.
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
COMMUNIST REACTIONS TO US ACTIONS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO LAOS
CW HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL
NOTE.hsjlnal vera.on ol the eslimate and additional ten will noi be circulated:
Central Intelligence Agency
IOPSr*RET
CONT*#UH> CHSSIM
hy the DIRECTOR Ol" CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE The following intelligent*'participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizationsthe Departments of State. Defense, the Army, tho Navy. ihc Air Force, and MSA.
y the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD ononcurring were the Director ot Inlelligence and ttewanh. Detxirtment nf State; The Uirtx-tor. Defense Intelligence Agency: the Assistant Chief of Staff for Inlelligence, Deportmenl of the Army; the Asslstanl Chief of NavelnhtlUaenccj. Deportment of the Xavy: Ihe Assistant Chief nf Staff In/dlii/cnce. USAF; the Direclor for Intelligence,d tht iHnxtor of Ihe Xatkiial Security Agency. The Atiunk' Ener.i/ Commissionto thc I'SI It and the Assistant Director. Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained the subject being outside of Iheir jurisdiction.
WHEN USED SEPARATELY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
3
SUBJECT: OHST REACTIONS TO US ACTIONS TAKEN
WITH REGARD TO LAOS
I. GENBRAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. General Cocnnmlat policy in Laos has been confident, prudent, and persistent.
a. The Cossffuniats continue to display considerablethat thoyood thing going in Laos. They apparently believe that tho situation there is so soft, Conminiet capabilities to support Pathet Lao (PL) subversion of tbe country so great, and the military ond political inhibitions on effective US countermoasureB so tolling, that Concunlst absorption of Laos and the undercutting of tho US position in tbe area areatter of tine- Wo believe that neither the USSR, Communist China, North Vietnaoor the PL la presently interested ln any settlement or partition scheavs which
would preclude ultimate realization of these goals, as been
aosr"olease through
cStoE -nt.lUo.mcw legacy.
Datej
na 1
GROUP from automatic
JT declasBiflcal
In responding to US pressures in Laos over the past few
years, the Communists haveenerally keen sense of what tbo traffic would bear. They have not pressed their luck, but, whenever facedossibly imminent and sharp rise In the US military presence ln the area, have postponed militory action untiland political Jockeyings haveew situation, and US pressures and attention have slackened. Io this process, the Cocznunista havo shown no disposition to risk major US military action.
After each spurt of nco-Ccasninist vigor in Laos, the
PL/DRV have resumed their persistent efforts to erode the non-Communist position there. Tbe recent flareup of Communist military pressures against the neutralists in Laos does not ln our viewadical change In this general pattern of behavior; iteaction tolack of Communist progress In the politicalesponse to local developments, an exploitation of opportunities presented by enemy weakness, andto the CosMunlstsan apparent decline in US attention to Laotian developments.
2. .The ConEBunlBts also probably estimate that the Weatorn Powers, and their allies, continue to bo reluctant to take positive action ln Loos. Moreover, the Communists probably believe that the nou^ommunist Laotians, end particularly their armed forces, are so disorganized
and weak that tho West could not, even if it would, make very effective use of them in countering Communist actions.
3, Communist responses to US actions vill be made in four centers: Moscow, Hanoi, Peiping, end on the ground in Laos. Each of these sees the Laotian situationifferent perspective, snd each is now Involved to varying degrees. Accordingly, each mightifferent degree of credence to US signals of commitment, and each will be inclined to react somewhat differently.
is more remote and less deeply Involved thanCcimmunist elements. Its immediate concern isewln Laos could leadS-Soviet confrontation. Theto prefer the tactic of subverting Laos throughpolitical means, but Is probably not whollyrecent Communist military gains there. In general, Moscowcertainly attempt toestraining influence on itsto prevent serious risk of war from developing in an area atof Soviet interests and influence.
of ultimate crisis, tbe DRV is the mostentity, since the subversion of Laos is largely tbeHanoi direction, under the probably conflicting guidance ofPeiping. The DRV's role ln Laos remains high, while that of the
USSR lino become somewhat less. Boned would almost certainlyore militant course than would the Soviets, but at tbe some time seek not to provoke US military action.
arger stake in southeast Asia thanby its current activity in Laos: some materiel supportDRV, the urgingorceful course In Laos, and theoutargely through roadbullding activitiesof aof influence In certain areas of those northern provinces ofborder on China. Peiping's interest rises sharply with anya strong US presence ln or near Laos, and China would becomeimportant actor in any situation where US militarytbe DRV seemed Imminent.
PL appears to exercise at least some degreemilitary activity, and by taking local initiative Soviet or Cninese policien, at least in tho short term.
k. Although the Sino-Soviet dispute has apparently not as yet crucially affected Communist policies concerning Laos, It would complicate Ccezainlst responses to forceful US or US-sponsored courses of action. The forthcoming Sino-Soviet confrontation this summer will probably intensify this problem and make It even more difficult for tbeto concert their responses.
a. Sino-Soviet estrangement could become so acute that the USSR would seek to dissociate itself froa Communist Chinand from the distant DRVin the oYentrisis showdown with the US ln
southeast Asia. Even inituation, however, it is unlikely
tbat tho USSR would abandon the DRV or Communist China.
b. Short of such crisis, continuation of Sino-Soviet dispute at about present levels will tend to keep Moscow Involved and might make it appear more militant concerning Laos than it might otherwise be.
II. COMMUHIST REACTIONS
5. Generally speaking, we would expect the Communists to react in the future much as thoy have in the past: quiet down when the threat of US military intervention seems markedly to Increase, and advance again when tbe threat has abated. We think thereood chance, therefore, that the first or second phases of action described below would lead eithere-establishment of the Government of National Union or to de facto partition. We do not believe, however, that either of these developments would go far to insure lasting stabilization in Laos, for tho internal situation in that country would remain highly vulnerable to the virtually certain continuance of determined Communist efforts ot subversion.
A. PEASE Iactions oot Involving tne use of US
forces, and generally vlthln the frame-vork of the Geneva These actions might include strengthening tbe Royal Laotian Armyhe Kong Lo neutralist forces, and tbe tribaland providing tbe PAR vlthfor strikes against Communist concentratlona and lines of comnunication within Laos. The principal objectives of these actions would be the concluoloaease-fire and reactivation of the National Union Government under Geneva Agreementa. It would be made clear to the CoBouolats that If the US-sponsored actions did not cause then to honor their Geneva commitments concerning Laos, the US would be ready and willing to raise the level of pressures.
6. Thereood chance that the first Communist reaction wouldL move toward talks at the local level. It le possible that their allies would suggastew international conference be held on Laos, dependingonsiderable extent upon how they Judged things were going for them in Laos. In any event, thewould probably embark on an international campaign denouncing the US actions.
t. Meanwhile, DRV encadromont of the PL might be increaoed to meet an increased FAR ground threat. Evidenceubstantial buildup of FAR or Kong Le units io local areas might be countered by limited PL/DRV* attacks to disrupt FAR and Kong Le forces. This
- 6
E-T
might resultuick effort to eliminate completely Kong Le's position in the Plain of Jars.
8. If US-provided aircraft were used by tbe FAR to attack the PL, the Communists would increase their political attacks oo the US and would probably try first to counter with ground fire. Including DRV (ond, perhaps, Communist Chinese) antiaircraft units. If these efforts proved ineffective and the FAR aerial attacks were really hurting, the Ccomiunlsts might introduce "volunteer" fighter aircraft.
B. PHASE IInot Involving combat uso of US
forces, but in some cases exceeding the limits of the Geneva Agreements. These actions might include, in addition to those of Phase I, removing existingon FAR/Kong Le offensive actions (ground andntroducing "volunteer" combat aircraft, significantly increasing US air and naval forces in adjacent areas, and undertaking US aerial reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam and harassment of DRV shipping. The objectives of this phase would be same as those of Phase I.
9, Communist concern over escalation would rise. We think that the Soviets at this stage would seek to persuade the US and the DRV/PL/ Chinese not to take such further actions as might escalate hostilities. The extent to which the PL, the DRV, thc Chinese, and the Soviets would believe tbat the US was prepared to take major additional steps would be influenced significantly by the nature and extent of US deployments
In tbe area. The absenceuildup of US ground forces In adjacentn Thailand,would detract from the credibility of US The Chinese would be harder to convince than the Soviets regarding US determination, and would probably exert whatever pressure they could upon Moscow to coll the US "bluff."
Phase II, we believe the Communists would bethan duringo attempt to bring the situationthrough negotiations. If they bad not already done so,press demands for an international conference and wouldto consolidate their militory gainsease-fireinitial offersease-fire would Include provisionsgrant then further areas of control. If this was notwould probably resume local military pressures hoping for anbased on the then existing positions. Communistany cease-fire would probably be that the US would find ittoigh pitch of preparedness ln the area over
the long term, and the Communists would await on opportunity to take renewed action whenever the situation appeared opportune.
the event the US were to harass DRV shipping and moveunits into the Gulf of Tonkin, the Chinese would almostIncreasingly threatening statements and ready themselvesdo not believe that Chinese forces would Intervene directly in Laos
or North Vietnam at this time, though we do not rule out the possibility that the Chinese might commit themselves formally to the defense of the DRV, in an attempt both to deter US actions and to increase pressures on the Soviets to extend their commitment in the area.
C. PHASE III Actions including combat use of US forces.
These might include, in addition to those actions ofnd II, US forces' occupation of key Laotian centers remain-log in non-Communist hands, US naval blockade of North Vietnam, US bombing of selected targets ln Laos and North Vietnam, and such additional commitment of US and SEATO force to the struggle as might be judged expedient. The objective of these actions would be achievementormal partition of Laos.
12. As we have indicated undernd II, Ccmmunist reactions would vary depending on many Imponderable factors. Without knowing what the precise reactions would be, or assessing their significance, we cannot estimate with any degree of confidence Communist reactions to Phase III. Assuming that the first two phases had failed to achieve the results sought, we would conclude either: (a) that the Soviets did not believe that the US would in fact take extreme action io southeast Asia; (b) that the Soviets were unable to control the situation; or (c) that- they were prepared to assume the rather considerable risks of assisting theon the scene.
He estimate that initial reactions to Phase III would be spproximately as follows:
Communist forces in Laos would probably attempt to
harass US forces and movements of US personnel, but would probably avoid direct confrontation with US forces. They might attempt to overrun areas defended by non-US forces.
b. The DRV* would raise the level of its military activity
In Laos.
Ccecunist Chins would increase its presence in Laos
and raise further its level of warnings to the US, but at this point would probably not openly commit Chinese Coamunist armed units. The Chinese would probably not core to put their aging fighter aircraft ln opposition to US oir forces over Laos, but might try to counter by providing the PL/DRY ln Laos with some Increased air defense
Ik. US air attacks on [forth Vietnam would pose thc immediate possibility of hostilities between the US and Communist China. We incline to the view that the Chinese would commit their forces to assist the DRV against these attacks, as needed, and we believe that Cccn&unlst forces ln Laos and South Vietnam would exercise their maximum remaining military capabilities in those countries and in defense of DRV efforts.
S
Chinese Communist aircraft would be clearly unable to cospete with US air power, and the Soviets would be under strong DRV and Chinese pressure to provide sdvaoced aircraft.
15. We are unable at this tine to estimate Communist responses beyond the local military reactions we nave just described. Whether the Communists at this stags would come to the conference table ready to arrive at some kind of settlement would depend largely upon their reasons for allowing the situation to reach this point. If their reason was that thoy did not believe the US would take extreme action, they now would have strong indications to the contrary and presumably would be willing to talk. If the Soviets had been unable to control the situation, perhaps tho US actions would have convinced the Chinese and Horth Vietnamese that the situation had become dangerous and that it was unduly hazardous to remain adamant in the face of Soviet disapproval. On the otber hand we cannot exclude the possibility that the Chinese would feel so deeply committed ln southeast Asia that they might be willing to accept the risks of large-scale engagement with US forces in the area. In any event, if the Soviets wore prepared to assume rather considerable risks, the situation might become quite critical ood involve the possibilityS-Chinese confrontation, with the Chinese supported by the Soviets, andS-Soviet confrontation.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: