LBJ LIBRARY Mandatory Review
Document
3
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
(Supersedesnd, Supplements)
Situation and Prospects in Cuba
Submhnd by thm DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Concurred in by tb*
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD Ai indkattd overftof3
HM
reparoWon or
l^lllllAgJWCy andrganization, of lh. rWf-menis ofef.PM. th. Army, th. Novy, th. Air Force, and NSA.
Concurringi
Director of Irrtefugenee ondof Sut. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Auhtan! Chief of Slofl forortm.nl of th. Army
As.htontf Novol Op.ro.ion>arm,.n. of th. Navy
Assistant Chief of Slofl.SAF
Dinrctor foroint Staff
Th. Assistantnv#ttlBorton Director of th. Noiionol Security Agency
Abstaining;
J
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
Situation and Prospects in Cuba
T
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Paoc
CURRENT.
Military
Political
The Economic
Castro and Latin
n.
Shorter Term
Military
Long-Run Political and Economic
Latin American
Soviet-Cuban
ANNEX: ESTIMATE OP MAJOR SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN CUBA
t
SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN CUBA
CONCLUSIONS
A.eriod marked by bitterness on Castro's part and by restraint on the part of the Soviets, the two parties nowto have agreed to emphasize the consolidation of the Castro regime. We believe that the current situation within Cubathis consolidation. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he is here to stay and as his regime gains In experience. It is unlikely that internal political opposition or economic difficulties will cause the regime to collapse. All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel, whose charismaticcontinues to be the most important factor in the forward drive of the Cuban revolution. (Paras.
B. Dependence on the person of Castro is,ajor vulnerability of the regime. Without leadership and withoutthese would have to be revolutionary and reformist to appealajority ofopposition force is likely to develop the power to challenge Castro, however muchor support it might get from the outside. But his death could result in one form of disorder or another ranging from power struggles within the regime's leadership to open civil war. Any successor is likely to be more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro has been because he will lack Castro's ability tothe loyalty of substantial numbers of Cubans. even under the most favorable circumstances, anywould have to have the supportarge part of the military before it could hope to overthrow the Communist regime, and would have to take account of the presence of Soviet troops.)
C. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the rnissile crisis. The Soviet military picture in Cuba ts in transitioncaling down of their forces becoming apparent. The total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be0ut we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be several thousand more. The Soviets remain in control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate some of them. We believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that they intend eventually to turn various weapons systems over to them. This is not to say that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn from Cuba; indeed, it is highly likely that the Soviets willignificant presence there. (Paras.
respect to the surface-to-air missile (SAM)doubt that the Soviets have specified an exact date forof operational control or would carry out such ansubsequent developments produced new dangers. Wethe Soviet Government remains acutely aware of the
capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces have beenby Increased training, new equipment, and someThe Cuban ground forces are probably well ableInternal resistance and to repel small-scale externalIn the event of US invasion, however, they wouldrevert fairly quickly to static defense orelatively small proportion of the Cuban militarywould be likely to carry on prolonged operations of)
F. In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplates an attempt to reintroduce strategic missiles Into Cuba. Continued US aerial surveillanceajor deterrent. We cannot, however, altogether rule out such an attempt. GreatlySoviet knowledge of US intelligence sources and methods with respect to Cuba would make it possible to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception, during both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the Indicators that US intelligence would be relying on. At some point the So-
viets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by introducing other weapons previously labeled "offensive" by the US. In such cases they would almost certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction. )
G. The Joint Khrushchev-Castro communique held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but withoutCastro's earlier general incitement to revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes tbat revolution will
come
only through violence, but the regime's exhortations on thehave been muted recently. The outlook isixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking torisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy and economic overtures. In general, we believe that situations are unlikely to develop in which Castro could intervene with substantial force without rendering himself vulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. )
H. While the Soviets and Cubans have probably resolved their more immediate problems we foresee varying degrees of friction in their future relations, particularly over the long run. They probably have notundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America, and Castro appears to insistnique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites.Castro hasong step toward the Soviet side ln the Sino-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro hastrong boost to his ego; assurances of continued economicthe commitment of Soviet prestige to the Cuban revolution; and recognition of Cuba's special importance as an example of what the revolutionary struggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and Cuban fortunes have been bound more closely together and their respective freedoms of action have beennarrowed. )
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DISCUSSION
I. CURRENT SITUATION
ignificant policy differences between Castro and the Soviet leaders were apparent during the missile base crisis of2 and (or three or four months afterwards. Castro's visit to Moscow Indicates that these differences have been submerged, though some basic tensions ln the relationship are likely to continue. Various indicationsover the last several months suggest that there is now agreementommon policy aimed primarily at consolidation of the Castro
orollary of this policy is some measure of restraint toward the US to minimize the danger of US intervention. Recognition by both the Soviets and Cubans of the necessity for taking steps to reduce the constant threatrisis with the US probably led to the currentTwo of Its manifestations have been the further withdrawals since February of Soviet personnel from Cuba and the toning down for the moment Castro's inflammatory appeals for violent revolution throughout Latin America.
Mililary Situation
The Sonet military picture istate of transitioncaling down of their forces becoming apparent The Soviets remain In control of the key weapons systems, while training the Cubans to operate most of them. The limited capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces areimprovingesult of their experience and increased training since last fall and their growing farnillarity with Soviet equipment. On balance, we estimate that there has been little or no reduction in overall military capabilities in Cuba since the end of the missile crisis.
In the months preceding the October crisis, the Soviet Unionery substantial buildup of its own military power ln Cuba and made sizable deliveries of arms and equipment for the Cuban Armed Forces.esult of the crisis, the Soviets removedRBMs and related equipment. IRBM-related equipment.et light bombers and associated personnel, but the rest of the equipmentubstantial Soviet military presence remain. (See Annex, "Estimate of Major Sovet Military Equipment ln Cuba.")
Identifying Soviet military personnel entering Cuba and estimating their number hasroblem of great difficulty from the start of the buildupheir entry was achievedanner compatible with the Soviets' desire to hide the arrival of strategic weapons; they wore civilian clothes, ln many cases debarked at night at remote ports, and moved quickly to guarded and Isolated encampments. To arrive at our estimates of Soviet troops in Cuba, we haveynthesis of all
available evidence. Including refugee and in-place sources of varying degrees of reliability. In addition, we have closely measured theand troop capacities of Soviet ships to and from Cuba and have undertaken functional analyses of the Soviet weapons systems in Cuba to determine the personnel required to operate and maintain them.esult of this examination, the estimate of the number of Soviets assigned to the air defense system, KOMAR boats, cruise missile systems, and MJO fighters was considered to be relatively firm. However, the number derived for ground forces personnel, particularly those at the four armored camps, was based on less firm evidence and could have varied in either direction.
oviet Forces. Given these limitations on the evidence, we estimated just prior to the troop withdrawals that began in0 was the most probable figure for Soviet military personnel ln Cuba, but did not exclude the possibility that it could have been several thousandareful evaluation of reports Indicates that since thatonservative minimumoviet personnel have been withdrawn. Most appeared to be military rather than civilian. We have no reliable evidence that moreew hundred militaryhave arrived ln Cuba since mid-February. Those departing since mid-February probably included personnel associated with the armored camps. MiG fighters, and some elemenls of the air defense system, although we cannot determine with any degree of certainly the number withdrawn from each weapons system or installation. Tho total Soviet military strength in Cuba is now estimated to be0ut we cannot exclude the possibility that there could be severalmore.
We believe that there haseduction In the Soviet personnel at the four armored camps. Some Cuban military personnel areand undergoing training at all four of the camps,eliable report presents good evidence that one has been evacuated by the Soviets and partially occupied by the Cubans. However, the equipment remains at all the camps.
Four full shiploads of military equipment have been identifiedinto Cuba since the crisis as againsthich arrived between July andn addition, other ships have carried material which might be used by the military. This includes the shipment of six helicopters, commercial explosives, parts forircraft, and large quantities of trucks and other vehicles. In sum, the recent shipments appear to have been resupply deliveries composed of munitions, vehicles, replacement parts, and maintenance equipment.
Cuban Forces and Capabilities. The numerical strength of theground forces haa been estimated, of whom0 are In the standing armyn the ready reserve. In addition there areome-guard militiamen, of little combat signlfl-
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cane* but usefulolice reserve. The capabilities of the standing army and ready reserve have been enhanced by new equipmont, and by further training and experience including the mobilization during the missileew divisions may now be capable of tacticalalthough the battalion combat team remains generally the basic tactical unit The Cuban ground forces are probably well able to control internal resistance and to repel small-scale external attacks. Their ability for defense against invasion has been enhanced by theof an armored brigade andombined arms "antl-lnvaslon shock defense" battalions. Cuban capabilities are still severely limited by lack of training and experience in combined operations and by their general lack of organic transport and logistic support. In the event of USthey would have to revert fairly quickly to static defense oroperations, butelatively small proportion of the Cuban military establishment would be likely to carry on prolonged operations of this type.
Cuban Navy is estimated toen.have been enhanced by the provision of Sovietmotor torpedo boats and submarine chasers, and byin its use, but remain limited essentially to coastal defenseoperations in shipping lanes adjacent to Cuba. The KOMARand coastal defense missiles remain under Soviet ccmtroL
the field of air defense the Cuban Air Force,a small but increasing role. The most important air defensethe SA-2s,. is still Soviet controlled. Thea jet fighter force composed of more thanconsiderable quantity of antiaircraft artillery.
Cuban capabilities for military operations overseas remain severely limited by shortage of the requisite airlift or sealift. The Cubans could probably not undertake an overseas operationcale larger than one battalion. For political as well as military reasons, the Castro regime Is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature.Cuba has sufficient resources for paramilitary operations in the Caribbean area toituation ln precarious balance.
Training of Cubans The reduction in Soviet military personnel ln Cuba since February has been accompanied by increasing indications of Cubans training in the operation of Soviet equipment and systems, which suggests that the Soviet*urnover of part or all of these systems to the Cubans.
Cuban pilots are flying theircraft, which are equipped with air-to-air missiles, and some will soon be able to fly themOne class ofilots began training inecond of about the same size is scheduled to begin in September: Cubans are also almost certainly being trained in ground control and maintenance.
The Cuban Air Force could man theystem byhe Soviets are also carryingizable training program for the Cubans ln the operation of KOMAR boats and cruise missiles. Cubans are being trainedumber of sites in the operation and maintenance of Soviet ground equipment.
believe that Cubans are also being trained on themissile (SAM) system and may soon begin to operate somea few sitesoutine basis. In view of the complexity of theit would require approximately another year of trainingCubans could take over the bulk of the maintenance work.Cubans learn to operate the system, the Soviets will probablyprovide training and technical assistance for some time.
Potoieoi Stability
All our evidence points to the complete political predominance of Fidel. To an important extent the forward drive of the Cubandepends on Castro's charismatic appeal. His personal indispen-sabillty has enabled him to surmounthallenge from old-line Communists in Cubarisis in his relations with Moscow. It has also enabled him to absorb some econoniic setbacks without serious risk to his regime. While no serious challenge to his power and control seems likely to emerge for some time, the regime's dependence on his person continues toajor vulnerability.
Castro is still suspicious of the leaders of the prerevolutionary Communist Party <PSP) and of their relations with Moscow. However, they appear to have accommodated themselves to his leadership and some occupy important positions. In present circumstances, it is unlikely that the "old" Communists will attempt to challenge Castro, as they did lnr that Moscow will want them to. It Is more likely that they will work for more power in the apparatus of the new party (PUBS) which is coming into being. Castro seems alert to this possibility and the selection of members of the new party appears to reflect some effort to prevent domination by the old PSP leaders. The completion of this party organization might provide Castro with another means of control and an important instrument for political indoctrination andof the populace. But over the longer run the existencetable and organized party apparatus could reduce the ^dispensability both to the Cuban regime and to the SovieU of Castro's personal leadership.
Popular attitudes willactor affecting the stability of theWe have no way of measuring these reliably, but we believe that an important minority of the Cuban people now gives positive support to Castro, and that the majority passively accepts his regime.continues, but it ismall scale and is Ineffective against the regime's security forces. Il cannot be either excluded or predicted that larger numbers of people will eventually be willing to take the risks of
or surreptitiously supporting an opposition struggle. The fact that Cuba is now Communist should not lead to the conclusion that security measures there will be as effective as In other Communist States. Should resistancearger magnitude, it might causeand factionalism within the regime. Ultimately this could lead In turnisruption of the security apparatus and the defection of armed elements. In this way, and probably only in this way, aor significant change in the regime might be brought about, At present, such developments seem unlikely.
The Economic Situation
The Cuban economy declined sharply, and there is almost certain to be some further decline in outputevertheless, the Cuban economic situation isritical source of weakness for the Castro regime and is unlikely to become one.
The decline in Cuban production has been partially offset by the substantial volume of economic assistance from the Bloc, particularly the USSR.he Bloc extended an0 million in balance of payments assistance. In addition, the Bloc provided some developmental equipment on credit. Goods delivered on these terms probably accounted for one-third of total Cuban imports.esult of Bloc assistance, Cuban imports rose substantiallyn spiteizable decline ln export earnings. Whatever the level of Cuban export earningsloc assistance probably will permit theof essentialfuels, industrial materials, and machineabout2 level. Meanwhile the political effects of economic decline have been mitigated by the radical change in the pattern of distribution of available consumer goods and services.
Cuba's production of sugar has declined3 and Its volume of exports probably will be more than one-third below thatn the other hand, the impact of reduced supplies will be largely, andmore than completely, offset by the sharp rise of world sugar prices to the highest levels In many years.3 sugar crop amountsittle less than four million metric tons. This compares2 cropillion metric tons and crops averaging well in excess of five million tons in Uie pre-Castro years. Cuba has already contracted to shipillion tons to the Free World this year; the larger figure would beons less thane cannot predict how much foreign currency this will produce, however, because prices may vary greatly depending on the date and terms of the sales, some of which were made before the sharp rise in prices. Nevertheless Cuba's earnings in the Free World will be greater than last year's.
The Soviets agreed during the Castro visit that they would pay sixound instead of the four cent price which they paid last year and which had been the contract price for this year's shipments. In
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order that Cuba could fulfill contracts it has been concluding since the end2 with Free World countries, the Soviets agreed to Cuba's diverting one million tons of sugar Irom the USSR trade agreement quota. These seeming concessionsetter face on Soviet-Cuban relationships so far as the Cuban people are concerned. The new terms had been sought by Carlos Rafael Rodriguezission to Moscow ln2 and their announcement during Castro's visit seemed largely intended to give Castro something to take home plus providing afor Cuba's economic deterioration.
The Soviets have thusajor irritant in the Soviet-Cuban relationship caused by the great rise In world sugar prices. They did thiseasonable cost. In fact, the two cent differentia] will go to pay part of Cuba's accrued debt to the Soviets, so that the grantingigher price representsuggling of barter and credit accounts and will not reduce Cuba's need for continued large Soviet balance of payments support this year.
in spite of Bloc economic assistance, total personal consumption in Cuba has fallen sharply, perhaps by as much as one-fifth, although this decline in personal consumption under Castro Is partly accounted for by the emigration and Impoverishment of the former wealthy and middle classes. Rationing and other distributionalhaveore even distribution of the declining totals of goods and services.
here are, nevertheless, many among the lower classes who are worse off than during the prc-Castro period; organized labor lnhas lost much of the wage differentials and other substantial benefits previously obtained. Workers and peasants generally probably arethat the economic improvements expected under Castro have not materialized. Disappointments or Increased hardships in regard to personal consumption are somewhat assuaged by the feeling ofsocial status and dlgnidad promoted by Castro's social reforms and effective tattoo of propaganda. Nevertheless, considerable economic discontent in Cuba Is reflected in worker apathy, absenteeism, and non-cooperation. These traits have traditionally been manifested by Cuban workers, however; and there has been little evidence so far of more dramatic forms of antiregimc activity because of economic discontent.
pathy and noncooperatlon. nevertheless, do impede Castro's efforts toward economic recovery. So far, Castro has relied on cxhorta' tion and on reward for outstanding workers as means of increasing worker effort, but with relatively little success Should Castro turn to harsh administrative measures to get the Cubans to workInitial steps toward the Introduction of work norms have already beenvery likely would be an exacerbation of the problem of worker discontent.
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Castro and Latin Amtka
hose Latin Americans. Communists and non-Communists, who are committed to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help, particularly from his training program Ln Cubaatin Americans received Communist indoctrination or training Ln guerrilla warfarend his large-scale dissemination of printed andpropaganda. At this time. pro-Castro revolutionaries areactive and aggressive only in Venezuela, Castro's priority target for revolution ln Latin America. On balance, the revolutionaries have tost ground in recent months In their efforts to weaken the Be tan court government through terrorism and sabotage. There is strongamong old-line leaders of the Communist Party of Venezuela for putting more emphasis on recruitment of peasant support and ontactics in rural areas as the best means ofuccessful revolution over the long term. Extremist elements, however, still are committedampaign of drastic action to provoko the military into ousting the Betancourt government, ln several other countries there have been preparations for violent activity, and ln Peru and Ecuador some incidents of violence by pro-Castro revolutlonaries.
sense of urgency created throughout Latin America bybase crisis has faded,onsiderable residue remains,in Central America. Soviet military intrusion Into theSoviet exploitation of the Cuban revolution for itspurposes, and Castro's subordination to the USSR were allclear to governments as well as to politically-consciousof the population. The strength and appeal offorces have been weakened, and the state of readiness toextremist threat remains high among those Latin Americanwhich see themselves faced by direct subversive attacks.
virtually every country of Latin America Castro'shad begun to decline well before the missile crisis, remainsImage has been most seriously damaged ln the eyes ofparticularly among labor groups and leftist-intellectuals andwho had sympathized with his anti-US position. In thepost crisis period, discussion among some of thetended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalistaway from alliance with Moscow-oriented Communists andAmong the public at large, many who formerly had beenconverted by the crisis to hostility toward Castro. Moreover,caused moderate center and conservative groups, by andanti-Castro, to be more aware than before of theof the USSR in this hemisphere and of the threat posed byan operational base for the Soviets.
mong the small countries of Central America the crisispressuresefinite solution to the Cuban problem. They have
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LnteTuLfled their efforts to control and combat subversive activities. In addition, the Mexican Government is beginning to cooperate ln efforts to control the movement of Latin Americans to and from Cuba through Mexico. On the other hand, in most of South America, populartoward Castro for conniving in the mtroduction of Soviet strategic power in the hemisphere has subsided more quickly and theirtend now to regard the affair as ended by the TJS show of resolve.
here have been indications of disapproval of Castro's policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties whichore gradual and less violent approach to revolution. Castro has in the past shown himself ready to collaborate with any group, Communist or not, willing to resort to violence and in so doing to circumvent some of the regular Communist parties or to work with dissident elements within them. Some of the regular parties, particularly in Brazil and Chile, strongly resent such tactics. Developments In recent months suggest that Castro, at least for the moment, hasess violent position.
II. OUTLOOK
Shorter Term Prospects
e believe that Castro and the Soviets are probably convinced that time can be made to work in Cuba's favor, providing the US Isretext for direct intervention or drastic measures such as some form of quarantine. The Soviets have probably argued that the Cubans should concentrate on the solution of important domesticin order to consolidate the regime, demonstrateommunist revolution cannot be reversed by the US, and prepare for futureln Latin America. In short, the USSR and Cuba probably Intend to play for time, avoid provocations likely to lead to USwithhold unnecessary concessions, and repair the damage to their prestige. Each will continue to employ flexible tactics in Latin America varied according to the political situation in particular countries. We expect that both the Soviets and Castro will adopt aggressive tactics whenever presented with tempting opportunities, and their appreciation of whatempling opportunity will probably differ as time naaaaa
f we assume no major circumstantial changes, such as Castro'slowup of Castro-Soviet relations, or decisive intervention by the US, we would expect the Castro regime to be more firmlyear hence than it ls today. We believe lt unlikely that economic difficulties or internal political opposition will cause the collapse of the regime. The mere passage of time tends to favor Castro as Cubans and others become accustomed to the idea that he and the Revolution are here to stay and as his regime gains in experience.
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ecision to avoid major crises with the US would not mean compliance with US wishes or lack of response to provocation. Thereide range of unpredictable contingencies. US overflights, which are galling ln view of Castro's preoccupation with demonstrating Cuban sovereignty, could produce an incident. Account must be taken of the possibilitylash with the US over the question of the continued Soviet military presence inevolutionary eruption in Latin America might break the present pattern of restraint ln Soviet and Cuban behavior. The present Soviet and Cuban emphasis onmay be diverted by other new opportunities for aggressive actions. There will also remain the possibilityreakdown of Soviet relations with Castro that could lead to internal conflict within Cuba, or anon Castro's part to carry out an aggressive policy on his own.
here have been fragmentary Indications of an Interest on Castro's part in an improvement in relations with the US. We believe that he has probably considered this as oneariety of alternatives. Itsto Castro, as to the Soviets, probably lies In the hope of lifting the US embargo and otherwise normalizing Cuban contacts with other Latin American countries. They may also feelimited rapprochement would reduce the danger of US intervention and permit greater freedom for the consolidation of the Communist regime in Cuba. At present we doubt that either the Cubans or the Soviets have much hope for anof Cuban-US relations, but it is an option that for their own purposes they will wish to keep open.
Mililary Prospect j
believe the Soviets have told the Cubans that theyto turn various weapons systems over to them. Thla Issay that all Soviet military personnel will be withdrawn fromit ls highly likely that the Soviets will maintain athere.
respect to the SAM system, we doubt that the Sovietsan exact date for transfer of operational control orout such an agreement if subsequent developments producedWe believe that the Soviet Government remains acutelythe risk involved. The Soviets are probably apprehensive thatbe tempted to shootS overflight if Castro hadthe SAMs. The Soviets cannot rely merely on Castro'sto do so and it is likely that they would make serious efforts toquestion of US overflights before giving the Cubans completecontrol of the SAMs It is possible that they will announcean intended turnover to Cuba and use the interim perioda termination of overflights either through some agreementUS or some dramatic action at the UN, claiming that theSoviet forces has removed any pretext for US surveillance. They might
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also hope that the passage of time and the possibility of an eventually calmer atmosphere might cause the US to desist from overflights It is also possible that the Soviets may come to regard the risks involvedurnover of the system as preferable to the political cost of eitherthe system or trying to keep It indefinitely under their own command.
The turnover of other weapons systems now under Soviet control would greatly increase Castro's independent military capabilities. 3Theircraft, which are armed with air-to-air missiles, would increase the total number of Jet fighters in Cuban hands to nearly two-thirds. These fighters alsoheoretical capability toa US high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. Inuccessful interception wouldreat amount of skill and luck. Although Cuban pilots, and probably ground controllersTeceding training from the Soviets, the op-erational effectiveness of these aircraft will be reducedime by the relative inexperience of these personnel
In our view, it is unlikely that the USSR contemplates an attempt to reintroduce strategic weapons in Cuba. Continued US aerial surveil-bmce would stillajor deterrent even if it were discontinuedaily routine. We beheve that the Soviets could have no solidthat they could deploy major weapons into Cuba without detection We have no evidence that Khrushchev has reappraised the risks of US counteraction toenture, and we think that his experience of last October has considerably reduced the chancesecond dangerous misjudgment.
owever, we cannot altogether rule out an attempt by the Soviets to reintroduce strategic missiles. Despite Increased US alertness to the possibility of reproduction, the chances of detection might be less thanoriemaI operation. Greatly enhanced Sovietof US intelligence sources and methods would make it possible for them to adopt improved measures of concealment and deception durine both shipment and deployment, and to avoid providing many of the indicators that US intelligence would be relying upoa
lthe Soviets might attempt to increase their military strength in Cuba by Introducing other weapons previously labeledby the US. They might calculate that under certain circumstances the Production of submarines might be effecteday not tothe US withlear and unmistakable challenge as produced the strong_ reaction of last October. They might also consider it pos-
fa limited numberers as replacement for obson the Cuban inventory on the grounds that they were
i Bul in 5UChthev wouW
certainly recognize the great risk of US counteraction.
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ndpecf,
believe lhat the current situation favors the furtherof Castro's Communist regime Ln Cuba. Security forces willcontinue to be highly effective. Internal resistance forcesto suffer cumulative attrition. Resistance fighters lost byor flight are unlikely to be effectively replaced. As timeCastro and the Communists in power, the hope that they canbecomes dimmer. Exile raids, sabotage, dropping ofand supplies can Improve the morale of those Cubans whoto the regime, but are unlikely of themselves to producecapable of overthrowing it.
despite the odds against it, the possibility of ashould not be excluded from consideration. Ifhappen to damage Castro's ability to command the loyalty ofpeople, for example,esult of IB-Judged measures tothe situation could get out of control. In suchleaderroup with an appealing program might appear andin rallying forces of opposition. Without leadership andthese would have to be revolutionary and reformistajority ofopposition force Is likely topower to challenge Castro, however much equipment or supportget from the outside. Furthermore, even under the mostcircumstances, any opposition would have to have the support ofpart of the military before it could hope to overthrow theregime, and would have to take account of the presence of
f Fidel Castro were to die. members and supporters of the regime, including the armed forces and security forces, would probably rally together to maintain the revolution and to defend it against any US intervention. hort time, however, such solidarity would be likely to weaken. We do not believe that Raul Castro, the designated successor, could bold his brother's positiontruggle for power with other personalities and groups in the regime. It is unclear who would win Intruggle. On balance we feel that the successor would probably be one of the top leaders of the regime; he wouldbe more dependent upon the Soviets than Castro, because he would lack Castro's special claim topower to command the loyalty of substantial numbers of the Cuban people. It is alsothat the struggle for power would leadhaotic civil war in which the whole present political pattern in Cuba would be changed.
e believe that economic recovery Ln Cuba will be slow; it will take at least several years before8 level of production is regained. There has been little noticeable improvement so far ln the key areas of economic organization, managerial efficiency, and workernotable weaknesses in Bloc countries generally. Also, the Soviet Union
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probably considers assistance to Cuba in the form of balance of payments credits as an emergency measure, and it Is likely that any recovery ln Cuban production vill be partly counterbalanced by reductions in such credits.
n the other hand, the Soviet Union probably Is prepared todevelopmental assistance to Cubarolonged period. Theapparently have backed away from some of the more ambitious Industrial projects talked of previously, sucharge steel plantetroleum refinery;umber of more modest industrial projects are moving ahead, as are projects for expanding agricultural production and for mineral exploration. Considering Cuba's favorable balanceresources and population, and assuming some Improvements ln efficiency, and continued Bloc aid, Cuba could in time regain Its position as one of the leading Latin American countries in per capita grossproduct.
latin American Poticimt
any areas in Latin America are vulnerable to revolutionarybecause popular aspirations for social programs are not being met. Castro still hopes to convince dissatisfied Latin Americans that the Cuban revolutionodel for them to follow. The Jointcommunique held up Cuba as an example for the rest of Latin America, but without endorsing Castro's earlier generalto revolution throughout the area. Castro probably still believes that revolution will come only through violence, but the regime'son the subject have been muted recently. In part, this Is because of Castro's disillusionment with the lack of revolutionary fervor among Latin American Communists, with the notable exception of Venezuela. More important, he probably feels that he has no choice but to bide his time and build up subversive assets for the future.osition has probably been strongly urged by Moscow and leading LatinCommunistsrestos In Brazil) who fear Castro will upset their own strategies. The tenor of the Joint communique ofay would suggest that Castro has accepted, at least for theore cautious and flexible line with respect to revolution tn Latin America.
he outlook isixture of tactics. We believe that during the next phase the Soviets and Cubans, seeking torisis with the US, will be careful not to engage in flagrant or gross actions which would_ invite US reprisals or countermeasures. The Soviets will continue with the more traditional efforts at penetration through diplomacy andovertures, with Brazil as the principal target. Subversiveand support will, of course, continue in Cuba. Castro probably still has high hopes for the ultimate success of armed revolution in Venezuela, especially after the end of Betancourt's term However, thestill have predominant influence among Latin American Cornmu- '
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and do not contemplate turning over their controls to Castro. Nevertheless, they have givenertain weight by describing him as the forerunner of Communist advance ln Latin America, andhis views may tend to be more influential with other LatinCommunists.
general, we believe that situations are unlikely to developCastro could intervene with substantia] force withoutvulnerable to US or OAS counteraction. He wouldto concentrate on rendering clandestine support to localThe danger will remain, however,ew aircraft orby Cuba might determine the outcomeontestand an established government.
Soviet-Cuban Re/ofions
While we believe that the Soviets and Cubans have come to grips with some of their problems and have probably resolved the moreones, the Cuban situation ls clouded by many uncertainties and Soviet-Cuban relations are far from permanently stabilized. Among these uncertainties is Uie question of US policy. Tne impact of Uie Cuban revolution in Latin America has lost much of its force, if only temporarily, because Castro has appearedawn in Uie strugglethe Great Powers. The Soviets are apparently convinced that this setback can be overcome provided the crisis with the US can beThey probably believe that they possess still some degree of deterrence against direct action by the US to overthrow Castro and that in any case Uie political inhibition againstourse remains strong. They probably calculate that avoidance of provocation will deprive Uie USretext for direct action. In addition, they recognize that the US effort to isolate and harass Castro will continue to contain certain dangers, but they probably hope to limit these by careful handling of any incidents, arguing that his interest as well as theirs will be best served by gradual consolidation of his regime.
Castro, while in the USSR,illingness to accept theline of peaceful coexistence and to recognize Uie Soviet Union's leadership of the Communist movement. On Uie other hand, some of Uie more sensitive points of dispute between the Chinese and Uie Sovietsugoslavia and Uie charges of dogmatism versus revisionism} were not mentioned in Uie communique ofay. Nevertheless, Castro didong step toward Uie Soviet side in Uie Slno-Soviet controversy. In turn Castro has received from thetrong boost to his own ego; assurances of continued economic support; Uie commitment ofprestige to the Cuban revolution as well as the generalized pledge to give Cuba "Uie necessary aid" in Uie eventS attack; andof Cuba's special importance as an example of what thestruggle can achieve in Latin America. Overall, Soviet and
16
fortunes have been bound more closely together and theirfreedoms of action have been somewhat narrowed.
e do foresee, however, varying degrees of friction ln Soviet-Cuban relations, particularly over the long run. Castro wants all the benefits of Soviet economic and military aid but insistsnique position in the Bloc without submitting to the discipline and control imposed on Soviet Satellites. Despite the harmonious tone of the joint communique, the partners probably have notundamental reconciliation of their appraisals of the situation in Latin America. As time passes and new conditions develop, they will probably again find themselves inover the proper course of action lo follow. The future level of Soviet economic aid to Cuba Is also likely toonebetween the two countries. For the present, however, wethat both the SovieU and the Cubans hope to stabilize theand girdong-term effort In Latin America.
17
ANNEX
ESTIMATE OF MAJOR SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT
inks and sell-propelled runs at lhe tour Soviet Camps and
Tanks and sett-propelled bum In Cuban
Field Artillery and AT
AAA
FROG
Military
SAM Sites*
SAMuideline' Missiles
Cruise-Missile
CnilM-MlssUM
Air Defense Radars-
Jet Fighters
FAGCT/TRESCO)
MIQ-IB IFARMER)
MIO-:i
KOMAR Croise-Mlsalie
Kronstadt
Motor Torpedo Boats lP-C> .
Equipment now under Soviet control.
s^trfr
i
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