61
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SINO-SOVIET RUPTURE FOR THE US
3
APPROVED FOR RELEASE0
CTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
3
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY MEMORANDUM:
SUMMARY
Whether oromplete Slno-Soviet break occurs,between the USSR and Communist China will almost certainly remain seriously ruptured lor the foreseeable future. The most important implication of this rupture is its potential for complicating and perhaps significantly changing world politics over the long term. Meanwhile it will also create orumber of difficulties for Moscow and Peiping--and for the US as well. At the same time, however, the Sino-Soviet rupture will offer theumber of new opportunities.
These opportunities may arise principally from acoincidence of US and Soviet interests, especially with respect to concernuclear-armed China. Suchinterests might permit the US to undertake some new tactical initiatives and toougher stance with respect to China, should the need arise, with somewhat leBSfor adverse Soviet reactions than may have been the case previously.
The chancesenuine Soviet approach to the US at China's expense are not great, but they do seem sufficient at least to Justify US planning now for meeting the new hazards and opportunitiesuture contingency might entail.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE0
Implications of tho Sino-Sovletfte US
For most practical purposes, there now is an open split in Sino-Sovlet relations. Theof the present confrontation, the directness of the most recent insults and accusations atand the theological certainty of bothreflect new dimensions of antagonism too ox-tensive to bo bridged. Similarly, present Chinese Communist pretensions, and the increasing use of the Sino-Sovlet dispute by European Communistand factionsever for promoting tbeir grievances against Moscow, constitute new challenges which must almost certainly be impelling Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership to question whether the forbearance they have shown in the past underprovocations might bring unacceptable harm to the interests of the CPSU and the Soviet state.whatever the Immediate results ofSino-Sovlet confrontation, the USSR and China will almost certainly not be able to restore mutual confidence or to achieve any genuine or lasting Although efforts may be made from time to time toore cordial relationship, especially by new Soviet and Chinese leaders, wethat Slno-Soviet relations will almostremain seriously ruptured for thefuture, whatever the case with respectomplete break.
Probably tbe most important implication of the Sino-Sovlet rupture is its potential forthe strategic setting of international politics. It will contribute to the displacing of two distinct and hostile power groupsore pluralistic world. The force of ideology will probably decline. The major states will probably re-examine some of their attitudes and re-evaluate their various interests
in the light of tbe slowly changing strategicwith consequent effect upon their policies toward the USSR, Communist China, the US, and the Western Alliance. Of greatPSt import to the US,will probably be the conclusions the USSR itself
APPIOVTJFOIIELUSI
ami in0
SECRE'P.
-SECRET
draws from the changing situation. The Soviets will probably have to decide whether to incline toward competing with China in hostility to the US, or as we consider somewhat more likely, toward pursuing the logic of their "peaceful coexistence" line and searching for new ways to demonstrate its validity. The US will ln any eventuch moreworld of new opportunities and problems. It is to these opportunities and problems implicit in the Slno-Soviet rupture that this memorandum is addressed.
A. Implications of Rupture for Communist China and thc Soviet Union.
can expect increased nationalthe Soviet and Chinese states. Thesignifies that Communist Ideology hasfailed to overcome nationalism within thehas indeed aggravated such sentiment. Tbenecessity places its ownwith blocthose ofbelieving that such Soviet behaviorambitions, at home and abroad, insiststhat only Its interpretation ofcan save the Communistdreadful harm. Because thoseseem unlikely to change underbecause they involve as well acompetition for authority, and becauseprobably be Intensified to the degreeChina emergesreat world power,
the prospect is probably not Just for rupture but for increased levels of tension between theso two giant nolghbor states. They may remain nominal allies for some time, but even so this tension will almost certainly be reflected in Increased meddling In each other's internal affairs, more attempted subversion of the other's party andleaders, and more regard for border defenses and troop dispositions against the other.
will consequentlyrowingof Soviet and Chinese interests. questions which cause thewith its own nationalwith the US, nuclear war, Germany, and
the difficulties of resource allocation amid the
-2-
increasing costs of military and spacewill almost certainly result in less coincidence of Soviet and Cblnese interests. Also, the gulf which separates Chinose and 3oviet socle-ties will probably widen, the one remaining much more austere and revolutionary for some years to come, the other looking forward Increasingly tothe fruits of domestic gains won.
can also expect an acceleratedof two competing and hostile Communistwith accompanying disruption of The collapse of unitary authorityCommunismevelopment of major The appearance of ChinaecondCommunist authority has already Impairedin the movement and made it morethe USSR to contain impulses toward autonomyother parties. In Eastern Europe, thisan Important catalytic factor into resist Soviet economic dictation,Eastern European parties will probablyfrom time to time to Insist onalthough none will probably wish tothe Albanian breakaway. World-wide,come toeast of more variegated aspect:
a spectrum of parties, some in power, some not,with all kinds of dissident groups and The Sino-Sovlet rupture will probably not in tbe near future seriously impair the ability of the world movement to Injure non-Communistand Interests. The rupture will, however, dampen morale and even basic belief among It will complicate CP efforts to palm off Communism on uncommitted audiencos as "scientific" truth guaranteed to yield amazing now brotherhood and progress dividends. And it will markedlythe ability of Moscow to continue enlisting other CPs in support of tbe USSR's diplomatic and otber Interests.
will be an increase in theand in Chinese-sponsored racialismin Asia, Africa, and LatinChinese activity has been harming Sovietin these areas for some tfurther stimulate Peiping to [Bet-fit?lands, belief that the situation ln tbegivesumber of advantages over economic and revolutionary situations
-3-
OfT'fT* FT
much moro akin to those of China than of the Soviet Union, antiwhlte sentiments, histories against the colonial powers,mostproclivity for Irresponsible action which Peiping can encourage much more than can Moscow. Although wc can expect aome increased susceptibility to these Chinese efforts among extremist movements In the underdeveloped world, such emphasis vlll ln many cases work to Peiping's detriment, and demand of the Chinese tho most varied and subtle tactical touch.
There will probablyecrease of Chinese confidence in the deterrent effect of the Slno-Soviet Alliance on US forcefulness in the Far East. China's failure thus far to seek to gain its foreign policy objectives by the exercise of all-out force, Peiping's brave oratory to the contrary, has of course chiefly been the result of respect for the overwhelming military power the US has appeared ready to bring to bear against it. This has been tn part the product of Chinese uncertainty with respect to Soviet support. The most recent deterioration in Slno-Soviet relations has almost certainly reinforced Soviet concern lest Chinese rashness involve the USSR in an East-Vest nuclear war not of its own choosing, and caused Peiping to suspect that the USSR would let China absorb US punishment so long as vitalinterests were not endangered.
China's economic and military programs will continue to suffer greatly from the denial of Soviet support, although China will probably increasinglythe possibilities of obtaining needed industrial supplies from nonbloc sources. The depth of Chinese Ill-feeling toward the USSR is perhaps illustrated best by the known costs China has accepted in defying Hoscow. The decline of Soviet deliveries andassistance0 has already caused enormous harm to China's economy and military establishment. China's leaders have thus succeeded in cutting off China from both bloc and nonbloc aid for herdevelopment and military programs. Moscow has one remainingof the pol currently supplied toChina has already inquired about obtaining Pol from nonbloc sources. Whether or not Khrushchev applies this unction China willto expand itsBllJMwWibloc countries. It will probably succeocr, particularly with respect to Japan, Western Europe, and Southeast Asia. This expansion will orobably not, however, make up the losses suffered from the decline of Soviet
in over-ail trade level, orin the unique nexus of patterns,and technical assistance whichew years ago in Sino-Sovlet economic relations. Moreover, Peiping's Interest in greater trade with Japan and the UK, for example, mayore restraining effect on Its foreign and military in Asia than might otherwise be the case.
B. Problems for the US
Sino-Sovlet rupture will probablyeither Moscow or Peiping suddenly andto change its basic objectives orthe US in the near future: the morninga complete break. Communist China and thewould still bo sworn to our destruction,yet critically weakened ln the hostilecould bring to bear against us. Therupture will probably not remove orsubstantial Par East problems facing theChinese Communist advanced weaponsbelligerency and encouragement ofin Southeast Asia: continuing fearln Asia, and uncertainty concerning USand the possibility that the Chinesewill some day undertake such rash ln the Taiwan Strait or Southeast Asia,initiate larger hostilities in the FarPeiping will ln time almost certainlyworld support for UN entry, evenand Indian advocacy of its cause willlessen.
rupture will create unique newfor the US. ompleteoccurs or not, thehineseequation will be changed significantly. will continue to probe US intontions withto Communist China, and will seek tothat there are benefits to be gained byUSSR's peaceful and honorable professionsvalue.* China will meanwhile probablymore important that it has been lnand Moscow and Washington may well find
it more difficult to readimes of acute crisis, than one anojjfrgrjiJrig
elow.
it
SI
President de Gaulle may tend to be confirmed in his view that the Chinese "yellow peril" demands of the
11. The Sino-Sovlet rupture will createnew problems affecting the policies of third states. Soviet "peaceful" stances will almostbe interpreted somewhat liberally by many US allies, and will further complicate US efforts to maintain firm lines against Soviet pressures and
presumably,respect to Peiping may cause increased fears of China among Its neighbors in Asia.
Although China's potential for expanding foreign trade Is limited, some attractive commercial opportunities are likely to arise, especially for Japan and Western Europe, as China looks to the West for capital goods and raw materials it once purchased from the USSR. The commercial ties that mightcould run counter to US policies toward Peiping and complicate our relations with our allies.
Zn their struggle with Moscow the Chinese will doubtless continue to try to capitalize on the division of the world into white and non-white, developed and undeveloped countrios. The Chinese will be careful to mute racialism in those instances where they will be seeking greater support from "white" partiesrgentina, Belgium, and New Zealand). The net effect, however, will probably be to stimulate racialist sensitivities. Tho Chinese will probably encourage radicalism in those areas where they can make the Soviets appoar timid without committing China to overt physical support of radical actions. For its part, Moscow may on occasion undertake more dangerous courses than might be the case in the absence of Chinese pressures; indeed, this was probahLt^-faclpx. in
the USSR's Cuban missile-basecases, such as in Italy, Moscow's waning control over the local CP may have the effect of enhancing
the nationalist cast and respectability of the party which in turn could increase its political strength. In more backward settings, on the other hand, the weakening of Moscow's control may at times lead some CP's to increased radicalism.
C. Opportunities for the US.
a greater degree than we feelappreciated, the Sino-Sovlet rupturethe by-product of US policy. The natureCommunist system, and Soviet dominance ofhave from the outset tended to dictatenot indebted to theits revolutionary victory, and potentiallyeventually defy Moscow. even though the developing rupture of theyears or so has been caused primarily byChinese actions, It has probably come moreperhaps more profoundly because of US actions.
US firmness and nuclear power have presented the USSR with enormous problems of national defense,all other Sovietthat of regard for the Chinese ally. US firmness has denied Khrushchev foreign policy gains anything like those ho has so long predicted as justifying, for Communist audiences, the risks and costs of his "peacefulcourse. The US has kept Mao from achieving his heart's desire of "completing the Chineseby acquiring Taiwan; Indeed, we have not even let him take the offshore Quemoys and Matsus.
pressures and these frustrationsand Chinese Communist ambitions representof basic US containment policy. Ina general continuance of such overall USwith increased US initiative andoffers considerable prospect forand weakening many of those aspectsand Chinese power already damaged bySino-Soviet estrangement. We doubt theopting basically to support eitheragainst the other, since such UScarry danger of commitment which wouldour true interest over the long run. would appear to be meritat ft* adageand patient position toward hvMhUllfefloping At the same time, and as the occasionwe can attempt to keep our enemies ineach other.
suggesting that there be thein US firmness or vigilance withSoviet objectives and power, we think thata few questions where US and Sovietcoincide sufficl?ntly to offer some promisewhich might help to retard China's growth
in power or to restrain some possible Chinese foreign policy folly. Such possible actions, discussedrelate not so much to US-Soviet cooperation, as to US moves undertaken either with less concern for Soviet reactions or, ln some cases, in theof Soviet acquiescence.
The principal such question may be that of delaying the emergenceuclear-armedChina. Nuclear proliferation will certainly benefit neither the US nor tbe USSR, particularly so in the case of an ambitious, hostile, andChina. This coincidence of Interests will of course have increasing relevance for US-Soviet arms and testing negotiations. Additionally, new implications may in time develop, perhaps with regard to such questions as possible US-Soviet exchange of information on China, US or Soviet sanctions against China, and US and Soviet benefit from any accidents or delays China's advanced weapons program might suffer.
Such partial coincidence of interests might also make less risky the buildup of US striking power against China in the Western Pacific and the Far East, by making clear tothe type of US weapons and theirthis US power was not directed principally against tbe USSR. of US and Soviet Interest may also develop situations where added Soviet assistance to India, say, might not be wholly detrimental to US Interest
in fashioning counterweights to China in Asia. In sum, the Sino-Sovlet rupture may well facilitate USin any future US confrontation with Communist China, should the need arise, by somewhat lessening the likelihood of extreme Sovietof course that US actions did not appear to the Soviets to endanger the basic CommunistAsia or otherwise to threaten vital socur^My1,xlltorosts of the USSR.
Eastern European parties movepromote tliolr economic interests, acquire andreater voice in tbeSoviet bloc policies, opportunities forcontactsreater exercise of UStend to Increase. Many parties ln theworld will be more vulnerable to splittingharassment which should, in time, lessen theirin national politics. The Sino-Sovletalso provide us an opportunity to playon the most deep-seated Chinese and Soviet fears
of the other: Chinese suspicion that Moscow andare about to gang up against Peiping, and Soviet concern about China's long-run power and expansionism.
the Slno-Soviet rupture mayMoscow to alter its traditional view thatisipolar struggleto Communist world victory. Thiscan explain individual renegades fromwe doubt that It can be sustained ln the face of
a defection of the scale of China and Its retinue of other Communist confederates. The rupture with China may thus support that tendency in Soviet thinking which appears to be seeing tbe world in terms of pragmatic greys rather than dogmatic blacks and whites. This in turn say cause the USSR toeed of the West. Indeed we now are seeing, and probably will Increasingly see, various Soviet approaches to the US at China's expense. For the foreseeable future these will probably be largely tactical devices designed in part to get the US to soften certain of its East-West negotiating positions.
should note that whether SovietChina will rise sharply over the long runpart depend on China's growth of power: thepower, the more pressure on tbe USSRcourt the US. If Chins begins clearly toUSSR may in time decide that it mustof Its basic objectives in order tosupportearsomeevent there should continue toisparity
in Soviet and Chinese technical-military power. The chances of such an eventual genuine Soviet demarche arc not now groat, but they do seeAPnTfMWUIftttU at least to justify US and Western plaftniinfllfnw for meeting the strange new hazards and opportunitiesontingency might entail.
-9-
SmCRET'
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: