APPROVED FOB4 CM HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
titlb: the joint debriefinguban author: b. e. layton
volume: 7
STUDIES IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collection ol articles on tho historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ot intelligence.
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l valuable precedent inbetween clandestine service and intelligence production offices.
THE JOINT DEBRIEFINGUBAN
Tbe difference ln the disciplines governing clandestineon the one hand and analysis and tbe production of finished Intelligence on tbe other Is the root cause of the many difficulties with which we wrestle in the management ofthe establishment of collection priorities, the full and economical exploitation of sources, and the evaluation of reports. The separation of the overt and covertIs In part an organizational and security necessity, but it is unnecessarily deepenedack of understandingthe two elements, with their so different concepts of the essential skills, methods. Importance, and even goals of their respective work. To this extent It has always seemed that the difficulties could be alleviated by more contacts at all levels, within the limitations Imposed by securitybetween the operational and overt analytic staffs. Over the past year there has been some progress in this sense.
One of the best and easiest ways to establish meaningful contacts and facilitate mutual understanding is to mount Joint projects such as that at the Madrid interrogationwhose fruitful operations were describedecent Issue of thisnother more recent project, being lessandroduct of unique circumstances, deserves therefore particular attentionrecedent in collaborative enterprise that could to advantage be repeated and multiplied
s Successful Experiment
Detailed information on Cuba ia hard to obtain, andnowledgeable Cuban defects he must be thoroughly utilizedource. One suchwill call himhad excellent contacts in Cuba was after defection Intensively debriefed ln the field The reports based on bis information
'Lawrence E. Rottra, "Projectn.t.
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Join! febriafi
among the most useful received in Washington. toiHalh Carlos was handled according to theo
Urfaced- But in view ofposition and contacts in Cuba, the amount ofhe possessed, and the critical need for informationtoini
or^eclln^^
,xmbiigi "mi was not germane to the debriefing process and does not affect these observations about It.
In March and April of this year representatives ofsections of four CIA production offices and the MPIC.with the clandestine services staff concerned, had six sessions wltb Carlos on subjects ranging from general political matters to geography. Then three additionalusing aerial photography were held. Permanent overt and covert representatives, one each, provided session-to-scs-slon coordination. All tbe meetings were taped. Reports based on them were prepared by the clandestine staff with the assistance of the permanent overt representative.
The debrieflngsuccess, and they demonstrated the value of joint projects. Although Carlos had already beendebriefed in the field, both new and corroborative Information concerning Cuba was obtained. For run-of-the-mill defector debriefings, requirements and questions sent to the field are usually sufficient; butource has detailed knowledge, expert substantive questioning can often unearth and develop Information that the less specialized fieldmight miss. Selectivity In questioning and subject expertise compensate for the analyst's lack of training InSpecialized knowledge can also lead to moreand exact questions and Is more likely to produce apattern from the bits and pieces of Information
Poiniera in Procedure
The Carlos experiment pointed up some considerations for hopeful future joint debrieflngs Any debriefing must take its substantive character from tbe potential of theareful scrutiny of the source's background In advance will avoid scheduling sessions inappropriate to his range of kno*l-
twife
edge.ule the sessions should begin with the moresubjects and conclude with the general This allows the defector to work up to the subjects he probably considers most Important and may increase bis cooperation.
The use of aerial photography with Carlos proved verymuch detailed Information was acquired from it. Aerial
photography would not always be applicable, but^where ;u has KeograpMc^lnfpnnatlon and where^security'siderations permit. It should be used from the beginning.
In preparation for the debricfings the analyst personnel must, flrst, familiarize themselves with the source'sand. second,ine of questioning and make some outline of it. During the sessions they should keep notes on the responses they think deserving of dissemination. The first two steps would reduce repetition during the debriefings and between them and the field interrogations, and they would allow points to be developed more coherently and completely. The note-taking would facilitate reporting: unaided use of tapes may result in some confusion.
If at all possible, the debricfings should be held soon after defection. In Carlos' case thereime lag of four months which reduced somewhat the value ot his information.considerations may preclude early Joint debriefings. but In any event, once it is decidedefector should bejointly, the sooner it Is done the better.
Broader Considcratums
The value of the joint debriefings cannot be judged solely by the number of reports produced There are both tangible and intangible gains from such debriefings, and they vary from component to component according to Its interests. TheEstimates staff is only peripherally interested to learnertain buildingactory, but operational andcomponents may find this an item ofhe clandestine services may be keenly interested inil is stored in Cuba, while the economic analyst may be more concerned about how long the oil will last. The ideas,and impressions gained by all participants may not be reportable, but in the long run they may prove very
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The most broadly important potential gam from joint a.n increased understanding and rapportlandestine services and Intelligence productionThe tatter can see some of the operational problems of deal'
Ufanemperament" the difficulty of obUlning continuity and completeness of information from defectors, the range of vagaries and LT .
tletles mvol.ed.ln r.
Jum.learer picture of the type of IniormaUon neededin analysis and see the difficulty of integratingomposite picture. The two components are thus mutually educated, and the rapport gained should contribute to establishing good working relations and leadoreinterchange. The partnership cannot fully utilise lbin pursuit of the intelligence objective until eachunderstands the workings and the problems of the other.
If )olnt debriefings are to be fully effective the production components should knowiven defector is beingand help determine whether be should be JointlyImproved formal and Informal communication with the operating components for this purpose Is advantageous to both parties. The analysts are better able to evaluate the' Informationource If more detail is available about his background and access than has in the past been provided by the usual CS source description; and the operators benefit from this Improved evaluative guidance and And more use made of their product
Steps to provide better Information about sources were in fact taken, with Just these considerations in mind, last spring All clandestine reporting elements were given the guide lines for making more revealing statements, consistent withsecurity, concerning sources' character, competence, and access to Information. This Innovation, which washe result of consultation between analytic elementswith Cuba and the responsible clandestine components, is still experimental and limited to reporting on Cuban sflsin from anywhere in the world; but if successful it could eeU be extended to clandestine reporting generally.
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It Is to be hoped that the increase recently achieved Inunderstanding between clandestine collection andcomponents wiU continue. Joint debrieflngs. besidessubstantive gains, contribute to this end. The joint debriefing* ol Carlos haveood and valuable precedent. The groundwork laid by them should be built upon.
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Original document.
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