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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM: The Growth of Chinese Influence in the World Communist movement.
the group which Communistleads isistinct minority inCommunist movement, the Chinesetaken long strides outosition wherestood its ground alone. Since the time ofsignificant open Chinese challenge toroughly the beginninghegathered increasing strength in theturn of the dispute has brought them neweither whole parties or significantother parties. Each new attempt by Khrushchev
to force the Chinese into Isolation has alienated more Communist leaders and more of the rank and file, either by the abrupt unilateral methods he has used or by forcing them to make achoice which was not always to Khrushchev's liking.
The meeting of international Communist leaders held in Moscow in0 demonstrated the difficulties which face Khrushchev in histo contain the challenge of intransigent Chinese views. After three weeks of hardincluding persistent attempts by the Khrushchev faction to browbeat the Chinese and others intoof its way of looking at the world, the statement which closed this round of the struggle was one which could be used by either side toits own views. The document was more than something that the Chinese "could live with." It was one which they could use to good advantage in the future.
Up0 the Chinese appear to have had limited aims with regard to the internationalmovement. They hoped to gain enough support for their views to influence the foreign policies of the Soviet Union, policies which they regarded
as inimical to their own interests. They believed that the Communist world shouldeader who establishes overall policy, but who does so in consultation with the other important members of the Communist camp. They looked to the Soviet Union to be that leader and visualized fora role as principal adviser and co-formu-lator of policies.
4. he Chinese have gradually given up any hope that they could influence the policies of tbe Soviet Union and thus ths direction the international Communist movement takes, without themselves taking on the mantle of leadership. They are therefore now engagedeep andcontest for doctrinalwhich they expect willong and drawn-out battle whose present may appear uncertain but whose future is assured. This is the rationale behind their insistence that they are onlya minority" as Lenin was onlyinority ln the Second International. Thethey have scorod in the past four years in gaining adherents to their doctrinal programs must serve to strengthen their resolve while at the same time lt creates new disquietude in Moscow. This success is examined brieflyegional basis below.
The Asian Parties:
The Chinese have made tbeir greatestinto formerly Soviet-influenced areas in Asia. Part of their appealacial one;their profession of doctrinal purity, they are not above using racist propaganda in their search for supporters. The support given by the New Zealand Communist Party, however, demonstrates that Peiping's appeal can transcend racial lines. Today the Chinese can be considered as tho leadersegional Communist sector embracing all the Important parties of Southeast Asia. From India eastward, only the Australian and Indian parties are committed to the Soviet camp.
The two most important parties ln the area are those now inNorth Korean and the North Vietnamese parties. The North Korean
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party is now clearly and deeply-committed to Peiplng. In tbe early days of the dispute, the North Koreans atteapted to maintain an uneasy neutralism. attracted to the Chinese viewsuaber of issues either because of geographic and racial affinities or joint oppositionouodtheNorth Koreans were still tied to tho Soviets through residual psychological pressures and economic and military aid programs. As the opposing positions hardened, however, it was less and less possible for tho Korean leadership tohoice, and the choice they have made is to support Peiping. Soviet recognition of this has beenin the treatmentorth Korean military delegation to Moscow last fall anddevelopments which suggest the Soviet Union is applying economic pressureefusal to supply new military aid.
North Vietnamese party alsothrough the beginning months of the sidispute in an attempt to maintain abalance between the two major parties. than the North Koreans of exchangingfor Chinese direction, and more adroit
atath down the middle, the Northhave continued throughout the dispute toautious neutralism. Recently, however, particularly in the last two months, Vietnamese pronouncements have takenistinct Chinese cast and have been prominently reprinted by the Chinese. Tho speech by First Secretary Le Duan onecent Nhan pan editorial, and the resolutionsecently held Central Committee meeting all suggest that tha lortb Vietnamese may be preparing to jump off their tightrope onto the Chinese side. It is still too early to tell,and the Vietnamese may well balance these statements with more pro-Soviet ones as they have ln the past. On Balance, nevertheless, it appears most likely that if the necessity for choice is made starktbe formation of two distinct internationals, forVietnamese will finally join with the Chinese.
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI)largest ln the non-Communist world andrepresents an important prize for each aide.
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Befored Soviet Party Congress inhe leadership of the party, represented mostly by its General Secretary Aidit, had been able to fight off the sentiment of the majority of the rank and file andumber of politburo members, and had avoided giving clear support to Chinese vievs. With Khrushchev's unilateral attack on Albania, however, and his quickening rapprochement with Yugoslavia, the pro-Peiping majority acquired better weapons with which to impose its views. Aidit, ln whattoaneuver to maintain his leadershiponversion, has now bowed to the pro-Chinosc majority and tbe PKI has takenosition contrary to Moscow's on the issues of Albania, Yugoslavia, the Sino-Indian border dispute, the Cuban crisis, and the necessity for an international Communist meeting. On domestic affairs, however, the PKI continues to use tactics with which the Soviet Onion agrees. Despite the generalized Chinese demands for more revolutionary militancy, there Is no indication that the realistic Chinese do not also agree with the PKI's moderate domestic tactics.
9. The Japanese Communist Party likes toItself as neutral in tbe dispute between the USSR and China and for some years was able todiscussion within the party and tolear choice in public pronouncements. Within the last year, however, while still giving the impression that it wishes there were no dispute to add to Its own problems, lt has swung into the Peiplng camp. It has republished Chinese attacks on Hehru,the Chinese border claims, published Mao's collected works, reprinted Chinese speeches,to attack Albania, given no support for the Soviet handling of the Cuban crisis, refused to carry in the Japanese edition of the World Marxist Review articles attacking the Chinese'point of view, and attacked Yugoslav "revisionism." One of the reasons for tbe leadership's pose of "neutralism" Is the existence within the partytrongof pro-Soviet thoughtignificant number of the rank and file. Defections from the party have occurred recently, with its stand on the Chinese side cited as the reason. The leadership, therefore. Is moving slowly and seeks toossible mediator of the dispute. The
evidence suggests, however, thatediator it would attempt to settle the dispute in Peiping's favor.
10. The InJian Communist Party is another deeply divided party, but ln this case tbe majority of the present leadership are moderate nationalists, who have condemned the Chinese attitudes andthe Soviet Onion. The party, however,trong minority whose leftist sectarian views are completely in line with those of Peiplng. At the mosent, many of this faction are still ln Indian jails, put there by Nehru for opposing theline on the border issue. They will be out some day, however, and the prospect is that they willreat deal of difficulty for theleadership if it maintains its present course. If they cannot move the party in tbe direction they wish, they may possibly move out of the party and form another which, within India, will mirror the Chinese.
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All important parties In the Arab world are firmly pro-Soviet. The Black Africanparties are as yet weak and they play little role in the international movement. Such parties as there are appear to be Soviet motivated, but there is significant sentiment for Chinese views among left-wing radicals ln Africa. Tbe predomlnence
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of Chinese Influence ln the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organizationor example, reflects this sentiment.
about eight months ago,in the secretariat of AAPSO suggestedviews had gained ground in thla body,direction taken by AAPSO's third conference
ln Tanganyika in3 Indicated that they now dominate it. This was driven home last week when Soviet supporters at tbe Afro-Asian Journalists Conference were blocked by the Indonesian chairman in an attempt to seat the USSRorking member rather than an observer.
Latin America, the majority ofparties are overtly ln the Sovietthe leadership remains pro-Soviet, there are clear-cut splits rising out ofand file almostcautious and tbe Impetuous, between thoseand their younger critics. Thesein local lntra-party strife, have beenthe Sino-Soviet dispute. Even the leadership
of the various parties are not Identical in their backing of Moscow. Support varies froa very strong ln Guatemala, Columbia, Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and others, to more luke-warm ln Ecuador, Venezuela, Uruguay, Honduras, and Haiti. And finally there are apecial cases, like that of the Brazilian party. Here the leadership of the official and more traditional Communist party la firmly pro-Soviet, but it must tread carefully because of the existenceissident Communist party whose policies of Leftist revolution are close to the Peiplng line.
Mexico, the Communist partysplit over the Sino-Soviet question. he Chinese Communist tradethen visiting Mexico reportedlyaid to the party ln exchange forof Peiplng's policies. Since then,has continued within the PCM anddo not appear near reconciliation. the recent postponement ofhParty Congress from July tooncern on tbe part of thaongress held now might break down over
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the Sino-Sovtet issue. In addition, as is occurring in many countries ln Latinommunist splinter group in Mexico consistentlyore militant outlook than the official PCM and is probably being supported from Pelping. Recent developments indicate that the controversy over the Sino-Soviet dispute within tbe Mexican Communist movement is probably growing more bitter rather than ameliorating.
16. Cuba has alwaysnigma ln the Sino-Soviet dispute. Within tne Cuban regime thereumber of important figures who view the world much as the Chinese view it. Nevertheless, Cuba is heavily dependent on the Soviet Union for economic and political support. Iterious blow to its pride in October, however, and thereforetake in attempting to appear independent of the Soviet Union. The result hasistinct shift in the nature of Cuban discussions of tho dispute within the Communist world. The flavor of Cuban leaders* speeches after the missilecouched in what appears to be neutraldeliberately favorable to the Chinese. eflection of the Soviet concern over this situation can be seen in Castro's present visit to the USSR. The Soviet leaders are clearly hoping to use this visit not only to emphasize their determination toCuba against US pressures but to strengthen their position with Castro within the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute.
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however, has another effect here, which, while not disposing these parties to Chinese influence, yet stores up future difficulties for the Soviet Union. For, against the background of schism in the international Communist movementoncomitant
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weakening of Soviet authority, an opportunity has arisen for various parties to assert their national individuality if they wish. In addition, Moscow's willingness to accept divergencies along the "road to socialism" in order tn envelop Yugoslaviaore loosely structured bloc allows strong parties elsewhere to oppose Soviet insistence that what is good for Moscow is also good for them.
The Italian party is the best example of the early development of this tendency to disregard Moscow on occasion, while yet supporting the Soviet party fully In the dispute with China. On theof the Common Market, the Italian party hasan approach which fits its needs better than the outright Soviet rejection. The Italian theory of "structural reform" is another deviation to fit the Italian scene; ln absolute terms, it is far moreoctrine than anything the Yugoslavs are doing. The Soviet Union is willing to permit this type of experimentation within the national parties, if these parties will fully support Soviet foreign policy aims and tactics. As the national parties become more and more accustomed to forming their own ideas on some policies, however, Soviet control is bound to become weaker and the structure of the Communist world Increasingly loose.
This willingness to defy Moscow on vital Issues of national Interest while yet supporting Soviet foreign policy guides and an antl-Cblnese line is not restricted to Communist partiesthe bloc. Rumania has recently stood up for its own economic development plans in the face of an attempt by the Soviet Union to promote Joint planning through CEMA. The Rumanian refusal to go along with CEMA plans was indicated in its Central Committee resolutions of early March. China,realizing that Rumania is far from ready to give lt overt support, nevertheless has reprinted these resolutions ln its party press, probably as an Indication to the Rumanians that lt stands ready to aid them if desired. Rumania has alsoits dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union's policies by returning its ambassador to Albania and is the only satellite regime to raise tbe level of its trade with China this year. Although we cannot expect Rumania soon to shift Its allegiance from
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Moscow to Pel pi rig. It is the existence of the Sino-Soviet dispute that allows room for regimes such as the Rumanian to exercise Independent judgment in the face of Soviet disapproval.
The Out look:
Since this memorandum has concentrated on the gains which the Chinese have made in theCommunist movement, lt has presented adistorted picture. The Soviet Union stillthe support of the large majority of the Only ln Asia have the Chinese made significant inroads andosition of Influence which could be translatedollowing willing toew International. In other arsas, the Chinese can boast of sentiment in their favor, of minority factions ln otber-orientad Communist parties, and of future prospects. In addition, ws do not know of any organizational ties that have developed between China and the parties now supporting ber. China's appoal Is based on Its interpretation of the basic doctrine; at some future date those parties nowthis interpretation might shiftosition of greater independence of both major centers or even back to the Soviet Dnlon.
On balance, however, Khrushchev must be deeply concerned by the attraction of so many parties to tbe Chinese positions. The development of new Communist parties is only likely in underdeveloped areas where Chinese Influence is now greatest, and the result will probably therefore be more Chinese-oriented parties. In those areas where Sovietis greatest, the trend appears to be toward the assertion of ever more Independence of view and action. It is with good reason that Khrushchev and his colleagues appear today more concerned with the problems within the Communist world than wltb any other single Issue.
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