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SC No.
SPECIAL REPORT
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
growth of chinese influence among world communists
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central intelligence agency
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GRCVTH OF CHINESE INFLUENCE AMONG WORLD COMMUNISTS
Although the group which Cownunist China now leads isistinct minority in theCommunist movement, the Chinese party has taken long strides outosition where it once stood its ground alone. Since the time of the first significant open Chinese challenge to Sovietroughly, the beginning ofChinese have gathered increasing strength in tbe movement. Each turn of the dispute has brought them new supporters, either whole parties or significant portions of other parties. Each new attempt by Khrushchev to force tho Chinese into Isolation has alienated more Communist leaders and more of the rank and file, either by the abrupt unilateral methods he has used or by forcing them to make achoice which was not always to Khrushchev's liking.
Rationale!
The meeting of international Communist leaders held in Moscow in0 demonstrated the difficulties which face Khrushchev in his attempts to contain the challenge of intransigent Chinese views. After three weeks of hard bargaining, Includingattempts by the Khrushchev faction to browbeat the Chinesu and others Into acceptance of its way of looking at the world, tho statement which closed this round of the struggle was one which could be used by elthor side to support its own views. The document was more thanthat the Chinese "could live with." It was one which they could use to good advantage in the future.
Up0 the Chinese appear to have had limited alms with regard to the international Communist movement. They hoped
to gain enough support for their views to influence the foreign policies of the Soviet Union, policies which they regarded as inimical to their own Interests. They believed that tbe Cowanoist world shouldeader who establishes over-all policy, but who does so in consultation with the other important members of the Communist camp. They looked to the Soviet Union to be that leader and visualized forole as principal adviser and co-formulator of policies.
he Chinese have gradually given up any hope that they could influence the policies of the Soviet Union and thus the direction tho international Communist movement takes, withouttaking on the mantle of leadership. They are therefore now engagedeep and
secret
contest for doctrinalconflict which they expect will be long and drawn out, whoso proaeot may appear uncertain but whose future is assured.
This is the rationaletheir insistence that they are onlyinority as Lenin was onlyinority ln the Second The successes they have scored ln the past four years ln gaining adherents to their doctrinal programs must serve to strengthen their resolve while at the same time lt creates new disquietude in Moscow.
The Asian Parties
The Chinese have made their greatest inroad into formerly Soviet-influencod areas in Asia. Part of their appealacial one; despite their profession of doctrinal purity, they are not above using racist propaganda in their search for supporters. The support given by the Now Zealand Communist Party, however, demonstrates that Peiping's appeal can transcend racial linos.
Today tbe Chinese can be considered tbe leadersegional Communist sectorall tbe Important parties of Asia and Oceania. Prom India eastward, only the Indian,and Ceyloneso parties are committed to tbo Soviet camp, and they eachtrong pro-Chinese minority. Tbe earlyof Albania to the Chinese camp, moreover, dramatically thatppeal is noteographic one.
The two most important non-Chinese parties in the area are those now inNorth Korean and the North Vietnamese parties.
The North Korean party now is clearly and doeply committed to Peiping. In the early days of the dispute, the North Koreans attempted to maintain an uneasy neutralism. Although attracted to the Chinese viewsumber of issues either because of geographic and racial affinities or joint oppositionommonNorth Koreans were still tied to the Soviets through residual psychological pressures and economic andaid programs.
As the opposing positions hardened, however, it was less and less possible for the Korean leadership tohoice, and the choice they have made is to support Peiping. Soviet recognition of this has been apparent in tho treatmenta North Korean military delegation to Moscow last fall and subsequent developments which suggest the Soviet Union isto apply economic pressureefusal to supply new military aid.
The North Vietnameae party also moved carefully through the beginning months Of tho Sino-Soviet dispute ln antoelicate balance between the two major
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More wary than the North Koreans of exchanging Soviet patronage for Chinese direction, and more adroit atath down the middle, the Xortb Vietnamese havethroughout the dispute toautious neutralism. Recently, however, particularly in the last two months,pronouncements have takenistinct Chinese cast and have been prominently reprinted by the Chinese.
The speech by FirstLo Duan onarch, aeditorial ln the partyKhan Dan, andecently held central committee meeting all suggest that the North Vietnamese may be preparing to Jump off their tightrope onto the Chineso side. It is still too early to tell, however, and the Vietnamese may well balance these statements with more pro-Soviet ones as they have in the past.
The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) is the largest In the non-Communist world and as such represents an Important prize for each side. Befored Soviet party congress lnhe leadership of the party, represented mostly by General Secretary Aidit, had been able to fight off the sentiment of the majority of tbe rank and file andumber of politburoand bad avoided giving clear support to Chinese views. With Khrushchev's unilateralon Albania, however, and his quickening rapprochement with
Yugoslavia, theiping majority acquired better weapons with which to Impose its views.
Aidit, ln what appears toaneuver to maintain his leadership ratheronversion, now has bowed to the pro-Chinese majority, and tho PKI has takenosition contrary to Moscow's on tho issues of Albania, Yugoslavia, the Slno-Indlan border dispute, the Cuban crisis, and the necessity for an international Communist meeting. On domestic affairs, however, the PKIto use tactics with which the Soviet Union agrees. Despite the generalized Chinese demands for more revolutionary militancy, there is nothat the realistic Chinese do not also agree with tho PKI's moderate domestic tactics.
The Japanese Communist Party likes to present Itself as neutral in the disputethe USSR and China and for some years was able to suppress discussion within the party and to avoid a clear choice in public pronouncements. Within the last year, however, while still giving the impression that lt wishes there were no dispute to add to Its ownit has swung Into tbe Peiping camp. It hasChinese attacks on Nehru, endorsed the Chineso border claims, published Mao's collected works, reprinted Chinese speeches, refused to attack Albania, given no support
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for the Soviet handling of the Cuban crisis, refused to carry in the Japanese edition of the TorId Marxist Review arti-cles attacking the Chinese point of view, and'attacked Yugoslav "revisionism."
One of the reasonsleadership's pose ofis the existencepartytrongof pro-Sovieta significant number ofand file. Defectionsparty have occurredits stand on the Chinese
ri side cited as the reason. therefore, is moving
slowly and seeks toossible mediator of the dispute. The evidence suggests, however, thatediator lt would attempt to settle the dispute in Peiping's favor.
The Indian Communistanother deeply dividedin this case thethe present leadershipnationalists, whothe Chinesesupport the Sovietparty, however, has awhose leftistare completely in lineof Peiplng. At theof this faction areIndian jails, put therefor opposing the govern-
ment's line on the border issue. They will be out some day,and the prospect Is that they willreat deal of difficulty for the present leadership if lt maintains its
present course. If they cannot move the party in tbe direction they wish, they may possibly move out of the party and formwhich, within India, will mirror the Chinese.
All important parties ln the Arab world are firmly pro-Soviet. Communist parties in non-Moslem Africa are as yet weak, and they play little role in the international movement. Such parties as there are appear to be Soviet motivated, but there is significant sentiment for
Chinese views among left-wing radicals ln Africa. Theof Chinese influence ln the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organisationor example, reflects this sentiment.
Developments in the past year suggested that Chinese views had gained ground in theof AAPSO, and thetaken by AAPSO's third conference in Tanganyika in3 indicated that they now dominate it. This was driven bone at tbe end of April when Soviet supporters at the Afro-Asian Journalistswere blocked by thechairman in an attempt to seat the USSRorkingrather than an observer.
Latin America
In Latin America, theof the Communist parties are overtly in the Soviet camp. Although the leadership remains pro-Soviet, however, there are clear-cut splits rising out of the rank and file almostbetween the cautloua and the impetuous, those In control and their younger critics. These divisions, rootod ln local lntraparty strife, have been widened by the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Even the leaderships of the various parties are not identical In their backing of Moscow. varies from very strong ln Guatemala, Uruguay, Colombia, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and others, to more lukewarm in
Honduras and Haiti, to doubtful in Ecuador and Venezuela.
And there are special cases, like that of the Brazilian party. Here the leadership of tbe official and more traditional Communist party is firmly pro-Soviet, but it must treadbecause of the existenceissident Communist party whose policies of leftistare close to the Peiplng line.
In Mexico, the Communist Party (PCM) now is engagedactiooal quarrel over the Sino-Soviet question. Inhe Chinese Communist tradethen visiting Mexico reportedly offered financial aid to tho party ln exchange for PCM support of Peiping's policies. Since then. Internal wrangling has continued within tbe PCM and the differences do not appear near reconciliation. In fact, tbe recent postponement ofh Extraordinary Party Congress from July to October appears tooncern on the part of tbe party leadershipongress held now might break down over tbe Sino-Soviet'issue.
In addition, as is occurring in many countries in Latinommunist splinter group ln Mexico consistentlytore militant outlook than tbe official PCM and is probably being supported from Peiplng. Recent developments indicate that the controversy over the Slno-Sovlet dispute within the Mexican Communist movement is probably
SEfZ/ULT
growing caorc bitter rather than ameliorating.
Cuba has always been an enigma in the Sino-Soviet Within tho Cuban regime thereumber of important figures who view the world much as tbe Chinese view it. Cuba remains heavily dependant on tbe Soviet Union for economic and political support. Iterious blow to its pride in October, however, and thereforetake ln attempting to appear Independent of the Soviet Union. The result hasistinct shift in tho nature of Cuban discussions of the disputetbe Communist world.
The flavor of Cuban loaders' speeches after the missilecouched in what appears to be neutral language-was deliberately favorable to theeflection of the Soviet concern over this Situation can bo seen in Castro's present visit to the USSR. Tbe Soviet leaders are clearly hoping to use this visit not only to emphasizo theirto protect Cuba against US pressures but to strengthen their position with Castro within the context of tbe Sino-Soviet dispute.
The Sino-Soviet dispute, howover, has another effect here, which, while not disposing these parties to Chineseyet stores up future difficulties for the Soviet Union. For, against theof schism ln theCommunist movementoncomitant weakening of Soviet authority, anhas arisen for various parties to assert their national individuality if they wish. In addition, Moscow's wlllingoess to accept divergencies along the "road to socialism" ln order to envelop Yugoslaviaore loosely structured bloc allows strong parties elsewhere toSoviet insistence that what Is good for Moscow is also good for them.
The Italian party is the best example of the early develop ment of this tendency toMoscow on occasion, while supporting tbe Soviet party fully ln the dispute with China, On the question of the Common Market, the Italian party hasan approach which fits its needs better than theSoviet rejection. The Italian theory of "structural reform" is another deviation to fit the Italiann
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absolute forms, It Is far moreoctrine than anything tbe Yugoslavs are doing.
The Soviet Union Is willing to permit this typo ofwithin the national parties, if those parties will fully support Soviet forolffn policy alms and tactics. As the national parties become more and more accustomed to forming their own Ideas on some policies, however, Soviet control is bound to become weaker and tho structure of the Communist world increasingly loose.
Eastern Europe
give it overt support,has reprinted thesein its party press,as an indication to the Rumanians that it stands ready to aid tbom if desired. Rumania has also expressed itswith the Soviet Union's policies by returning Itsto Albania, and lt is tbe only satellite reginte to raise tbe levol of Its trade with China this year.
Although Rumania cannot soon be expected to shift its allegiance from Moscow to Peiping, it is the existence of the Sino-Soviet dispute that allows room for regimes such as tho Rumanian to exercise independent judgment in the face of Soviet disapproval.
willingness to defy Moscow on vital issuos ofinterest while supporting Soviet foreign policy guides and an anti-Chinese line is not restricted to Communist parties outside tbe bloc. Rumania has recently stood up for Its own economic development plans ln the face of an attempt by the Soviet Union to promoto joint planning through tho Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA).
The Rumanian refusal to go along with CEMA plans wasln its central committee resolutions of early March. China, although realizing that Rumania is far from ready to
Outlook
The Soviet Union stillthe support of tbe large majority of the International Communist movement. Only in Asia have tbe Chinese madeInroads andosition'of influence whichranslated into awilling toow international. In other areas, with tbe exception of theparty, the Chinese now can only boast of sentiment ln their favor, of minority pro-Pelping factions In Communist parties otherwise oriented, and of future prospects.
Moreover, do organizational ties ore known to nave developed between China and tbo parties now supporting it. China'sIs based on itsof the basic doctrine; at sone future dato those parties now supporting thismight shiftosition of greater independence of both major centers or even back to the Soviet Onion.
On balance, however,must be deeply concerned by the attraction of so many parties to the Chinese positions
The development of new Communist parties is likely only inareas where Chinese Influence now is greatest, and the result will probablybe sore Chinese-oriented parties. In those areas where Soviet influence Is greatest, the trend appears to be toward the assertion of ever moreof view and action. It is with good reason thatand bis colleagues appear today more concerned with the problems within tbe Communist world than wlthjmy other single Ihsuo.
Original document.
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