CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED
TITLE: Wanted: An Integrated Counterintelligence
AUTHOR: C. N. Geschwind
VOLUME:
7
IN
INTELLIGENCE
A collodion ol articles on ihe historical, operational, doctrinal, and theoretical aspects ol intelligence.
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All sUMcmcnis of fact, opinion or analysis expressed in Studies in Intelligence are those of
ihe authors Ihey do noi necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government endorsement of an article's factual staicmcnts and interpretations.
if**
for aggressive prosecution of the clandestine war under aand unified command.
WANTED: AN INTEGRATED
The nature and seriousness of the debility that pervades our counterintelligence efforts are obscured by manyThe Communist secret services have taken care to hide the strategy underlying their covert attack. The noise-lessness of the covert war between them and our forces lets success and failure alike remain concealed. Our forces are so compartmented that they do not register their aggregateto deal with the world-wide coordinated enemy attack. Moreover, although the enemy's home front In the covert war is fundamental to his campaigns abroad, we have beentoation's foreign actions as distinct from Its domestic activities and therefore do not mount all-outcovert action aimed at the Communist Interior. The most blinding factor, however, has been the deceptive semantic linkage between intelligence and counterintelligence: thisterminology of the past inhibits the development of the new concepts needed in today's situation. Many of the participants in our effort are also inhibited by concern for their particular pieces of the counterintelligence pie in any radical revision of our strategy.
ecognition of present shortcomings can provide the stimulusew effort. The difficulty of making these convincingly manifest under the circumstances cited above is aggravated by the confusion of the many different theaters of covert war and the endless variety of tactics andengaged. Yet the same political and strategic concepts oppose each other in every theater, and the fundamentals of the covert conflict In one theater should hold for the others, due allowance being made for local peculiarities, the tactical situation, and the stage of the conflict's development in each. It should therefore be possible tosable if crude
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picture of the general war situation byartlcu lar specimen theater of operations as typical of ail.
Confrontation in Germany Here we shallreliminary examination of the situation in the German theater, almost an ideal specimen Germany is physically as well as ideologically split,lon reflecting faithfully, theistrengths and weajSesses'of sponsoring major combatant; the sponsors have large covert forces of their own in the theater; the situation there has matured; and the history of the covert war in Germany Is long and heavily documented. And in spite of the fact that we have had almost every natural advantage we have done very poorly there.
The Enemy Forces
5 the massive, fully mobilized Soviet securitymaintaining its wartime momentum, began to build an East German security system to gain full control of the East Oermans and use them in covert warfare against the rest of Germany. The East German Communists stood to gainpoweruccessful local security control system. The distrust and fearystem creates among the people prevents them from combining against the regime andit, playing one segment of the government machinery off against the others, toertical organization with power concentrated at the top. The security systemand destroys hidden opponents. It provides the means to monopolize information, control propaganda, concealand eventually raise the young to blind obedience.
The power thus acquired makes it possible for the regime to undertake expensive foreign ventures with great flexibility and disregard for public opinion. The national Investment can be concentrated on Industrial might and war potential by holding living conditions for the people to the lowestlevel. Abroad, the security system is used to control partisan and other covert forces and to Infiltrate and subvert adjacent areas. It steals foreign inventions and culturalmaking possible industrial progress that could notbe achieved.
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Tbe trcurtty system is the real secret of Communist power and the real secret weapon of the era. Fundamental to tbebe skillful exploitation of Informers; Communist power Is ultimately based upon the intimidatedortion of the population. It Is understandable that the Communists from the beginning put utmost seal Into the development of security systems in East Germany and the other new Satellites and call these secret services "the sword of the-party" while attempting Jo, conceal their ^df^cancVTrrSmthe Vestof the
Today, with fewerfficers, the Soviets arethe monolithic, well-organized East German secret service. This organization is staffed by atnd NCO's. who deploy0 secret Informers ISpUat home to keep the people under control and have Infiltrated at0 secret agents into West Germany In performance of their share of the Communist mission of covert warfare against uncontrolled adjacent areas-1
Now that the wall has split Berlin, effectively sealing In the East Germans, the process of communiting the people and reducing them to sundered helplessness can go forward at full pace. So long as these people have not been thoroughly subjugated, the Communist program to use themeapon against the West andounterbalance against restlessand other Satellites is blocked. The East Germanstill cannot control the area unaided; If the Red Army werepontaneous revolution could still develop among the East Germans. Judging from the suplneness with which they accepted the splitting of Berlin and expropriation
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from the farmers, however, the day cannot be distant when they will have followed the Russians and Chinese In reaching fun subservience lo the Communists.
The Communist task of covert warfare against WestIs now performed almost entirely by theeaving the Soviet and other Satelliteto create difficulties for us In other places such asEast German service is beginning to dispatch agentsoperate,.^
among and through Germans and German communities every-where.
Although the Communist security systems, with their virtual blank check on manpower, may seem to be enormously costly enterprises, they are really cheap in terras ofof population employed and net power and capabilities for covert warfare delivered, providing leverage forremendous empire. The East Germanpyramid looks about as follows:
ussian0 German officers andnformers and transborder agents
As adjuncts toan apparat there are aofegular police with Its ownsystemarty membership, Ipso facto informers. This establishment Is the Instrument fora population
To what degree these figures are paralleled in the other Satellites and the USSR itself has not been determined.must be made for the fact that East Germany bas been the object of an intense Soviet effort. Nevertheless, it would be surprising if the percentages reflected in thefairly solid statistics did not apply more or less to any Communist country being usedase for further covert attack on the West (and what Communist country Is not sopplied tonhabitants of the USSR and Its European Satellites, they would Indicate that about
r uie Job of infiltrating Wert Germany wllh Communist agents and nbverztves Is now In tbe hands of tbe East Oerman service.
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oviet and Satellite secret service officers and NOO'snformers and transbordcr operatives as the basic instrument for the control and expansion of the empire. These figures do not Include party members or the police forces and their informers at home or the overt and covert Communist parties, fellow travellers, dupes, and influence agents1 abroad.
Figures onecret army do notof course reflect the kind of substance one aasoclstes witharmies Many secret operatives are not only worthless but counterproductive. The friction, confusion, and other difficulties Inseparable from covert action greatly lower the efficiency per man. Nevertheless, If only one informer or agent ln ten la productively engaged in the covert war, the net retinueffectives, combined with the officer and NCO corps, givesovert force, all categories, of overillion persons in the European theater and USSR-controlled areas fully mob Hired for covert action.
The Western Counterforce
While in East Germany the Communist regime Is steadily suppressing the population and moulding It Into anof war against us, at the same time infiltrating selected targets in the West, the logical counter-weapons. Western counterintelligence and other covert forces, seem powerless to Interfere preventively. West Germany has come to reflect not only all ourbooming economy, an excellent overtolidly democratic form ofall our weaknesses as well, among the most important of which
'A category of sympathisers and operatives who support communist operaOocu within (Arret gortrnaienU without having much. If any, opera.Uonal contact with the Partyecret service. ThoseofflUon to Influence appointment* arrange to have fellow travellers or counlerproducUie per tons picked for key Jobs Those who can influence activity sec to It that either oounterprodueUve or worthless work Is pushed and useful projects sidetracked. In the cultural field they can sidetrack anti-Corr.muni.tt literature. Dims. etc. and subUy push the party lineariety of ways. MoUvaUon appears to range from anU-cl*UlsaUon urges to outright control by black-mall or other means. Influence agents are practically not convict,he most they can be charged with Is "honestheir acUviUes add up to subtle sabotage.
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persistent Inability to cope adequately with the drives of the Communist secret apparatus.
lmost Immediately upon cessation of hostQiUes with Germany, the United States dismantled the Office of Strategic Services, Its own covert counterattack force, andthe leisurely and haphazard development Inolitical and security system loaded with civilies safeguards. Covert action, such as continued at all. concentrated upon pacifying the area by ferreting out the more heavily compromised Nazis. Eventually the Aro5y'cc" ter Intelligence Corps, which was for several years the only security organization of any consequence in the US. Zone of Germany, made increasing efforts to buildecurityagainst the infiltration of Communist agents. At first most of the low-level Communist agents were so inept that It was the fashion to Joke about them in counterintelligence circles. Then as the Western hare saw the Eastern tortoise making unexpected headway and the Korean War created heavy political pressures, the West Germans establishedand clandestine services of their own and the VS. services pushed the development of special covert action organizationseries of exposes of covert action undertaken by these hastily assembled organizations reverberated throughout Europe, and the development of new organization largely subsided.
9 the Western security and counterintelligencein the German theater was about as follows. Theservices were splitederal Intelligence service (BND) responsible for transborder operationsederal security service (BtV) responsible for defensive counterintelligence,emi-autonomous Land security servicesederal police servicendemi-autonomous Land police fceces. Nelther the BND nor the BfT and UVt had executive action (arrest and interrogation) powers; these were reserved to tbe police forces. By this time the British forces had turned over most of their counterintelligence responsibilities to theservices In their area. In tbe VS. Zone the backbone of the security structure was provided by the CIC and the
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eavy pressure (or reorganization had been built up by the manifest Incapacity of this setup to handle theproblem and deal with the growing; East German in-filtration capabilities.as subordinated to theIntelligence Serviceomplex arrangement which greatly reduced its coherence and competence for counter-intelligence operatlons^jmiierejappears..to have;beeopcctation that the West German services would develop pro-trams and coordination adequate to fill the gaps created by this reorganization. The expectation was of course notbecause West Germany Is not centrally organized. From then on the counterintelligence components In the Ocrman theater. Allied as well as German, have been able to effect only ad hoc coordination. CIA's attempts to establishby agreement, because the Agency was regarded by most other counterintelligence componentsompetitor, ran into enormous difficulties.'
By and large, the German andesser degree the US. services have continued trying to function Independently of one another and have done little to fix responsibility for spe-dflc counterintelligence targets on specific components.the concept that covert war, like any other war, calls for coordinated effortubdivision of functions and targets, the shortcomings of the present setup In the German theater and the reasons for Its inability to repel the Communistand launch an effective counterattack become clear. In the covert war it makes no more sense tohaos of autonomous counterintelligence units than It would to disband NATO and let each army, navy, and air force make h* own arrangements to deal Independently with an overtattack.
There are of course many other factors besides Inadequate organizational concepts obstructing counterintelligencein Germany. Therereat East-West disparity Incapability: the Communists can Inflict bor-
" Sherman Kent's Strategic tnteUioenct., bad warned of this dancer with respectoordinating; agency's prodncUco of podUve
rtndouB punishments on hosUle and recalcitrant operatives, while the Western states,ariety of legal concept impose almost trivial sentences even for treason. The West German legal system, ln particular, leans over backward to such an extreme inascal every chance to beat the law that obtaining convictions for espionage, subversion, and treason is exceedingly costly in man-hours. With thecounterintelligence services so burdened In; carrying through each hostile,agent case, It pays the adversary system to send out. Just for their nuisance and distraction value agents practically certain to be caught Moreover, theunlst operatives are therefore easily motivated to enter the West, while agentsestern service are very reluctant to undertake prolonged clandestine tasksostile area. The defensive networks of the Communist services haveense and practically Impenetrable screen of informers, while the West German defenses are so weak thai hostilehave had little practical difficulty entering andthemselves by posing as refugees.
The persistent interservice sharpshootlng of the last decade has not improved the situation. Very few in theservices are now prepared to undertake riskyfor fear of being picked off by competitors in the eventlap. Inigh premium has been placed uponand timid operations, since the errors ofand defeats therefrom go unnoticed while thefrom misfire of aggressive action would be painfully evident
The Western publics, finally, egged on by the press'sexploitation of the GestapophObUt of the average Oer-man cltisen. have been more hostile than friendly to their own counterintelligence personnel, withholding Important moral and materia] support, while Western legislators teemlind spot whfeb prevents their seeing the desperate need for counterintelligence legislation.
In one sector of covert activity, information procurement, the Western secret services have performed adequately, largely because the floods of refugees from East Germany have provided Information for the asking. But the Berlin wall has now stopped that flood and it would seem that an informaUon-procurement crisis also impends. The opportunities of past
years to establish far-flung sleeper-agent networks having largely been wasted and the East German security service now being ready in great force to interdict Western covert operations, it will take immense effort to procurethe InformaUon that used to fall Into our hands.
In assessing the disparities between the Communist covert forces and those of the West in Germany we must bear In mind, fuxtb*OTOjs,nthayhe. .Wesbjm services/have-had. most every moral and financial advantage. The Westernmy has been booming, while Uie Communist economies have uniformly failed to produce adequately. The East Germans have overwhelmingly opposed the regime. The West German population at our disposal,illion, greatly outnumbers theillion East Germans. In spite of these advantages we have not achieved any notable victories In the covert war.
The principal deficiencies in our setup in the German theater appear to be the following:
Lack of aggressive task-force-type counterattackand indeed the lackovert war conceptcounterattack and psywar operations oncale as to neutralize the adversary apparatus within its own areas.
Inability to infiltrate Communist-held areas.
Inability to prevent Communist inflltraUon of our areas.
Defensive stance and lack of initiative in such operations as are mounted.
Progressive inability to deal with growing case-loads,organization, inadequate informationand the depressing effects of continual reverses.
Lnterservice rivalry with case-grabbing, sharpshooUng, target-hogging, information hoarding, and other side effects.
A Diagnosis
The primary cause of our infirmity Is governmentalto the course, significance, and necessities of the covert *ar. It has been the curse of parliamentary governments since the days of Kerensky that they have failed to see the bnportance of meeting the Communists full force in the eovert as well as the overt struggle. They have consistently
not attempted to counter, In their concentration on physical weaponry, the Communists' possessionew and decisive organizational weapon, their secret service apparatus.1 VI
Democracy's Blind Spot
Parliamentary governments and their political interpreters simply do not think, of the secret control systemiecerganizational engineering'which Is'We^blisis* of Communist; power, nor do they think of itulnerable point forevertheless, the security system is the Achilles' heel of the Communist movement, for without it the Communists would have to rule by persuasion, seeking the consent of the To the rulers themselves Its existenceonstant source of guilt feelings and anresent threat to Individual and collective security. Theret apparatus, many of whose chiefs have been assassinated by the Party in the course of the years,rittle,xtended undertaking which has all it can do to maintain Its control over the people under present conditions. wes most of its success to the fact that no correctly mounted, jt sustained counterattack against it has ever been delivered.
Why are the parliamentary governments so oblivious tohis vulnerable secret weapon and its implications? Becauseur intelligence and counterintelligence services have failed totell them the facts In terms that laymen canhe spates of spy stories and other scandals that eruptublic view from time to time place the whole matterere "spy nuisance" light, actually helping to conceal the fact that the Communist security system Is the controlent whereby entire peoples are mobilized for war against us. l
'Tot coseot descriptions ol organlzaUonsJ weaponry and Its potenUsl see The Organizational Weapon by Philip Selznlk (Free Press.eoe,nd The Continuing Struggle (Chapter VI by Richard Louis Wslier (Athene Press. Inc, New. These boots an at least on tbe right track. For tbe oblivious sideCentral intelligence and National Security by Harry Howe Ransom, which reflect* tbe blindness of lnteUUjeocemlnded men lo tM counterintelligence problem, and the willfully blindonflict by Robert 8trausz-Hupe and others. authors take one frightened look down theorridor and scuttle on.
The presentation needed Is an "Ugly American" kind ofto the counterintelligence field.
Conceptual Red Herring
Our inability to see and report the facts about the covert war is In large part due to our beingemantic rut."intelligence" as the root of "counterintelligence" and tt^ore thinking in distorted termSSfVlt is no exaggeration to say that the word "counterintelligence" has become one of the most dangerously misleading in our language because It enshrines the concept that in counterintelligence we are countering the operationsostile IntelligenceThe fact is that in attempting to counterommunist secret service we are operating against an Immense covert-war machine which resembles anorganization about the way an armyheriff's posse.
The Communist secret services are gigantic, multiple-purpose organizations which break the will of whole peoples, mass-producing home front and invasion agents. They do, of course, also procure Intelligence, but only as one of manysecret activities. We cannot adequately counterat* tack or defend againstonster under the impression that It is an intelligence organization, or Judge our results by Intelligence criteria.
The inadequate concepts and confused semantics with which we are operating have so many points of unfavorable impact on our activities as toabulation:
Jmpacf on aggressiveness. It Is the Job of intelligence to collect and analyze Information. Espionage for this purpose, insofar as It is aggressive, acts only with the objective of getting past the opposing counterintelligence and security forces as uneventfully as possible. Since the gathering of intelligenceecret preparatory function, agents doing It "Je not supposed to undertake executive action, agitate, or otherwise risk attracting attention. Counterintelligence, on the other hand, is engaged in covert war, all-out andit has to takehome by investigating, arrest-mg, Interrogating, doubling, and prosecuting Communistand abroad by carrying out recruitment,harassment, diversionary, and psywar operations against
their secret service system. These diverse concepts offor action not only are fundamentallybut call for agents of fundamentally differentand attitudes For the mteMgence-rninded man. to know about the opposition and his Installations Is the whole goal; for counterintelligence, knowing is only the beginning of tbe road-^mething has to be done about the information.
JT.fetew('tm management^ The product of in. telUgence collection, no matter how voluminous, presents few handling problems: the espionage organization simply passes it on to its customers. The data the espionage organization itself uses and files is largely confined to information about Its own agents, projects, operations, and operational conditions, together with so much about the target as Is needed to run agents against it and to understand what they are reporting. It Is quite satisfactory for an espionage organization to store its operational information in ordinary files indexedards: there is no manipulation problem, andercent of it Is retirable once an operation Is over and the agent disposed of. Counterintelligence, on the other hand uses information as its ammunition and Is its own best customer. Thismust be so stored and managed that it can beupdated and mobilized to serve as the basis for further action.
While intelligence Information tends to deteriorate rapidly, counterintelligence Information retains Its value for lifetimes. Since the Communist secret service apparatus Is tremendous. It follows that information about its operatives (the main Ingredient of counterintelligence Information complexes) is correspondingly vast and will accumulate at many times the rate of obsolescence Attempts to solve the informationproblem by setting up arbitrary destruction programs based on frequency of use or other ordinary concepts ofmanagement are comparable to cutting off partan's liver because he is too fat. Counterintelligence needs all the meaningful Information it can get concerning lbs targets.
Impact on security. Intelligence procured byfor example, information derived from such an agent as Vyacheslav Molotov were heto haveprotection, it must be compartmented, perhaps for
puny years, and it may so pinpoint the agent that It cannot be used at all for fear of exposing him. Even lists ofrevealing as they do national ignorance, estimates, talent,ave to be severely controlled. InformaUon, on the other hand, concerns the officers and retinueovert force which must be fought by many people. Much of It is fragmentary and must be "married" ^th other data beforeU can be used or even understood. The only type which requires the kind of handling that nearly all espionage data must have Is that pertairiing to and derived from agents who bave penetrated the interiorostileor security serrlce. The lossounterintelligence agent Is ordinarily hke any other battle casualty; the loss of an Intelligence agent canatastrophe. Any clandestine services organization attempting to handleand espionage information along the same lines isbound to have grave difficulties. The continual churning up of the former wherever the counterintelligence effort is at all alive messes up the machinery and channels that han-dle highly sensitive data.
Impact cm targeting. It Is essential that espionage organl-tauons be compartmented because security is crucial, and compartmentation is possible because these organizationsagainst discrete targets. Operational coordination is not essential, for example, between components operatingolitical Intelligence target in East Germany and those operatingilitary intelligence target In Espionage targets tend also to vary with the times the emphasis of national policy, and ignoranceiven enemy activity. Counterintelligence, however, operatesone or another partingle permanent, giant Urgtt. the Soviet and Satellite secret service system. The wtous components of the counterforce have to subdivide the job, coordinate their operations, andulk ofJust as any other army must The conflict whichbetween managerial concepts in selecting espionage(What's the currentnd counterintelli-rence targeting (What's the next move in the plan ofis obvious.
impact cm planning. An espionage organization generally "nakes its plans operation by operation. Counterintelligence
services should plan whole campaigns on both strategic and tactical levels. They need to lay down an Integrated strategy for perhaps years of struggle and correlate the efforts of armed forces, police, security, psywar, and defensive andcounterintelligence elements In composite groups or task forces.
Research and analysis. Espionage organisations pass their products along to customers who do the^researchthe Information.othernand,onstantly to re-collate and re-evaluate, study, and act upon the data It acquires. Most action it initiates will be based on Its research for leads and vulnerable spots in target persons. Espionage components, when intertwined withpersonnel, complain that the latter are foreverover fragments of Information Instead of "getting out and recruitingounterintelligence requires great amounts of office space and clerical man-power, whileoperates best under utmost emphasis on outside activity. Counterintelligence action must conformormal strategy and research must support this strategy, whereas espionage efforts are directed by the requirements of customer agencies. The efficiency of both is lowered by attempts to merge them along command and area lines.
Public relations. Espionage organizations naturally shun the light of publicity. Counterintelligence must have public support and an understanding legislative backing. One of the most disturbing aspects of the present situation, we have noted, is the unawareness of Western governments of the role played by the Communist secret services.should carry on publicity to make the people and their representatives aware. The espionage case officer, having to function within complex environments under cover, where the mere fact of his becoming known for what he Is may be totally incapacitating. Is Justly hipped on the matterounterintelligence officer, like his police counterparts, can often operate almost unhindered blown.
Review and control. Espionage services cannot beby any kind of lay board suchongressionalbecause espionage operations require extreme security precautions. Furthermore, they are soatter of luck and operational technique is soatter of opin-
loo that from practical considerations supervision has toto experts. Since espionage organizations, whento their proper sphere, are relatively small, functionforeign targets. Involve no massive organizationmass aspects, and have little effect on politics, lacksupervision, if iteficiency,elativelyone. Counterintelligence organizations of modembe^rrnisslve, complex structures whichbortlera but have^ffcctsbe supervised by some independent reviewingas the armed forces must be so supervised; and thewill be of positive benefit in making the layof the Importance of their
Operational technique. Espionage agents are usuallythrough the so-called professional or "classic" covert approach In which one agent Is used to recruit another. This practically never works in counterintelligence operationsommunist secret service officer. The officerto recruitment would be one In trouble and already thinking seriously of seeking protection from his service. Knowing its suspiciousness and the machinations it employs and being by now at least mildly paranoid and veryhe fears that everyone around him is reading his mind and so views any covert approachrovocation by his own service. Any Communist secret service officer attempting toolleagueulnerable condition can accordingly expect to be turned in.
The underlying idea of our present operational concept has been precisely that we can accomplish such recruitmentsufficient scale toubstantial effort In thetheater this concept has not paid off. Whenever agents have been "recruited" from within the East German security and Intelligence apparatus they themselves have personally taken the initial step by presenting themselves to us. The only function performed by the "recruiter" has been to be on hand to accept the agent's application. Most of theInformaUon that has been obtained on the East Germansystem has been derived from defectors who either nad been or were about to be thrown out because they were in bouble. Obviously, therefore, the way to get adversary of-
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fleers lo cooperate is to concentrate on psychological andactions which will get them Into trouble, making their careers so shaky that they come to the point of ap preaching one or another Western service. Thisoncept Involving the use of large organizations able to maintainpsywar programs and Is at marked variance with the no-noisc mentality of the espionage agent handler.
C^aruaotionoi'A^
Why, if there are so many conflicts of Interest betweenand counterintelligence groups, are they so often yokemates? The teaming up appears to haveideof peculiarities ln the evolution of our covert operations system The FBI, developing separately from intelligence as an element of the Attorney General's Office, was given only "defensive" counterintelligence functions. CIA, created toossibly fatal repetition of the Pearl Harbor attack, acquired counterintelligence functions along with its respon-sibilties for coordinating Intelligence activities, for protecting sources and methods, and for running secret trans borderTheilitary organization, had responsibility for the security ol. Zone of Germany thrust upon it and found itself embroiledastly stronger Communist secret service system.
The development of these primary organs was warped by the extremely limited concepts underlying the laws andcontrolling them Moreover, the preponderance ofpositions were occupied by mtelllgence-rninded men who gravitated Into them from other intelligenceOSS men of the Wild Bill Donovan stamp and regular counterintelligence officers did not play muchole on the levels where policy was made and organization formulated.
The predominance of intelligence-minded Influence led both to the hamstringing of the psychological warfare program and to the fragmentation of the counterintelligence effort In the formative, and especially after theWar. strong voices in the government were able to streamline the covert action organizations and many other Government components, removing built-in competitive faa-tures which the Roosevelt administration had developed to
keep surier-government functioning on democratic lines* No group likes competition, and intelligence groups are noIt was therefore quite natural on this ground alone for the dominant intelligence-minded element to make sure that countermteUlgence should not get out of hand. In the German theater, rivalry and conflict between the CIC and CIA resulted in the eventual disintegration of thewith potentially .mcalcuiable eflects^rm 'ffle^ourse of'the' "'covert war.
There isociferous faction thattorm ofthe moment it is suggested that an effectiveorganization be established. These people, the Gestapophobes. profess to see the threat of creating astate in any effective attempt to close the dangerous gap between the capabilities of the Communist secret service system and those of our jerry-built counterintelligence. Still others are determined that nothing should be done to make the Communists angry, failing to understand that thewill do anything they dare to us whether we make them angry or not. However varied their motives, these seem all to agree on the necessity of keepingdecentralized and subordinate.
It is of course true that there is real danger tony government-sponsored covert action organization. Making counterintelligence independent from intelligence functions, however, isay to reduce this danger. Giving the responsibility for both covert and overt war to the same organization would also be hazardous. What woneedripleovert war authority, anservice, and an organ for covert war. The threat to our liberty today comes not from our covert action organs but from the Increasing inability of the remaininggovernments to deal with the Communist thrusts.
A Prescription
The first step towardustained covertupon the Communist secret services would be recognl-Hon of the fact that existing Western concepts and organlza-
'Tbls phenomenon Is well described on pp.f Presidential Peufcr by Richard E. Neastadt (John.
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tion are obsolete and inadequate. It Is true that CIA, within an intelligence framework, is attempting to coordinate tbe type of action called for and has here and there had someor momentary success. The rate of achievement,makes the prospect remote that anything worth while can be accomplished without substantial changes in organba-JftSbSZ'thcjnfusionhe exUt-*lng"setup isficitito the underground conflict is being handled adequately, whereas in fact all that Western counterintelligence now does is bite the stick that prods its ribs, Ignoring the hand that holds it The Unitcd'S'iates has to accept responsibility for*In the international covert war as well as infor an overt one. Intelligence-mlndedness. with Itson knowing rather than doing. Is out of place in covert war. The rationale underlying the terms counterintelligence and counterespionage should be discarded and replaced byof covert counterattack and terminology reflecting them. The Communist secret service systemajor weapon, and the Western counterweapon has so far not been forged.
Elementsounterweapon
After this recognition of inadequacy, concrete measures could beseparation of intelligence and covert war functions and the establishmentovert war organization led by action-minded men. This organization should beto mobilize, not to supplant, the existing counterintelb-gence. and foreign, that are attempting to deal Individually with the Communist system. Tbe aim would be to establish coordinated covert task forcescale roughly comparable to the collective overt forces organized in NATO and SEATO.
eorganization must perforce be preceded andby an Information campaign designed to make thethe Congress and other government organs, and NATO and SEATO understand the nature of and necessity for the proposed action. It must be brought home to those who la* fluence the course of Western policy that an adequate covert counterattack would also openew strategy of mdirect
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ttUck' upon the entire Cornmunlst power structure that could help break up the present stalemate.
The proposed organization, an old story in Communist areas, will be essentially new for the West, and it wul have to be fitted Into the framework of democratic government. That itting will requireilot model could first e assembled to carry on the .coverthe German
theater. Oermany would appeaTto be the^fdeal^ar^'for^testgjga..
runs, not only because of the full-blown state of the
war there but also because we havearge marginrroreserve of good will. The required specializedand volumes of compiled information are there In quan-titles as adequate as are likely to be found anywhere. The West Germans are still willing to accept our leadership; the East Germans are not yet communized. Certainf our own organization which could readily be Integratedtreamlined US-German covert counterforce areon the spot In embryo.
Regardless of where the new organisation is assembled or under what auspices. It will need the following operational components In addition to the support elements that all overt organizations need:
A Qeneral Staff, composed of representatives of all
tlclpatlng services. chief, to developand tactics and to plan and coordinate operations, in Information Mobilization Division* to apply the most advanced methods of electronic data processing to the problem of achieving instantaneous theater-wideand interchange of information on thecovert apparatus, its personnel, and Its victims and to supply thus the ammunition needed for operations. A Neutralization and Corrosion Operations Division* responsible for the engineering of psywar operations. ncluding the mobilization of Informer resistance, against the Communist secretational Operations Office, creating special task forces and groups of forces to operate against the secret serv-
1ucid exposition of the advantages of Indirect attack see Strattav. by B. H_ UdOe.Il Hartraefer.. 'Nuclei of these components aireadjhe German theater.
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ices of countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the USSR which have no Western counterparts as in the split countries. (Note that the German areagood bases for operation against most of theSatellite services.)
Strategy and Tactics
The strategy of the covert counterattack can.bejtgpt^slgipic by confining itingle mission, the unseaungof the*Com-munist security system by all methods short of hot war. The generic tactics can be equally simple: use the multipleof tbe system to undermine and negate it, principally by mobilizing its informer and agent networks against tt. With respect to the ruling Communist parties this effort would be in the nature of an indirect attack, striking at the basis of their poweray that reduces the danger of hot war in direct proportion to its success without increasing It if unsuccessful
Tactics that could be pursued can be described in detail. The East German security apparatus, for example, hasinternal vulnerabilities. Many of its officers haveparanoid characteristics and vices which make themto personalized psychological measures. Theefforts the regime makes to insulate these officers bear witness to their fear of this type of assault. We are in possession of thousands of Items of information which can be used to conduct this kind of attack. The East Germanofficers can be reached by many avenues: they are in fact the easiest of all East Germans to reach, because it Is part of their job to watch the West.
It is Important to bear ln mind that the Communistits weapons andsychological weapon: it works because it generates andigh level of fear and inter-citizen distrust. It will begin to crack the moment the people recover the ability and the will to conspire against it. This fundamentalcannot be removed or offset by the Communists; all those involved with it, mcludlng the Communists, hate the system.
The informers of the system are the ultimate basis of its power, and they hate it most of alL For them it is a
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respect-eroding, born*-wearing, ceaseless imposition, forcing them to betray their friends In order to enslaveerson forced to become an informer conceals his plight as be would VD and seeks somehow to arrive at anwith the security service. He winds uptool pigeon for life withoutJudas withoutieces of silver.
The system counts upon the Informer's concealing hisThe-Western world .has played Into Its hands In this crucial matter bytream of condemnation andat the hapless Informer, not lifting an effective finger to help him defendsychological program aimed at removing the stigma and depicting the informer notudas (Judasutictim entitled to his neighbor's sympathy would, if successful, do more tothe security system than any action undertaken against it since Lenin and Dzexzhinsky set It up. Thecan be mobilised, encouraged, and coached in many ways to frustrate the system. The security apparatchiks know this and have devised Ingenious provocation programs to keep them In line. But the system has been able toits informers largely because these victims have been left to shift for themselves.
If the Informers and other captive citizens can be mobilized to engage In counter-judo In East Germany, the securitywill be plunged into cumulative difficulties which win radiate through the entire Communist power structure. Many competent analysts maintain that the Communist Party Itself must be attacked effectively and directly if tbe Communist regime Is to be overthrown. Ultimately this is true: what Is in question here is means to disarm the Party. The secret service system is what gangsters callhe weapon thatan onanwhat it takes toictator does not have toestapo to get power,estapo enables him to keep It. So long as the Communist security system is Intact, the Party behind It cannot be destroyed.
Prospect*
In the past. Western agencies have individually launched small and ineffective psychological campaigns aimedat the captiveare helpless to do anything
but try to revolt as Inthe Communists them-selves, who are beyond the reach of any but the ultimateA correctly conceived, manned, and mountedcounterattack against the secret service system has never been attempted.
What can reasonably be expected of an international covert counter-force once it were established? We cannot expect
weWe eSWonstrUc^ongoose-like organization to destroy the Communist cobra But It should be able to produce at least the followingcited in the probable order of
We should put the Gsramunists on the defensive in the covert war. Thisevelopment they fear. They feel guilty about tbe security system and its need for secrecy, and this is one of the reasons they persistently refuse to allow any form of that inspection upon which the Western powers insistondition for
The Joint International effort would mobilize and collate information exposing networks of secret servicenow protected by the dog-in-the-manger fileof the many American and Europeancomponents operating independently of one
It would substitute beneficial competition among the participating CI services for the hamstringing cross fire of today, putting pressure on the timid to act rather than react and attack the adversary rather than seek advantage in the flaps of other services.
The spreading knowledge of the new organization and its purpose would raise the morale of the captive peoples and tend to Inhibit security service action through dread of the day of reckoning.
As harassment tactics became effective, their impact on conventional operations aimed at penetrating theinterior of the security services should be such as to restart the flow of defectors and eventually yield penetrations which would supplyissinger
cent" of InformaUon we need to bring the securityto the ground. The agent Inundation which presently overwhelms UieWestern services would be reduced, and thelr operalives now Ued down with petty drudgery couldtheir talents to the detection of high-levelagents in the West.
get into cumulative difficulties which would eventually lower Its effectiveness to the point of breakdown. It has toertain Jevel of prestige andwhich, once breached, is almost impossible toin the face of persistent harassment.
Under the leadership of the United States the Western world hasevel of mtemational cooperation on the overt fronts which would have been considered Impossible In other times. To fall to tryimilar level of cooperation on the covert front Is to acquiesce In theecisive weapon without even trying to strike It from their hands.
Original document.
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