SPECIAL REPORT - THE FRENCH NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE PROGRAM

Created: 5/31/1963

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

SPECIAL REPORT

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

THE FRENCH NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE PROGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

GCGRUT

THISSMATEHIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION ING TinWfATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STi WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAQE^AWS,Sfc, THE TBJWSMIS-SIOX OR HEVESATION OF WHICH IN ANY itfANNER TO AN UNAUTHORISED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

This documenjytoUST NOT BE RELEASEO^fQ FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS. If merited with specific dNseminotioo controU*fri accordance with the provision* of, the^ocument must be handled within the framewoNt of limitation so imposed.

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THE FRENCH NUCLEAR STRIKE FORCE PROGRAM*

Unshaken by increasing costs, delays, and the prospect of early obsolescence of the Mirage IV delivery system, France Is pressing ahead with the developmentuclear "force de frappe." The ovor-all cost of developing this strike force is high, but probably not too great for tbe French economy if presont growth is Maintained and pressures are limited. Toost and meet the current timetable for the various strike force elements, however, bard decisions must still be made on what systems and what degree of sophistication to shoot for.

Goals

French efforts touclear strike force now appear firmly centered on the Mirage IV bomber with SO-kilotoe fission weaponsirst-generation systom, andorce of nuclear submarines carrying intermediate-range ballistic missiles ials) with thermonuclear warheadsecond-generation system. An article by Armed ForcesMessater In the May issue of Revue de la Uefen.se Rationale gave at fiFasT-semiofficial notice that this Is the path the French are following. His state- implied that other possible delivery systems, such

This article has boon pre-pared in collaboration with the Offices of NationalScientific Intelligence, and Research and Reports. pecial National Intelligence Estimate on tho French nuclear program is scheduled forin June.

as land-based IRDMs or air-to-surf ace missiles, will not be pressed to the point ofan operational capability, even though they could bo achieved earlier and at less cost than the submarine-based system.

In short, tbe French appear to have decided to concentrate for reasons of cost andon certain aspects of their program but have not finally eliminated otherpromising projects. Competition for tbe available resources has not yot reached the stage whore final decisions are necessary.

Mirage IV Aircraft

The Mirage IV aircraft, despite its inadequate radius of operation and otherwill remain France's only means of delivering nuclear weapons for the next five years and possibly for an additional one to two years. Because of tbls,and because resources have already been expanded to meet aircraft

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and production-line tooling costs, It is highly likely that production ofMirage IV sill be maintained at the planned rate.

However, since maintenance of the Mirage IV force on an airborne alert would greatly increase operating oxpenses, Parle may choose to maintain it attate ofonly lo times of severe crisis.

There is some ovldence that Is order to IncreaseMirage IV's combat range and survivability, the French have considered development of air-to-Burfaca missiles. Reduction

of bomb size and weight would also make some pod volumefor fuel. However, neither of these schemou will yieldbenefit to justify the

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necessary effort. Within the limitations of the existing Mirage IV design, in-flight refueling is the most practical method of range extension. At best, the Mirage IV weapons falls short of French.

Submarine Program

The development of aHUM Is closoly rclatud to that of the "Diamant" satellitefirst two stages of which presumably could also serveand-based missllc--and eveo that of the earlier sounding rockets used In tho Prencb space program. At this particular stage of French missilery, benefits for both the military and space programs can be derived from

further development of tho "Diamant's" liquid-fueled

first stage.

As the various programs continue to develop, however, they will become lessand could result In heightened direct competition for available resources and technicians. Pressures for decisions to cut back tholoss directly beneficial to tho submarine missile will aount. However, the collateral technical benefits for French science and Industry of tho missile and spaceIntho govornmont has publiclyprobably militate

against dropping completely those programs not directly related to the Polaris-type submarine system.

In any case,and-based IHBM program wouiu not reault In substantial over-all savings In the short run since most of tbe initial cost would be In research and development. At the same tire if Paris hopes to have its submarine system on schedule, it must not alight development of those technical items, such as tbe complex navigational system, peculiar to the nuclear submarine. of soae of these items could cause further difficulties and delays.

Nuclear Weapons

The development of nuclear warheads and higher yield bombs is far and away the mostaspect of the French strike force program, and the conquest Of the technical problems Involved is the controlling factor In the acquisitionomplete, second-generation system. As In tbe case of missile development, the road along which the French nuclear program must travel Is well defined, where on tho road Franco may llsn to stop or, at loaat, pause, is loss certain.

There is every indication that France will press ahead with tho development of a

pound submegaton thermonuclear warhead that would be compatible with the submarine-launched missiles. eaponcould not be achieved until the, assuming that there is no decrease in testing and developmental efforts.

Although resourcesto the nuclear program could be concentrated on the developmenthermonuclear weapon to the detriment of peaceful uses for energy and fission weapons, much of the expenditure in the latter two fields has already been made, and little would be saved byove. The plutonlum production facility at Uarcoule Is In operation. At least seven tests of plutonlum weapons have been completed, and achievementound,weapon is probably within reach by

Furthermore,ission warhead Of this size would be compatible

with the anticipated submarine-launched IRnii and would serve as an interim warheadhermonuclear warhead ofweight and dimensions could be developed. arhead of this yield probably would satisfy French requirementseapon to be used against population centers.

Competition For Resources

The various elements of the French nuclear weapons system program have not yet been unacceptably competitive in terms of available resources and Moreover, because both missile and nuclear weaponstages are sequential In character, resources can for some time be spread among several projects without Jeopardizing progress toward the attainment of the principal objectives. However, hard decisions remain to be made on what degree of sophistication and power is acceptable for each weapons system. (mitJilHTON

Original document.

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