPHHICH WAS CALLEDOCUMENTI," EXPLAINED THE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY THE GROUP OF SOCIALIST AUTONOMISTS WHO REFUSED TO GO ALONG WITH NENNI ON THE ISSUE OF THE AGREEMENT FOR THE FORMATION OF MORO'S PROPOSED CENTER-LEFT GOVERNMENT. FIElD DISSEM- STATE.

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Original document.

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