CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ESEARCH STAFF
INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
CIA/ RS3
OCI
SUBJECT: hecklist For the Sino-Soviet Talks
High-level Sino-Sovlet talks (without Khrushchev and Mao) are to begin in Moscowuly. The two parties speak of composing their differences sufficiently to make worthonference of all the parties, similar to70 Moscow conferences, perhaps before the end of the year.
The attached checklist of Soviet and Chinesein the dispute-is arranged under the headings of: The State of the Dispute, The Next Step (Bilateralhe Backdrop70uestions of World Communist Strategy (in fivetateand The 'Unity' of the Movement (in sixhe positions, taken fron Soviet and Chinese statements of the past few aonths, are given in the words of the parties themselves, although most of the statements have beenit. Not all of the positions In thearerelating to aspects of strategy could run on for many pages; but the more important are.
The checklist shows how difficult it will be for the two parties to reach an agreement, even an agreementtable truce. It is designed to help the interested spectator in his reading of whatever pronouncements, ln one voice or two, nay emerge from the Moscow talks.
The DDI/RS has had useful contributions to this memorandum from several colleagues in OCI and ONE.
JFKFOR REHASE
CASE # confidential-
MANDATORY
OCUMENT #.
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THE STATE OF THE DISPUTE
The differences between us are of long standing. They are not to be explained by the different conditions in which we work, but are serious differences on questions of principle.
Soviet
Differences between us have arisen recently. They can be explained by theconditions in which the parties are working, and they need not turnharp conflict.
isthird great debate" (the first two being Lenin versus Eautsky and Bernstein, and Stalin versus Trotsky andetween the Marxist-Leninists and the "modern revisionists,"revolutionaryandideology." Ourare afraid toour case against them.
A polemic on fundamental problems has indeedolemic in which ourhave attacked the common line of the world Communist movement. These polemics damage our common interests, giving aid and comfort to the enemy.
persistent errors of our opponents have exposed the bloc and movement to increasing "dangerplit."
We cannot agree that the movement is "on the brink of anut it is truehighlymoment" has arrived.
Comment: Only in recent months have theadmitted publicly that the dispute is serious; they now are more willing than the Russians to describe it as that. The Russians take the same view of it privately, however, and they are no longer contending, as in
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their3 letter to the Chinese party, that the cohesive factors In their relationship are of greater importance than the divisive factors.
The Chinese all along have seemed eager to debate, confident that they have the better case (as indeed they do, by the book). The Russians in two periodsnd) have contendedublic debate is necessaryiew they take when they think they are winning thend in two periods 2 andave contended that such debatead thing (their view when they think they are losing). The Russians currently assert that the Chinese are breaking an agreement to halt polenics; the Chinese deny that they agreed. This question into halt polemics, and how to define awill be hard to handle.
The Chinese have recently become morealso to describe the movement as being on the vergeplit; the Russians have put this possibility less sharply, in terms of "mutualr "subversion of (our) unity." If the parties were choosing their words carefully, the difference in the terms wouldhinesetoormal break, and aunwillingness to do no; however, the Russians might be glad to see the Chinese take the initiative, while the Chinese might really be unwilling to do so.
THE NEXTILATERAL TALKS
We have always advocated comradely discussion; we proposed bilateral talks moreear ago, and others have recently agreed.
Soviet
We have always advocated comradely discussion, and we welcome the recentagreement to have bilateral talks.
questions that need to be discussed, in order of importance, are: he strategy and tactics of revolution today; imperialism andpeace; hestruggle; trengthening the might and unity of the bloc;trengthening the unity of the movement. ew definition of its general line.
The questions that need to be discussed, in order of importance, are: trengthening the might of the. foreconomic competition;
the fight for peace and peaceful coexistence;
the struggle against imperialism; upport of the national liberation movement;the unity and cohesion
of the bloc and movement.
want to discuss the full range of questions Inand we are willing to have as many talks as
We are ready to discuss whatever questions thewant to discuss.
have always been opposed to public exposure of our differences. Lately the CCP has been subjectyleaders and spokesmen among others. We haveto some attacks, but,
Since2 we have urged an end topolemics; thus, while we could answer theattacks" in thepress, we will not. The most recent Chinese letter /X4 June/ also *
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inese
despite the CPSU'sof "groundless st-tacks" on It, we have not yet replied directly to the Soviet attacks. If our charges are groundless, why is the CPSU afraid to print them? No one has the right to order an "end to open polemics" in order to keep the other side from replying.
Soviet
contains "groundless and tWb??less attacks" on the CPSU and other parties. We will not print it, because it would callublic reply which would provoke freshto our understanding, the wishes of other parties, and tbe spirit of our imminent
who care about the unity of the camp and the movement hope that our talks will help todifferences, strengthen unity, and create favorable conditions foreeting of all the parties.
"We should liko to hope"eeting will improve the atmosphere, and thateeting we can carryeries of measures to overcome the existing difficulties.
Comment: In the second set of positions above, the question of first Importance to thestrategy and tactics ofin the sense that they have made it the center of their criticism of the Soviet party, does not appear at all on tbe Russian list; the Chinese usually combine their first question with part of their second, as in theirune letter, in which they speak of the bloc's "general line" asagtinst the counterrevolutionary global strategy. imperialism." In thatune letter, the Chinese presented their views on "questions that need to be discussed in the talks" in the form ofoints occupyingages and then added that there were "other questions of common
concern" such as deStallnlzation and the theses ofhd CPSU congresses that should be discussed.
Note that the Russians do not committo talking as long as necessarys long as the Chinese think The Russians have implied privately that they know they cannot resolve theno natter how long they talk.
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THE70 DECLARATIONS
The crux of the dispute is the interpretation of70 declarations of the Communist parties.
Soviet
All of the fundamentalexpressed in70 declarations are still valid.
have been absolutely faithful to70 declarations, whereas others have not been.
We have been faithful to, and we are determined to defend, 70 declarations.
general line expressed in the declarations is one of resolute revolutionary struggle, which cannot be "one-sidedly reducedpeacefulnd 'peaceful
"We are deeply convinced that there are no groundse-examination" of that line. The most recent CCP letter /l4 June7 again makes an "arbitraryof theand "distorts their major theses."
Comment: The most) of the state-ments and declarations issued after aconferenceishmash of Soviet and Chinese positions which satisfied neither party. ew weeks, both parties had reaffirmed all of their former positions.
The Soviet statements given above do not make apparent the degree of Sovietwith0 declaration. While both parties have departed from some of the "joint" positions taken in that the Russian departures have been more obvious; for example, that declaration spoke of revisionism as the "main danger" and was
"dt)Ml DEN 'i -fT^r-
bard on Yugoslavia, whereas the Russians (as the Chinese say) are themselves revisionists and are conciliatory to Yugoslavia. For thisobvious Russian departures and because0 declaration supported the Chinese on issues of authority. the principle of unanimity) and provided for further multipartythe declaration has been of more use to the Chinese in the dispute than to the Russians.
QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNISTtrategy versus Tactics
Is necessary totrategy aa well as tactics.
We always distinguishstrategic andquestions.
opponents pretend to have both strategy and tactics, but theystrategy to and in specificthey swing between "advonturisa"s witness their conduct of thebase venture in Cuba.
Our strategy, the strategy of the world Communist Is set forth in70 declarations. Whereas agreement Ison questions ofopinions may differ on tactics, although we should seek unity on these too.
"paper tiger" thesis calls for despising the enemy strategically, in the long term, whilethe enemyand seriouslyh Lu; therefore, It is neither capltulationist nor adventurist.
The "paper tiger" thesis as usually presentedanof the enemy. The thesis when spelled outlatitude: of course we believe that in the long run we will win; of course we adapt our tactics to particular situations.
Comment: Until recently, Khrushchev has preferred to blur tbe distinction between strategy and tactics In order to givemaximum maneuverability; the Chinese have not let bin get away with It.
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The Chinese recognize that Khrushchevtrategy (ofut they dislike its points of emphasis toegree that they dismiss it as improvisation, as no strategy at all. The Chineso letter ofune ln effect calledew world Communist strategy along Mao's old lines.
Similarly, the Russians recognize that Mao shows flexibility in some respects and from time to time, but they see Mao's strategy as simple-minded, so confined as it is to an obsessive hatred of the United States and an obsessive vision of revolutionary opportunities.
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QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNISThe Balance of Power
balance of power ln the world has already changed in favor of
The balance of power in the world arena "is changing" steadily in favor of
recognize thathas powerful military weapons, and our "paper tiger" thesis has alwaysthe admonition to respect the enemy tactically. militarily).
Leftwing Communists repeat old slogans, think It is "easy" to deal withand "recklesslythe strength of Imperialism, especially its military strength.
the bloc and its friends are superior in other respects, so that they need not submit to "nuclear blackmail" and canuch more aggressive struggle.
Leftwing Communists have alwaysourse which would risk the defeat of Sovietcounsel which iscry of desperation, an attitude of capltulatlonlam."
Comment: It Is uncertain whether either Hoscow or Pelping ever really believed, as both pretended to believe for some years, that the bloc enjoyed military superiority over the West; ln any case, the Chinese believed that the Soviet deterrent was such that the USSR coulduch moreprogram.
The USSR's retreat from its missile base venture in Cuba lastventure aimed at the achievementituation in which
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a much more militant program could behave made clear to the(who criticized tbe venture after the fact ashat the Soviet deterrent was not what they believed it to be. However, the failure of the venture has not affected the abiding Chinese thesis that political (moral and Ideological)are of greater Importance, so that Communist parties need not be deterred from armed struggle and other forms of violence by their opponents' superiority in arms. Thus the Chinese thesis in practice calls for the Chinese to respect the enemy tac-tlcally, but for other parties to plunge into action despite the odds.
QUESTIONS OF WORLD COMMUNISTPeaceful Coexistence"
It is "wrong" to sakecoexistence the general line of bloc foreign policy. Peaceful coexistence with those who are nottoward us is possible, but maximum pressure must be maintained against the united States at all points.
Soviet
Peaceful coexistence, which is the "general line" of bloc foreign policy, is the only correct principle for relations between states with different socialas Lenin taught us and as the Chineseprofess to believe.
certain leaderoes not struggle; his soft interpretation of peaceful coexistence extends even to the relations betweenand oppressed, and negates the struggle against Imperialism and for liberation.
Poaceful coexistencea vigorous struggle between systems by sll means short of war, andclasses by all means including armed struggle when necessary, and itto the steadyof the liberation movement.
competition will not establish socialism, and the building of astate cannotthe liberation
We will be victorious in peaceful economic and the victory of socialism ln the world is advanced "first of all" by building the bloc's economy.
certain leader /Khrushchev/ who believes in tHe good will of Western leaders, pins his hopes on agreements between great powers.
It is not necessary to believe in the good will of Western leaders in order to believe that negotiations are worth while; and they are.
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do not reject all con-promise, onlycompromise; someadvance the people's cause, others (as ln Cuba) are "treacherous."
A negotiated settlement even on bad terms, such as the Brest-Lltovsk treaty /or thenay beln the short run, if it preserves us for our ultimate victory.
Comment: The Russians view the balance of power as making peaceful coexistence notably with the United States. The Chinese emphasize that Khrushchev's version of it dilutee the orthodox Communistto the West, discourages and inhibits revolutionary forces everywhere, andPeiplng (lacking Russian support) from "liberating" Taiwan. The Chinese letter ofune is again scornful of Khrushchev's emphasis on 'peaceful coexistence.'
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a world without wars is impossible so long asexists, and the imperialists incessantly foment local wars (pages of illustrations).
sovlet
thereossibility of banishing world war before capitalism has been wiped out.
hope of preventing world war depends onin the struggle against imperialism and in support of oppressed the modernbeg imperialism for peace, instead of struggling.
the preventionew world warhoroughly realistic task, in partthe imperialists fear our military might. the chinese themselves claim to be striving toorld war and to believe this possible.
modern revisionists, who exaggerate theof technology, also exaggerate the consequences of world war, which would be serious but would destroy only imperialism, not the people.
the movement must take into account the "basicchange of military technical meanshe world looks to us to prevent thecatastrophe" of world war.
modern revisionists, fearing the expansion of local wars, are insincere about supporting "just" wars in this category.
local wars in general should be avoided, but there are "just" wars, and these we firmly support.
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revisionists* interest in disarmamentood example of seeking anwhich would beto the bloc and to tbe liberation movement; even the interest is.
disarmament may or may notealistic goal, and progress toward it will ln any case be slow, but at the least it is an effective issue.
comment: the russians tend to imply anability to deter wars of all kinds, although they no longer assert expressly that tbe west is increasingly deterred from local wars; the chinese complain bitterly whon moscow blurs this question.
the russians emphasize the importance of soviet military power (as comparod with chinese rhetoric)eterrent, emphasize also the fearful consequencesorld war (and imply that the chinese areto the consequences and may even desirear), andommitment to give material support ln local wars to anti-western forces (colonial peoples, newly-independent countries, "liberation" forces ln underdeveloped countries, rebellious elements in developed western countries).
the chinesetrong concern about as they want tbe very weaponsisarmament agreement would abolish or restrict. the chinese accuse the russians of obtuseness, cowardice, and treachery on these matters, and call for "sacrifices."
questions of world coioiunistactics in underdeveloped and developed countries
no revolutionary party will struggle if it has abandoned the goal of overthrowing the old system and no longer believes that it can win.
sovlot
as lenin taught, leftism overestimates theof movement and flourishes revolutionary phrases. revolutions occur when conditions are ripe.
of revolution"eaningless concept: only counter-revolution is
we are against the export of both revolution and counter-revolut ion.
revisioniststhe possibility of gaining power by political means; peaceful means may sometimes be used to the
point of the transition to socialism, but then the state must be smashed.
there are good possibilities for gaining power bymeans; the chineseadmit such a of course, if the exploiting classes usethe working class must also.
underdeveloped areas are the "focus of worldhemovement mustsupport this struggle, for it is "decisive' for our cause.
the national liberation movement is an integral part of the world revolutionary process, but the fate of the world will not bein the underdeveloped areas.
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Modern revisioniststhe liberation struggle to peace, and even help the imperialists to suppress it.
Peaceful coexistence serves to advance the liberation struggle, which increasingly deals defeats to imperialism.
Chinese program, with its emphasisural base, armed struggle, and the early hegemony of the Communist party, is the model for people of theareas.
No party /except ours7,of its size, and prestige, can define the tactics ofstruggle In other countries.
major parties of North America and Western Europe are all led by cowardly revisionists.
The experienced parties of North America and Western Europe are working well In difficult conditions.
Comment: The Russians and Chinese agree that the greatest opportunities lie in thecountries, but disagree as to the weight of these countries in the struggle, and disagree also about the prospects for military action and about the speed with which the Communists can move for control (the Russians are more cautious).
The Chinese now appear to be directly urging to militancy the receptive parties or factions of parties in these countries, rather than genuinely urging the Russians to urge them, as the Chinese want the gospel to come from Peiping. The Chinese do not, however,ilitant course on all of the Communist parties of thethey do not urge It, for example, on the Indonesian party, because they do not want to disturb their
good relationship with the indonesian party and with sukarno.
as for the developed countries, the russians may or may not really believe that some of the parties. italy's) can cone to power by pari lament ary means, but they seem at least to believeilitant course for these parties at this tine would alienate then fron their societies and thus nake then useless for more positive actionoscow has useful relationships now with those governments. the chinese, lacking such relationships with most of the developed countries, complain about the europeanof soviet policy and profess to see revolutionary opportunities there aa elsewhere, to be exploited by large-scale strikes and violencei
STATE RELATIONS
another party /thehich wants Tts own program to be the universal model, our general line and our "leap forward" and commune programs, and said that we were carrying out an "adventurist" policy ln directing the work of the state.
There may be differentof concrete problems of socialiste.g. we expect innovations as underdeveloped countries move toward However, theofistake.
socialist country must rely mainly on itself for its construction. Those who favor "division of labor" andseek to impose their will, and put economicon us. They speak of not letting ideologicalintrude, and thentear up" hundreds of contracts.
Each socialist country can solve its national tasks "only in the closestwith other bloc states. Differences may arise on the forms and methods of our cooperation. Stable and dependable economicare necessary, so ideological differences should not be "mechanically" transferred to state
Cuban comrades have discovered whatertaincountry /the USSR7 are worth.
The might of the blocdefends the victories of socialism."
certain Communist country /the USSR7 has not only Tailed to support us in our clashes with astateut has actually supported our enemies.
As is well known, we always
give strong support to our friends.
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state relations withertain country has consistently been guilty of great-nation chauvinism. As for the GPSU's claim not to sow hostility, we will not recapitulate the "many unpleasantut will ask the CPSU to abide by this statement ln the future.
Ideological and tactical differences must not be used to fan nationalistic prejudices, distrust, or discord among socialist
people. We have never done anything to encourage hos-
tility toward the Chinese people among our people.
Comment: The Russians in recent years have been emphasizing China's economic andbackwardness, and the great reduction of Soviet aid0 has of course made it even more difficult for Peiping to solve its problems. The Russians have alsoChina's dependence on the USSR for military protection against the West: thisery sore point, as the USSR does not provide to China or help the Chinese to make the modern weapons which would reduce that dependence,
The Soviet support of India, which is to Increase, has been painful, and the Russians, knowing themselves vulnerable on this issue, have not really replied to Chinese statements on 'the matter.
The Russians have often implied that anIn Chinese behavior would berewarded; the Chinese have scorned these overtures, and have implied that the USSR will have much to worry about when China, without substantial Soviet help,reat power.
THE 'UNITY' OF THEhe Meed for Unity
What is necessary first of all is to strengthen the unity of the movementof the conditions for the victory of our cause.
Soviet
As the Chinese note, the guarantee of all ourlies inthe unity of the
matter how serious our differences, we should be patient and find ways to eliminate them, in order to unite our forces against the common enemy.
Future generations will not forgive us if we fail to find the strength in ourselves to overcome our existing differences.
the touchstone of proletarianis no longer whether each Communist party defends the USSR, but whether it defends the entire camp, the unity of the camp on the basis of Marxism-Leninism.
In working out its own line, each Communist party must bear in mind the interests, aims and tasks ofhole, itsline" at any given period.
those who claim to be trying to break down the barriers of nationality, color, and geographicalare really trying to efface the difference between oppressors andand to hold back revolutionary struggles.
The unity of the worldmeans class anti-imperialistot organization along national, racial or geographical lines; organization on the latter lines would do harm to our struggle.
Finally: the parties must unite on the basis of our
Marxist-Leninist interpretation--of70 declara-
tions. Those who defend the "erroneous opportunist line"certain socialist/the USSR/ are notunity.
The basis for our0 declarations, all of
the fundamental conclusions of which have been confirmed by life itself. What is
needed now is the concerted observance by all parties
of these jointly-formulated appraisals and conclusions.
Comment: In asking all parties to consider tbe interests of the entire camp or movement, each of course means its conception of the overall interest, in which Its own interest is placed firBt.
The Chinese see unity as one of the conditions of victory, the other being aprogram, as they define It, on which the parties can unite. The Russians want theto stop criticizing them, to stopamong the other parties, and to stop threatening to seteparate movement.art of their cultivation of anti-Soviet Communists both inside and outside the bloc, the Chinese, who pose as spokesmen for all colored peoples, have already begun to split the fronts on geographical lines, and areto set up their own organizations without Soviet participation.
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THE 'UNITY' OF THEhe 'Equality' of the Parties
In interparty relations, we stand for independence and equality, and wethe Soviet party's recognition of the equality of the parties.
Soviet
We support the principles of the "complete equality of rights" of all parties and of "equal demands" upon all parties, large or small, without exception.
as the CPSU says, there are no superiors orin the movement, then it is impermissible tothe program or line of one party on other parties as the "common program" of the movement.
There are no superior or inferior parties. We never impose our line; but other parties may freelyand sometimes dopositions as their common line.
working out commonwe stand for theof unanimity through consultation." We cannot have the "wielding ofhat kind of unity aeans "split."
Socialist equality means both the "right toequally" in working out the general line, and the "equal responsibility" of the parties for theof that line.
Comment: Both parties believe that some parties are more equal than others. The Russians even agree that the Chinese as well as theparty has specialessparty could not have got the samefrom the Russians that the Chinese party has. But the Russians will not give thea status asto anofthey would like.
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With regard to multiparty conferences, for Peiping Chinese equality means Chinese veto power (which Peiping in effect had, at the lasthile for Moscow Chinese equalityshouldto the Soviet-dominated majority.
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mrirrrnKATTiiri
THE 'UNITY1 OF THE MOVEMENT
he Source of the Danger
opponents, who once
agreed that revisionism is the main danger, now claim that dogmatism and sectar-
ianism are the main dangers.
All of us agreed thatwas the main dangor at the time, but that dogmatism andcould become the main danger to individual parties.
revisionism is still the main danger.
"Leftwing opportunism" is now "no less dangerous than revisionism."
Comment: Tho Chinese 'legal' case is good, ln that0 declaration ofssertsd that revisionism was the main danger, and there has been no subsequent multiparty conference with the authority to change that formulation.
The Russians in recent months have more often described the Chinese and their supporters as "leftwing opportunists" than as dogmatists, in part because this turns against the Chinese the charge of "opportunism" that Peiping has made against Moscow. The Chinese havean evasive answer to the charge of that dogmatism is expressed as mechanically copying the policies of another or submitting blindly to his will. They seem to believe that there is no such thing as left opportunism, although they have defended thera-selves against charges of left adventurism.
THE 'UNITY' HEriends and Enemies
The modern revisionists treat enemies as friends and friends as enemies.
Soviet
We are the friends of allut not oflenders.
opponents have tried to ruin Albania for not obeying their baton, while they have tried to "reverse the verdict" of0 conference on theYugoslav clique" and have since wooed the Yugoslavs.
We have been very patient with the Albanian party, which has been very rude to us; and we are trying to improve relations withocialist country building socialism, while trying to help the Yugoslavs correct their mistakes.
CPSU letter says that the CPSU hopeB that Soviet-Albanian relations may be improved. But everyone knows that the CPSU isfor thein Soviet-Albanian We continue tothat the CPSU must take the initiative torelations.
Our proposal last February for bilateral talks with tbe Albanian party waswe are stilltoeeting, and we "do not reject the thought" that relations can be Improved.
question of attitude toward Tito's cliquemajor question ofbecause they are "traitors to the Cosuaunist cause."
The Albanian and Yugoslav issues are both matters of principle, but they must not be allowed to overshadow the main problems of our times.
The Chinese Communist party will never" allow traitors to bo brought into Communist ranks.
Communist parties cannot "unilaterally expel" other Communist parties from the movement.
for the Soviet party have attacked the glorious parties of China, Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Buraa, Malaya, Thailand, Japan, and New Zealand.
The Soviet party highlythe struggles of the parties of Western Europe and North America attacked by the Chinese, and also tbe struggles of Asian, African, and Latin American parties.
the slogan ofthe "cult of thecertain persons are Interfering In theaffairs of otherand are trying to force them to change their "What is this If not subversion?" But theyare cowardly, fear the truth, lack popular and will be Drought down.
The CPSU haa liquidated the effects of Stalin'scult and has completely restored Leninist principles in relations among fraternal parties and states, the principle ofin theiraffairs. The CPSUcommittee "unanimously approves" Khrushchev'sof relations with the CCP.
Comment: While the Chinese no doubt detest Tito and the Russians no doubt detest Hoxha, Tito Is useful to Peipingurrogate for Khrushchev, and Hoxha serves Moscowurrogate for Mao.
The Russians have recently seemed more willing than the Chinese to compromise by treating both the Yugoslav and the Albanian parties asof the movement. Talksonferenci
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might break down simply on the Issue of whether to Invite Yugoslavia; although the Chinese might prove willing to have the Yugoslav party attend, in order to put Khrushchev and the Yugoslavs on trial together there, in recent weeks Peiping has seemod intransigent on this point.
The Albanians much resent the Sovietof their caseecondary matter. They have sometimes seems to fearlno-Sovlet deal at their expense, but this seems unlikely, because Chinese prestige with Peiping's actual and potential supporters would decline greatly if Peiping were to abandon Albania.
The nine parties (in addition to China's) specified as attacked by Soviet spokesmen comprise the Chinese camp ln the dispute; they range from all-out supporters (the Albanians) to on-balance supporters (the North Vietnamese). Although most of the parties of the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America (in addition to the Western parties attacked by Peiping) support the Soviet party in the dispute, the Chinese do not attack the parties of the underdeveloped areas, because they believe they can compete successfully with Moscow for influenco over them, and there are in fact pro-Chinese factions in many of them;ew of them would probably support the Chinese on some issuesultiparty conference.
The most recent Chinese letter tends tothat Peiping's fulminations last fall about "subversion" in the Chinese partysome overture from the Russians to their known or suspected supporters in the Chinese leadership; the conciliators of the USSR do not seem to be Mao's likely successors. Whether there are conciliators of the Chinese among Russian leaders is uncertain; the Soviet leader (Eozlov) who has had the best treatment
in tbe Chinese press now seems to be out of the running.
THE 'UNITY' OF THErospectsultiparty Conference
Sincee have beenonference of all /nowf the Communist parties, of the type held in7 and
Soviet
In our2 letter to the CCP, we advocateddiscussionmaller group/. There are now "sufficient grounds"onference of all the parties.
conditions foronference are the cessation of polemics and the cessation of attacks on the Chinese camp. The USSR should also take the initiative to improvewith Albania, but we will not cease to expose and condemn Yugoslavia.
Preparation for such ashouldilateral Slno-Sovietthe cessation of polemics in the open press, and the cessation of criticism of another party within one's own party and Into third parties.
questions to be discussedultiparty conference are mainly those of strategy and tactics, and intrabloc and interparty relations.
The conference should center on the common tasks ofthe advance of themovement, theof the bloc and the unity of the movement.
discussions of these questionsonference must be in accordance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism and the statements of70 conferences.
In preparing for aparties shouldanalyze "newin international life" and their ownof earlierdecisions" of the movement.
If the principle ofunanimity throughis
provided in0 declara
tion of theone should not speakmajority" or "minority,"
Previous conferences have shownommon line can be worked out only when the "all-around experience of alldetachments" is properly taken into
relyso-called majority in order to force through one's own erroneous line and carry out sectarian and splitting policies."
Comment: The Russians have dragged their feetonference of all the parties, believing on the basis ofhat their authority would be further diminished.
Whether an agreement on ceasing polemics, and an agenda and an invitation listonference, can be worked out is onference is held, the Chinese will stand on orthodoxy, while the Russians will contend that newin the world require new approaches.
The final set of positions shows the Chinese declaring clearly that they will not submit to the principle of majority rule, and the Russians declaring indirectly their continued favor for majority rule. Looked at another way, the Russians do notajority: as Peiping may contend, the parties of thecamp have at least half of the Communist party members ln tie world.
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the 'unity' of therospectsompromise
we are forunity, not sham unity: unity on the basis of marxism-leninism and70 declarations,
not on the basis of the yugoslav program or any other such revisionist basis.
soviet
we are striving for cohes-sion, to prevent theof some detachments" of ourf course communists cannot tolerate concessions on basicof theory.
matters of principle, marxist-leninists must "differentiate between right and wrong and straighten things out."
while remaining "implacable
on principles, we will try to "clear the path of all superficial thingsour cohesion."
question is: willbe straightened out on the above basis, or will thereplit?
the question is: will we advance in one rank, or engagearmful
comment: chinese statements here as elsewhere are less flexible than russian statements: the chinese are thinking along straight lines, want things "straightened out" on these lines, and speakspilt" as the alternative; the russiansillingness to livereat variety of differences among the parties, provided that those who differ with moscow (from the yugoslavs to the chinese) refrain from polemics, obstructionism, and evangelism. even in the best case, which would be the holding of another conference of all the parties and the
issuance of another "unanimous" declaration, it is hard to see how the reconciliation could be anything but unstable and temporary. that the Chinese would again insist on and get veto power in the working out of athe Russians would have to compromise heavily tounanimous" statement, and even then the Chinese would refuse to be bound later by any position in the declaration which was not actually their own; and assuming that the Chinese would again refrain from using their veto power absolutely, but would use it to eliminate the most offensive Russian positions and to qualify the others, the Russians too wouldeclaration which they could presentustification for their program. (On any other assumptions, there would be no declaration at all: lackhinese veto wouldercent Russian declaration, absolute use of the Chinese veto wouldercent Chinese declaration; each party would prefer no declarationeclaration dictated by its opponent.) The Chinese know that they cannot succeed, onference of all the parties, in attracting the majority to their side, they can at best use the conference to "expose" Khrushchev and to enlarge their camp. And the Russians know that they cannot solve their Chinese problemonference, they can at best use theto display their domination of the majority of the parties and to placate those parties which thinkonferenceerious effort to repair the damage to the movement. In the second-best case, there will be no declaration, butruce, an agreement to cease publicwould almost certainly be unstable and temporary. In the worst case (for thethere will be no conference, or the Chinese camp will walk out; either way, the Chinese mightonference of their own, ew Communist (Real Communist) Manifesto.
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Original document.
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